

To: Jim Mehl, ERSIS Manager
From: Zack Clayton, Rad Coordinator
Subject: September Monthly Report
Date: October , 2016

Beans

Training: 0
Drills: 1
Meetings: 4
Technical Assistance: 3
Public Assistance: 0

Web Page Views: There were 55 page views in September.

Radiological Safety Program Pages: <http://epa.ohio.gov/derr/ersis/er/rad.aspx>

Coming Attractions

10/4 Ingestion Sampling Training
10/11 URSB
10/12 IREP Tech Group
10/27 NEPAC
10/31 IREP Nuclear Power group

Facility updates

Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station

Davis Besse operated until September 10. The plant tripped offline due to

A licensed operator from the Davis Besse Nuclear Power Station (DBNPS) was found to have signed forms validating the accuracy of the list of prescription medication he was taking when he knew the list was inaccurate. This list is included in required reporting to the NRC by DBNPS. After an investigation by the NRC and through a professional mediator, DBNPS and the First Energy Nuclear Operating Company (FENOC) have agreed to a list of several corrective actions ultimately bringing better awareness to FENOC and all of its licensed operators. As a result the employee in question is no longer a licensed operator and is no longer employed by FENOC. See ADAMS number ML16138A562 and ML16245A488.

The DBNPS plant tripped offline September 10 at 0343. The automatic reactor trip occurred due to a Main Generator lock-out. The cause of the generator lock-out is being investigated at this time. All control rods fully inserted. Post trip, the Steam Feedwater Rupture Control System was actuated due to high Steam Generator 1 level. The cause of the high Steam Generator 1 level is being investigated. See Event 52232.

After resolving the issues causing the plant scram at DBNPS, a startup was attempted on Monday, September 19, and subsequently stopped as it was discovered that some electrical breakers were misaligned which could have adversely affected Reactor Plant Safety (RPS). The Reactor plant is in a safe condition and the NRC resident inspector has been notified. DBNPS plant personnel are actively working to resolve these issues and satisfy the requirements to safely restart the reactor. See Event 52247.

Perry Nuclear Power Plant

Perry started September at full power but reduced power on the 24th.

Beaver Valley Power Station

Beaver Valley Unit I

Unit I operated at full power until late on September 14, when it reduced power to 42% to perform maintenance to a condensate pump. The plant resumed power in coastdown to a September 24 refueling outage.

After review, Beaver Valley determined that Event Report 52132 needs to be withdrawn and it does not meet the criteria for reporting. This was a postulated event that would cause all three steam lines to remain open if there was a fire, compromising shutdown margin. This has been determined not to be the case.

Beaver Valley Unit II

Unit II operated at full power for the month.

DTE

Fermi II

Fermi II started September at reduced power but was at full power by the 5th. It operated at full power for most of the month.

Fermi III

There was no activity reported for Fermi III

Portsmouth Enrichment Plant

There was no activity reported for the Portsmouth site.

Activity

- 9/7 IREP Power Plant Group – Agency and plant reports, and last minute plan details for the Perry evaluated exercise.
- 9/8 Sampling Exercise Planning - Progress reports from the involved agencies and emergent issues were discussed. A to do list was generated to finish off the loose ends of the drill.
- 9/13 Perry evaluated exercise – This went well. All the open FEMA items from the Beaver Valley exercise were resolved. Discussions about modeling projections were observed and commended by FEMA.
- 9/14 IREP full committee – Agency updates, committee reports, and training plans. Progress and direction of the ESF-10 update was discussed, and status of the modeling tools available for various radiological events was explored. The only current programs appear to be for power plants. Other rad events are still using 10 year old modeling programs. FEMA is piloting an intermediate phase planning course that should be an excellent resource for the intermediate phase IREP committee. The late phase laboratory procedures, SAMS, will be ready for review in March.
- 9/21 Ingestion Sampling Training for October 4 – final planning meeting for the background sampling mission in Columbiana County for the ingestion training required by REP plan. A Rad Responder event has been created and procedures for use by Ohio teams will be explored.
- 9/23 Internal meeting for the October 4 training. Setting up teams, making sure there are enough mobile devices for RadResponder, a laptop for the coordinator, choosing the meters and probe to use, and other logistic considerations.

Statistics, NRC Reports, News, and ADAMS References

Operating Power Levels

September

Date	BV1	BV2	DB	Perry	Fermi2	
1	99	100	100	100	84	
5	99	100	100	100	100	
10	97	100	0	100	100	DB trip on Generator lockout
12	97	100	0	100	100	
15	42	100	0	100	100	BV1 maintenance on condensate pump.
16	48	100	0	100	100	
19	81	100	0	100	100	DB fail to restart on breaker misalignment
22	80	100	19	100	100	
23	69	100	100	100	91	
24	0	100	100	62	100	
26	0	100	100	67	100	
27	0	100	100	80	100	
30						

Event Reports

Part 21	Event Number: 52212
Rep Org: FLOWSERVE Licensee: FLOWSERVE Region: 1 City: RALEIGH State: NC County: License #: Agreement: Y Docket: NRC Notified By: WADE SHEPHARD HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ	Notification Date: 08/31/2016 Notification Time: 16:00 [ET] Event Date: 08/31/2016 Event Time: [EDT] Last Update Date: 08/31/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE	Person (Organization): RAY POWELL (R1DO) JONATHAN BARTLEY (R2DO) BILLY DICKSON (R3DO) GREG WARNICK (R4DO)

Event Text

PART 21 NOTIFICATION - FLOWSERVE SWING CHECK VALVES

The following is an excerpt of the part-21 notification:

"Susquehanna Nuclear reported two size 3 class 900 Anchor Darling swing check valves were not passing LLRT [local leak rate tests]. After disassembly there appeared to be wear between the hinge arm and seat ring of the valve body apparent on the hinge. The interference was not severe enough to stop hinge arm motion of the disk, but did affect ability of the valve to seal during LLRT."

Affected Serial Numbers: BQ752, BQ753, and BO809

Affected Sites: Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Brunswick, **Davis Besse**, Kewaunee, Conn Yankee, Monticello, Susquehanna, Framatome, Chin Shan, and Kuosheng

Engineering Evaluation 10CFR21 No. 91

POC: Wade Shephard: 919-832-0525

Part 21	Event Number: 52216
Rep Org: ENERSYS Licensee: ENERSYS Region: 1 City: READING State: PA County: License #: Agreement: Y Docket: NRC Notified By: WILLIAM ROSS HQ OPS Officer: STEVEN VITTO	Notification Date: 09/01/2016 Notification Time: 14:51 [ET] Event Date: 09/01/2016 Event Time: [EDT] Last Update Date: 09/02/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 21.21(a)(2) - INTERIM EVAL OF DEVIATION	Person (Organization): RAY POWELL (R1DO) JONATHAN BARTLEY (R2DO) BILLY DICKSON (R3DO) GREG WARNICK (R4DO) PART 21/50.55 REACT (EMAI)

Event Text

PART 21 - POTENTIAL FAILURE OF BATTERY SYSTEM CONNECTIONS

"This letter will serve as notification from EnerSys to the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission of an identified deviation in published literature information. The literature defines requirements for resistance in both cell to cell and cell to terminal connections in supplied battery systems. High connection resistance causes increased cell voltage drop and a potential failure to meet run time requirements.

"Internal investigation by EnerSys confirms that no defects exist in systems tested before shipment to customer utilities as internal documented procedures define correct parameters. However, the potential of less than desired performance exists if the values noted in the literature are used during installation and test at utility sites.

"EnerSys does not have the ability to evaluate if a defect exists at customer utilities so per the provisions of Part 21, notification is being made to both the Commission and affected EnerSys customers."

