

To: Jim Mehl, ERSIS Manager
From: Zack Clayton, Rad Coordinator
Subject: August Monthly Report
Date: September 1, 2015

Beans

Training: 0
Drills: 0
Meetings: 1
Technical Assistance: 3
Public Assistance: 3

Web Page Views: There were 19 page views in August.

Radiological Safety Program Pages: <http://epa.ohio.gov/derr/ersis/er/rad.aspx>

Coming Attractions

10/5 URSB
10/22 NEPAC

Facility updates

Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station

Davis-Besse operated at full power for the month.

Davis-Besse provided an update on the elevated levels of tritium in ground water that were first detected on February 3, 2015. The sample results for August show 13 samples above the agreed reporting threshold of 2000 picocuries of tritium per liter (pCi/L). Generally the sample results are holding steady or slightly decreasing. The highest sample result was 6246 pCi/L. The limit for tritium in drinking water is 20,000 pCi/L.

Perry Nuclear Power Plant

Perry operated at full power for the month.

Beaver Valley Power Station

At approximately 530 am on August 26, a single warning siren in Beaver County Pennsylvania was inadvertently activated. No emergency was declared at the Beaver Valley Power Station. The plant is required to report this event to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. See Event number 51345.

Beaver Valley Unit I

Unit I operated at full power for the month.

Beaver Valley Unit II

Unit II operated at full power for the month.

At 0837 EDT on August 17, 2015, it was determined that Beaver Valley Unit 2 had experienced a small oil leak of approximately 1 liter from equipment located inside the Alternate Intake structure. Some of which progressed to the Ohio River. Subsequent to confirmation of this discovery, notification was made to the following offsite agencies starting at 1030 EDT:

- National Response Center (Incident Report # 1125865)
- Pennsylvania (PA) Department of Environmental Protection
- Beaver County Emergency Management
- PA Emergency Management Agency
- Downstream water authorities (Midland Water Authority, Allegheny Ludlum, East Liverpool Water Co.)

The source of the oil leak has been stopped. Absorbent material has been placed to contain the oil that had leaked. See Event number 51323.

DTE

Fermi II

Fermi II operated at full power for the month.

Fermi III

Fermi III continues as a documentation evaluation.

Portsmouth Enrichment Plant

Activity

8/12 IREP Irep is envisioned to change to an oversight role. The subcommittees are: Nuclear Power Plant, Intermediate Phase, Radiological Technology, and Plan Development. These will be chaired by ODH. Work continues on the Radiological Task Force SME concept, ODH, OEPA, and OEMA are interested in this. DOE/RAP team or speakers may be invited to a future meeting. It would be nice if this could extend to an exercise as well.

Office Issues

Upgrading the Ludlum 2241-3 meters to blue tooth capability for use with Rad Rasponder. Purchase of two new units with bluetooth to complete our capability.

Statistics, NRC Reports, News, and ADAMS References

Operating Power Levels

August

Date	BV1	BV2	DB	Perry	Fermi2
1	100	100	100	100	88
3	100	100	100	100	100
10	100	100	100	100	100
17	100	100	100	100	100
24	100	100	100	100	100
31	100	100	100	100	100

Event Reports

Inadvertant Siren Activation

Lessons Learned

During a scheduled quiet test of the PNPP EPZ sirens on July 2, 2015 an inadvertent audible siren test was performed from Ashtabula County. The EPZ and Western Lake County sirens sounded for three minutes. The following are some lessons learned from this event:

The accidental sounding of the sirens was a human performance error. The individual performing the test confused the scheduled quiet test with an audible test that was scheduled the following week. The quiet test and the following week's audible test were both to be performed by Ashtabula County.

The Siren Standard Operating Procedure provides guidance for inadvertent siren activation. Part of this guidance is the use of the Emergency Alert System (EAS) to inform the public of the

inadvertent activation. The script used for the EAS message is contained in a software database that is used by the three counties. It takes time to go to the computer, startup the computer, run the database software, and print out the message to be read into the EAS. This caused about a half hour delay from the sounding of the sirens to the transmittal of the EAS message to the public.

The Siren SOP has been revised to include the wording of the EAS message for Inadvertent Siren Activation. This reduces the time needed to transmit the EAS message to the public.

When the EAS message was transmitted, the category of "Test" was used, instead of the correct category of "Civil Alert". The operator was not familiar with what the other categories were so she "pressed the one I always use" to send the message.

Discussions with the agency that oversees the EAS in Ohio revealed that the categories used on EAS messages are only seen by the EAS broadcasters. It is not used as part of the EAS message broadcast to the public. However, the category can have an effect on whether the message gets transmitted and how it is transmitted. Any "Test" category may or may not be broadcast by the radio/TV station. It is up to the EAS station to determine if the "Test" EAS message is broadcast to the public. All other EAS categories are required to be broadcast by the station. Cable and Satellite providers sometimes use the EAS category as part of the "text crawler" that they broadcast. If a category of "Fire" is used for a flooding incident, the crawler may indicate that the flooding is a "Fire Emergency" rather than a "Civil Alert". In the State of Ohio, the category "Civil Alert" should normally be used on any actual event messages initiated by the EMAs.

The correct EAS category was added to the Siren SOP for inadvertent siren activation.

Training for all dispatchers and EMA personnel on Siren Activation and the EAS is being scheduled in Ashtabula.

