

To: James Mehl, ERSIS Manager
From: Zack Clayton, Rad Coordinator
Subject: April Monthly Report
Date: May 4 , 2015

Beans

Training: 0
Drills: 0
Meetings: 4
Technical Assistance: 1
Public Assistance: 1

Web Page Views: There were 48 page views in April.

Coming Attractions

5/5 Davis-Besse HAB evaluation
5/12 Office 365 training
5/13 IREP
5/15 Public Records Training
6/2-4 RAT Training

Facility updates

Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station

Davis-Besse operated at full power for the month.

Perry Nuclear Power Plant

Perry restarted April 25 and operated for the rest of the month.

A small brush fire was reported at the Perry Nuclear Power Plant at approximately 12:30 PM April 6. The fire was extinguished by a local fire department. The fire occurred on the plant property but outside of the areas housing plant structures and no vital plant systems were affected. The cause of the fire has yet to be determined. No additional notifications or response actions are required.

Beaver Valley Power Station

Beaver Valley Unit I

Unit I operated at full power until they started the coast down to the April 20 outage.

At 4 AM April 17 Beaver Valley Unit 1 was taken offline due to a vibration in a condensate pump motor. The cause of the vibration is being investigated. The reactor safe and stable . No additional notification or response actions was required. The reactor was restarted to finish the coast down to refueling outage.

Beaver Valley Unit II

Unit II operated at full power for the month with one power reduction on April 12-13.

On Sunday, April 12 at approximately 7:00 AM Beaver Valley Unit 2 reduced power production to 60% due to an issue with a heater drain in a non-radiological area of the plant. The reactor is stable and continues to function safely. The utility is diagnosing the problem. No additional response or notification actions are required.

At 0411 on April 15, 2015, Beaver Valley Unit 1 manually tripped the reactor from approximately 85% power due to the trip of a condensate pump. The unit was performing an emergent power reduction due to a degraded condensate pump prior to the manual reactor trip. The Unit was in coastdown for refueling. See Event No. 50985.

DTE

Fermi II

Fermi II operated at full power from April 6 to the month.

On April 4 Fermi II exited the technical specification outage of Event Number 50831

Fermi III

Fermi III continues as a documentation evaluation.

Portsmouth Enrichment Plant

Activity

- 4/1 IREP - Agency and Plant updates. Discussion of Davis-Besse dry run. The logger in the assessment room will be filling in State significant events. Paper flow and document runner to get copies to who needs them. Clarification of who gets copies of what. Encourage duty room to log into WebEOC during the drills to stay current on the event.
- 4/1 Grant discussion/Strategy session – Briefing management on grant responsibilities, training requirements, existing TO and member roles.
- 4/2 RAT Steering Committee – Discussion with management on training, future TO, and member roles.
- 4/23 NEPAC Plant, Tate and County updates. Training discussion of online issues. Upcoming REP conference and scheduling.

Office Issues

Statistics, NRC Reports, News, and ADAMS References

Operating Power Levels

April

Date	BV1	BV2	DB	Perry	Fermi2	
1	100	100	100	0	0	
4	100	100	100	0	8	Fermi2 reactor HVAC trip analyzed and retracted
6	99	100	100	0	100	BV1 in coast down for refueling
13	98	60	100	0	100	
20	48	100	100	0	100	
25	0	100	100	29	100	BV1 refueling, Perry exiting refueling
27	0	100	100	87	100	
30	0	100	100	100	100	

Event Reports

PART 21 REPORT - POTENTIALLY DEFECTIVE PRESSURE & TEMPERATURE SWITCHES

The following information was originally received in NRC Region IV on July 16, 2014 via email. Relevant portions of the submittal are provided below without graphs, tables or pictures.

"SOR is a supplier of basic components to the nuclear power industry. The components of concern for this notification are SOR nuclear qualified Pressure and Temperature switches with TA housings manufactured from 2004 through 2009.

"The defect being reported is a potential out of tolerance condition concerning the machined sealing surface for an environmental seal on the SOR nuclear TA housing. Other switches with a similar defect have the potential to not meet their intended safety function.

"Summary: SOR Inc. began a 10CFR21 evaluation on 6/4/14 upon receipt of three SOR pressure switches, model number 5TA-B45-U8-C1A-JJTTNQ (SN's 041100627, 041100628, and 041100629). These were returned from Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee (VY) due to inspections which questioned the suitability of the sealing surfaces on the face of the housings where the cover O-ring seals.

"The product evaluation was concluded on 6/24/14 and it was determined that this issue is a reportable defect as defined by 10CFR Part 21. If the switch housing has an inadequate machined sealing surface, the potential exists for steam permeation into the switch housing during accident conditions. This could result in an increase in set point as well as allow moisture into the housing potentially causing electrical consequences such as current leakage or a short. It is anticipated that the above noted condition represents a small percentage of the total number of housings from this batch of castings. Also, the potential risk is thought to be small due to a second redundant seal on the cover. This condition is being reported as a conservative measure.

