

To: Jim Mehl, ERSIS Manager  
From: Zack Clayton, Rad Coordinator  
Subject: July Monthly Report  
Date: August 4, 2016

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## Beans

Training: 1  
Drills: 0  
Meetings: 2  
Technical Assistance: 3  
Public Assistance: 0

Web Page Views: There were 26 page views in July.

Radiological Safety Program Pages: <http://epa.ohio.gov/derr/ersis/er/rad.aspx>

## Coming Attractions

8/4 IREP Power Plant  
8/17 Perry dry run  
8 /23 IREP Tech Group  
9/13 Perry evaluated exercixe

## Facility updates

### **Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station**

Davis Besse operated at full power for July

On June 30<sup>th</sup> 2016 the control room received alarms associated with the Safety Features Actuation System. The alarm conditions should have required entering the Tech Spec and required a plant shutdown within 6 hours. Ultimately the system was repaired correctly and retested and determined to be safe. However after an internal meeting with FENOC Senior Leadership it was determined that the six hours had been exceeded.

### **Perry Nuclear Power Plant**

Perry operated at full power for most of July

On July 6, at 1852 due to suspected thunderstorms in the area, the halon fire suppression system at the training center activated, there was no evidence of smoke or fire, and the training center is not in the protected area. Fire trucks were dispatched and assisted in the investigation. There were no injured or contaminated personnel. No NRC report is required.

## **Beaver Valley Power Station**

### **Beaver Valley Unit I**

Unit I operated at full power for the month.

### **Beaver Valley Unit II**

On July 29 BVPS conducted a review of the unit 2 Fire Protection Safe Shutdown Report, in this review a postulated fire could possibly and spuriously open all three steam generator atmospheric dump valves. This could adversely affect plant cooldown rate and shutdown margin. To mitigate the potential of this occurring hourly fire tours of the affected areas were initiated. This is an 8 hour reportable condition to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. There has not been a fire and the plant is operating safely under normal operating conditions. See Event 52132

## **DTE**

### **Fermi II**

Fermi II operated at full power for the month.

On July 8 2016, at 19:09 [EDT] a severe thunderstorm warning was issued for Monroe County. This severe thunderstorm warning included the Fermi 2 site. Due to the high winds encountered during the thunderstorm, the Technical Specification (TS) for the secondary containment pressure boundary was not met two times during the storm. See event 52076.

On July 14, 2016, Fermi 2 Environmental Engineering determined that a notification to the State of Michigan Department of Licensing and Regulatory Affairs, Bureau of Fire Services, Storage Tank Division is required regarding discovery of a leaking underground fuel oil storage tank. The underground fuel oil storage tank was unearthed while excavating for 120kv switchyard cable replacements. This is an underground fuel

oil storage tank from the 1950s or earlier was not in service at the site, and it is unknown when the tank was last used. See event 52085.

### **Fermi III**

There was no activity reported for Fermi III

### **Portsmouth Enrichment Plant**

There was no activity reported for the Portsmouth site.

### **Other Sites**

On July 19, Andrew Barienbrock, DDAGW, contacted us for a situation related to the Montgomery Co. terrorism exercise. It was regarding using meters to detect radiation in drinking water and what if anything we could do. Handheld meters are not sensitive enough to use for this. I indicated that the plant staff could draw a sample or the RAT could sample the water, and then transport the sample to ODH Lab for analysis. Turn around time is about 6 hours after the sample analysis starts. This would be faster than sending the sample out to a commercial lab. The isotope of concern was 137 Cesium.

### **Activity**

- 7/5 IREP Tech teleconference on Docusign presentation. Fee is based on the number of users but it is unclear how a user is defined. ODH will contact Docusign and determine this. It may affect the paper flow and form submission for sampling.
- 7/11 URSB – Normal business for the Board, NRC, and FENOC reports. Ohio EPA briefed the Board on the draft Drinking Water Protective Action Guidance. This fills an important gap in public health protection for contaminated water. The board asked Zack Clayton Clayton to gather comments from the member agencies and submit them prior to the comment closing date of July 25. Comments were submitted on July 19.
- 7/16-21 EOC Active for RNC in Cleveland - There were no missions or events that involved Ohio EPA related to the convention.
- 7/28 NEPAC - FENOC, FEMA, State, and County reports were given, OEPA briefed on the Draft Drinking Water PAGs, and there was a lengthy discussion of breaking in the new phone system at the various points of contact. The old system was using 1970s dedicated copper wire equipment and repairs were becoming difficult.

## Office Issues

Statistics, NRC Reports, News, and ADAMS References

### Operating Power Levels

July

Date	BV1	BV2	DB	Perry	Fermi2
1	100	100	100	100	100
4	100	100	100	100	100
11	100	100	100	100	100
18	100	100	100	97	100
25	100	100	100	92	100
31	100	100	100	100	100

### Event Reports

Part 21	Event Number: 52055
Rep Org: CURTISS WRIGHT Licensee: TARGET ROCK, CURTISS-WRIGHT FLOW CONTROL CORPORATION Region: 1 City: FARMINGDALE State: NY County: License #: Agreement: Y Docket: NRC Notified By: JOHN DEBONIS HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA	Notification Date: 06/30/2016 Notification Time: 16:52 [ET] Event Date: 05/02/2016 Event Time: [EDT] Last Update Date: 06/30/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE	Person (Organization): HAROLD GRAY (R1DO) OMAR LOPEZ (R2DO) MICHAEL KUNOWSKI (R3DO) THOMAS HIPSCHMAN (R4DO) PART 21/50.55 REACT (EMAI)

#### Event Text

PART 21 - INADEQUATE SWAGING AND ADHERENCE OF SILICONE O-RING AND SILICONE PAD IN SOFT SEAT MAIN DISC AND PILOT DISC ASSEMBLIES

The following is a summary of the information from the email provided:

"[The] soft seat main disc and pilot disc assemblies are installed in certain process solenoid operated valves, some of which perform safety related functions such as containment isolation. These designs include a soft seat insert in the main and/or pilot disc that could loosen and potentially result in excessive leakage or failure of the valve to operate properly.

"Supplier:

Target Rock, Business Unit of Curtiss-Wright Flow Control Corporation  
1966E Broadhollow Road, East Farmingdale, NY 11735

"Should you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact Michael Cinque, General Manager at (631) 293-3800.

"Plant Site Locations:

Arkansas Nuclear One, Grand Gulf, Peach Bottom, Sequoyah, Browns Ferry, Hatch, **Perry**, Shearon Harris, Brunswick, Limerick, Pilgrim, South Texas, Dresden, Millstone, Quad Cities, Susquehanna, Duane Arnold, Nine Mile Point, River Bend, Three Mile Island, **Fermi**, Palo Verde, Saint Lucie, Watts Bar."