POC: 800-538-3627 ext. 1974

* * * UPDATE FROM WILLIAM ROSS TO STEVEN VITTO AT 1339 EDT on 09/02/2016 * * *

"The literature in question is the EnerSys Safety, Storage, Installation, Operation and Maintenance Manual for Flooded Lead-Acid Batteries C, D, E, F and G, number US-FL-IOM-002 dated January 2007. The errors are located in Section 7.4.3.8c line 2. The current wording of '... connection is more than 30 percent or 5 Mohms above the average...' should read 'connection is more than 10 percent or 5 micro-ohms, whichever is greater, above the average'."

Licensees affected are Dominion North Anna, Dominion Surry Nuclear Power Plant, Energy Northwest Columbia Generating Station, Entergy Nuclear Operations IP2, **First Energy Beaver Valley NPP**, NextEra Energy Point Beach Nuclear Plant, **Perry Nuclear Power Plant**, and San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station.

Notified R1DO(Powell), R2DO (Bartley), R3DO (Dickson), R4DO (Warnick), and Part 21Group via email.

Power Reactor	Event Number: 52232
Facility: DAVIS BESSE Region: 3 State: OH Unit: [1] [] [] RX Type: [1] B&W-R-LP NRC Notified By: TOM COBBLEDICK HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA	Notification Date: 09/10/2016 Notification Time: 07:23 [ET] Event Date: 09/10/2016 Event Time: 03:43 [EDT] Last Update Date: 09/10/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION	Person (Organization): KARLA STOEDTER (R3DO)

Unit	SCRAM Code	RX CRIT	Initial PWR	Initial RX Mode	Current PWR	Current RX Mode
1	A/R	Y	100	Power Operation	0	Hot Standby

Event Text

AUTOMATIC UNIT TRIP DUE TO MAIN GENERATOR LOCK-OUT

"At 0343 EDT, with the unit operating at approximately 100% full power, an automatic reactor trip occurred due to a Main Generator lock-out. The cause of the generator lock-out is being investigated at this time. All control rods fully inserted. Post trip, the Steam Feedwater Rupture Control System was actuated due to high Steam Generator 1 level. The cause of the high Steam Generator 1 level is being investigated at this time.

"The unit is currently in Mode 3 (Hot Standby) and stable, at approximately 550 degrees F and 2155 psig. Steam is being discharged through the Atmospheric Vent Valves for decay heat removal. There is no known primary to secondary leakage, and all safety systems functioned as expected.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of the event."

The licensee notified the State of Ohio, Ottawa and Lucas County.

Power Reactor	Event Number: 52247
Facility: DAVIS BESSE Region: 3 State: OH Unit: [1] [] [] RX Type: [1] B&W-R-LP NRC Notified By: ANDY MILLER HQ OPS Officer: DANIEL MILLS	Notification Date: 09/16/2016 Notification Time: 23:35 [ET] Event Date: 09/16/2016 Event Time: 16:57 [EDT] Last Update Date: 09/16/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION	Person (Organization): STEVE ORTH (R3DO)

Unit	SCRAM Code	RX CRIT	Initial PWR	Initial RX Mode	Current PWR	Current RX Mode
1	N	N	0	Hot Shutdown	0	Hot Shutdown

Event Text

ESSENTIAL BUSES NOT ALIGNED TO POWER TRANSFORMERS DURING PLANT STARTUP

"At 1657 Eastern Daylight Time (EDT) the plant entered Mode 4 (from Mode 5), and subsequently, at 1710 EDT, it was discovered that 480V AC essential buses E1 and F1 were being supplied from the shutdown operations transformers. The essential buses E1 and F1 are required to be aligned to the power operations transformers in Mode 4 for operability in accordance with TS 3.8.9.

"With both E1 and F1 essential buses aligned to the shutdown operations transformers with the plant in Mode 4, both trains of the essential electrical power distribution system were

inoperable, resulting in a loss of safety function. At 1733 EDT both E1 and F1 essential busses were aligned to the power operations transformers as required by TS 3.8.9.

"This issue is being reported as a loss of safety function of the essential electrical busses.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of the event."

Part 21	Event Number: 51923
Rep Org: AZZ - NUCLEAR LOGISTICS, INC. Licensee: AZZ - NUCLEAR LOGISTICS, INC. Region: 4 City: FORT WORTH State: TX County: License #: Agreement: Y Docket: NRC Notified By: TRACY BOLT HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO	Notification Date: 05/12/2016 Notification Time: 19:23 [ET] Event Date: 05/10/2016 Event Time: [CDT] Last Update Date: 09/22/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE	Person (Organization): ART BURRITT (R1DO) JAMIE HEISSERER (R2DO) ERIC DUNCAN (R3DO) VIVIAN CAMPBELL (R4DO) PART 21/50.55 REACT (EMAI)

Event Text

PART 21 - INITIAL NOTIFICATION OF MASTERPACT BREAKER FAIL TO CLOSE

The following information was a licensee received facsimile;

"Pursuant to 10CFR 21.21(d)(3)(ii), AZZ/NLI is providing written notification of the identification of a potential defect or failure to comply.

"On the basis of our evaluation, it has been determined that there is sufficient information to determine if the subject condition is left uncorrected could potentially create a Substantial Safety Hazard or could create a Technical Specification Safety Limit violation as it relates to the subject plant applications. The plants will need to evaluate their application to determine if the identified condition could have an impact to the plant operation.

"The following information is required per 10CFR 21.21(d)(4):

"(i) Name and address of the individual or individuals informing the Commission.
Tracy Bolt, Director of Quality Assurance
Nuclear Logistics, Inc.
7410 Pebble Drive
Ft. Worth, TX 76118

"(ii) Identification of the facility, activity, or the basic component supplied for such facility or such activity within the United States which fails to comply or contains a defect.

"Masterpact NT and NW style circuit breakers.

-The failure of the breaker being ready to electrically close after being subjected to an 'Anti-Pump condition'.

Note: The specific application where the failures have occurred is when the breaker is being utilized as a starter for closing into an inductive load like a fan motor.

"(iii) Identification of the firm constructing or supplying the basic component which fails to comply or contains a defect.

AZZ/ Nuclear Logistics
Fort Worth, Texas 76118

"(iv) Nature of defect or failure to comply and the safety hazard which is created or could be created by such defect or failure to comply.

"Possible 'failure to close' condition of Masterpact breakers NT and NW style, that are being used with specific logic schemes that are subjected to 'anti-pump' conditions during normal operation. These breakers have a higher susceptibility to not return to the ready to close position after the close signal has been removed.

"PSEG reported approximately 14 instances with different breakers in different cubicles where they initiated an electric close order, and the breakers failed to close. All of the 14 instances were in applications of being used to start an inductive load.

"NLI inspected three of the breakers (all NWs) that were returned by PSEG and could not fully replicate the problem as described by the plant. NLI was only able to repeat the failure to close when performing an 'anti-pump' test. The failure to close was intermittent, but could be duplicated. When the anti-pump condition was not present, NLI could not duplicate a failure to close. Visual inspections of the tested breakers did not reveal any visible damage to the breaker linkages, latches, shunt close or shunt trip assemblies.

"Schneider Electric (SE) performed testing of three Masterpact NW08 breakers (operated to beyond design life) and duplicated the fail to close condition as described by the plant. It was determined that a standing close signal with a trip/open signal applied is determined to be the root cause of the fail to close issue. The SE testing confirms that the presence of this condition can cause the breaker anti-pump latch to receive excessive forward pressure. When the nose of the latch impacts the close coil plunger, it will 'rock' up in the rear, catching on the top of the mechanism plate. Once the close voltage is removed, and the plunger retracts, the latch may or may not let go. If the latch does not release, then application of the close coil voltage will simply activate the close coil plunger and without the latch underneath the plunger, the breaker will not close.

"PSEG performed extensive troubleshooting at the Hope Creek plant and discovered that all of the affected breakers were in an anti-pump condition when the breakers failed to close.

"(v) The date on which the information of such defect or failure to comply was obtained.

