Beans:

Training: 0
Drills 0
Meetings: 1
Technical Assistance: 1
Public Assistance: 2

Web Page Hits: There were 35 page views for June

Coming Attractions:

WG 7/7
URSB 7/12
NEPAC 7/29
WG 8/4

Facility Updates:

**Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station**

Davis-Besse continued June in RFO 16 due to the reactor head axial stress corrosion cracking issues.

At approximately 2:00 pm on June 10, a FENOC employee received an electrical shock when coming into contact with barrier delay fencing around a transformer. Electrical Maintenance discovered a temporary power cable grounded to the barrier delay fencing as the cause for the incident. The cable was repaired and the fence verified to be safe. Electrical Maintenance also walked down all temporary cables to ensure their safety.

Davis-Besse has formed a problem solving team to determine if May 2010 groundwater samples that indicated levels above 2,000 picocuries per liter were indicative of an active leak or migration from historical onsite leaks. Part of the process to make the determination is to take monthly samples of all wells that previously indicated levels above 2,000 picocuries per liter.

There are a total of 6 wells with levels above 2,000: 5 construction wells (those put in
when the site was first constructed) and one groundwater protection initiative well (recent well). The groundwater protection initiative well is one of the new monitoring wells on-site. June samples of these 6 wells show levels have not changed. The remainder of the monitoring wells indicate levels below 2,000 picocuries.

Monthly testing will continue for the remainder or the year or until levels decline below 2,000 picocuries. The next testing will be conducted in July.

The NRC recently sent a Confirmatory Action Letter (CAL) to FENOC to ensure Davis-Besse takes the necessary action to return the plant safely to full power after an extended outage that included the repair of 24 CRDM's (control rod drive mechanisms) that exhibited cracking. See ADAMS Accession Number ML101740519. The CAL requires Davis-Besse to do the following:
1. Shut down the plant no later than October, 2011 and replace the reactor head with a newly manufactured reactor head before returning to operations.
2. Provide technical information regarding the time at which the next inspection of the existing reactor head would be required, based on reactor head temperatures, regardless of the 2011 planned shut down.
3. Provide a sample of the CRDM nozzles to the NRC for independent crack analysis.
4. Strengthen leak monitoring procedures.

NRC sent a special inspection team to Davis-Besse to oversee activities associated with the CRDM cracking. A public meeting will be conducted in the vicinity of the plant to present the results of this special inspection. No date has been provided yet.

Davis-Besse synchronized to the electrical grid at 0425 (4:25 am) on Tuesday, June 29 ending an outage that began Feb. 28, 2010.

**Perry Nuclear Power Plant**

At approximately 7 am June 4 the Alpha Recirculation pump at Perry Nuclear Power Plant tripped for unknown reasons. The plant reduced power to 60% while they investigated the cause of the pump trip and the nature of the repairs that will be needed. Perry reduced power as low as 23 % while they fixed the pump and returned to full power on June 14. The plant took several actions around this pump trip during this time:
1) They readjusted the set points on the instrumentation to reflect this reduced operating level. The new set points were to ensure the plant equipment will function as intended while operating without the tripped recirculation pump.
2) To identify the cause of the trip they examined breaker and logic components of the pump. Recirculation pump A tripped because of failures of several optical isolators in one of the breakers.
3) The operators underwent refresher training on possible actions they may need to take with the plant in this current configuration.
4) The management team developed a plan for this incident. The Pump was restored in two days, but reactor power was limited by Xenon buildup in the system for several
As of May, 2010 Perry received elevated readings (greater than 5,000 picocuries per liter) of tritium in the underground drain system (collection basin). This is in the same area as the elevated readings (59,500 picocuries per liter) reported in 2006 due to a feedwater pipe leak.

The Perry plant recently collected a back-up sample that indicated levels slightly above 2,000 picocuries per liter—indicating a downward trend. Perry contends that the elevated readings are from a raised water table level due to recent above average rainfall and not any additional leakage. Drinking water levels for tritium are 20,000 picocuries per liter.