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Power Reactor	Event Number: 52076
Facility: FERMI Region: 3 State: MI Unit: [2] [ ] [ ] RX Type: [2] GE-4 NRC Notified By: DEREK ETUE HQ OPS Officer: BETHANY CECERE	Notification Date: 07/08/2016 Notification Time: 23:14 [ET] Event Date: 07/08/2016 Event Time: 20:05 [EDT] Last Update Date: 07/08/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL	Person (Organization): PATTY PELKE (R3DO)

Unit	SCRAM Code	RX CRIT	Initial PWR	Initial RX Mode	Current PWR	Current RX Mode
2	N	Y	100	Power Operation	100	Power Operation

**Event Text**

**SECONDARY CONTAINMENT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION NOT MET**

"On July 8 2016, at 19:09 [EDT] a severe thunderstorm warning was issued for Monroe County. This severe thunderstorm warning included the Fermi 2 site. Due to the high winds encountered during the thunderstorm, the Technical Specification (TS) for the secondary containment pressure boundary was not met two times during the storm for a duration time of 2 seconds total (one second for each event).

"At 20:05:21 Secondary Containment pressure went positive (0.22 inches of water gauge) and at 20:05:22 returned back below plant TS limits (-0.35 inches of water gauge).

"At 20:06:33 Secondary Containment pressure went greater than TS limits (-0.10 inches of water gauge) and at 20:06:34 returned below TS limits (-0.28 inches of water gauge).

"All plant equipment responded as required to the changing environmental conditions and Reactor Building HVAC returned the secondary containment pressure below the TS limits. There were no radiological releases associated with this event. The severe thunderstorm warning for the area was cancelled at 20:30.

"The TS requirement is to maintain secondary containment greater than or equal to 0.125 inches of vacuum water gauge (TS SR 3.6.4.1.1) for secondary containment operability. Declaring secondary containment inoperable is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material.

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

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Power Reactor	Event Number: 52079
Facility: DAVIS BESSE Region: 3 State: OH Unit: [1] [ ] [ ] RX Type: [1] B&W-R-LP NRC Notified By: ANDREW MILLER HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON	Notification Date: 07/10/2016 Notification Time: 10:29 [ET] Event Date: 07/01/2016 Event Time: 05:42 [EDT] Last Update Date: 07/10/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS	Person (Organization): PATTY PELKE (R3DO)

Unit	SCRAM Code	RX CRIT	Initial PWR	Initial RX Mode	Current PWR	Current RX Mode
1	N	Y	100	Power Operation	100	Power Operation

**Event Text**

**FAILURE TO PERFORM TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REQUIRED SHUTDOWN**

"At 2342 [EDT], June 30, 2016, the Control Room received panel alarms associated with Safety Features Actuation System (SFAS) Channel 2. Subsequent investigation revealed the alarms were due to a loss of supplied power caused, in part, by a level permissive in the Borated Water Storage Tank (BWST) to be inoperable. With SFAS Channel 1 BWST level transmitter previously declared inoperable for maintenance, the on-shift operating crew did not correctly identify that technical specification (TS) 3.3.5, Condition B applied which is a 6-hour shutdown required action. At 0245, following a duty team call when the condition was re-assessed, the crew entered the proper additional Condition B and correctly identified they were approximately 3 hours into a 6-hour shutdown specification. At 0330 the condition was inappropriately exited on the premise that an operable but degraded situation could be justified. The plant did not initiate a shutdown required by technical specification but, in retrospect, should have initiated and completed a shutdown within 6 hours of 2342.

" On July 1 at 1351, the BWST level transmitter for SFAS Channel 1 was repaired and declared operable [and exited TS 3.3.5 Condition B], however, the total time exceeded the 6-hour shutdown action. The plant remained stable throughout this event. On July 9, 2016, while internally discussing the event among FENOC senior leadership, it was determined that a 4-hour report would have been made if the shutdown was initiated. Hence, this report is retrospective in that a 10 CFR 50.72(h)(2)(i) required report should have been made upon the initiation of any nuclear plant shutdown required by plant's technical specification.

"A Licensee Event Report will be provided pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) as a condition that was prohibited by the plant's technical specification. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

[At 1325 EDT on July 1, it was determined that the justification for SFAS channel 2 BWST level permissive to be operable but degraded could not be supported and reentered TS 3.3.5 Condition B.]

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Part 21	Event Number: 51923
Rep Org: AZZ - NUCLEAR LOGISTICS, INC. Licensee: AZZ - NUCLEAR LOGISTICS, INC. Region: 4 City: FORT WORTH State: TX County: License #: Agreement: Y Docket: NRC Notified By: TRACY BOLT HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO	Notification Date: 05/12/2016 Notification Time: 19:23 [ET] Event Date: 05/10/2016 Event Time: [CDT] Last Update Date: 07/13/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE	Person (Organization): ART BURRITT (R1DO) JAMIE HEISSERER (R2DO) ERIC DUNCAN (R3DO) VIVIAN CAMPBELL (R4DO) PART 21/50.55 REACT (EMAI)

**Event Text**

**PART 21 - INITIAL NOTIFICATION OF MASTERPACT BREAKER FAIL TO CLOSE**

The following information was a licensee received facsimile;

"Pursuant to 10CFR 21.21(d)(3)(ii), AZZ/NLI is providing written notification of the identification of a potential defect or failure to comply.

"On the basis of our evaluation, it has been determined that there is sufficient information to determine if the subject condition is left uncorrected could potentially create a Substantial Safety Hazard or could create a Technical Specification Safety Limit violation as it relates to the subject plant applications. The plants will need to evaluate their application to determine if the identified condition could have an impact to the plant operation.

"The following information is required per 10CFR 21.21(d)(4):

"(i) Name and address of the individual or individuals informing the Commission.

Tracy Bolt, Director of Quality Assurance  
Nuclear Logistics, Inc.  
7410 Pebble Drive  
Ft. Worth, TX 76118

"(ii) Identification of the facility, activity, or the basic component supplied for such facility or such activity within the United States which fails to comply or contains a defect.

"Masterpact NT and NW style circuit breakers.

-The failure of the breaker being ready to electrically close after being subjected to an 'Anti-Pump condition'.

Note: The specific application where the failures have occurred is when the breaker is being utilized as a starter for closing into an inductive load like a fan motor.

"(iii) Identification of the firm constructing or supplying the basic component which fails to comply or contains a defect.

AZZ/ Nuclear Logistics  
Fort Worth, Texas 76118

"(iv) Nature of defect or failure to comply and the safety hazard which is created or could be created by such defect or failure to comply.

"Possible 'failure to close' condition of Masterpact breakers NT and NW style, that are being used with specific logic schemes that are subjected to 'anti-pump' conditions during normal operation. These breakers have a higher susceptibility to not return to the ready to close position after the close signal has been removed.

"PSEG reported approximately 14 instances with different breakers in different cubicles where they initiated an electric close order, and the breakers failed to close. All of the 14 instances were in applications of being used to start an inductive load.

"NLI inspected three of the breakers (all NWs) that were returned by PSEG and could not fully replicate the problem as described by the plant. NLI was only able to repeat the failure to close when performing an 'anti-pump' test. The failure to close was intermittent, but could be duplicated. When the anti-pump condition was not present, NLI could not duplicate a failure to close. Visual inspections of the tested breakers did not reveal any visible damage to the breaker linkages, latches, shunt close or shunt trip assemblies.