The State of Ohio is sending a technician to test/program the EAS encoders in the three EPZ counties to ensure the category "Civil Alert" is working. (Currently Lake County does not have the Civil Alert category on their equipment)

When the inadvertent audible siren test was performed, it was noted that the Western Lake County sirens sounded along with the EPZ sirens. Normally, the Western Lake County sirens had to be initiated by Lake County when Ashtabula or Geauga counties sounded sirens. This was due to the fact that siren radio signals did not always reach the Western Lake County sirens. Further investigation showed that when the vendor recently changed/added some of the radio repeater equipment, the radio signal was improved. The Western Lake County sirens now receive the siren activation signals from any county. This eliminates the requirement of Lake County having to send an additional siren activation signal in order to sound the Western sirens.

Lake County has eliminated the requirement to send an additional activation signal in order to sound the Western sirens.

Although the audible siren activation was a mistake, we learned some very valuable information from this event.

"The only real mistake is one from which we learn nothing"
See Licensee event report 51198.

Part 21	Event Number: 51280
Rep Org: NAMCO CONTROLS Licensee: NAMCO CONTROLS Region: 1 City: ELIZABETHTOWN State: NC County: License #: Agreement: Y Docket: NRC Notified By: KEVIN SUTHERBY HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN	Notification Date: 07/31/2015 Notification Time: 14:27 [ET] Event Date: 05/19/2015 Event Time: [EDT] Last Update Date: 07/31/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE	Person (Organization): RAY MCKINLEY (R1DO) GEORGE HOPPER (R2DO) CHRISTINE LIPA (R3DO) GREG WARNICK (R4DO) PART 21/50.55 REACT (EMAI)

PART 21 REPORT INVOLVING LIMIT SWITCHES EA180 AND EA170 MANUFACTURED IN A SPECIFIC DATE RANGE

The following information is an excerpt from a Namco Controls fax:

"Subject: Notification of Product Anomaly Namco Controls Division of Dynapar Corp EA180 & EA170 Limit Switches Manufactured March 25th 2014 through December 30th 2014.

"Dear Sir(s) / Madam(s),

"The purpose of this letter is to notify you of our resolution for the subject anomaly that was brought to our attention by the Nebraska Public Power District, Cooper Nuclear Station in Brownville, NE via our rep network (Mr. Curt Duphill) on May 19th 2015. On May 30th our senior engineer, Mr. Troy Kloss, visited the plant site during a plant shutdown to investigate the issue and determined that a Part 21 investigation was warranted. Dynapar's Namco Controls business sent out an early indication notice to customers as part of the investigation on 6/3/15 which included switches of date codes 1214 and 1314 (week-year). As a result of this initial notice, a second reported potential anomaly was identified by Salem Nuclear Power in Hancocks Bridge, NJ. However these switches at Salem were replaced previously and no root cause analysis was performed prior to the switches being discarded.

"Because of this anomaly the nuclear limit switch may not reliably state the condition of the device (in this case a main steam isolation valve) that the switch is measuring and could be a potential safety hazard depending on the nuclear power plant control logic.

"As a result of our internal investigation, we isolated the switch performance degradation to a compression spring in the limit switch assembly. We have validated lot control traceability of the compression spring in question, which contained 1100 suspect springs, to shipments within the subject date range and have determined 417 Namco limit switches were shipped to US customers with this potential anomaly. We are notifying the affected customers- see included

list. In addition, Namco Controls has changed our inspection criteria as of 07/31/2015 for this item in order to prevent future occurrences.

"At this time, we have generated a Technical Bulletin (TB1501) summarizing the conclusions and recommendations. We will notify all customers, both domestic and foreign, by August 7th 2015.

"If you have any questions or concerns, please direct them to Quincy Hill, Quality Manager at qhill@dancon.com.

"Thank you.

"Kevin Sutherby
"Vice President & General Manager
"Namco Controls Division of Dynapar Corporation
"ksutherby@dancon.com
"910.862.5411 (office)
"2100 West Broad Street, Elizabethtown, NC 28337"

The part numbers impacted are:

EA170-11302,-12302,-21302,-31302,-32302,-41302,-42302,-51302, and
EA180-11302,-11307,-11309,-11402,-12302,-12307,-12309,-12402,-21302,-21309,-21402,-
22302,-22309,-31302,-31309,-31402,-32302,-32309,-32402

at the following facilities:

Farley Nuclear Plant, Callaway Energy Center, Palo Verde Nuclear Generation Station, **Fermi 2 Nuclear Power Plant**, Millstone Nuclear Power Station, North Anna Power Station, Catawba Nuclear Station, McGuire Nuclear Station, Robinson Nuclear Plant, Harris Nuclear Plant, Columbia Generation Station, Arkansas Nuclear One, River Bend Nuclear Station, Waterford 3 Nuclear, Clinton Nuclear Station, LaSalle County Generating Station, Braidwood Generating Station, Limerick Generating Station, Byron Generating Station, Quad Cities Generating Station, **Perry Nuclear Plant**, Plant Hatch, Cook Nuclear Plant, Cooper Nuclear Station, Seabrook Station, Duane Arnold Energy Center, Salem/Hope Creek Nuclear Generation Station, South Texas Nuclear Project Electric Generating Station, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation, Prairie Island Nuclear.