At 1:12 pm on June 23 the Central Alarm Station of the Perry Nuclear Power Plant had indications of smoke from the back-up ventilation system. Perry Township Fire responded to the Central Alarm Station inside the protected area. Madison Fire, Painesville Fire, Fairport Harbor Fire, and Leroy Fire also responded as back-ups but remained outside the protected area. The Central Alarm Station was evacuated as a precaution. The cause of the smoke was a back-up ventilation control power transformer that had overheated. Currently Perry is clearing the smoke and permitted employees to return to the Central Alarm Station. Perry is investigating the root cause of the transformer overheating.

**Beaver Valley Nuclear Power Station**

**Beaver Valley Unit I**

Beaver Valley Unit I operated at full power for June.

**Beaver Valley Unit II**

Beaver Valley Unit II operated at full power for June.

**Fermi II**

Fermi declared an Alert June 5 when the plant's auxiliary building suffered damage from severe weather. Additionally the plant lost one of two sources of offsite power. The plant shut down automatically. Offsite power was restored On June 6, 2010 at 11:31 offline power was restored to Fermi, and on June 7 at 01:20 am Fermi exited the Alert condition. The plant remained offline until June 16 for repairs to the auxiliary building.

**General Plant information**

The June 23, magnitude 5.5 earthquake in Ottawa, Ontario was felt on-site at the Perry plant. However, the control did not receive any indications of a seismic event exceeding
Technical Specification parameters. Therefore, the earthquake did not result in an event classification. As a precaution Perry is conducting a walk-down of the plant but do not expect to find any damage.

The earthquake was also felt at Beaver Valley but there were no indications in the control room.

At Davis-Besse, the earthquake was not felt and there were no indications in the control room.

**Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant**

There were no reports for Portsmouth in June.

**Activity:**

6/10 Working Group – Agency updates and plant status. There was a discussion of contaminated debris management and Agriculture will contact DSIWM for Guidance.

6/10 After Action meeting. Discussion and assignment of issues from the last exercise. Also updated the matrix to reflect progress from previous meetings.

**Office Issues:**

None at this time.

**NRC Reports and Statistics:**

June operating power levels

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<th>BV2</th>
<th>DB</th>
<th>Fermi2</th>
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**Information Notices**
The ADAMS Accession documents are publicly available and will be accessible via the public website Electronic Reading Room in the Agency Document Access and Management System (ADAMS), http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html or to access generic communications files on the NRC Homepage: http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/gen-comm/reg-issues/2010/. To access these documents use the ADAMS Accession number listed with the title. This is in the format of: ML #

*****

BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION: NRC EVALUATED EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE - INSPECTION REPORT NO. 05000334; 05000412/2010502. ADAMS Accession No. ML101520199

*****

PDF version RIS 2010-06, Inservice Inspection and Testing Requirements of Dynamic Restraints (Snubbers), dated June 1, 2010 (ML101310338)

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FERMI 2 - LICENSE AMENDMENT REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OF THE CYBER SECURITY PLAN (TAC NO ME2678) – ML101440406

*****

Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 1 - Request for withholding information from public disclosure – ADAMS Accession no. ML101190578

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BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION: OFFSITE PLANNING DEFICIENCIES IDENTIFIED DURING THE APRIL 20, 2010 BVPS EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE. ADAMS Accession No. ML101540501

*****

Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 1 - Request for withholding information from public disclosure. ADAMS Accession no. ML101190431

*****

DAVIS-BESSE 2010-006 (DRS) Fire Protection ADAMS Accession # ML101540611

*****

PDF version RIS 2010-07, Regulatory Requirements for Application of Weld Overlays and Other Migration Techniques in Piping Systems Approved for Leak-Before-Break, dated June 8, 2010 (ML101380231)