"This revised notification is being submitted based on the information gathered on 5/10/2016 after additional testing, at the request of River Bend, was performed. This additional testing was requested following the notification that was provided to the plants listed below, in the

original issue of this letter in February 2016.

"The evaluation of the condition was originally completed in September of 2012. The issue was originally determined at that time to not be a reportable condition based on the breaker not containing a defect and the condition was believed to be attributed to the specific logic scheme at the plant. To date, this issue has only been reported to NLI from the following plants, PSEG Hope Creek and River Bend Station. No other plants have reported this specific fail to close condition. NLI was in direct communication with the plants when this issue was first being evaluated and the failure analysis were being conducted. The two affected plants were knowledgeable of the condition.

"(vi) In the case of a basic component which contains a defect or fails to comply, the number and location of these components in use at, supplied for being supplied for, or may be supplied for, manufactured or being manufactured for one or more facilities or activities subject to the regulations In this part.

"Plants which have been supplied the Masterpact circuit breakers.

"PSEG Hope Creek - Issue Identified for NW style

River Bend - Issue identified for NT style

Callaway - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.

St. Lucie - This issue has not been identified however. the potential should be evaluated.

Turkey Point - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.

Beaver Valley - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.

Davis Besse - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.

Three Mile Island - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.

Calvert Cliffs - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.

Hatch -This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.

STP - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.

SONGS - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.

KHNP Ulchin - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.

KHNP Kori - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.

Duke Oconee - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.

Duke McGuire - Non-safety (not supplied by NU), This issue has not been identified.

"(vii) The corrective action which has been, is being, or will be taken; the name of the individual or organization responsible for the action; and the length of time that has been or will be taken to complete the action.

"NLI originally created a technical bulletin to address the issue and recommendations. However, since new information has been recently identified, NLI TB-12-007 will be revised, as the proposed solution will not reliably solve the problem for all postulated events. Upon completion of the revised technical bulletin, it will be re-submitted to the plants which have been supplied the Masterpact breakers from NLI.

"(viii) Any advice related to the defect or failure to comply about the facility, activity, or basic component that has been, is being, or will be given to purchasers or licensees.

"NLI is currently working with the OEM of the circuit breaker to determine the permanent solution to correct the possible failure to close event after the breaker is subjected to an Anti-Pump condition.

"Advice for plants with breakers currently installed: Evaluate the applications where the breakers may be potentially subjected to an Anti-Pump condition; where the close coil will be energized for an extended period of time.

"The circuit breaker will continue to operate if this condition is present however there may need to be human interaction with the circuit breaker by manually pressing the trip/open button on the front of the circuit breaker to free the mechanism.

"Please contact NLI with any questions or comments.
Sincerely,
Tracy Bolt
Director of Quality Assurance"

* * * UPDATE ON 5/13/16 AT 1153 EDT FROM TRACY BOLT TO BETHANY CECERE * * *

"Added 4 additional plants that were inadvertently left off the list.

"Browns Ferry - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.
Fort Calhoun - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.
Wolf Creek - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.
Seabrook - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated."

Notified R1DO (Burritt), R2DO (Heisserer), R3DO (Duncan), R4DO (Campbell), and Part 21 Group via email.

* * * UPDATE AT 1612 EDT ON 7/13/16 FROM TRACY BOLT TO JEFF HERRERA * * *

The following information was received via facsimile:

Additional information in attachment has been updated since the original report provided on 5/13/2016.

Additional facility identified as impacted:
St. Lucie - Issue identified

For additional information contact:
Tracy Bolt
Director of Quality Assurance
AZZ/NLI Nuclear Logistics
7410 Pebble Drive
Fort Worth, Texas 76118

Notified the R1DO (Ferdas), R2DO (Rich), R3DO (Kunowski), R4DO (Gaddy) and Part 21 Reactor group (via email).

* * * UPDATE AT 1907 EDT ON 9/22/16 FROM TRACY BOLT TO JEFF HERRERA * * *

"On the basis of our evaluation, it has been determined that there is sufficient information to determine if the subject condition is left uncorrected could potentially create a Substantial Safety Hazard or could create a Technical Specification Safety Limit violation as it relates to the subject plant applications. The plants will need to evaluate their application to determine if the identified condition could have an impact to the plant operation.

"Plants which have been supplied the Masterpact circuit breakers:

"PSEG Hope Creek - Issue Identified for NW style

River Bend - Issue identified for NT style

Callaway - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.

St. Lucie - This issue has been identified.

Turkey Point - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.

Beaver Valley - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.

Davis Besse - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.

Three Mile Island - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.

Calvert Cliffs - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.

Hatch - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.

STP - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.

SONGS - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.

KHNP Ulchin - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.

KHNP Kori - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.

Duke Oconee - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.

Duke McGuire - Non-safety (not supplied by NLI). This issue has not been identified.

Browns Ferry - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.

Fort Calhoun - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.

Wolf Creek This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.

Seabrook This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.

"NLI originally created a technical bulletin to address the issue and recommendations. However, since new information has been recently identified, NLI TB-12-007 has been revised. The solution for this potential problem is to replace the XF (shunt close assembly) with the XFCOM shunt close assembly.

"The part numbers are:

847323 (100-130VAC/DC)

847324 (200-240VAC/DC)

Additional details regarding the replacement device are contained in the NLI technical bulletin TB-12-007."

Notified the R1DO (Krohn), R2DO (Blamey), R3DO (Jeffers), R4DO (Deese) and Part 21 Reactor group (via email).

!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!

Power Reactor

Event Number: 52132

Facility: BEAVER VALLEY Region: 1 State: PA Unit: [] [2] [] RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP NRC Notified By: KEN TIEFENTHAL HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ	Notification Date: 07/29/2016 Notification Time: 01:51 [ET] Event Date: 07/28/2016 Event Time: 21:20 [EDT] Last Update Date: 09/26/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION	Person (Organization): BLAKE WELLING (R1DO)

Unit	SCRAM Code	RX CRIT	Initial PWR	Initial RX Mode	Current PWR	Current RX Mode
2	N	Y	100	Power Operation	100	Power Operation

Event Text

POSTULATED FIRE EVENT THAT COULD ADVERSELY IMPACT SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT

"A review of the Beaver Valley Unit 2 Fire Protection Safe Shutdown Report (FPSSR) found that a postulated fire had the potential to spuriously open all three individual steam generator atmospheric dump valves in addition to a common residual heat release valve. Previous analysis did not consider all of the valves spuriously opening from a fire. The potential impact of these valves spuriously opening is a cooldown that could adversely affect shutdown margin.

"Hourly fire tours have been put in place for those fire areas that have the potential to initiate this condition.

"This condition is reportable as an 8 hour report in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B).

"The NRC Resident Inspector was notified."

This condition is not applicable to Unit 1.

* * * RETRACTION FROM DAN SCHWER TO VINCE KLCO ON 9/26/16 AT 1428 EDT * * *

"Retraction of EN 52132 'Postulated Fire Event That Could Adversely Impact Safe Shutdown Equipment'.

"On 07/29/2016, an 8-hour notification (EN 52132) was made describing the discovery of a postulated fire event that could adversely impact safe shutdown equipment, specifically the spurious opening of the three Atmospheric Steam Dump Valves (ASDVs) and the Residual Heat Release (RHR) Valve, simultaneously. This notification was made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) as an unanalyzed condition because of the potential effect on shutdown margin. Further engineering evaluation has determined that the required shutdown margin is not challenged by the event, as bounded by previous analysis of a similar scenario as well as validated operator actions. Therefore, this does not result in a reportable condition.

"The Resident NRC Inspector has been notified."

Notified the R1DO (Cook).

News

Senate to zero in on new reactors with Moniz on tap

[Hannah Northey](#), E&E reporter

Published: Monday, September 12, 2016

The fate of the nation's ailing nuclear reactors and the pace at which they can be replaced with new high-tech designs will be a major focus this week with the appearance of Energy Secretary Ernest Moniz before a Senate panel.