Part 21	Event Number: 51285
Rep Org: UNITED CONTROLS INTERNATIONAL Licensee: FERRAZ SHAWMUT/MERSEN Region: 1 City: NORCROSS State: GA County: License #: Agreement: Y Docket: NRC Notified By: KORINA LOOFT HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN	Notification Date: 08/04/2015 Notification Time: 10:29 [ET] Event Date: 06/05/2015 Event Time: [EDT] Last Update Date: 08/04/2015

Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE

Person (Organization):
ART BURRITT (R1DO)
GEORGE HOPPER (R2DO)
ROBERT DALEY (R3DO)
RAY AZUA (R4DO)
PART 21/50.55 REACT (EMAI)

Event Text

PART 21 REPORT - FERRAZ SHAWMUT/MERSEN FUSES P/N: AJT25 AND AJT60

The following information was excerpted from the email provided by the reporting organization:

"On April 2015, United Controls International (UCI) performed dedication testing on time delay fuses AJT25 and AJT60 for **First Energy - Perry Nuclear Power Plant** under purchase orders 45469886 and 45469450, respectively. The subject fuses were being tested per United Controls Standard dedication testing which excludes seismic and environmental testing requirements. Both fuses, AJT25 and AJT60 opened during their current clearing tests at times that are within their respective clearing time tolerance ranges but their Smartspot labels did not change color, as required, to indicate the fuses cleared.

"For fuse AJT25, eight fuses have been tested, including one (1) fuse from the first lot which comprises 30 fuses (with manufacture date 09/15 [9th week of 2015]) and seven (7) fuses from the second lot which comprises 32 fuses (with manufacture date 10/15). Five (5) fuses were tested for current clearing at 135% of the fuse rated current, two (2) fuses were tested for current clearing at 200% of the fuse rated current and one (1) fuse was tested for current clearing at 500% of the fuse rated current.

"For fuse AJT60 with manufacture date 06/15, only one (1) fuse was tested from the received lot of fuses which comprises 24 fuses for current clearing time at 135% of the fuse rated current. Further testing of the AJT60 fuses was not performed since a trend was already observed in regard to the fuses AJT25 failure.

"UCI has returned all received fuses in the three (3) received lots. Mersen [Ferraz/Shawmut/Mersen] has then performed evaluation on the 30 AJT25 fuses with manufacture date of 9/15 (9th week of 2015), confirmed that the seven (7) fuses that UCI has tested were open and conducted testing on six (6) among the remaining 23 fuses. Testing by Mersen revealed that only two out of the six fuses had their Smartspot indicator that went off to indicate that the fuses cleared. Upon further examination by Mersen; it is believed that over tightening of the crimping jars during installation and crimping of the ferrule endcaps is the cause of the Smartspot indicator's malfunction.

"The fuses are Ferraz Shawmut/Mersen part numbers AJT25 and AJT60. UCI recommends the purchaser to include a requirement for suppliers to provide fuse with manufacture date after 6/30/15 where the manufacturer has performed corrective action to prevent this issue from recurring."

Point of Contact: Divya Paidy, Engineering Manager, dpaidy@unitedcontrols.com, (770) 496-1406, ext. 106,

Part 21	Event Number: 51293
Rep Org: ABB INC. (MEDIUM VOLTAGE SERVICE) Licensee: ABB INC. (MEDIUM VOLTAGE SERVICE) Region: 1 City: FLORENCE State: SC County: License #: Agreement: Y Docket: NRC Notified By: DAVID BROWN HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON	Notification Date: 08/06/2015 Notification Time: 14:23 [ET] Event Date: 08/06/2015 Event Time: [EDT] Last Update Date: 08/06/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE	Person (Organization): ART BURRITT (R1DO) ANTHONY MASTERS (R2DO) ROBERT DALEY (R3DO) PART 21/50.55 REACT (EMAI)

Event Text

PART 21 REPORT - NOTIFICATION OF DEVIATION REGARDING HK CIRCUIT BREAKER PIVOT PIN

The following summary was excerpted from a facsimile received from ABB:

"This letter provides notification of a failure to comply with specifications associated with a pivot pin, part number 193610B00, used in HK circuit breakers. This pin is used as the pivot point for the arcing contacts. Information is provided as specified in 10CFR21 paragraph 21.21(d)(4).

"Notifying individual: Jay Lavrinc, Vice President & General Manager, ABB (Medium Voltage Service), 2300 Mechanicsville Road, Florence, SC 29501, phone number: (843) 413-4727

"Identification of the Subject component: ABB part number 193610B00 pivot pin. This pivot in is used on new legacy HK circuit breakers and during HK breaker refurbishments. The pivot pin is also available as a component item, as part of HK breaker refurbishment kits, and as part of upper terminal contact assemblies.

"Nature of the deviation: During a breaker refurbishment at the ABB Florence facility, it was noted that a pivot pin cracked at the threads during installation. The peening operation performed on the threaded end of the pivot pin caused cracking due to brittle failure. Laboratory testing revealed that this particular pivot pin was made from an incorrect material. This pivot pin was purchased in April of 2015 and parts from this batch were used between 14 April and 28 May of 2015. There have been no field failures reported at this time.