*****

Summary of the June 3, 2010, Public Meeting to Discuss the Results of Repairs Made to the Reactor Vessel Head and the Basis for Davis-Besse's Decision to Start Up ADAMS Accession Number ML101610792

*****

Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 2 - Request for Additional Information Re: Spent Fuel Pool Rerack License Amendment (TAC No. ME1079) ADAMS Accession No.: ML101380546
Letter to Tom Gurdziel, regarding 10 CFR 2.206 regarding FirstEnergy, Davis-Besse – ADAMS ML 101590201

Perry: Operator Licensing Examination Approval
ADAMS Accession No. ML101620585

FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company - Branch Chief Reassignment – ADAMS Accession No. ML101480377

FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company - Branch Chief Reassignment – ADAMS Accession no. ML101540032

Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1 - Environmental Assessment and Finding of No Significant Impact – ADAMS Accession no. ML101610264


PDF version Information Notice 2010-12, Containment Liner Corrosion, dated June 18, 2010 (ML100640449)

CONFIRMATORY ACTION LETTER - DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION ADAMS Accession Number ML101740519

Perry Inspection Report 2010 402 - Cover Letter Only
ADAMS Accession No. ML101750233

Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1, One-Time Exemption from the requirements of 10 CFR Part 26, Section 26.205(d)(3) – ADAMS Accession no. ML101730457

Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No.2-Impacts To The Review Schedule Regarding The Spent Fuel Pool Rerack License Amendment Request (TAC No. ME1079) ADAMS Accession: ML101720365


Davis-Besse to Replace Reactor Head in 2011

FENOC announced today that Davis-Besse’s Reactor Head will be replaced during an outage planned in the fall of 2011 – a proactive decision that accelerates the original replacement timetable by almost three years. The new head, which uses Control Rod Drive Mechanism (CRDM) nozzles made of an Alloy 690 material less susceptible to
Primary Water Stress Corrosion Cracking (PWSCC), is expected to arrive on site in time to support this earlier installation date.

“FENOC places safety first, and replacing the reactor head three years ahead of schedule reinforces this commitment,” said FENOC President and CNO Jim Lash. “We carefully weighed all our options and listened to external and internal stakeholders. When we confirmed we could undertake this project in 2011, we took action to do so. This decision is the right thing to do, and it clearly demonstrates our alignment with a strong safety culture.”

The new head was ordered in 2001 and was originally scheduled to be installed along with two new steam generators in 2014. However, the site is revising its next planned outage start date from Feb. 2012 to the fall of 2011 to accommodate earlier installation of the new reactor head. The steam generators, which were ordered in 2009, are being fabricated; the schedule for their installation remains 2014.

The PWSCC is a known industry issue that was first identified in the 1990s and has resulted in other utilities installing new reactor heads. The new head also is designed to use a new, Integrated Head Assembly package that will be prepared by AREVA. These long-term improvements will strengthen the plant’s materiel condition and reliability, while also improving its operating margin. During Davis-Besse’s 16th refueling outage, which began in February, testing of the existing reactor head CRDM nozzles led to modifications on 24 of the 69 CRDM nozzles due to indications of PWSCC. Following these modifications, extensive testing was performed to verify the reactor head’s structural integrity and assure its ability to operate safely and reliably through the plant’s next operating cycle.

“We are confident that the process used to modify the affected nozzles was successful,” said Jim. “Postmodification inspections and tests indicate these nozzles will support continued safe and reliable operations. At the same time, we believe that advancing the installation of the new reactor head will provide additional margins of safety and reliability for long-term plant operations.”

“Expediting the head replacement timetable will prove challenging, but our team has proven countless times it is dedicated to doing the right thing and capable of overcoming challenges,” says Barry Allen, site vice president, Davis-Besse. “I am very confident our team will be successful.”