The secretary is scheduled to testify Thursday before the Senate Energy and Water Development Appropriations Subcommittee alongside Republican environmental activist and entrepreneur Jay Faison and Judd Gregg, a former senator from New Hampshire who co-chairs the industry advocate Nuclear Matters.

The hearing is a reflection of a technical and legislative drive to build new reactors as a number of older plants, struggling to compete with cheap natural gas and low demand, have closed their doors.

While the industry has warned that an additional 15 to 20 plants could close, proponents like Faison have called on the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to expedite permitting of new designs.

Faison, founder of the private ClearPath Foundation, recently beefed up the ranks of his organization by hiring a former NRC member. And in a recent [blog post](#), he criticized an outdated and overregulated regime by which new reactors are licensed.

Faison argued it would take a decade and half a billion dollars, not to mention \$100 million in fees, to get a reactor approved by the NRC in the United States, whereas the same process would cost much less and take about four years in Asia.

ClearPath is championing bipartisan bills in both chambers — the "Nuclear Energy Innovation and Modernization Act" — that would establish a new plan for advanced reactor licensing with collaboration between the NRC and DOE.

The lower chamber's version of the bill, [H.R. 4979](#), is slated to come up for a vote under suspension in the House this week ([see related story](#)).

Moniz will likely focus on the department's ongoing support of new nuclear technology research. The secretary will also most likely get a grilling from the subcommittee chairman, Republican Sen. Lamar Alexander of Tennessee, who has a well-known distaste for the agency's support of renewables over nuclear power.

Schedule: The hearing is Wednesday, Sept. 14, at 2:30 p.m. in 138 Dirksen.

Witnesses: Energy Secretary Ernest Moniz; former Republican Sen. Judd Gregg of New Hampshire; and Jay Faison, founder and CEO of the ClearPath Foundation.

Twitter: [@HMNorthey](#) Email: hnorthey@eenews.net

Source: <http://www.eenews.net/eedaily/2016/09/12/stories/1060042627>

Dayton Daily News

Complete. In Depth. Dependable.

Officials seek cleanup funding for Ohio uranium plant

Posted: 11:17 a.m. Sunday, Sept. 11, 2016

Updated: 11:17 a.m. Sunday, Sept. 11, 2016
The Associated Press

PIKETON, Ohio —Ohio's U.S. senators are again pushing for continued federal funding for the cleanup of a Cold War-era uranium plant in southern Ohio where workers periodically have been warned about the threat of layoffs for several years.

Democrat Sherrod Brown and Republican Rob Portman have asked top members on the Senate Committee on Appropriations and Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development to include funding for work at the former Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant in Piketon in any short-term continuing resolution that may pass through the committee or subcommittee.

A continuing resolution is a temporary spending measure that can be used by legislators to continue funding programs until both the House and Senate reach an agreement on a final budget for the next fiscal year that also has the president's approval.

Funding for the cleanup has been included in an appropriations bill that passed by the Senate earlier this year, but awaits House action.

The plant produced enriched uranium for defense and commercial uses until 2001, and its shutdown left behind chemicals, radioactive areas and old buildings. The cleanup is expected to take decades and offers some of the best-paying jobs in a pocket of high unemployment.

Warnings of the potential for large-scale layoffs have loomed over the plant's workers in recent years. But a bill signed last year by President Barack Obama that included more than \$200 million for cleanup operations brought some relief.

Jeff Wagner, a spokesman for main contractor Fluor-BWXT Portsmouth, said the senators' letter shows the state's Congressional delegation is staying on top of the situation. He said Fluor remains active in the funding discussions.

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Davis-Besse reactor shut itself down over the weekend, no injuries or radioactivity reported

By John Funk, The Plain Dealer

on September 12, 2016 at 1:37 PM, updated

September 12, 2016 at 4:07 PM

OAK HARBOR -- Davis-Besse engineers and electricians are wrapping up repairs to the electrical controls of the nuclear power plant's generator today following an automatic shutdown over the weekend.

In a routine filing with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, FirstEnergy reported that the reactor automatically and instantly shut itself down early Saturday morning after the plant's main generator shut itself off.

Here's what happened:

The generator and steam turbines that spin it are not in the reactor building. They are located in a separate and adjacent turbine building. And a roof vent in that building had failed to completely close during an early Saturday morning storm and downpour.

Engineers determined that rainwater which had leaked through the vent had found its way into the generator's voltage regulating controls -- which are located in a electrical cabinet in a room under the turbine floor.

The rain water had seeped through expansion joints in the heavy concrete floor of the turbine building, and then dripped into the electrical cabinet, creating a short in the controls, said spokeswoman Jennifer Young.

She said electrical crews had dried out the cabinet and replaced the controls. Another crew fixed the roof vents that had not closed completely.

"While the plant is offline, we will also take the opportunity to replace a valve on the pressurizer, which is part of the reactor coolant system," Young said in an email. That system and valve are located in the reactor's containment building, and that means the reactor will have to be further cooled before crews can enter the building and drain the pressurizer system in order to replace the valve.

Young said the job would therefore take a couple of days.

In the meantime, the break in hot weather means electrical demand will remain lower than it has been during recent weeks.

Vindy.com

The Valley's Homepage

Ohio nuclear plant back up operating

Monday, September 26, 2016

OAK HARBOR, Ohio

An Ohio nuclear plant along Lake Erie is operating again after a nearly two-week shutdown.

The Davis-Besse plant east of Toledo had been shut down since Sept. 10 after rainwater entered its turbine building.

Akron-based FirstEnergy Corp. says it restarted the plant's reactor Thursday after repairing the plant's electrical controls.

A company spokeswoman says the rainwater prompted its turbine generator to automatically shut down.

Associated Press

Seekers of waste solution eye Reid's exit

[Hannah Northey](#), E&E reporter

Published: Wednesday, September 28, 2016

The looming retirement of Senate Minority Leader Harry Reid (D-Nev.), an outspoken Yucca Mountain foe, is poised to trigger more open debate about nuclear waste next year, ex-Rep. Norm Dicks (D-Wash.) said yesterday.

"Now that he's leaving the Senate, there's going to be a revisit, especially on the appropriations matters," said Dicks, a former senior appropriator who co-chairs the Bipartisan Policy Center's Nuclear Waste Council. "Whether that's going to make a big, new difference, we'll have to wait and see."

Speaking at a BPC event in Washington, D.C., yesterday, Dicks and Sonny Perdue, the former Republican governor of Georgia who co-chairs the waste panel, unveiled a [menu](#) of recommendations for revamping the nation's long-stalled nuclear waste policies.

Among the proposals, the report called on Congress to develop a new nuclear waste management organization, separate from the Department of Energy. The panel also said future consent-based siting efforts should encourage multiple applications for waste storage sites, ensure a fair and thorough assessment of all options, and avoid "down-selecting to a single option too early in the process."

The panel did not take a position on Yucca Mountain.

Reid has long opposed the construction and licensing of Yucca, the long-planned repository in his home state, and recently slammed the Nuclear Energy Institute for rejecting alternatives to the site ([E&E Daily](#), Sept. 8). Reid also said he supports nuclear power as a climate-mitigating technology.

Other members of the Nevada congressional delegation have predicted a renewed push for Yucca after Reid leaves office. Sen. Dean Heller (R-Nev.), who also opposes the project, said in August that Reid's departure will create a window of opportunity for Yucca Mountain in the eyes of those who want it to go forward ([Greenwire](#), Aug. 19).

A number of lawmakers eager to find a legislative solution to the growing problem of nuclear waste are eyeing Hill activity come February.