"Corrective actions include:

- a. Removed all remaining pivot pins from stock. (Action complete)
- b. Contact primary vendor to investigate cause and correct on future orders. (Action Complete)
- c. Added material verification to our Critical Characteristic cards for future orders. (Action Complete)
- d. Upgrade of ABB's spectrometer to analyze this silicon bronze material on all future

shipments. (Action Complete)

e. Obtained and tested, via qualified laboratory, a batch of pivot pins to supply to customers. (Action Complete)

f. Notification of the potential existence of this deviation to affected customers (Action to be completed the week of 10 August 2015)

"Affected Customers: Dominion (Surry Power Station); **DTE Energy (Enrico Fermi Power Plant 2)**; Exelon Corporation (Limerick Generating Station); TVA (Sequoyah Nuclear Plant)

"Recommendations: If the part was installed in a breaker or assembly and the threaded end did not show signs of failure or fracture at installation, it is not considered to be part of the suspect population. ABB recommends that these pivot pins be visually inspected at the next convenient maintenance cycle. If the pivot pin is in their inventory as a component item or in a kit and was shipped in the time interval of the suspect material, it should be returned to ABB for replacement."

Power Reactor	Event Number: 51313
Facility: FERMI Region: 3 State: MI Unit: [2] [] [] RX Type: [2] GE-4 NRC Notified By: BRETT JEBBIA HQ OPS Officer: STEVEN VITTO	Notification Date: 08/12/2015 Notification Time: 13:31 [ET] Event Date: 08/12/2015 Event Time: 10:07 [EDT] Last Update Date: 08/12/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL	Person (Organization): ROBERT ORLIKOWSKI (R3DO)

Unit	SCRAM Code	RX CRIT	Initial PWR	Initial RX Mode	Current PWR	Current RX Mode
2	N	Y	100	Power Operation	100	Power Operation

Event Text

SECONDARY CONTAINMENT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS NOT MET

"At 1007 [EDT] on August 12, 2015, while restoring Reactor Building (RB) HVAC (RBHVAC) after surveillance testing, an equipment malfunction resulted in improper damper alignment resulting in Secondary Containment Technical Specifications (TS) to not be met.

"The plant TS require Secondary Containment pressure be maintained greater than or equal to -0.125 inches of vacuum water gauge (TS SR 3.6.4.1.1). This specification was not maintained for five seconds and the highest pressure observed was -0.095 inches of vacuum water gauge. This value was observed on only one of two installed recorders, of the Secondary Containment pressure recorders. The highest observed pressure on the other recorder was -0.14 inches of vacuum water gauge. Secondary Containment was restored by the Standby Gas Treatment System (SGTS) already in operation and shutting down the affected train of RBHVAC.

"The technical specification requirement is to maintain secondary containment at -0.125

inches of vacuum water gauge for secondary containment operability. Declaring secondary containment inoperable is reportable under 10 CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(c) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

*** UPDATE AT 1159 EDT ON 08/13/15 FROM BRETT JEBBIA TO S. SANDIN ***

The licensee is updating this report to delete the minus sign for all references to inches of vacuum water gauge.

"FOLLOW UP - CORRECTED INFORMATION: At 1007 [EDT] on August 12, 2015, while restoring Reactor Building (RB) HVAC (RBHVAC) after surveillance testing, an equipment malfunction resulted in improper damper alignment resulting in Secondary Containment Technical Specifications (TS) to not be met.

"The plant TS require Secondary Containment pressure be maintained greater than or equal to .125 inches of vacuum water gauge (TS SR 3.6.4.1.1). This specification was not maintained for five seconds and the highest pressure observed was .095 inches of vacuum water gauge. This value was observed on only one, of two installed recorders, of the Secondary Containment pressure recorders. The highest observed pressure on the other recorder was .14 inches of vacuum water gauge. Secondary Containment was restored by the Standby Gas Treatment System (SGTS) already in operation and shutting down the affected train of RBHV AC.

"The technical specification requirement is to maintain secondary containment greater than or equal to .125 inches of vacuum water gauge for secondary containment operability. Declaring secondary containment inoperable is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)c as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material."

the licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Powell).

Power Reactor	Event Number: 51323
Facility: BEAVER VALLEY Region: 1 State: PA Unit: [] [2] [] RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP NRC Notified By: KEN TIEFENTHAL HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON	Notification Date: 08/17/2015 Notification Time: 12:59 [ET] Event Date: 08/17/2015 Event Time: 10:30 [EDT] Last Update Date: 08/17/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION	Person (Organization): ANNE DeFRANCISCO (R1DO)

Unit	SCRAM Code	RX CRIT	Initial PWR	Initial RX Mode	Current PWR	Current RX Mode
2	N	Y	100	Power Operation	100	Power Operation

Event Text

OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO OIL SPILL

"At 0837 EDT on August 17, 2015, it was determined that Beaver Valley Unit 2 had experienced a small oil leak of approximately 1 liter from equipment located inside the Alternate Intake structure, some of which progressed to the Ohio River. Subsequent to confirmation of this discovery, notification was made to the following offsite agencies starting at 1030 EDT:

"National Response Center (Incident Report# 1125865), Pennsylvania (PA) Department of Environmental Protection, Beaver County Emergency Management, PA Emergency Management Agency, and downstream water authorities (Midland Water Authority, Allegheny Ludlum, East Liverpool Water Co.)

"This notification is a required 4-hour report per 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(2)(xi).