The Reactor Head Replacement Team, led by Joe Rogers, will oversee shipment of the new head from France to the United States. The replacement head is expected to arrive at Davis-Besse in the fall of 2010. The team is making the necessary site preparations to receive, store and inspect the new head on site. The team also is preparing to erect several new site buildings to support the overall project and the expected influx of supplemental personnel. Bechtel and AREVA will support the head replacement project.
Currently, the Davis-Besse team continues to make good progress in preparing to exit its refueling outage. The plant is expected to be returned to service by July.

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Licensees, Stakeholders and Interested Members of the Public,

This e-mail is to inform you of the implementation of the Division of License Renewal’s new method of distributing publicly available\(^1\) outgoing correspondence related to operating reactors. This process allows us to send our correspondence to you electronically. You will continue to receive all other operating reactor correspondence currently distributed through our listserver.

This process will be used starting on July 1, 2010.

If you would like to sign-up additional e-mail addresses or add or remove yourself from distribution for any plant, please complete the following:

1. Go to the NRC’s public website (www.nrc.gov).
2. Click on the “Public Meetings and Involvement” tab.
3. On this page, under the heading “Information and Meeting Schedules to Help You Participate,” click on “Subscribe to E-mail Notices.”
4. At the top of the next page will be a link to the Operating Reactor Correspondence website. or
5. Click on the following link: http://www.nrc.gov/public-involve/listserver/plants-by-region.html

This website allows you to subscribe and unsubscribe e-mail addresses from the various lists. There is also a link at the bottom of this e-mail, which allows you to unsubscribe as well.

Thank you for your assistance in making this new process a success.

________________________

\(^1\) Correspondence that contains Sensitive Unclassified Non-safeguards Information (SUNSI) (e. g., proprietary information, security-related information, or Privacy Act information) will continue to be distributed by hard copy.
FirstEnergy moves up installation of reactor head at Davis-Besse after NRC discussions
By TOM HENRY
BLADE STAFF WRITER
OAK HARBOR, Ohio — FirstEnergy Corp. announced Monday it will move up installation of its new Davis-Besse reactor head by three years. The device will be installed in the fall of 2011 instead of 2014. According to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, FirstEnergy expedited the timetable after learning the regulatory agency was uncomfortable with the utility's plans to keep Davis-Besse operating until its next refueling outage 21 months from now. Nuclear plans typically go two years between refuelings. Davis-Besse has been offline since Feb. 28.
The NRC wants the existing head, put into service in 2004, inspected more frequently. "Our calculations were much more conservative," Viktoria Mitlyng, NRC spokesman, said. "After the discussions, the utility just decided to replace the head." She said the NRC's findings will likely be released Wednesday.
The existing head was installed following the plant's record two-year outage that occurred after the plant's old reactor head nearly burst. If it had, radioactive steam would have formed. Both devices were made years ago of Alloy 600, a type of metal being phased out in the nuclear industry because of its propensity to crack under prolonged heat and stress. The new head will be made of Alloy 690, a more robust type of metal.
The existing head is a temporary replacement brought in from a mothballed plant in Midland, Mich., that Consumers Power, now Consumers Energy, never completed. Both the NRC and the utility initially thought the replacement head would last 10 to 15 years before showing signs of aging. Heads at other nuclear plants have lasted more than 25 years without developing leaks — but Davis-Besse has long been the nation's hottest-operating nuclear plant.
The replacement head was found to be leaking in one of its 69 control-rod drive mechanism nozzles following Davis-Besse's Feb. 28 shutdown. Tests showed flaws developing in another 23 of the nozzles, which jut out of the top of the head and are used by operators to move control rods. That controls the plant's nuclear fission process.
Contact Tom Henry at:
thenry@theblade.com
or 419-724-6079.
****
Back to: http://www.toledoblade.com/article/20100630/NEWS16/100639987
Article published June 30, 2010
Davis-Besse in service after scheduled outage
OAK HARBOR, Ohio — The Davis-Besse nuclear power plant returned to service at
4:25 a.m. Tuesday after a scheduled refueling outage that began Feb. 28, parent company FirstEnergy Corp. announced. The plant yesterday morning was running at 21 percent power and will be running at full power — 908 megawatts — in the next several days. The outage was to repair control rod drive nozzles, replace cables and valves, and inspect and test equipment. The plant’s next outage is scheduled for the fall of 2011 to install a new reactor head.