"Schneider Electric (SE) performed testing of three Masterpact NW08 breakers (operated to beyond design life) and duplicated the fail to close condition as described by the plant. It was determined that a standing close signal with a trip/open signal applied is determined to be the root cause of the fail to close issue. The SE testing confirms that the presence of this condition can cause the breaker anti-pump latch to receive excessive forward pressure. When the nose of the latch impacts the close coil plunger, it will 'rock' up in the rear, catching on the top of the mechanism plate. Once the close voltage is removed, and the plunger retracts, the latch may or may not let go. If the latch does not release, then application of the close coil voltage will simply activate the close coil plunger and without the latch underneath the

plunger, the breaker will not close.

"PSEG performed extensive troubleshooting at the Hope Creek plant and discovered that all of the affected breakers were in an anti-pump condition when the breakers failed to close.

"(v) The date on which the information of such defect or failure to comply was obtained.

"This revised notification is being submitted based on the information gathered on 5/10/2016 after additional testing, at the request of River Bend, was performed. This additional testing was requested following the notification that was provided to the plants listed below, in the original issue of this letter in February 2016.

"The evaluation of the condition was originally completed in September of 2012. The issue was originally determined at that time to not be a reportable condition based on the breaker not containing a defect and the condition was believed to be attributed to the specific logic scheme at the plant. To date, this issue has only been reported to NLI from the following plants, PSEG Hope Creek and River Bend Station. No other plants have reported this specific fail to close condition. NLI was in direct communication with the plants when this issue was first being evaluated and the failure analysis were being conducted. The two affected plants were knowledgeable of the condition.

"(vi) In the case of a basic component which contains a defect or fails to comply, the number and location of these components in use at, supplied for being supplied for, or may be supplied for, manufactured or being manufactured for one or more facilities or activities subject to the regulations In this part.

"Plants which have been supplied the Masterpact circuit breakers.

"PSEG Hope Creek - Issue Identified for NW style

River Bend - Issue identified for NT style

Callaway - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.

St. Lucie - This issue has not been identified however. the potential should be evaluated.

Turkey Point - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.

**Beaver Valley** - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.

**Davis Besse** - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.

Three Mile Island - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.

Calvert Cliffs - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.

Hatch -This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.

STP - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.

SONGS - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.

KHNP Ulchin - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.

KHNP Kori - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.

Duke Oconee - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.

Duke McGuire - Non-safety (not supplied by NU), This issue has not been identified.

"(vii) The corrective action which has been, is being, or will be taken; the name of the individual or organization responsible for the action; and the length of time that has been or will be taken to complete the action.

"NLI originally created a technical bulletin to address the issue and recommendations. However, since new information has been recently identified, NLI TB-12-007 will be revised, as the proposed solution will not reliably solve the problem for all postulated events. Upon completion of the revised technical bulletin, it will be re-submitted to the plants which have been supplied the Masterpact breakers from NLI.

"(viii) Any advice related to the defect or failure to comply about the facility, activity, or basic component that has been, is being, or will be given to purchasers or licensees.

"NLI is currently working with the OEM of the circuit breaker to determine the permanent solution to correct the possible failure to close event after the breaker is subjected to an Anti-Pump condition.

"Advice for plants with breakers currently installed: Evaluate the applications where the breakers may be potentially subjected to an Anti-Pump condition; where the close coil will be energized for an extended period of time.

"The circuit breaker will continue to operate if this condition is present however there may need to be human interaction with the circuit breaker by manually pressing the trip/open button on the front of the circuit breaker to free the mechanism.

"Please contact NLI with any questions or comments.  
Sincerely,  
Tracy Bolt  
Director of Quality Assurance"

\* \* \* UPDATE ON 5/13/16 AT 1153 EDT FROM TRACY BOLT TO BETHANY CECERE \* \* \*

"Added 4 additional plants that were inadvertently left off the list.

"Browns Ferry - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.  
Fort Calhoun - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.  
Wolf Creek - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.  
Seabrook - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated."

Notified R1DO (Burrirt), R2DO (Heisserer), R3DO (Duncan), R4DO (Campbell), and Part 21 Group via email.

\* \* \* UPDATE AT 1612 EDT ON 7/13/16 FROM TRACY BOLT TO JEFF HERRERA \* \* \*

The following information was received via facsimile:

Additional information in attachment has been updated since the original report provided on 5/13/2016.

Additional facility identified as impacted:  
St. Lucie - Issue identified

For additional information contact:

Tracy Bolt  
Director of Quality Assurance  
AZZ/NLI Nuclear Logistics  
7410 Pebble Drive  
Fort Worth, Texas 76118

Notified the R1DO (Ferdas), R2DO (Rich), R3DO (Kunowski), R4DO (Gaddy) and Part 21 Reactor group (via email).

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Power Reactor	Event Number: 52084
Facility: FERMI Region: 3 State: MI Unit: [2] [ ] [ ] RX Type: [2] GE-4 NRC Notified By: JEFF YEAGER HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA	Notification Date: 07/13/2016 Notification Time: 22:43 [ET] Event Date: 07/13/2016 Event Time: 19:55 [EDT] Last Update Date: 07/13/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL	Person (Organization): MICHAEL KUNOWSKI (R3DO)

Unit	SCRAM Code	RX CRIT	Initial PWR	Initial RX Mode	Current PWR	Current RX Mode
2	N	Y	100	Power Operation	100	Power Operation

#### Event Text

##### SECONDARY CONTAINMENT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION NOT MET

"On July 13, 2016, at 19:50 EDT a severe thunderstorm warning was issued for Monroe County. This severe thunderstorm warning included the Fermi 2 site.

"Due to high winds encountered during the thunderstorm, the Technical Specification (TS) for secondary containment pressure boundary was not met numerous times. The duration of time that the secondary containment Technical Specification was not met was approximately 1 second for each event.

"All plant equipment responded as required to the changing environmental conditions and Reactor Building HVAC returned secondary containment pressure within TS limits. At 20:40 EDT secondary containment vacuum was greater than the TS operability limit of 0.125 inches of vacuum water gauge (TS SR 3.6.4.1.1) and steady, and the LCO was exited. There were no radiological releases associated with this event.

"Declaring secondary containment inoperable is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material.

"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."