"The source of the oil leak has been stopped. Absorbent material has been placed to contain the oil that had leaked. No press release is planned.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

Part 21	Event Number: 51344
Rep Org: FURMANITE Licensee: FURMANITE Region: 4 City: Houston State: TX County: License #: Agreement: Y Docket: NRC Notified By: KERRY J. KOSKI HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA	Notification Date: 08/25/2015 Notification Time: 18:31 [ET] Event Date: 08/25/2015 Event Time: [CDT] Last Update Date: 08/25/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 21.21(a)(2) - INTERIM EVAL OF DEVIATION	Person (Organization): RICHARD SKOKOWSKI (R3DO) STEVE ROSE (R2DO) VIVIAN CAMPBELL (R4DO) PAUL KROHN (R1DO) PART 21/50.55 REACT (EMAI)

Event Text

PART 21 FURMANITE NUCLEAR GRADE LEAK SEAL MATERIAL FSC-N-1B

"Furmanite FSC-N-1B Batch #1026 was discovered (post-delivery) to have Chloride levels above acceptable limits. As Discovered: 2400 ppm Chloride. Furmanite Specification: 100 ppm Chloride.

"Part Name: Nuclear Grade Leak Seal Material FSC-N-1B.

"Specification: Furmanite Material Specification 1220.1 R2.

"Furmanite Notice Number: 25.08.2015

"Potential affected customers:

America Electric Power - DC Cook
Arizona Public Service - Palo Verde
DTE Energy - Fermi Power Plant 2
Duke - Catawba Nuclear Station
Duke - McGuire Nuclear Station
Exelon Nuclear - Limerick Generating Station
Florida Power & Light Co. - St. Lucie Nuclear Plant
Florida Power & Light Co. - Turkey Point Nuclear Plant"

Power Reactor	Event Number: 51345
Facility: BEAVER VALLEY Region: 1 State: PA Unit: [1] [2] [] RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP NRC Notified By: SAMANTHA MILOSH HQ OPS Officer: DAN LIVERMORE	Notification Date: 08/26/2015 Notification Time: 09:45 [ET] Event Date: 08/26/2015 Event Time: 05:48 [EDT] Last Update Date: 08/26/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION	Person (Organization): PAUL KROHN (R1DO)

Unit	SCRAM Code	RX CRIT	Initial PWR	Initial RX Mode	Current PWR	Current RX Mode
1	N	Y	100	Power Operation	100	Power Operation
2	N	Y	100	Power Operation	100	Power Operation

Event Text

SPURIOUS INTERMITTENT ACTUATION OF AN EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION SYSTEM SIREN

"At 05:48 [EDT] BVPS [Beaver Valley Power Station] received notification that siren #6, Potter Township Municipal Building, was sounding intermittently. The fire department activation cable to the siren was severed by a motor vehicle. The ENS activation function remains functional.

"This event is reportable as a 4-hour Non-Emergency Notification 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) as 'a News Release or Notification of Other Government Agency.'

"The Resident Inspector has been notified."

News

The Times-Journal

Plans approved for decontamination and decommissioning of Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant site

Posted: Thursday, July 30, 2015 3:40 pm

Updated: 3:48 pm, Thu Jul 30, 2015

PIKETON—

The Ohio Environmental Protection Agency (Ohio EPA) and the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) have agreed upon a plan to demolish the massive, iconic process buildings and other facilities undergoing decontamination and decommissioning (D&D) at the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant.

The formal Record of Decision (ROD) for the Process Buildings and Complex Facilities D&D Project details DOE's decision for the D&D of the plant's three large process buildings (each more than 30 acres under roof) and other facilities and auxiliary systems.

The decision comes on the heels of a waste disposition decision Ohio EPA and DOE recently agreed to that calls for the construction of an on-site waste disposal facility as part of the remedy for more than two million cubic yards of D&D waste. Waste that does not meet the approved acceptance criteria for the onsite facility will be shipped off site for disposal at appropriate licensed federal or commercial disposal facilities.

"These are some of the largest buildings ever constructed. Their size and function during production years make D&D of this plant a complicated endeavor," said William E. Murphie, manager of DOE's Portsmouth/Paducah Project Office. "The Department of Energy thanks the Ohio EPA for its collaborative and thorough review, and the Portsmouth Site Specific Advisory Board and all stakeholders who participated in this multi-year process. These decisions are a major milestone in moving the D&D Project forward in a safe, efficient, and environmentally responsible manner."

A proposed plan for the facilities' demolition was issued in November 2014 and a subsequent four-month public comment period and a public meeting were conducted. All of the several hundred comments were reviewed and considered in the ROD's final language.

DOE evaluated two alternatives on how to conduct the D&D of more than 200 buildings and structures under consideration. Alternative 1 was no action, which provided a basis for comparison, but the risk to human health and the environment made Alternative 1 unacceptable. DOE's preferred alternative —Alternative 2 —includes the controlled removal of stored waste, materials, hazards, process gas equipment, and process piping. It also includes:

- Demolition of the buildings or structures;
- Characterization and demolition of underground man-made features;
- Treatment as needed to meet transportation and disposal requirements;
- Packaging of generated waste for final disposal; and
- Transportation and disposal of the waste.

The plan also provides:

- An opportunity for the installed portions of the site infrastructure, which are deemed valuable to the community for post-cleanup industrialization, to remain.

- Recovery of materials from the gaseous diffusion processing equipment for possible recycling and reuse, to the extent it continues to be considered safe, cost-effective, and in the best interests of the project.

- Promotion of recycling of building materials as an option for disposal when it can be done safely, compliantly, and in a cost-effective manner.

The Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant is located on a 3,777-acre reservation near Piketon. It was constructed between 1952 and 1956 and uranium enrichment operations spanned from 1954 until 2001 for national defense applications and the commercial nuclear fuel industry.

For more information visit

<http://energy.gov/pppo/PORTS-D-D-ROD> , www.fbportsmouth.com , and www.energy.gov/pppo .

