Beans:

Training: 1
Drills 0
Meetings: 4
Technical Assistance: 1
Public Assistance: 1

Web Page Hits: There were 12 page views for January

Coming Attractions:

1/31-2/2 ICS-300 Training
2/9 Working Group
2/17 NEPAC teleconference
2/23 FENOC Grant Negotiations
2/25 E-Phase procedure review continues
3/8 Working Group
3/9-11 RAT Training
3/15 DB EAL training
3/18 DB Assessment Tabletop
4/5 DB Dry Run
4/6 Working Group
4/11 URSB

Facility Updates:

**Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station**

Davis-Besse operated at full power in January.

On Nov. 5, 2010 Davis-Besse had an unanticipated movement of a control rod. The root cause was a problem with the power supply to the control rod drive mechanism system (for that control rod). To ensure there is not a repeat problem, Davis-Besse powered down to 0% and replaced the power supplies to the control rod drive mechanisms for all of the control rods. The power down was early Saturday, January 8 and repairs on the control rod system were completed on Sunday, January 9.
The plant stayed off line until late on Thursday, January 14 for replacement of a pneumatic relay for a main steam isolation valve. During testing, the valve stroke time was not within tolerances and additional time was needed to correct this.

At approximately 2:43 am January 19, 2011 Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station declared an Unusual Event due to an explosion and/or fire within the Protected Area of the plant. The explosion occurred in an outdoor area where construction is underway and appears to be the result of a temporary electrical transformer catching fire. The fire was extinguished by the plant fire brigade without offsite assistance. No safety related systems were affected and there was no release of radioactive materials. The plant remains operational. The Unusual Event was exited at 3:58 am. The plant is investigating the cause of the explosion. See Event No 46551.

**Ottawa County**

At approximately 8:50 am January 31, all of the sirens in Ottawa County, including those within the Emergency Planning Zone for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, were activated for three minutes. The initiation signal came from a computer terminal at the Ottawa County Sheriff's office. The activation appears to be the result of a computer malfunction. The siren vendor has been contacted and they are on site investigating the malfunction. The Director of the Ottawa County Emergency Management Agency issued a press release explaining the situation to the public. Davis-Besse confirmed there were no problems at the plant and has made the required event report to the NRC.

**Perry Nuclear Power Plant**

Perry operated at full power in January.

**Beaver Valley Power Station**

**Beaver Valley Unit I**

Beaver Valley Unit I operated at full power for January.

**Beaver Valley Unit II**

Beaver Valley Unit II operated at full power for January.

**Fermi II**

Fermi started the month at reduced power to replace a hotwell pump. They maintained about 73% power until January 28 when they took the plant offline.
Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant

There were no reports for Portsmouth in January.

Activity:

1/5 Working Group At OEMA. Agency updates, plant updates, planning for the URSB meeting and identification of attendees. Discussion of the FEMA documents for the FENOC meeting on the 27th.

1/10 URSB meeting canceled.

1/12, 19 E-Phase procedure review. Making the Assessment and field procedures work together properly.

1/31-2/2 ICS-300 Training for EOC staff.

Office Issues:

1/21 All Staff meeting with Governor and Director.

NRC Reports and Statistics:

operating power levels

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Information Notices

Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit No. 1 - Request for additional information related to the license amendment request for modification of TS 2.1.1, Reactor Core SLS – ADAMS Accession no. ML110040168

Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2 - Request for Additional Information Regarding the Request for Approval of the Cyber Security Plan License Amendment Request (TAC Nos. ME4383 and ME4384) ADAMS Accession: ML110050487

Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 2 - Request for Additional Information Re: Revised Steam Generator Inspection Scope using F* Methodology Amendment (ME3498) ADAMS Accession: ML110060678

Davis-Besse: NRC Emergency Preparedness Annual Inspection Report No. 2010501 ADAMS Accession No. ML110180610

Fermi: NRC Emergency Preparedness Annual Inspection Report No. 2010501 ADAMS Accession No. ML110190541

FERMI UNIT 2 NOTIFICATION TO PERFORM TRIENNIAL FIRE PROTECTION BASELINE INSPECTION AND REQUEST FOR INFORMATION ADAMS ACCESSION# ML110200355.

Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 1 - Request for additional information related to the license amendment request for approval of Davis-Besse Cyber Security Plan – ADAMS Accession no. ML110060497

Perry: NRC Emergency Preparedness Annual Inspection Report No. 2010501 ADAMS Accession No. ML110190611

Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 1 - Correction of audit of the licensee’s management of regulatory commitments – ADAMS Accession no. ML110060598

Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit No. 1 - Request for additional information related to the license amendment request for approval of the Perry Cyber Security Plan – ADAMS Accession no. ML110060385

Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit No. 1 - Acceptance of requested licensing action re: License amendment request to modify Technical Specification 3.1.4 "Control Rod Scram Times" to incorporate Technical Specification Task Force 222-A, Revision 1 – ADAMS Accession no. ML110120161
NRC APPROVES USE OF ADVANCED FIRE PROTECTION STANDARD AT OCONEE NUCLEAR PLANT IN SOUTH CAROLINA

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has approved the Oconee Nuclear Station’s adoption of the National Fire Protection Association’s “Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light-Water Reactor Electric Generating Plants” (NFPA 805). “This is an important milestone in the continuing effort to strengthen fire protection regulations at U.S. nuclear power plants,” said Chairman Gregory B. Jaczko. “After making safety improvements, Oconee becomes the second applicant to receive NRC approval to transition to the new fire protection standard. Approval of Oconee’s application also starts a six month clock for the other reactors to submit their fire protection license amendment requests to the NRC.”

NFPA 805 describes how existing U.S. reactors can provide acceptable fire protection programs by applying risk-informed, performance-based requirements and fundamental fire protection design elements. Under the NFPA 805 standard, reactor owners and operators perform engineering analyses to demonstrate their installed fire protection systems and features will meet specific fire protection and nuclear safety goals, objectives, and performance criteria. These comprehensive evaluations of fire safety measures allow U.S. reactors to focus their resources in the most appropriate manner.
Plant owners must also install additional equipment or take other measures if the analyses call for them. In the case of Oconee, the NFPA 805 analysis led the plant to make several modifications, including installation of additional fire detection systems and upgraded fire barriers. The NRC’s safety evaluation for Oconee’s transition concludes the plant has documented and demonstrated its fire safety enhancements. The NFPA issued the standard in 2001, and the NRC provided extensive opportunity for the public and the fire safety community to participate in the agency’s examination of the standard. The NRC incorporated the standard in 2004 as a voluntary alternative to existing fire protection regulations. Oconee, located 30 miles west of Greenville, S.C., and the Shearon Harris plant, located 20 miles southwest of Raleigh, N.C., volunteered in 2005 to lead the industry’s pilot implementation program. Oconee submitted its formal application to switch to NFPA 805 in May 2008 and revised the application in April 2010.

NRC NEWS
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Office of Public Affairs Telephone: 301/415-8200
Washington, D.C. 20555-0001
E-mail: opa.resource@nrc.gov
Site: http://www.nrc.gov
No. 11-001 January 3, 2011
An additional 46 reactors at 29 sites, representing 17 utilities, have told the NRC they plan to adopt the NFPA 805 approach. The NRC expects other U.S. nuclear power plants will consider adopting this approach once the industry gains experience in implementing the standard. For those plants choosing not to transition to NFPA 805, the Commission has determined that licensees must have identified all fire-induced circuit failure violations and noncompliances, as well as implement compensatory measures. These licensees were granted a total of 36 months of enforcement discretion to end November 2012.
More information on the NFPA 805 approach and fire protection at U.S. nuclear power plants is available on the NRC website here:

News releases are available through a free listserv subscription at the following Web address: http://www.nrc.gov/public-involve/listserv.html. The NRC homepage at www.nrc.gov also offers a SUBSCRIBE link. E-mail notifications are sent to subscribers when news releases are posted to NRC’s website.

FENOC will be transitioning to NFPA 805 standard at all 3 sites over the next three years.

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NUCLEAR: Foes renew protest against reactors chosen by Duke and Progress (01/11/2011)

Peter Behr, E&E reporter
Nuclear power opponents reacted to the proposed union of Duke Energy and Progress
Energy by renewing safety complaints against the Westinghouse AP1000 reactor design that both companies have chosen for future projects. A Nuclear Regulatory Commission advisory panel is scheduled to take up aspects of the revised AP1000 on Thursday. A coalition fighting the reactor design said yesterday its concerns are not being heeded. "The AP1000 is being fast-tracked" by the NRC, said Arnold Gundersen, an independent nuclear engineer. "They basically want to get this approved in the next year," so that proposed new nuclear projects can proceed.

Duke Energy has selected the AP1000, designed by Westinghouse, a Toshiba Corp., subsidiary, for its proposed Lee reactors 1 and 2 near Charlotte, S.C. Progress Energy plans to use the reactor for its Shearson Harris units 2 and 3 in Wake County, N.C., and for two reactors in Levy County, Fla. Four other publicly announced nuclear reactor projects have also chosen the AP1000, including Southern Co.'s Vogtle 3 and 4 reactor project near Augusta, Ga. The Energy Department has awarded an $8.3 billion conditional loan guarantee for the Vogtle project.