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Power Reactor	Event Number: 52085
Facility: FERMI Region: 3 State: MI Unit: [2] [ ] [ ] RX Type: [2] GE-4 NRC Notified By: BRETT JEBBIA HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK	Notification Date: 07/14/2016 Notification Time: 13:01 [ET] Event Date: 07/14/2016 Event Time: 09:15 [EDT] Last Update Date: 07/14/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION	Person (Organization): MICHAEL KUNOWSKI (R3DO)

Unit	SCRAM Code	RX CRIT	Initial PWR	Initial RX Mode	Current PWR	Current RX Mode
2	N	Y	100	Power Operation	100	Power Operation

#### Event Text

#### OFFSITE NOTIFICATION OF GOVERNMENT AGENCIES OF AN OIL SPILL TO THE ENVIRONMENT

"At 0915 EDT on July 14, 2016, Fermi 2 Environmental Engineering determined that a notification to the State of Michigan Department of Licensing and Regulatory Affairs, Bureau of Fire Services, Storage Tank Division is required regarding discovery of a leaking underground fuel oil storage tank. The underground fuel oil storage tank was unearthed while excavating for 120kv switchyard cable replacements. This is an underground fuel oil storage tank from the 1950s or earlier was not in service at the site, and it is unknown when the tank was last used. The size of the tank is estimated at 2,250 gallons. An unknown quantity of oil has leaked into the immediate surrounding ground and is currently contained in the soil. There is currently no indication of any of the leakage flowing beyond the site boundary or reaching any waterways. Fermi 2 is conducting an investigation to determine the appropriate steps to address the storage tank and impacted soil.

"A notification to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency is not required.

"This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) for an event or situation related to the protection of the environment for which a notification to another government agency will be made.

"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."

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Power Reactor	Event Number: 52132
Facility: BEAVER VALLEY Region: 1 State: PA Unit: [ ] [2] [ ] RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP NRC Notified By: KEN TIEFENTHAL HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ	Notification Date: 07/29/2016 Notification Time: 01:51 [ET] Event Date: 07/28/2016 Event Time: 21:20 [EDT] Last Update Date: 07/29/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY	Person (Organization):

10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION	BLAKE WELLING (R1DO)
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Unit	SCRAM Code	RX CRIT	Initial PWR	Initial RX Mode	Current PWR	Current RX Mode
2	N	Y	100	Power Operation	100	Power Operation

**Event Text**

POSTULATED FIRE EVENT THAT COULD ADVERSELY IMPACT SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT

"A review of the Beaver Valley unit 2 Fire Protection Safe Shutdown Report (FPSSR) found that a postulated fire had the potential to spuriously open all three individual steam generator atmospheric dump valves in addition to a common residual heat release valve. Previous analysis did not consider all of the valves spuriously opening from a fire. The potential impact of these valves spuriously opening is a cooldown that could adversely affect shutdown margin.

"Hourly fire tours have been put in place for those fire areas that have the potential to initiate this condition.

"This condition is reportable as an 8 hour report in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B).

"The NRC Resident Inspector was notified."

This condition is not applicable to unit 1.

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**News**

Posted on [July 1, 2016](#) by [Portsmouth Daily Times](#)

**DOE gives \$3 million to monitor Piketon cleanup**

By Frank Lewis - [flewis@civitasmedia](mailto:flewis@civitasmedia)

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) announced today it has awarded a grant of approximately \$3 million to the Ohio Environmental Protection Agency (Ohio EPA) to support ongoing oversight and monitoring of the environmental cleanup at the former Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant Site in Piketon, Ohio.

The Portsmouth/Paducah Project Office of DOE Environmental Management (EM) will administer the new grant over a five-year period that will end on June 30, 2021. The anticipated annual funding during that time period will be up to approximately \$616,000. The grant will support ongoing activities funded under a previous grant that expired on June 30.

The financial assistance helps the State of Ohio recover costs and supports a framework for successful cooperation between DOE, the U.S. EPA, and Ohio EPA in addressing environmental impacts associated with past and present activities at the site. Numerous

activities will continue as they pertain to environmental requirements, regulatory orders, agreements, and relevant sampling and investigational work plans pertaining to ongoing site decontamination and decommissioning actions, and environmental restorations and cleanup projects. That includes providing information on preferred regulatory and technical approaches to ongoing cleanup and related decisions, including future site uses.

Environmental sampling data at the Department of Energy's Portsmouth Site is now accessible to the public through an enhanced geographic mapping tool on the Internet.

The tool offers access to information such as publicly available environmental documents, and groundwater-level and analytical data.

The Portsmouth/Paducah Project Office (PPPO) Environmental Geographic Analytical Spatial Information System (PEGASIS) features an external GIS (Geographic Information System) and analytical data viewer that provides easy access to environmental data.

The EM cleanup at the site commenced in 1989, and the plant ceased gaseous diffusion enrichment operations in 2001.

In May it was announced the decontamination and decommissioning work at the former Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant was again funded to the tune of \$40 million more than last year, in appropriations found in Water Appropriations legislation.

U.S. Senator Rob Portman (R-OH) announced at that time the Senate had passed new funding for the cleanup project. The funding supposedly maintains current employment levels for the D&D work at the Portsmouth Plant.

Reach Frank Lewis at 740-353-3101, ext. 1928, or on Twitter @franklewis.

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## **Reactor closures threaten Clean Power Plan -- NEI**

[Hannah Northey](#), E&E reporter

Published: Friday, July 8, 2016

The nuclear industry is once again warning the Obama administration that a spate of more than a dozen reactor closures -- present and future -- threatens to sidetrack signature climate goals and clean energy initiatives.

At risk are President Obama's "all of the above" energy policy and U.S. EPA's Clean Power Plan, which both rely on the existence and expansion of nuclear power plants that are currently struggling -- and some closing -- in gas-rich energy markets, the Nuclear Energy Institute [told](#) the Department of Energy in comments released today.

What's more, wind and solar don't have the scale to replace massive reactors that have churned out carbon-free power for decades, NEI said.

"Both of these initiatives are at serious risk, to the extent the United States continues to shut down operating nuclear power plants, and fails to make provision for the new nuclear generating capacity that will be needed starting in the next decade," the trade group wrote.

NEI made the comments earlier this month in response to DOE's request for information for its sweeping, high-level assessment of the nation's energy infrastructure, the Quadrennial Energy Review, a cornerstone of Obama's climate plan.

While the nuclear industry group's message is not a new one, recent announcements from companies like Exelon Corp. that reactors could close in Illinois and New York have put a fine point on the challenges the U.S. fleet is facing.

Nuclear currently provides 20 percent of all electricity and more than 60 percent of greenhouse-gas-free electricity, according to the U.S. Energy Information Administration.

But some reactors have already shut down ahead of schedule, and the industry has warned that an additional 15 to 20 units may be on the chopping block.

If Exelon and other utilities follow through with threats to close their plants in Illinois, New York and elsewhere, the nation could see an increase in carbon dioxide emissions of up to 64 million

tons, depending on what fuel is used to replace those plants, NEI said. That's enough to erase the large gains states would make under the Clean Power Plan, according to the trade group. "As a point of comparison, the Environmental Protection Agency's analysis includes an estimate that the Clean Power Plan will lead to CO2 emissions being reduced 82 million tons by 2020, so the loss of the avoided emissions from the nuclear plants that have closed or are scheduled to close negates more than one-half of this expected reduction," NEI wrote in a release accompanying its July 1 comments.

Twitter: [@HMNorthey](#) Email: [hnorthey@eenews.net](mailto:hnorthey@eenews.net)

Source: <http://www.eenews.net/eenewspm/2016/07/08/stories/1060039999>

Note: Davis Besse is one of the plants mentioned for possible closing in some sources.