*****

!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!

**Power Reactor**

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<td>RX Type: [1] GE-6</td>
<td>Event Date: 04/05/2010</td>
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<td>NRC Notified By: DOUGLAS SHORTER</td>
<td>Event Time: 22:50 [EDT]</td>
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<td>HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH</td>
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<td>Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY</td>
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<td>10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL</td>
<td>HIRONORI PETERSON (R3DO)</td>
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**Unit**

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**Event Text**

LOSS OF SAFETY FUNCTION TO CONTROL THE RELEASE OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

"At 2145 [EDT] hours on April 5, 2010, a loss of electrical power to the Division 1 Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) initiation logic occurred. Control room annunciators for 'Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Out of Service', 'Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) Out of Service', and 'RCIC/RHR D2 to D1 00 File Power Loss' were received. At 2250 hours, the Control Room staff determined a loss of isolation function existed. The operators entered Technical Specification (TS) action statements for Emergency Core Cooling System Instrumentation (TS 3.3.5.1), RCIC Instrumentation (TS 3.3.5.2), and Primary Containment and Drywell Isolation Instrumentation (TS 3.3.6.1). The power loss was caused by a blown fuse which occurred during surveillance testing. The surveillance test was suspended and plant personnel commenced troubleshooting and investigation efforts. A recovery plan is being developed to back out of the surveillance test and replace the fuse to re-energize the logic, while ensuring the plant does not experience an undesirable actuation of the logic."
"The power loss caused five containment isolation valves to lose automatic isolation function. These valves have no associated inboard automatic isolation valve powered by Division 2. As a result of the power loss, the valves cannot automatically close on demand to isolate and therefore cannot perform their automatic function to isolate the containment.

"This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as an event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to control the release of radioactive material.

"The NRC Resident Inspectors have been notified."

The licensee entered a 12-hour shutdown action statement for the loss of containment isolation function as a result of the power failure.

** RETRACTION FROM LLOYD ZERR TO PETE SNYDER ON 6/4/2010 AT 1126 **

"On April 6, 2010, at 0611 hours, notification was made to NRC Operations Center of an event that at the time of discovery, could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to control the release of radioactive material [10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(c)]. A blown fuse during surveillance testing caused a loss of electrical power to the Division 1 Loss of Coolant Accident initiation logic. The power loss caused five containment isolation valves to lose their automatic isolation function. These valves have no associated inboard automatic isolation valve powered by Division 2. As a result of the power loss, the valves could not automatically close on demand and therefore, could not perform their automatic function to isolate containment.

"Following further evaluation, it was determined that a loss of safety function of structures or systems that are needed to control the release of radioactive material did not occur. Based on review of valve leak rate test history and compliance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, General Design Criteria, the penetrations and Containment were capable of performing their intended design function. The associated inboard valves and/or water seals were capable of automatically isolating containment. Additionally, all required Technical Specifications Limiting Conditions for Operation were complied with for the identified issue, and therefore, no operation or condition prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications existed.

"Since the event or condition reported in Event Notification 45815 would not have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material, this event or condition is not reportable and the notification is retracted. Additionally, based on not meeting any 10 CFR 50.73 reporting criteria, no Licensee Event Report is required. The evaluation (i.e., Reportability Determination) for this event or condition is documented in Condition Report 10-74904.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

Notified the R3DO (Pelke).