House Energy and Commerce Chairman Fred Upton (R-Mich.) and Rep. John Shimkus (R-Ill.), a top contender for the committee gavel in the next Congress, are "huge proponents" of Yucca Mountain and will be advocating for a review of the license, Dicks said. Shimkus is preparing a legislative blueprint to advance Yucca Mountain this Congress ([E&E Daily](#), Sept. 8).

Shimkus in a statement yesterday said he appreciated the attention the BPC had given nuclear waste but criticized the group's inability to agree on what constitutes a "consenting community" and turned the focus back to Yucca Mountain.

"The idea of abandoning Yucca Mountain — a national asset that \$15 billion has been spent over 30 years to study and develop — in favor of an idealistic standard that may never be defined, is an irresponsible waste of both ratepayer and taxpayer dollars, as well as a guarantee that nuclear waste will remain where it is for the foreseeable future," Shimkus said.

In the upper chamber, a bipartisan quartet of senators in March introduced the "Nuclear Waste Administration Act of 2015," [S. 854](#), which would establish an independent agency to oversee the consent-based process through which consolidated storage facilities and a repository would be chosen. The agency head would be appointed by the president and need Senate approval.

Sen. Dianne Feinstein (D-Calif.), one of the bill's authors, has pushed the provision for years, only to be rebuffed in the House, where key Republicans have insisted that the price for interim storage is continued funding for Yucca Mountain. Recent House drafts of nuclear waste legislation maintain the Yucca linkage to congressional approval for temporary storage.

Senate Environment and Public Works Chairman Jim Inhofe (R-Okla.) recently accused Feinstein of placing a hold on a separate Senate measure aimed at boosting advanced reactors to move S. 854. Feinstein's office has not commented on the issue.

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Source: <http://www.eenews.net/eedaily/2016/09/28/stories/1060043523>

Fukushima news. This is included as a case study for the types of issues that may develop in the case of an incident at a US reactor. The Fukushima Daiichi Reactors are identical to some US reactors and are the closest incident that has occurred to compare to US concerns.

Source: <http://www.hiroshimasymndrome.com/fukushima-accident-updates.html>

September 29, 2016

- Why the public debate on child thyroid screenings is complicated. On one hand, a Fukushima pediatrician's group feels that future screenings should be voluntary, thus reducing the scale of the study. On the other hand, a group of residents opposes the pediatrician's opinion and demands that the program maintain obligatory participation. When state-of-the-art child thyroid screenings began five years ago, there were essentially three purposes for it – identifying the effects of low-level radiation exposure, protecting the health of Fukushima residents, and lowering anxiety felt by the prefecture's population. Over time these goals have become questions - can the program actually identify low-level exposure effects, are the screenings actually a health benefit, and does program alleviate apprehensions? Public dissatisfaction remains a significant problem, largely because of long-standing distrust of the government. One disgruntled resident said, "In the long run, the national government is inclined only to accept test results showing 'no increase' in cancer." While the large-scale screening has shown no increase in child thyroid cancers, harmful rumors continue to circulate with negative effects on the mental health of many Fukushima residents.
<http://www.jaif.or.jp/en/reaching-a-common-ground-on-thyroid-gland-screening/>
- Tepco reports that the replacement of old wastewater tanks at F. Daiichi is behind schedule. Bolted-together tanks were initially used to store the contaminated waters being produced inside the four damaged units at F. Daiichi. Some of the tanks leaked along the vertical seams, so Tepco was forced to use only welded-seam tanks. Replacing the more than 200 original bolted-together tanks has been going slowly. It was hoped that the replacement would be finished by the end of March, 2017. But, it now seems that the completion date will be sometime in June, 2018. More than 100 of the one-thousand ton bolted-together tanks still need to be exchanged.
<http://jen.jiji.com/jc/eng?g=eco&k=2016092800865>

September 26, 2016

- Canadian antinuke is found guilty of death threats to Fukushima research scientists. Dana Durnford was found guilty of criminal harassment in Victoria, British Columbia, last Thursday. Durnford broadcast that University of Victoria's Jay Cullen and Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution's Ken Buesseler should be publicly executed for being part of an alleged international conspiracy to cover-up the effect of Fukushima radioactivity on the Pacific Ocean. Durnford was sentenced to three years' probation. Jay Cullen said, "I expected and was pleased with the judge's ruling. Mr. Durnford, on many occasions, threatened physical violence against scientists and others who have focused their attention and expertise to better understand how the Fukushima nuclear disaster has affected the marine environment and human health. Such behavior is criminal."

Ken Buessler said that threatening violence is “never an appropriate response to scientific findings you might disagree with.” Durnford spouts protestations on his website, saying that “They [the nuclear conspirators] bankrupted us in these court proceedings in order to silence us.”

<http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/09/23/national/crime-legal/canada-activist-found-guilty-harassing-scientists-fukushima-fallout/#.V-UmpdLr0dU>

- Most of Hirono Town’s voluntary evacuees plan on repopulating. Hirono is located south of Naraha, and is outside the Tokyo-mandated evacuation zone in total. Nearly all of the town’s 5,000 citizens initially fled following the 2011 Fukushima accident. About 45% of the voluntary evacuees have already returned home. Another 1,700 say they want to go home by next spring. Most say they will go home because their free temporary housing is expected to terminate by the end of March, 2017. Hirono Mayor Satoshi Endo showed the outcome of the town’s survey municipal assembly on Sept. 13.
<http://www.fukushimaminponews.com/news.html?id=728>
- Cesium in Fukushima dam sediments causes anxiety in some residents. The Mainichi Shimbun calls the dams “de facto storage facilities for high concentrations of radioactive cesium...” The government says water in the dams is safe, but some people say that is a ploy to downplay what they feel is a real problem. Some sediment samples show radioactivity greater than the 8,000 Becquerels per kilogram national standard for radioactive waste disposal, but water-borne cesium activity is only one or two Bq/liter – well-below the drinking water limit of 10 Bq/l, which is the lowest Cesium standard in the world. Area radiation exposure levels around the dams are below 2 microsieverts per hour. But, some Fukushima residents want the sediments dredged out and buried elsewhere as radioactive waste. The government says the cost and effort to do this is not justifiable. The Ogaki agricultural dam is estimated to hold sediment containing 8 trillion Becquerels of cesium activity. A Namie official says worries about what might happen if the dam breaks, “...when asked what they [Environment Ministry] plan to do if the dams break, they have no answers. It’s painful to us that we can only give town residents the answers that the Environment Ministry gives us...” Another official worries about consumer impact, “No matter how much they are told that the water is safe, will consumers buy agricultural products from Namie, knowing that there is cesium at the bottom of local dams?” <http://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20160926/p2a/00m/0na/011000c>
- Tokyo may add more hurdles to Fukushima Daiichi restarts. Currently, government policy calls for the approval of host communities and host prefectures before restarts can happen. The new legislation would make it mandatory for F. Daiichi, and could possibly expand the number of required approvals to non-host municipalities in Fukushima Prefecture. Further, Tepco will have only three years after the legislation is approved to get it done. The new rule will be submitted to the Diet during its extraordinary session, which begins today. F. Daiichi lies within the 20-kilometer radius of F. Daiichi; the old “no-go” evacuation zone. F. Daiichi experienced no damage to any of the nuclear safety systems of its four units during the Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami of March, 2011.
<http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/09/24/national/japan-mulls-legislation->

[requiring-local-government-approval-restarting-fukushima-no-2-nuclear-plant/#.V-Z9I9Lr0dV](#)