Gundersen, who spoke yesterday for several foes of the AP1000, renewed his contention that the reactor design is "dangerously flawed," based on its reliance on a sealed steel containment shell surrounded by an open concrete shield building. The Westinghouse design employs a "passive" cooling system to prevent a reactor core meltdown. In an emergency, water would pour onto the containment shell from a tank above it, dissipating heat as steam. The steam would exit an opening at the top of the concrete building.

**Concerns about aircraft strikes and the 'chimney effect'**

Gundersen testified before the NRC's Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards last year that a leak in the steel shell caused by corrosion would provide a pathway for a release of reactive materials, which would be carried out of the concrete building by steam through the opening at its top, into the outside air. Gundersen calls it the "chimney effect."

"At least 77 instances of containment system degradation have occurred at operating U.S. reactors since 1970. That includes eight through-wall holes or cracks in steel containments -- two discovered in 2009 -- and 60 instances of corrosion that thinned the liner walls below the allowable thickness," Gundersen and other AP1000 opponents said last year.

The ACRS is scheduled to discuss design modifications on the AP1000 that would protect it against the impact of an aircraft crash, as well as a final safety report on the Vogtle project. Its conclusions would be made public in about a week. Industry officials expect the NRC to rule on the AP1000 design this year.

The NRC should require Westinghouse to install filters at the building's top exit, to trap escaped radioactivity, Gundersen said. "Right now, it is like a whale's blowhole," he said.

Westinghouse spokesman Vaughn Gilbert said last year that Gundersen's arguments were flatly wrong. "We disagree completely and unequivocally with every conclusion that was put forward," Gilbert said. "The reality is that the steel in question is 1.75 inches thick, it is corrosion-resistant, and it is highly unlikely corrosion would ever be an issue."
"Contrary to what they reported," he added, "if corrosion were to begin, it would be quickly discovered in a manner that is prompt and appropriate, and it would be remedied before it would come close to being a problem."

Gundersen said yesterday that inspections to detect possible corrosion cannot be relied on. "No one doubts the AP1000 will work in a perfect world," he said. "But the world really isn't perfect. ... That's exactly the point. Human error is not factored in."

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**Power Reactor Event Number:** 46551  
**Facility:** DAVIS BESSE  
**Region:** 3  
**State:** OH  
**Unit:** [1]  
**RX Type:** [1] B&W-R-LP  
**NRC Notified By:** TOM PHILLIPS  
**HQ OPS Officer:** DONALD NORWOOD

**Notification Date:** 01/19/2011  
**Notification Time:** 03:10 [ET]  
**Event Date:** 01/19/2011  
**Event Time:** 02:32 [EST]  
**Last Update Date:** 01/19/2011

**Emergency Class:** UNUSUAL EVENT  
**10 CFR Section:** 50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED  
**Person (Organization):**  
TAMARA BLOOMER (R3DO)  
WILLIAM GOTT (IRD)  
MARK SATORIUS (R3)  
BRUCE BOGER (NRR)  
TRIPP STRINGFIELD (DHS)  
ERWIN CASTO (FEMA)

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**Event Text**

NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT DUE TO A FIRE AND EXPLOSIONS IN THE PROTECTED AREA

"An electrical fire and explosions were reported near the Containment Access Facility construction area. An Unusual Event was declared based on HU4. Temporary electrical power at service disconnect DSLM3-3 was isolated. The fire was out at 0243 EST. The fire was extinguished using dry chemical. The fire was reported at 0232 EST on 1/19/11. The cause of the fire has not been determined at this time."

The fire and explosions were initially reported by site security personnel. The licensee declared the NOUE at 0243 EST based on criteria HU4. The licensee initially called for offsite assistance in putting out the fire, however, the fire was extinguished by plant personnel and the offsite assistance was turned back. The licensee posted a reflash watch. The fire reportedly involved temporary cables and possibly a transformer supplying power to the construction area which is located inside the protected area outside the auxiliary building.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE FROM TOM PHILLIPS TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 0405 EST ON 1/19/2011 * * *

The licensee terminated the Notification of Unusual Event at 0358 EST. No additional information is available at this time.

Notified R3DO (Bloomer), NRR EO (Skeen), IRD (Gott), DHS (Stringfield), and FEMA (Casto).

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