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**Fukushima news.** This is included as a case study for the types of issues that may develop in the case of an incident at a US reactor. The Fukushima Daiichi Reactors are identical to some US reactors and are the closest incident that has occurred to compare to US concerns.

Source: <http://www.hiroshimasymndrome.com/fukushima-accident-updates.html>

### **July 28, 2016**

- Unit #2's re-solidified fuel (corium) is confirmed to be inside the reactor vessel (RPV). Tepco has posted a detailed Press handout concerning the muon scanning results for unit #2 (link below). On page four of the handout, we can see that the corium remains in the bottom head of the RPV. The image also indicates that some of the damaged fuel is still in the core area, where it was located before the March, 2011, tsunami-spawned nuclear calamity. Page six of the handout shows that of the 210 tons of fuel and support structures that originally comprised the undamaged core, 20-50 tons remain in the core barrel and "about 160 tons" is collected in the RPV's bottom head. The inherently limited resolution with muon imaging compels approximation of the masses, which leaves the speculative door open for believing that as much as 14% of the core might possibly have worked its way through some of the bottom head and re-solidified on the base-mat beneath the RPV. However, if we compare the unit #2 core barrel image with unit #1, we see a drastic difference. Unit #1's core barrel showed brightly, indicating full relocation. Unfortunately, but not unexpectedly, only one major news outlet in Japan, NHK World, reported on Tepco's news release. However, NHK's article makes it seem that the corium in the bottom head of the RPV is still molten, which is absolutely incorrect. (unit #2 imaging) [http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/nu/fukushima-np/handouts/2016/images/handouts\\_160728\\_01-e.pdf](http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/nu/fukushima-np/handouts/2016/images/handouts_160728_01-e.pdf) -- (unit #1 imaging) [https://www4.tepco.co.jp/en/nu/fukushima-np/handouts/2015/images/handouts\\_150319\\_01-e.pdf](https://www4.tepco.co.jp/en/nu/fukushima-np/handouts/2015/images/handouts_150319_01-e.pdf) -- [http://www3.nhk.or.jp/nhkworld/en/news/20160728\\_31/](http://www3.nhk.or.jp/nhkworld/en/news/20160728_31/)
- Less than 1% of food-fish caught near F. Daiichi remains contaminated. Only one of the 113 fish taken from within 20 kilometers of Fukushima Daiichi in April contains any detectable Cesium-134. The Pacific Ocean has a background concentration of Cesium-137 from post-WWII nuclear weapon's testing. Cs-137 has a half-life of ~30 years, which means it will be detectable for more than 300

years. But, the Cs-134 has only a two year half-life and literally disintegrated from the Pacific two decades after atmospheric weapon's testing stopped. Any Cs-134 currently found in the Pacific waters or its biota must have come from the Fukushima accident in 2011. Cs-134 was readily detectible in food-fish near F. Daiichi soon after the bulk of radioactive emissions were expunged from the four damaged units. The current lack of detectability strongly indicates that aqueous releases to the Pacific have greatly diminished and the fish caught within 20 km of the nuke station are safe to eat. [https://www4.tepco.co.jp/en/nu/fukushima-np/f1/smp/2016/images/fish02\\_160722-e.pdf](https://www4.tepco.co.jp/en/nu/fukushima-np/f1/smp/2016/images/fish02_160722-e.pdf)

- On the other hand, only 5 of the 18 fish caught inside the F. Daiichi port area have no detectible Cs-134. This should come as no surprise because the inner quay – where all releases to the sea originate - is barricaded and sealed with a permeable “silt dam” which allows water level inside the quay to rise and fall with the tides. The silt dam filters the greater amount of both Cesium isotopes and keeps them within the quay itself. But, the port area outside the quay, within the break-wall, continues to receive tide-spawned Cesium isotopes, slowing the drop in concentrations in the meat of port-area food-fish. It is important to note that 55% of the fish taken from the port have less than the national limit for consumption of 100 Becquerels per kilogram – the highest percentage to date. [https://www4.tepco.co.jp/en/nu/fukushima-np/f1/smp/2016/images/fish01\\_160722-e.pdf](https://www4.tepco.co.jp/en/nu/fukushima-np/f1/smp/2016/images/fish01_160722-e.pdf)
- Tepco wants its nuclear stations removed from the “Pokemon Go” app. Virtual monsters are believed to be hidden at nuke plants, and this includes at least one of Tepco's three stations; F. Daiichi. F. Daini, and Kashiwazaki-Kariwa. App creator, Niantic Inc., will only say that Fukushima Daiichi and Daini stations were not included in the design. However, some of the monster locations are within the government-mandated F. Daiichi evacuation zone, where players can enter after going through registration procedures. Fukushima Governor Masao Uchibori says it is “unfavorable” for citizens to enter the zone while playing Pokemon Go. No players have yet been found on Tepco premises or within the Fukushima evacuation zone. <http://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20160726/p2a/00m/0na/015000c> -- <http://english.kyodonews.jp/news/2016/07/423087.html>

## July 25, 2016

- Regional banks have been reopening in evacuation zone communities. Residents have been slow to repopulate after the lifting of Tokyo's 2011 withdrawal order. The banks feel that reopening branches would be an incentive for the reluctant residents to return. The Namie evacuation order is scheduled to be retracted next March, so Abukuma Shinkin has reopened a branch in the town. “We hope our branch, where local people can stop by freely and enjoy chatting, will become a place that can console them,” said branch chief Takahiro Abe, “Being the first to reopen a branch in the town will hopefully allow us to attract people and see rises in deposits and loans.” The prior reopening of Toho

Bank in Naraha has not had much impact. The branch was reopened in April, seven months after the evacuation order was lifted. Only about 8% of Naraha's residents have gone home.

<http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/07/24/business/fukushima-banks-hope-to-lure-nuclear-evacuees-back-by-reopening-branches/#.V5SvQSnr0dV>