September 22, 2016

- Fukushima InFORM says trace-levels of Pacific coastline radioactivity are peaking. The concentration of the F. Daiichi “fingerprint” isotope, Cs-134, has “increased considerably” since 2014, but this is nothing to worry about. The level has gone from barely detectible in off-shore locations in 2014, to no more than 3 Becquerels per cubic meter (ton of seawater) in 2015. The trend indicates “...that the smearing effect will continue to disperse the plume and that we are approaching the maximum.” However, concentration in Vancouver ocean water will probably double in 2016, and perhaps triple before it begins to decline. But, InFORM points out that these levels are nothing to worry about because will be hundreds of times less than Canada’s 10,000 Bq/m³ limit for drinking water. <https://fukushimainform.ca/2016/09/20/september-2016-informal-update/>
- The number of “farm inns” near the F. Daiichi’s evacuation zone is increasing. There are 24 of these inns in the Towa district of Nihonmatsu, roughly 40 kilometers from F. Daiichi, a few km. from the border of the mandated evacuation zone. Visitors may work on the farms and partake in cuisine grown there. The program is intended to assure Japanese citizens that Fukushima farm produce is safe to eat. The city’s farmer population dropped about 50% over the past half-century. However, the increase in necessary lodging for people working within the evacuation zone has spurred having these inns. To date, only about 1,000 people have taken advantage of the opportunity, but it is expected that those numbers will swell. It is hoped the inns will counter unfounded rumors that persist throughout Japan. <http://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20160921/p2a/00m/0na/016000c>
- Namie cattle are now being used to study the effects of low-level radiation exposure. The article has been released by the Associated Press. Roughly 200 are tested every three months. Researchers draw blood, collect urine, and check for unusual lumps or swollen lymph nodes. This is point at which objective reporting dwindles and makes in accord with the AP’s on-going antinuclear agenda. The report contains numerous misstatements, exaggerations, and negative innuendos. For example, the article states that the animals live in “radioactivity that is 15 times the safe benchmark.” The article is referring to the ultra-conservative Tokyo guideline for decontamination, which is not a benchmark for safety. Further, the article also says Namie is “...a ghost town with no prospect of being habitable for years,” even though 87% of Namie’s former population has been allowed to make visits and over-night stays at their homes since 2014. For these people, the remaining restrictions will be lifted by Tokyo in six months. <http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/wireStory/cows-fukushima-radiation-zone-find-purpose-science-42269800>
- F. Daiichi staff prevents groundwater overflow caused by Typhoon Malakas from reaching the sea. The company held a Press conference on September 21st, and provided pictures of the F. Daiichi staff’s efforts. <http://photo.tepco.co.jp/en/date/2016/201609-e/160921-02e.html> -- <http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/nu/fukushima->

[np/handouts/2016/images/handouts_160921_01-e.pdf](http://handouts/2016/images/handouts_160921_01-e.pdf) However, Japan's popular Press made it sound as scary as possible. Japan Times said the situation was "raising fears of tainted water flooding out to the plant's port area." The Asahi Shimbun said, "there is a possibility that some of it spilled into the sea," and later adds, "...most of the water may have poured into the sea..." As it turns out, only one of the numerous piezometers for measuring groundwater level indicated a rise to 3cm above ground-level, but Tepco pointed out that there is a much higher wall around it so there is little chance that any of the water made it to the sea. A Tepco official said, "We will analyze the seawater because we cannot determine whether groundwater containing radioactive materials has actually leaked." None of these reports mention that the entire shoreline is covered by an impermeable wall that virtually assures there will be no outflow to the sea. Further, there is no mention of the actual contamination level in the one suspect piezometer, though it is dubbed "tainted".

<http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/09/21/national/typhoon-rain-raises-tainted-fukushima-plant-groundwater-near-surface/#.V-JmPNLr0dU> --
<http://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/AJ201609210047.html>

September 19, 2016

- Japan creates laser technology to break up solidified corium. Corium is the re-solidified material resulting from meltdown of a nuclear fuel core. Removal of corium from F. Daiichi units #1, 2, & 3, is a problem because of the inaccessible locations of the material due to the high radiation levels in each containment (PCV). The Japan Atomic Energy Agency, Hitachi-GE Nuclear Energy Ltd. and Sugino Machine Ltd. have jointly developed new laser technology that could possibly solve the problem. On September 8th, the three-party group said the technology is "highly adaptable to decommissioning work" because water can be sprayed to prevent contaminated dust from dispersing while the laser beam moves and cuts the debris. The dense, extremely hard corium beds need to be crushed into small pieces to effect removal and eventual disposal. The technology can cut up any thickness of the debris regardless of conditions inside PCVs, in both water-filled and dry spaces. The laser system promises to be less problematic than drills and other cutting tools for remote-control in narrow spaces, eliminating problems such as being jammed or damaging of cutting edges. <http://www.fukushimaminponews.com/news.html?id=726>

September 15, 2016

- Tepco begins disassembly of F. Daiichi unit #1's prefabricated outer enclosure. The enclosure was erected in 2011 to stanch the release of atmospheric radioactive isotopes. It has been a complete success. Now, it is time to disassemble the structure in order to remove debris from the March 12, 2011, hydrogen explosion. This must be done to eventually move the used bundles in the spent fuel pool to the ground-level storage facility. The roof was removed last year, with the final section taken off on October 5th. After nearly a year of following ultra-cautious procedures, the first side-wall panel was removed on September 13th. It weighed 20 tons and covered nearly 400 m². A Fukushima prefectural official said, "Steady progress is necessary in reconstruction, but we hope they will carry on the procedure with safety as the No. 1 priority." Tepco will

use tarpaulins to prevent release of airborne radioactive materials after the enclosure is fully disassembled. Tepco and Tokyo have set a 2020 target date for used fuel removal. http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/2016/1323201_7763.html --

http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/nu/fukushima-np/handouts/2016/images/handouts_160913_01-e.pdf --

<http://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/AJ201609130070.html>

- Tepco posts the contamination level in the unit #1 & 2 common exhaust drain sump. The depressurizations of March 12 (unit 1) and March 13-14, 2011 (unit 2), resulted in large volumes of radioactive gasses flowing up and out of the common stack. The sump collected any condensation left behind by the exhaust gasses. The water in the pit is nearly two feet deep. Samples were taken by F. Daiichi staff and found to have the following radioactive isotopic concentrations: gross Beta activity is 6×10^7 Becquerels per liter, Cesium-134 is 8.3×10^6 Bq/l, and Cs-137 is 5.2×10^7 Bq/l. https://www4.tepco.co.jp/en/nu/fukushima-np/handouts/2016/images/handouts_160913_02-e.pdf

September 12, 2016

- Fukushima Medical University finds no connection between thyroid cancer and the nuke accident. Professor of Epidemiology Tetsuya Ohira reported, "At the present stage, we have found no evidence pointing to any relationship between More than 300,000 children have been screened with state-of-the-art ultrasound technology. The children's records were divided into three groups; (1) those in which one percent or more of the people had an external radiation dose of 5mSv or more, (2) those where 99.9% or more of the people had an external radiation dose of 1mSv or less, and (3) all others. Less than 0.01% of the children tested positive for thyroid anomalies in all three groupings. The similar rates between the three exposure groups showed there was no correlation with the nuke accident releases. Professor Ohira explained, "We had already released findings on the prevalence of thyroid malignancies or possible malignancies by area, including *Nakadori*, *Aizu* and *Hamadori*. This time, we divided the municipalities by radiation doses for comparison. What is significant is that there was no difference by area or individual." The team also reported that 112 of the cohort were found to have nodules that tested positive for carcinoma. <http://www.iaif.or.jp/en/external-radiation-exposure-found-to-be-unrelated-to-prevalence-of-thyroid-cancer-in-minors-aged-18-and-younger/> -- <http://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/AJ201609100031.html>
- 99.9% of Japanese foods were well-below national standards for radioactivity in 2015. Seventeen northern prefectures have had their farm and marine products tested since the nuke accident. A Food Safety Policy Division official said, "The cesium levels of 99.99 percent of vegetables, tubers and roots have dropped below 25 becquerels. There must be farm products for which we can scale down inspections if cultivation management continues to be carried out properly as in the past." A non-profit group official said, "No matter how you look at it, it is excessive to inspect all cattle. Even if the scope of inspections is scaled down, there will be no change in risks involving beef." Many feel that since the risk of cesium contamination is extremely low, funds for tests should be used for fighting

disease-causing germs of a much higher risk. Japan's radiocesium limit of 100 Becquerels per kilogram is ten times lower than the European Union, and 12 times lower than America's 1,200 Bq/kg standard. More than 260,000 items were tested in 2015, and only a smattering of wild vegetables, meats, and seafood failed to pass the test. Of the 264 items that failed, 259 were wild mushrooms, freshwater fish, and other "hard to control" foodstuffs. None of the seafood taken from waters offshore from Fukushima Prefecture were above-standard. Regardless, food producers continue to complain about public radiophobia hurting business. One said, "We are still suffering from groundless rumors."