*****

Power Reactor Event Number: 45979
Facility: FERMI
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [2] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: RUSSELL WARD
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK

Notification Date: 06/06/2010
Notification Time: 03:10 [ET]
Event Date: 06/06/2010
Event Time: 02:38 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/07/2010

Emergency Class: ALERT
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL

Person (Organization):
PATTY PELKE (R3DO)
MELANIE GALLOWAY (NRR)
SCOTT MORRIS (IRD)
JACK GROBE (NRR)
MARK SATORIUS (R3)
MARY ANN DOYLE (DHS)
DWIGHT FULLER (FEMA)

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Event Text

AUTOMATIC REACTOR SCRAM DUE TO PARTIAL LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER

"Reactor shutdown. All control rods inserted. Maintaining reactor vessel level with reactor core isolation cooling. Maintaining reactor vessel pressure with reactor core isolation cooling. [Automatic] Reactor scram due to loss of division 2 offsite power. Classification code: Unusual Event (HU1) Natural Destruction Phenomena Affecting the Protected Area."

The licensee declared a Notification of Unusual Event at 0253 EDT. All rods fully inserted and decay heat is being removed by the main condensers. Division 1 buses are being powered by 1 of 3 offsite feeds and division 2 buses are being powered by the Emergency Diesel Generators.

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

** ** UPDATE FROM JEFF GROFF TO DONG PARK AT 0425 EDT ON 6/6/2010 ** **

"Division 2 power provided by Emergency Diesel Generators number 13 and 14."
The licensee declared an Alert at 0417 EDT. The reactor remains stable in Mode 3. Physical damage to the auxiliary and the turbine buildings were noticed after an initial inspection.

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3RA (Satorius), NRR (Grobe), IRD (Morris), R3DO (Pelke), NRR EO (Galloway), DHS (Doyle), FEMA (Guy), DOE (Morrone), USDA (Ussery), HHS (Standifer), and CNSC (Gdesnryxrs).

** *UPDATE FROM JEFF GROFF TO DONG PARK AT 0603 EDT ON 6/6/2010 * * **

"At 0238 [EDT], severe weather caused a loss of 345KV [switchyard power]. Reactor scrammed from a turbine trip. Plant is stabilized with RPV [Reactor Pressure Vessel] water level in normal band and RPV pressure at 820 psig. RPV Pressure is being controlled on turbine BPV [By Pass Valve]. Division 2 EDG's [Emergency Diesel Generator] are supplying power to division 2 buses. Plant is currently in Alert due to physical damage to plant due to severe weather."

The NRC Senior Resident Inspector is on-site. Notified IRD (Morris), R3DO (Pelke), NRR EO (Galloway).

** *UPDATE FROM ED KOKOSKY TO DONG PARK AT 0247 EDT ON 6/7/2010 * * *

"There is no release of radiological materials. No further potential exists for uncontrolled release of radioactive materials to the environment. The Reactor is shut down. Reactor pressure and temperature are within normal bands. Offsite electrical feeds to the site have been restored. An overall damage assessment has been prepared and reviewed to ensure no conditions exist that would create an entry condition to the Emergency Plan. Plant repairs will be accomplished through site processes."

At 0220 EDT on 6/7/10, the licensee has terminated from the Alert classification.

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3RA (Satorius), NRR (Grobe), IRD (Grant), R3DO (Pelke), NRR EO (Galloway), DHS (Doyle), FEMA (Blankenship), DOE (Bailey), USDA (Ussery), HHS (Peagler), and CNSC (Gdesnryxrs).

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Event Time: 09:36 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/24/2010

Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section: 26.719 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
Person (Organization): JULIO LARA (R3DO)

<table>
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<th>Unit</th>
<th>SCRAM Code</th>
<th>RX CRIT</th>
<th>Initial PWR</th>
<th>Initial RX Mode</th>
<th>Current PWR</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>Power Operation</td>
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</table>

**Event Text**

FITNESS FOR DUTY - SUPERVISOR TESTED POSITIVE DURING RANDOM DRUG/ALCOHOL TEST

A non-licensed employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random drug/alcohol test. Unescorted access has been suspended. Contact the HOO for further details.

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

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