- A Russian company says it can be a part of the F. Daiichi wastewater clean-up effort. State-based Rosatom's waste disposal facility has built a prototype system that strips all radioactive isotopes, including Tritium. The naturally-occurring isotope of Hydrogen is removed through distillation and electrolysis. Although biologically harmless, Tritium's weak emissions concern millions of Japanese. These fears have kept Tepco from expunging the more than 600,000 tons of water that have been cleansed of all isotopes except Tritium. The Rosatom system is said to reduce Tritium by a factor of 6,000, which would bring the concentrations well-below Japan's drinking water limit. Rosatom says duplicating the facility at F. Daiichi would probably cost about \$700 million.  
<http://asia.nikkei.com/Politics-Economy/International-Relations/Japan-nuclear-cleanup-next-target-in-Russian-economic-offensive>
- Tokyo declassifies 7.7 tons Chiba City's contaminated waste. When collected, the wastes had a radioactivity level of greater than 8,000 Becquerels per kilogram and were designated as "specified", which disallowed ordinary trash burial. However, natural radioactive decay has dropped 3.5 tons of zeolite down to 6,100 Bq/kg, and 4.2 tons of incinerator ash down to 4,000 Bq/kg. While this technically allows the 7.7 tons to be disposed as ordinary trash, Chiba Municipal Government will probably continue storage of the material because it is afraid regular disposal will cause residents anxiety and harm the trash disposal business. <http://jen.jiji.com/jc/eng?q=eco&k=2016072200629> -- <http://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20160722/p2a/00m/0na/021000c>
- Rent-free evacuee housing is extended for another year. Fukushima Prefecture's government announced the decision on July 15<sup>th</sup> in Fukushima City. This will affect the evacuees from ten of the eleven municipalities impacted by the Tokyo mandate of 2011. The one community that has decided to not honor the extension is Naraha, which will consider the rent-free option on an individual basis. The prefecture decided to prolong the housing benefit because the lifting of the evacuation order differs from community to community inside the evacuation zone. The 10 affected municipalities are the whole areas of five towns (Naraha, Tomioka, Okuma, Futaba and Namie) and two villages (Katsurao and Iitate). In addition, it is applied to portions of Minamisoma City, Kawamata Town and Kawauchi Village. In Minamisoma, the program only applies to evacuees from "difficult-to-return" and "residency-restricted" zones, plus another zone preparing for the lifting of the evacuation order.  
<http://www.fukushimaminponews.com/news.html?id=699>
- Tokyo tells nuclear operators to be wary of the new "Pokémon Go" game. The Nuclear Regulation Authority is calling for heightened security to prevent people from entering the premises of nuclear plants while playing the game on a smartphone. **This is because three teens entered the employee parking lot of an Ohio nuclear plant while playing the game and were apprehended by station security guards.**

[http://www3.nhk.or.jp/nhkworld/en/news/20160722\\_28/](http://www3.nhk.or.jp/nhkworld/en/news/20160722_28/) -- <https://public-blog.nrc-gateway.gov/2016/07/19/pokemon-go-not-a-go-at-nuclear-plants/>

### July 21, 2016

- Greenpeace Japan continues to foment Fukushima radiophobia because of detectible radioactive contamination in Fukushima riverbanks, estuary, and marine sediments. Their posted report says, “The radiological impacts of the Fukushima nuclear disaster on the marine environment, with consequences for both human and nonhuman health, are not only the first years. They are both ongoing and future threats, principally the continued releases from the Fukushima No. 1 plant itself and translocation of land-based contamination throughout Fukushima Prefecture, including upland forests, rivers, lakes and coastal estuaries.” Of course, the report fails to mention that the contaminants are essentially fixed in the sediments and the so-called “consequences” are exaggerated assumptions on the part of Greenpeace. For example, Kendra Ulrich, senior global energy campaigner at Greenpeace Japan, says the purified waters containing only biologically-harmless Tritium is “highly contaminated”, the ice wall designed to reduce groundwater in-leakage to the turbine buildings is supposed to “reduce groundwater contamination”, and the three long-ago re-solidified reactor cores are still “molten”. <http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/07/21/national/greenpeace-reports-jump-radioactive-contamination-fukushima-waterways/#.V5C32ynr0dU> -- <http://www.ecowatch.com/radiation-fukushima-rivers-200-times-higher-than-pacific-ocean-seabed-1937971722.html>

### July 18, 2016

- 70% of recently-returning evacuees have less than 1 millisievert/yr exposure. A September survey of 65 returning citizens in Kawamata, Tomioka, and Katsurao, revealed the low average. The maximum exposures were 2.62 mSv/yr in Kawamata, 1.78 mSv/yr in Tomioka, and 1.84 mSv/yr in Katsurao. When combined with Japan’s estimated natural background of ~1.5 mSv/yr, those repopulating in the three towns will actually have much less exposure than millions of Americans living in the Rocky Mountains and surrounding high-altitude plateaus. The survey was run by the Nuclear Regulation Authority. All exposures were adjusted relative to lifestyle, hours indoors, and the time spent outdoors. The exposures are currently less than the readings last September due to the constant decay of radioactive isotopes. The exposure data was released by the NRA at a Fukushima Prefecture Press Conference on July 6<sup>th</sup>, but only reported in Fukushima Minpo. <http://www.fukushimaminponews.com/news.html?id=694>
- Tokyo says it will remove many “difficult to return” designations next decade. “Difficult to return” is defined as locations where 2011 estimates of annual exposure were fifty millisieverts per year or greater. The revisions could affect 25,000 of the more than 36,000 evacuees who fled from the zones Tokyo designates as “difficult to return”. The government says it will begin relaxing restrictions in 2021. The potentially affected locations are mostly in Okuma,

Futaba, and Namie Towns. Tokyo admits that radiation levels in the zones are considerably less than to 50 mSv/yr criterion due to rainwater flushing of surface contaminants and ever-diminishing nature of radioactive decay. For example, the installed radiation monitor in Okuma, one of the co-host communities for F. Daiichi, is now showing an actual level of about 9 mSv/yr. In principle, when exposure levels drop below 20 mSv/yr people are allowed to return home. However, the socio-political baggage that would come with dropping the restrictions at that level has kept the “difficult to return” designation in-vogue. The Reconstruction Agency says that exposure concerns are the main reason why only about 10% of the population say they will go home if and when the restrictions are removed.

<http://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/AJ201607170022.html>

## July 14, 2016

- Minamisoma City is now fully re-opened to residents. Tokyo has formally lifted the government-imposed evacuation order of 2011, allowing as many as 10,800 more citizens to have unrestricted access to their homes. About half of the city was evacuated following the nuke accident. The pre-accident population was nearly 64,000. Two of the evacuation zones were re-opened previously, but the latest lifting of the restrictions for the Odaka and Haramachi Districts affects the largest number of evacuees to date. This is the fifth cancellation of a Fukushima evacuation order, and the largest in land-area and population to have the mandate lifted. About 2,000 of the former residents have returned. The relatively low percentage of people taking immediate advantage of the order being lifted is attributed to the long period of Tokyo’s ban of returning home resulting in many families finding suitable employment and accommodations elsewhere, and (of course) the fear of low level radiation exposure. Mayor Katsunobu Sakurai said, "This is not the end of our reconstruction, it is the beginning."  
[http://www3.nhk.or.jp/nhkworld/en/news/20160712\\_06/](http://www3.nhk.or.jp/nhkworld/en/news/20160712_06/) --  
<http://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/AJ201607120054.html> --  
<http://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20160712/p2a/00m/0na/018000c>
- The Science Council of Japan held a symposium on communicating food safety. Participants focused on the theme of radiation communication because deep-rooted issues of fear and misinformation continue more than five years since the nuke accident. Among the many speakers was Fukushima Medical University’s Dr. Yuji Hasegawa, who said that much of the problem revolves around Fukushima citizens “negatively labeling” local produce. He called for all Japanese to have radiation-monitoring instruments to decide on food safety for themselves. Another speaker, Kyoto University’s Dr. Yoko Niiyama, spoke about inadequate risk communication, saying, “What the public knows is limited by the information environment.” He explained that distrust of the government and the Press led people to gather their own information and form strong, often incorrect opinions. He suggested that actual experts should try to understand what people fear and inform as a response. One other participant, Tokyo University’s Dr. Nobuyuki Yagi, said the huge volume of purified water at F. Daiichi contains only one

radioactive isotope, the biologically-innocuous Tritium, which has held up releasing the water to the sea. He cited Dr. Niiyama's research showing that consumers "intuitively reject" products that might contain radioactivity, especially from Fukushima sea foods. <http://www.jaif.or.jp/en/science-council-of-japan-holds-symposium-on-food-and-radiation-risk-communication/>