<http://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20160909/p2a/00m/0na/023000c>

- Nearly 200,000 tons of F. Daiichi's stored water has been stripped of radioactive Strontium. More than 720,000 tons have been run through the multi-stage purification system (ALPS), but detectible levels of Sr-90 remain after the process. Tepco added a Strontium-stripping technology to allay public fears. Once stripped of Sr-90, all that remains is biologically-harmless Tritium. While scientific evidence shows that the Sr-90 stripped water should be discharged to the sea, local fisheries fear that unfounded rumors would further damage the market for seafood. http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/betu16_e/images/160909e0101.pdf

September 8, 2016

The status of the Fukushima Daiichi "ice wall" has been a major news story this week. The Press claims the wall is failing due to accelerated rainwater run-off. Tepco's regularly-posted data on in-ground temperatures show that the run-off has caused some superficial thawing. Obviously, Japan's Press continues to doubt Tepco's honesty.

- Actual F. Daiichi "ice wall" data reveals it is not melting. Over the past weekend, Japan's Press made it seem as if the frozen earth wall surrounding the basements of F. Daiichi's four damaged units was melting due to the series of typhoons that have struck the Tohoku coast. However, the data posted on 8/25 shows that melting occurred only at the surface, and the rainwater had absolutely no impact at depth. More than 95% of the already frozen locations showed little or no surface thawing. Most of the remainder show it in the top meter of the 30-meter wall. A few of the locations on the inland stretch softened deeper than one meter, with two of the more than 1,500 locations down to five meters, and one spot to a depth of nine meters. In other words, none of the F. Daiichi ice wall has not come close to fully melting. Once again, we Japan's Press has exaggerated to the maximum. https://www4.tepco.co.jp/en/nu/fukushima-np/handouts/2016/images/handouts_160825_01-e.pdf The 9/8/16 postings show that all twenty of the readings in strategically-placed "temperature monitors" are now below 0° Celsius. Only the few locations near one of land-side wall sections where freezing is not allowed by Tokyo is thawed to a depth of more than six meters. All other locations seem to have recovered from the temperature dips experienced with the most recent typhoon. https://www4.tepco.co.jp/en/nu/fukushima-np/handouts/2016/images/handouts_160908_01-e.pdf
- Also in the above link, we find that the injection of concrete into the slowly freezing locations is working. One of the five former problem locations is now

fully frozen, and the other four are steadily showing a steady trend which is approaching 0°C. Unfortunately, none of Japan's Press outlets have reported this.

- The Mainichi Shimbun believes the "ice wall" resembles a "bamboo screen". In complete disregard for the data showing the thawing of the ice wall is superficial (above), the Mainichi says, "The ice wall has holes in it." There are generally two reasons behind the editorial. First, "There has been almost no drop in the amount of radioactive water produced." But, the Mainichi fails to believe Tepco's continual posting that the ice wall is not supposed to stop the production of contaminated water because nearly all of it comes from leaks out of the reactor cooling systems. Second, a bevy of mostly-anonymous "experts" are evoked. One un-named person says, "TEPCO's claim that the ice wall is highly effective at blocking the water flow is utterly bankrupt." Nagoya Professor Akira Asaoka, is even more provocative, "The ice wall isn't really a 'wall' per say, but more like a bamboo screen, which has gaps. It's obvious that the ice wall's ability to block water is poor." In both cases, the actual intent of the barrier is completely ignored. <http://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20160907/p2a/00m/0na/011000c>
- Former USNRC Chair Dale Klein says Japan should release all purified F. Daiichi water to the sea. He calls for a controlled release, meaning it should be done at a relatively slow pace. Unfortunately, Klein feeds the Press' continual fixation on the unfounded fear of a large accidental release when he says, "It is much better to do a controlled release in my view than to have an accidental release. I get nervous about just storing all that water when you have about a thousand tanks. You have all the piping, all the valves, everything that can break." All that remains after full treatment of the water is biologically-innocuous Tritium, a naturally-occurring isotope of Hydrogen. Klein admits that a rapid release "will not be a safety issue, but it will be an emotional issue. A lot of people are not going to know what tritium is and they're just going to perceive that the water is glowing in the dark." <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-09-05/treated-fukushima-water-safe-for-release-tepco-adviser-says> (*Comment – Catering to unfounded fears and misconceptions only insures their continuation. IMHO, just do it! When nothing negative happens, the public will understand there is nothing to fear and the Tritium issue can be put to bed.*)

September 5, 2016

- Ten percent of Naraha's population has returned home. Tokyo's evacuation order was rescinded last year, allowing the pre-evacuation population of over 7,000 to return. Only 681 have taken advantage of the opportunity, but it is a start. A town official said, "We expect the town's population to go up in steps." Mayor Yukiei Matsumoto says the town may have been overly optimistic, "With our expectations, we somewhat inflated the repatriation goal," but he expects accelerated repopulation once more infrastructure is effected. Naraha's radiation level is actually only half of that in the prefectural capital, Fukushima City – 0.1 micro sievert per hour vs. 0.23 µSv/hr. But, residents still say they fear residual F. Daiichi radiation, especially with respect to children. One Naraha grandfather said, "Work is still under way at the plant to prepare for decommissioning, and we are concerned about radiation exposure. We cannot encourage our

grandchildren to return.” More than half of those who have returned are age 65 or older. <http://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/AJ201609050042.html>

- NHK World says F. Daiichi fuel remains molten, which is not true. Internationally-popular NHK World makes the following statements, “Japan's academic societies are soliciting robot technologies that will allow direct surveying of molten fuel in the crippled nuclear reactors in Fukushima,” and, “Removing the molten fuel is considered the most difficult step in dismantling the plant.” In fact, NHK used the term “molten fuel” four times in the brief article. Nowhere is it stated that the formerly melted fuel re-solidified once cooling water flow was re-introduced in units #1, 2, & 3 by *March 15, 2011*!! NHK is usually reliable with its Fukushima reports, but they dropped the ball on this one. http://www3.nhk.or.jp/nhkworld/en/news/20160904_12/
- Japan’s Press fixates on F. Daiichi ice wall melting due to typhoons. The Asahi Shimbun reports that typhoons hitting the Tohoku coast this summer have caused some surface melting of the frozen soil surrounding the four damaged units at F. Daiichi. The newspaper makes it sound as if the entire project is a failure when it says, “TEPCO admitted the underground wall of frozen dirt is not working.” However, that’s not what Tepco actually said. The company reported that partial melting happened at two sections of the more than 1,000 refrigerant pipes in the earth. In addition, the newspaper posts that the minor, largely superficial melting allowed contaminated groundwater to leak from around the building basements and flow into the Pacific. But, Tepco actually said in *might* have caused some of the groundwater to move “toward the sea” – not into it. Also, a less than three inch temporary rise in groundwater level at the steel and concrete, sea-side impermeable wall is made to seem as a precursor to a catastrophic outflow into the ocean. <http://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/AJ201609020020.html>
- The NRA posts its decision on burial of high-level nuclear waste. The Nuclear regulation Authority says radioactive debris resulting from nuclear unit decommissioning must be buried at least 70 meters deep for 100,000 years. Conclusive data shows that used nuclear fuel bundles decay to below naturally occurring Uranium levels in about 500 years...not 100 centuries. Thus, the decision follows the NRA’s typically over-reactive and absurdly conservative socio-political agenda, catering to the Press at-large and millions of Japanese experiencing extreme radiophobia; believing that even the most miniscule level of radioactivity is a certifiable death threat. The NRA has radioactive wastes divided into four categories, depending on radiation levels; extremely high, high (L1), comparatively low (L2) and extremely low (L3). The NRA decision applies to L1 material, which is largely used nuclear fuel bundles that are not recycled. The nuclear utilities will be responsible for managing the disposal for 300-400 years, and Tokyo for the remainder of the 100,000 year period. <http://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/AJ201609020034.html>