YUCCA MOUNTAIN:

Key senator calls industry shift an 'unwelcome surprise'

[Hannah Northey](#), E&E reporter

Published: Tuesday, August 4, 2015

Senate appropriators last night expressed apprehension over the nuclear industry's decision to take a stronger stand on the Yucca Mountain nuclear waste repository in Nevada, an about-face that could jeopardize a yearslong effort to craft a bipartisan solution in the upper chamber.

Sen. Dianne Feinstein of California, the top Democrat of a key Senate Appropriations subcommittee, said she was disappointed the Nuclear Energy Institute is now pursuing a strategy that requires a final decision on the contentious Nevada repository before any spent nuclear fuel or high-level radioactive waste from the Energy Department is stored at consolidated storage sites, as was first reported in *E&ENews PM* ([E&ENews PM](#), July 31).

"It puts everything way back," Feinstein said during an interview. "It was a huge unwelcome surprise because I believed that NEI had the position that although we want Yucca, we understand it's not going to happen now, but even if we had Yucca, we'd have a need for additional storage."

Feinstein has been working for months with Sen. Lamar Alexander of Tennessee, Republican chairman of the Senate Energy and Water Appropriations Subcommittee, to advance a pilot program for interim storage in the fiscal 2016 energy and water spending bill.

The appropriators also joined with Sens. Lisa Murkowski of Alaska, the Republican chairwoman of the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee, and Maria Cantwell of Washington, the panel's top Democrat, to advance legislation to jump-start the country's long-stalled waste policies. The bill, [S. 1240](#), would have required that the creation of both temporary waste storage sites and permanent repositories be undertaken at the same time and would have outlined a process by which funds would be collected to pay for the new program.

Alexander, who has been carefully balancing the bill and spending language with a push for Yucca in the House, questioned during an interview whether NEI had publicly stated its change in position.

"I hope that's not the case," Alexander said. "The Senate position is that we want to move as rapidly as we can to find storage for nuclear waste on all fronts. We want Yucca Mountain, some of us want Yucca Mountain, repositories, long-term and consolidated and a private storage facility. That's the way to deal with that."

Alexander said he's hopeful that the nuclear industry won't change its position, which has been constant since 2013, especially at a time when President Obama is making it more difficult for nuclear power to thrive.

"We need to be thinking about ways to unite to find places to store used nuclear fuel," he said.

NEI, which did not respond immediately to a request for comment, circulated a list of "legislative principles" last month that made its Yucca-first priority clear. One source briefed on the matter said NEI's executive committee had unanimously signed off on the list. NEI had formerly backed a multipronged strategy that called for a decision on Yucca alongside the identification of consolidated storage sites.

Feinstein reiterated her concern about 2,200 uranium rods at a shuttered reactor in her home state of California cooling in wet storage pools close to the beach, as well as dry casks waiting to travel to a repository. And while the senator said she's more determined than ever to push the bill, she acknowledged that the industry had caught her off-guard.

"I'm more determined than ever, but I had assumed the nuclear waste industry understood it was to their benefit, A, to have a nuclear pilot project and, B, to have a nuclear policy that makes sense, so that as you develop a nuclear future, you know you can deal with the waste," Feinstein said. "What they're saying is 'We don't want to deal with the waste,' and that makes no sense at all."

Reporter Geof Koss contributed.

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Source: <http://www.eenews.net/eedaily/2015/08/04/stories/1060022934>

The Columbus Dispatch

Environment

Many reject Japan's Fukushima efforts

By Martin Fackler

THE NEW YORK TIMES

Sunday August 9, 2015 11:40 AM

IITATE, Japan —For four years, an eerie quiet has pervaded the clusters of farmhouses and terraced rice paddies of this mountainous village, emptied of people after the disaster at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant, 25 miles away, spewed radiation over a wide swath of northeastern Japan.

Now, litate's valleys are filled again with the bustle of human activity, as heavy machinery and troops of workers wearing face masks scoop up contaminated soil into black garbage bags. They are part of a more than \$10 billion effort by the central government in Tokyo to clean up fallout from the 2011 accident and allow many of the 80,000 displaced residents of litate and 10 other evacuated communities around the plant to go home.

Last month, the administration of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe seemed to take a big step toward that goal by adopting a plan that would permit two-thirds of evacuees to return by March 2017. But while some evacuees have cheered this chance to return, many more have rejected it. Thousands from Iitate and elsewhere have joined lawsuits or organized groups to oppose the plan by the government, which they say is trying to force residents to go back despite radiation levels that are still far above normal.

They accuse Tokyo of repeating a pattern from the early days of the disaster of putting residents at risk by trying to understate the danger from the accident. They say the central government is trying to achieve its own narrow political interests, such as restarting the nation's powerful nuclear industry or assuring the world that Tokyo is safe enough to host the Summer Olympics in 2020.

"If the national officials think it is so safe, then they should come and live here," said Kenji Hasegawa, a former dairy farmer in Iitate who has organized about 3,000 fellow evacuees to oppose the return plan.

"The government just wants to proclaim that the nuclear accident is over, and shift attention to the Olympics."

Central government officials and the local leaders who support the plan say such fears are misplaced.

They say the plan gives residents the right to freely decide for themselves whether to go back, and it will offer unspecified financial support to those who choose not to.