- Kyodo News posts that the unit #2 re-solidified fuel (corium) is in the reactor. As earlier reported (and subsequently deleted) by NHK World, Kyodo says the Muon scanning image shows that the 200 tons of corium has accumulated in the bottom head of the Reactor Pressure Vessel.  
<http://english.kyodonews.jp/news/2016/07/421290.html>
- An accidental spill of mildly-contaminated water occurred at F. Daiichi on Monday. Workers were using a vacuum truck to remove contaminated rainwater from a storage tank when a hose came loose. About 80 liters (16 gallons) of the stored rainwater spilled out and into a drainage ditch before flow was stopped. Samples of the water revealed about 1,200 Becquerels of Strontium-90 per liter. All of the spilled water was contained and recovered by the workers. Nothing leaked into the barricaded inner port (quay). Radiation monitors downstream of the incident showed nothing detectibly unusual.  
[http://www3.nhk.or.jp/nhkworld/en/news/20160712\\_12/](http://www3.nhk.or.jp/nhkworld/en/news/20160712_12/)

## July 11, 2016

- Contaminated soils are transferred from schools to Okuma. Twenty-eight of the bags were removed from Akai Junior High in Iwaki on July 2<sup>nd</sup>; the first day of the transports. They were shipped by truck to a Fureai parking lot in Okuma's Ottozawa District. The lot is capable of storing 10,000 cubic meters of the contaminated soil bags. It is estimated that Fukushima schoolyards currently have a total of 300,000 cubic meters of bagged materials. The transporting of the bags will be Saturdays, public holidays, summer vacations and other days when schools are closed. Iwaki Mayor Toshio Shimizu said, "We would like to thank the people of Okuma town where the waste is being moved. We expect to carry polluted soil from school facilities as soon as possible for the sake of children's safety and peace of mind."  
<http://www.fukushimaminponews.com/news.html?id=692>
- The Iitate Village office opened on July 1<sup>st</sup>. The evacuation order for the village is scheduled to end March 31, 2017. Iitate partially resumed office functions in April, 2014, but most administrative tasks were performed in Fukushima City. On July 1<sup>st</sup>, long-term visits were approved for interested residents. Two districts are allowed to have long-term visits, but less than less than 4% have exploited the opportunity. Regardless, Iitate Mayor Norio Kanno said, "We would like to do our best to have as many villagers as possible return home permanently."  
<http://www.fukushimaminponews.com/news.html?id=691>
- Nikkei.com asks who will pay for F. Daiichi decommissioning. Former site manager Akira Ono said, "Decommissioning is a project that will last 30 or 40 years, and we will have to pass the work on to future generations. We must turn this place from a disaster site to a decommissioning site." The project will take

new technology and a lot of money. How much money? It is estimated that the total decommissioning cost will approach \$100 billion. But, Nikkei says "...nobody mentions who will pay the bill and how. Currently, compensation and decontamination are being covered by the state, on Tepco's behalf, without charging interest. Tepco and other power companies will eventually have to reimburse the government for compensation payouts through a pool of contributions. The government will recoup decontamination costs by selling the Tepco shares it owns." The problem is that Japan's move towards liberalization of the electricity market could "become increasingly difficult to maintain." Professor Noriko Endo of Keio University says, "If Japan is to continue using nuclear power, it needs to have a long-term perspective, including about how nuclear power stations should be operated, rather than making ad hoc plans." Nikkei.com is the world's largest financial newspaper with an international circulation of over 3 million. <http://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Trends/Who-will-pay-for-decommissioning-the-Fukushima-reactors>

### July 7, 2016

- The remaining Fukushima evacuee number drops below 90,000. On July 4<sup>th</sup>, Fukushima Prefecture announced that the combined total of remaining mandated and voluntary evacuees stands at 89,323. Nearly 48,000 remain in the prefecture, and just over 41,000 reside elsewhere. The highest confirmed total was in May, 2012, and stood at nearly 165,000. <http://www.jaif.or.jp/en/number-of-fukushima-evacuees-falls-below-90000/>
- Cattle breeding resumes in Naraha Town. When Tokyo ordered everyone to leave in 2011, there were about 40 cattle breeders in the area. The Town restarted the breeding process soon after the evacuation order was lifted last September. Now, one breeder has taken over the "test breeding". Four calves were delivered to his farm on Wednesday, and he hopes to eventually reach full operation once he proves there is no danger to the livestock. Shuko Watanabe, the breeder, says each calf cost around \$9,000, but the town covered half the cost. It will be two years before the calves are mature and ready for market. [http://www3.nhk.or.jp/nhkworld/en/news/20160707\\_02/](http://www3.nhk.or.jp/nhkworld/en/news/20160707_02/)

### July 4, 2016

- Independent international researchers say Pacific Ocean radiation is nearly normal. The Scientific Committee on Oceanic Research (SCOR), bringing together oceanographic experts from around the world, reports that Pacific radioactivity is rapidly returning to pre-Fukushima levels. Co-author Pere Masque states, "As an example, in 2011 about half of fish samples in coastal waters off Fukushima contained unsafe levels of radioactive material. However, by 2015 that number had dropped to less than 1 percent above the limit." He cautioned that residual contamination in the seafloor near northeastern Honshu Island suggests that "Monitoring of radioactivity levels and sea life in that area must continue." SCOR was formed in 1957 as an international ocean research

collaboration between scientists from 35 countries. About 250 scientists participate in SCOR activities on a voluntary basis.

<http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/07/04/national/science-health/pacific-ocean-radiation-back-near-normal-after-fukushima-study/#.V3phWCnr0dV> --  
<https://www.ceoe.udel.edu/about/affiliated-programs/scientific-committee-on-oceanic-research>

- U.S. and Canada work together on Fukushima Pacific Ocean tracking. The early question was whether or not predictions of the spread of the plume would be accurate. JoEllen McBride of Fukushima InFORM explains, “The biggest hurdle to testing is the sheer size of the ocean, which makes monitoring and sampling difficult. Another problem is that water is constantly in motion, affected by wind, competing currents and temperature, which can make predictions difficult.” Yet, most reputable projections have proved accurate. The detected concentrations of radioactive material are exceedingly low and can only be analyzed using state-of-the-art laboratory equipment. The concentrations are so low that the “level of monitoring done by [American] states does not meet the level for research.” This means, the trivial concentrations are well-below scientific and regulatory concern. However, some states, like Alaska, collaborate with researchers and agencies to assure their citizens that there is nothing to worry about.  
<http://www.voanews.com/content/states-agencies-work-together-tracking-fukushima-radiation/3402040.html>

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## Information Notices

Unless otherwise noted, these are ADAMS Accession documents, are publicly available, and will be accessible via the public web site Electronic Reading Room in the Agency Document Access and Management System (ADAMS),

<http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html>

or to access generic communications files on the NRC Homepage:

<http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/gen-comm/reg-issues/2013/>.