September 1, 2016

- Almost 100% of Fukushima rice harvested in 2015 had no detectible contamination. Of the more than 10 million bags tested that year, 99.99% contained no detectible radioactive Cesium. None of the few with detectible

radiocesium exceeded the national marketing standard of 100 Becquerels per kilogram. 2015 was the first harvest where no tested bags exceeded the limit. Fukushima Prefecture found 71 bags (0.0007%) over the limit in 2012, 28 bags (0.0003%) in 2013 and two bags (0.00002%) in 2014. The prefecture says one reason for the historically-low percentage of above-standard tests is the use of potassium chloride-based fertilizer that retards absorbance of Cesium.

<http://www.fukushimaminponews.com/news.html?id=719>

- 99% of Fukushima-area fish and shell-fish have no detectible F. Daiichi radioactive Cesium. In Tepco's latest monthly data posting, only one of 89 caught fish showed barely detectible Cesium-134; the "fingerprint" isotope for F. Daiichi contamination. The one stone flounder recorded less than one Becquerel per kilogram above minimum detectability. The fish was taken 15 kilometers from F. Daiichi, offshore of Odaka ward in Fukushima Prefecture. Meanwhile, five of the seventeen fish caught inside the F. Daiichi break-wall contained detectible Cs-134, but only two (a marbled sole and a greenling) contained more than the 100 Bq/kg limit for marketing in Japan. https://www4.tepco.co.jp/en/nu/fukushima-np/f1/smp/2016/images/fish02_160824-e.pdf -- https://www4.tepco.co.jp/en/nu/fukushima-np/f1/smp/2016/images/fish01_160824-e.pdf (*Comment - It is important to note that the limit for radio-Cesium contamination in the United States is 1,200 Bq/kg.*)
- Okuma Town will offer its municipal property for the temporary contaminated rural waste facility. Okuma is one of the two F. Daiichi host communities, along with Futaba. The town office says they will offer 95 hectares of municipally-owned land to the Environment Ministry for the interim storage site. This will be about 10% of the total Okuma land area that Tokyo wants to use for the facility. The town expects to show the plan to the municipal assembly in September and then explain it to townspeople. Among the land plots to be offered to the ministry are schoolyards, including a 1-hectare tract inside the *Fureai Park Okuma* sport facility, as well as community halls and municipal housing. The ministry says they would like to purchase the land once the formal offer is made, but the Town office has yet to decide on a leasing option which will allow the property to be re-used after the 30-year facility closes.

<http://www.fukushimaminponews.com/news.html?id=720>

Information Notices

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<http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html>

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[http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/gen-comm/reg-issues/2013/.](http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/gen-comm/reg-issues/2013/)

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Part 21 and Miscellaneous

Regulatory Issue Summary 2015-19, Revision 1, "Decommissioning Timeliness Rule Implementation and Associated Regulatory Relief," dated September 27, 2016
ML16008A242

FirstEnergy

FENOC – Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2; Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 1; and Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit No. 1 – Request for Withholding Information from Public Disclosure
ADAMS Accession No. ML16202A376

Davis-Besse

CONFIRMATORY ORDER RELATED TO NRC REPORTS 05000346/2016008;
INVESTIGATION REPORT NO. 3-2015-009; DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION
ADAMS Accession Number: ML16245A488

: MID-CYCLE ASSESSMENT LETTER FOR DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION
(REPORT 05000346/2016005)
ADAMS Accession Number ML16242A348

Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station - NRC Security Baseline Inspection Report
05000346/2016405 - Cover Letter Only
ADAMS Accession Number ML16257A312

Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station - Closure of Unresolved Item 05000346/2016010-01 -
Inspection Report 05000346/2016010
ADAMS Accession Number ML16260A137

Perry

MID-CYCLE ASSESSMENT LETTER FOR PERRY NUCLEAR POWER PLANT (REPORT
05000440/2016005)
ADAMS Accession Number ML16239A336

Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit No. 1 - Use of Encryption Software for Electronic Submission of Safeguards Information (CAC No. MF8298).

ADAMS Accession No.: ML16238A049

Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit No. 1 - Issuance Of Amendment Concerning Revision To The Perry Nuclear Power Plant Emergency Plan (CAC No. MF7046)

ADAMS Accession No. ML16158A331

PERRY NUCLEAR POWER PLANT—NRC TEMPORARY INSTRUCTION 2515/191, MITIGATION STRATEGIES, SPENT FUEL POOL INSTRUMENTATION AND EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS INSPECTION REPORT 05000440/2016009

ADAMS Accession Number ML16258A452

Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1 – Baseline Emergency Preparedness Biennial Exercise Inspection Report 05000440/2016502

ADAMS Accession Number: ML16265A048

Perry Nuclear Power Plant - NRC Temporary Instruction 2515/191, Mitigation Strategies, Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation and Emergency Preparedness Inspection Report 05000440/2016009. ML16258A452

Beaver Valley

MID-CYCLE ASSESSMENT LETTER FOR BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2 (REPORT 05000334/2016005 AND 05000412/2016005)

ADAMS ML16235A293

Beaver Valley Power Station, Submittal of Discharge Monitoring Report.

ML162

Portsmouth Facilities

09/20/2016 American Centrifuge Decommissioning Publicity

ML16253A058

12/15/2016 American Centrifuge Project - Decommissioning Publicly Noticed Call

ML16253A057

NRC Approval of Request to Suspend Review of Decommissioning Program for the American Centrifuge Lead Cascade Facility.

ML16217A012

Fermi 1

No reports

Fermi 2

MID-CYCLE ASSESSMENT LETTER FOR FERMI POWER PLANT (REPORT
05000341/2016005)

ADAMS ACCESSION NUMBER ML16239A322

Fermi Power Plant, Unit 2 – Baseline Emergency Preparedness Biennial Exercise Inspection
Report 05000341/2016502

ADAMS Accession Number: ML16252A296

Ltr 09/09/16 Fermi Confirmation of initial Lic Exam (MEB)

ADAMS Accession Number: ML16256A080

NOTICE OF AVAILABILITY OF THE FINAL SUPPLEMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
STATEMENT FOR LICENSE RENEWAL OF FERMI 2

ADAMS Accession Number: ML16146A690

FERMI, UNIT NO. 2 - REVISED RELIEF REQUEST NO. PRR-007 FOR THE
INSERVICE TESTING PROGRAM THIRD 10-YEAR INTERVAL (CAC NO.
MF7573)

ADAM ACCESSION #: ML16230A508

Fermi, Unit 2, Revision 20 to Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Chapter 5, Reactor Coolant
System and Connected Systems.

ML16165A456

Fermi, Unit 2, Revision 20 to Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Chapter 4, Reactor.

ML16165A455

NUREG-1437, Supplement 56, Volume 1, "Fermi, Unit 2, Generic Environmental Impact
Statement for License Renewal of Nuclear Plants."

ML16259A103

NUREG-1437, Supplement 56, Volume 2, "Fermi, Unit 2, Generic Environmental Impact
Statement for License Renewal of Nuclear Plants."

ML16259A109

Fermi 3

No reports