Mass layoff possible in Portsmouth uranium cleanup

By Kantele Franko

ASSOCIATED PRESS

Friday August 28, 2015 2:32 AM

Workers decontaminating and decommissioning a Cold War-era uranium plant in southern Ohio are again being notified about hundreds of potential layoffs because of an anticipated funding gap, a reprise of warnings they heard a year ago for the same reason.

The Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant in Piketon produced enriched uranium for defense and commercial uses until 2001. Its shutdown left behind chemicals and radioactive areas to be addressed and huge buildings to be demolished — work that is taking decades and employs about 1,800 people in a pocket of high unemployment. Notices about the possible layoffs were sent on Wednesday to 1,400 employees as officials anticipate a funding gap of \$55 million to \$80 million heading into the fiscal year that starts Oct. 1, said Jeff Wagner, a spokesman for the main contractor, Fluor-BWXT Portsmouth.

The company is first seeking voluntary departures, such as retirements, and hopes to have fewer than 570 layoffs among its own employees, affiliated personnel and subcontractors, Wagner said Thursday.

Those layoffs could occur around Oct. 22, but the project's director and other leaders remain hopeful they'll get funding needed to continue their current pace, which costs roughly \$387 million annually, Wagner said.

Hundreds of layoffs were averted last year because Congress approved extra funding. This time, the situation is a bit different.

About 70 percent of the project's funding comes from a program in which the overnment sells uranium, but the amount that can be bartered has been reduced for 2016, so project officials must hope the balance is made up through appropriations, Wagner said. Scioto County Commissioner Mike Crabtree told the Chillicothe Gazette the funding uncertainty amounts to "bullying" by the U.S. Department of Energy, which runs the cleanup.

"We were basically told the DOE wants us to deal with the cuts this year or suffer a greater job loss next year," Crabtree said.

The Energy Department has said it is committed to the safe, effective cleanup of the site, but "the projected funding profile" might require workforce adjustments.

U.S. Sen. Rob Portman said lawmakers will once again have to scramble to find funding. As he has repeatedly, the Ohio Republican called for adequate annual funding in the federal budget for the cleanup.

"It's actually less expensive to the taxpayer over time to start moving to actual cleanup rather than almost maintaining the site, which is about all you can do with the low levels of funding," Portman said Thursday in Columbus. "It may seem like it's more money up front, but it's actually billions of dollars less money over time — billions because they're now pushing the cleanup really out to the 2050s."

toledoBlade.com

Nuclear dilemma

8/29/2015

Environmental groups and others were outraged this summer when they learned of a plan in Canada to dispose of low and midlevel nuclear waste less than a mile from Port Huron, Mich., across from the tip of the state's Thumb. Ontario Power Generation proposes to bury the stuff two football fields deep, in a solid rock formation that geologists say has been stable for 450 million years.

Protesters are not appeased. The leader of Canada's leading opposition group warned that "the last place to abandon radioactive nuclear waste is right beside the largest supply of fresh water on the planet."

Both of Michigan's U.S. senators are demanding that the State Department require the International Joint Commission to study the risks first. Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper, who is fighting a tough battle to hold onto his job, has postponed a final decision until after his country's national elections on Oct. 19.

The issue merits careful review, but planners and protesters on both sides of the border are ignoring a far greater problem: Neither the United States nor Canada has a comprehensive plan or a national site to store its thousands of tons of highly dangerous spent nuclear fuel rods.

This country's plan to bury much of its waste in Nevada's Yucca Mountain was scuttled by politics. Other suggested solutions are inevitably met with not-in-my-backyard attitudes. In Michigan, huge piles of spent nuclear fuel remain above ground, under sometimes dubious security, in Monroe, near Lake Erie, and Charlevoix, near Lake Michigan.

What to do with less-dangerous waste at the site near Port Huron demands careful consideration. But on broader issues of nuclear power and our joint futures, the United States and Canada have much greater cause for concern.

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Part 21 and Miscellaneous

FirstEnergy

Davis-Besse

Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 1 - Request for Additional Information Related to Security Plan Changes (TAC NO. MF5801)

ADAMS Accession Number: ML15218A065

Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 1 - Notification of Significant Errors in the Emergency Core Cooling System Evaluation Model (TAC No. MF5578)

ADAMS Accession Number: ML15190A414

ACRS Review of the Davis Besse Nuclear Plant LRA - Transmittal of the SSER

ADAMS Accession No.: ML15205A169

SUPPLEMENTAL SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT RELATED TO THE LICENSE RENEWAL OF DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION, (TAC NO. ME4640)

ADAMS Accession No.:ML15196A429

Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station; NRC Initial License Examination Report

05000346/2015301

ADAMS Accession Number ML15226A309

Davis Besse Nuclear Power Station Unit 1 Staff Assessment of Information Provided Pursuant to title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations Part 50 Seismic Hazard Reevaluations for Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review
ADAMS Accession No.: ML15230A289

Documents encl B&W Owners Group 890929 response to NRC 890807 request for addl info re BAW-2085 rept concerning NRC Bulletin 88-011, "Pressurizer Surge Line Thermal Stratification."

ADAMS Accession No.: ML15224A129

Supplemental Safety Evaluation Report Related to the License Renewal of Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, (TAC No. ME4640)

ADAMS Accession No.: ML15196A429

ACRS Review of the Davis Besse Nuclear Plant LRA - Transmittal of the SSER.