To access these documents use the ADAMS Accession number listed with the title.

This is in the format of : ML#####A###

## Part 21 and Miscellaneous

Information Notice 2016-09, “Recent Issues Identified When Using Reverse Engineering Techniques in the Procurement of Safety-Related Components,” dated July 15, 2016

ADAMS Accession No. ML16075A285

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## FirstEnergy

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## **Davis-Besse**

Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station - NRC Security Baseline Inspection Report  
0500346/2016404 - Cover Letter Only  
ADAMS Accession Number ML16183A029

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Ltr 07/11/16 Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station - Alternative Dispute Resolution Session on  
July 21, 2016  
ADAMS Accession Number ML16193A495

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Ltr 07/13/16 Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station - Requalification Program Inspection  
ADAMS Accession Number ML16195A322

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SUMMARY OF JUNE 21, 2016, PUBLIC MEETING WITH FIRSTENERGY NUCLEAR  
OPERATING COMPANY TO DISCUSS THE 2015 END-OF-CYCLE PLANT PERFORMANCE  
ASSESSMENT OF DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR STATION  
ADAMS Accession Number ML16197A052

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Davis Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 1 - Regulatory Audit In Support Of The License  
Amendment Request To Implement Risk-Informed, Performance-Based, Fire Protection  
Program As Allowed By Title 10 Of The Code Of Federal Regulations, Paragraph 50.48  
ADAMS Accession No. ML16201A017

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DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT 1 – RELAXATION OF THE SCHEDULE  
REQUIREMENTS FOR ORDER EA-12-049, “ORDER MODIFYING LICENSES WITH REGARD  
TO REQUIREMENTS FOR MITIGATION STRATEGIES FOR BEYOND-DESIGN-BASIS  
EXTERNAL EVENTS” (CAC NO. MF0961)  
ADAMS Accession No.: ML16193A383

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Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 1 - Request for Additional Information Regarding  
Amendment Request to Revise Emergency Action Level Scheme (CAC No. MF7364)  
ADAMS Accession No. ML16196A015

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DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION—NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT  
05000346/2016002  
ADAMS Accession No. ML16207A600

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Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1 - Notification of NRC Triennial Fire Protection  
Baseline Inspection Request for Information; Inspection Report 05000346/2016009  
ADAMS Accession Number ML16210A043

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## **Perry**

PERRY NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, UNIT 1– INTERIM STAFF RESPONSE

TO REEVALUATED FLOOD HAZARDS SUBMITTED IN RESPONSE TO 10 CFR 50.54(f)  
INFORMATION REQUEST – FLOOD-CAUSING MECHANISM REEVALUATION (CAC  
NO. MF6099)

ADAMS Accession No.: ML16202A350

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Director's Decision DD-99-08

ML16172A228

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## **Beaver Valley**

JUNE 8, 2016, NRC GENERIC FUNDAMENTALS EXAMINATION RESULTS  
FOR BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION, UNIT 2 (COVER LETTER PUBLICLY  
AVAILABLE, ENCLOSURES WITHHELD FROM PUBLIC)

ADAMS Accession No. ML 16193A455

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BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION – EVALUATED EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS  
EXERCISE INSPECTION REPORT 05000334/2016502 AND 05000412/2016502

ADAMS Accession No. ML16202A286

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Beaver Valley Power Station, Submittal of Discharge Monitoring Report for May 2016.

ML16183A261

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Beaver Valley, Unit 2, Application for Order Consenting to Transfer of Licenses and Approving  
Conforming License Amendments.

ML16182A155

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Region I Operator Licensing Exam Schedule from 07/01/2016 to 07/30/2018.

ML16174A392

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## **Portsmouth Facilities**

Submittal of Centrus Energy Corp - Reply to a Notice of Violation; VI0-70-1113/2015-401-01.

ML16196A293

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American Centrifuge Operating, LLC (ACO) - Submits an Update Regarding Nominated  
Reviewing Officials for the American Centrifuge Lead Cascade Facility and American Centrifuge  
Plant.

ML16196A296

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06/16/2016 Summary of Drop-In Visit Meeting with Centrus Energy Corp and American  
Centrifuge Operating, LLC, Discussing Plans for Decommissioning and Terminating the ACO's  
Materials License for the Facility.

MLML16196A006

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Slides - Lead Cascade Decommissioning Plan Pre-Submittal Meeting - Presentation -  
Redacted.

ML16197A175

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NRC Response on Transfer of Security Responsibilities at Paducah-Governor Crossing Facility.  
ML16188A253

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American Centrifuge Operating, LLC, Submittal of Changed Pages of the Emergency Plan.  
ML16196A266

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American Centrifuge Plant - Submittal of Description of Change and Changed Pages to the Security Program.

ML16190A146

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Enclosure-DOE Evaluation of Updated Thin Client System Continuous Monitoring Report.

ML16188A243

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NRC Response on Updated Thin Client's Continuous Monitoring Report Part 1.

ML16188A224

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Audit of the DNFSB's Oversight of Nuclear Facility Design and Construction Projects (DNFSB-16-A-06).

ML16188A213

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2017 Lead Cascade Inspection Schedule (Non-Safeguards).

ML16182A078

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## **Fermi 1**

No reports

## **Fermi 2**

Fermi Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 2 - Cyber Security Problem and Identification Inspection Report  
05000341/2016406 - Cover Letter Only

ADAMS Accession Number ML16197A517

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REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON SEVERE ACCIDENT MITIGATION  
ALTERNATIVES FOR THE REVIEW OF THE FERMI 2 NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, LICENSE  
RENEWAL APPLICATION ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW (CAC NO. MF4064)

ML16188A192

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License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-545, Revision 3, "TS Inservice Testing Program Removal & Clarify SR Usage Rule Application to Section 5.5 Testing," Using the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process.

ML16207A433

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Fermi, Unit 2, Revision 20 to Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Chapter 2, Site Characteristics.

ML16165A453

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Fermi, Unit 2, Revision 20 to Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Chapter 3, Design of Structures, Components, Equipment, and Systems.

ML16165A454

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Fermi, Unit 2, Revision 20 to Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Chapter 1, Introduction and General Description of Plant.

ML16165A449

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Fermi, Unit 2, Safety Evaluation Report Related to the License Renewal.

ML16190A241

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Fermi, Unit 2, Submittal of Revision 20 Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, 10CFR50.59 and 10CFR72.48 Evaluation Summary Reports, Commitment Management Report & Revisions to Technical Requirements Manual & Technical Specifications Bases,...

ML16165A441

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### **Fermi 3**

No reports