ADAMS Accession No.: ML15205A169

Perry

Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1 – Staff Assessment of Information Provided Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations Part 50, Section 50.54(f), Seismic Hazard Reevaluations for Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-Ichi Accident

ADAMS Accession No.: ML15208A034

Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit No. 1 - Acceptance Review of Application to Transfer of Control of License and Conforming License Amendment (TAC No. MF6412)

ADAMS Accession No.: ML15210A368

PERRY NUCLEAR POWER PLANT INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000440/2015002

ADAMS Accession No.: ML15222B119

Ltr 08/12/15 Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1 - Information Request for Temporary Instruction 2201/004 Inspection, Notification to Perform "Inspection of Implementation of Interim Cyber Security Milestones 1 - 7"

ADAMS Accession Number ML15226A222

Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit No. 1 - Issuance of Amendment Concerning Technical Specification 3.8.4 "DC Sources - Operating" (TAC No. MF5298) (L-14-271)

ADAMS Accession No.: ML15201A529

Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit No. 1 - Notice of Consideration of Approval of Transfer of Facility Operating License and Conforming Amendment, Opportunity for a Hearing, and Order (TAC No. MF6412) (L-15-195)

ADAMS Accession No.: ML15219A256

2015/07/22 NRR E-mail Capture - [External_Sender] FW: Perry ESEP Clarification Questions

ADAMS Accession No.: ML15212A955

Perry Nuclear Power Plant - Fifteenth Inservice Inspection Summary Report.
ADAMS Accession No.: ML15210A187

Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1 - Staff Assessment of Information Provided Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations Part 50, Section 50.54(f), Seismic Hazard Reevaluations for Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force.

ADAMS Accession No.: ML15208A034

Beaver Valley

Beaver Valley: NRC Investigation Report No. 1-2014-023

ADAMS Accession No. ML15215A047

Beaver Valley Power Station - Integrated Inspection Report 05000334/2015002 and 05000412/2015002

ADAMS Accession No.: ML15216A495

Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2 - Response Regarding Phase 2 Staffing Submittals Associated with Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 9.3 Related to the Fukushima Dai-Ichi Nuclear Power Plant Accident

ADAMS Accession No.: ML15203A011

July 23, 2015, Summary of Meeting with Representatives of the U.S> Army Corps, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and First Energy Nuclear Operating Co. to Discuss Flooding Analysis Associated with Beaver Valley Power Station

ADAMS Accession No.: ML15225A481

BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION: BASELINE SECURITY INSPECTION REPORT

05000334/2015404 and 05000412/2015404

ADAMS ACCESSION NO. ML15230A151

Beaver Valley Power Station, Units 1 and 2 – Staff Review of Interim Evaluation Associated with Reevaluated Seismic Hazard Implementing Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1

ADAMS Accession No.: ML15233A120

ENT00638B - NUREG-1806, Vol. 1, Technical Basis for Revision of the Pressurized Thermal Shock (PTS) Screening Limit in the PTS Rule (10 CFR 50.61) (Aug. 2007).

ADAMS Accession No.: ML15222A850

ENT00638A - NUREG-1806, Vol. 1, Technical Basis for Revision of the Pressurized Thermal Shock (PTS) Screening Limit in the PTS Rule (10 CFR 50.61) (Aug. 2007).

ADAMS Accession No.: ML15222A849

ENT00637 - NUREG-1874, Recommended Screening Limits for Pressurized Thermal Shock (PTS) (March 2010).

ADAMS Accession No.: ML15222A848

IR 05000334/2015002 and 05000412/2015002, 04/01/2015 - 06/30/2015, Beaver Valley Power Station Integrated Inspection Report.

ADAMS Accession No.: ML15216A495

Beaver Valley Power Station Discharge Monitoring Report (NPDES) Permit No. PA0025615.
ADAMS Accession No.: ML15211A199

Beaver Valley, Unit 1 - Twenty-Third Refueling Outage Inservice Inspection Report.
ML15233A023

Portsmouth Facilities

Transmittal of Security Incident Log per 10 CFR 95.57(b) for American Centrifuge Operating, LLC.

ADAMS Accession No.: ML15233A028

Response on Submittal of Change and Changed Pages (ACO 15-0025).

ADAMS Accession No.: ML15224A885

Submittal of Description of Change and Changed Pages to the Security Program for the American Centrifuge Plant.

ADAMS Accession No.: ML15224B398

Fermi 1

No reports

Fermi 2

REQUEST FOR WITHHOLDING INFORMATION FROM PUBLIC DISCLOSURE (TAC NO. MF4222)

ML15209A424

FERMI POWER PLANT, UNIT 2--NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT
05000341/2015002

ADAMS ACCESSION NO. ML15215A629

Ltr. 08/17/15 Fermi Power Plant – Notification of NRC Inspection and Request for Information

ADAMS Accession Number ML15231A161

Ltr 08/20/15 Operator Licensing Examination Approval

ADAMS Accession Number ML15232A428

Ltr. 08/20/15 Fermi Power Plant Requalification Program Inspection

ADAMS Accession Number ML15232A807

Fermi 2 - Inservice Testing Program Relief Request PRR-012 for Quarterly Test of Core Spray Pumps (Tac No. MF5816)

ADAMS Accession No.: ML15218A360

Schedule Revision for the Safety Review of the Fermi 2 License Renewal Application (TAC No. MF4222)

ADAMS Accession No. ML15238B790

Fermi 3

DTE Electric Company Report of Fermi 3 QAPD Changes.

ADAMS Accession No.: ML15212A768

8-6-15 Fermi 3 Certified Index - Filed Version.

ADAMS Accession No.: ML15218A610