"Evaluation: There are 2 (redundant) environmental seals on the cover of the nuclear TA housing. One O-ring seals on the undercut of the cover threads (151 O-ring). This seal is not in question and is not part of this evaluation. The other O-ring seals between the face of the enclosure and the O-ring groove on the cover (042 O-ring). This is the seal that is the subject of this evaluation.

"Redundant O-ring seals are used on the SOR 'TA' cover to minimize steam permeation into the housing during LOCA or HELB conditions. The consequences of permeation are that it can result in an increase in the set point and also allow moisture into the housing which could have electrical consequences. The returned switches have a suspect sealing surface on the face of the housing where one of the two O-rings (the 042 O-ring) is intended to seal. For the purposes of this Part 21 evaluation, consideration needs to be given to whether this suspect sealing surface could result in increased permeation into the switch enclosure.

"Switches #041100627 and 041100628 both have an area on the face of the housing where the casting did not have sufficient material for cleanup when the housing was machined. This area was characterized by use of the SOR CMM and measuring the area where the O-ring is expected to seal.

"Switch #041100629 was different from #041100627 and 041100628 in that it had one small indentation in the sealing surface which was immeasurable but does not meet surface finish requirements.

"The TA housings on the returned switches are clearly out of tolerance. It is SOR's position that the environmental seals on any switch with a similar defect has the potential to not meet its' intended safety function. . .

"Evaluation of Previous Shipments: SOR has validated shipments for a quantity of 56 pressure and temperature switches with the subject TA housing.

"Potentially affected customers/utilities include: TVA/Watts Bar, TVA/Browns Ferry, TVA/Sequoyah, Entergy Nuclear/Vermont Yankee, Entergy Operations/River Bend, Southern California Edison, Third Qinshan Nuclear/QSNPP-3-A (TQNPC), Fairbanks Morse Engine, STP Nuclear Operating Co., Hydro Quebec /Gentilly II, Progress Energy/Shearon Harris, Control Components Inc./Korea Hydro Nuclear Shin-Kori & Wolsong, Control Components Inc./KHPN Shin Kori 3 & 4, Korea Hydro & Nuclear/KHPN Yonggwang NPP #5, Konan Engineering/Yonggwang Nuclear, and **First Energy/Davis-Besse Nuclear**. (Total Potentially Affected = 56.

"Root Cause: The returned TA housing castings did not meet print and therefore did not allow enough material for cleanup of the machined sealing surface.

"Permanent Corrective Action: SOR internal documentation is being changed to require 100% inspection of the raw casting height. Also, the 1/8 [inch] minimum finish dimension is being added to the housing machining drawings.

"Action by Nuclear Power Plant: SOR recommends that the application for each switch noted in the above table be reviewed to determine if it is being used in a LOCA or HELB application. If so, SOR recommends an inspection to visually check for an adequate sealing surface of the housing . This inspection is also recommended for switches that have not yet been installed. The minimum required sealing surface is 1/8 [inch] (0.125 [inch]). After inspection, all units should have the 042 and 151 O-rings replaced if the units do not exhibit the deviation.

"SOR will send replacement O-rings at no charge upon request. If units are found that do not meet the acceptance criteria, they will be replaced free of charge by SOR. Contact SOR Director of Customer Service, Greg Barber for the replacements:

"Greg Barber
"913-956-3059
"gbarber@sorinc.com"

* * * UPDATE FROM MELANIE DIRKS TO VINCE KLCO ON 4/2/15 AT 1421 EDT * * *

The following information was excerpted from a facsimile:
Korea Hydro Nuclear power plants were added to include Shin-Kori 1 & 2; Shin Wolsong 1 & 2.
Notified the Part 21 Reactors Group via email.

Part 21	Event Number: 49230
Rep Org: ABB INC. Licensee: ABB INC. Region: 1 City: FLORENCE State: SC County: License #: Agreement: Y	Notification Date: 07/31/2013 Notification Time: 17:45 [ET] Event Date: 07/31/2013 Event Time: [EDT] Last Update Date: 04/08/2015

Docket: NRC Notified By: JAY LAVRINC HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD	
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE	Person (Organization): GORDON HUNEGS (R1DO) MICHAEL F. KING (R2DO) STEVE ORTH (R3DO) THOMAS FARNHOLTZ (R4DO) PART 21 REACTORS (EMAI)

Event Text

PART 21 REPORT - DEVIATION OF HK CIRCUIT BREAKER CLOSE LATCH SPRING

ABB identified a deviation with close latch springs provided since 1/20/2010 used in medium voltage HK circuit breakers. These close latch springs are used on new legacy HK circuit breakers, replaced during HK circuit breaker refurbishment activities, and provided in HK refurbishment kits and as component items. The ABB part number for the close latch spring is: 162374A00. The nature of the deviation is a reduced spring force. There is a potential for an aged HK circuit breaker with hardening grease and this reduced spring force not to close.

The following is a list of affected customers:

Detroit Edison Fermi 2

- Dominion VA
- DTE
- Duke Catawba
- Duke Energy - Seneca
- Duke Energy - Cataw
- Duke Huntersville
- Duke McGuire
- Duke Oconee
- Entergy River Bend
- Exelon Limerick
- Exelon Nuclear
- Exelon Peach Bottom
- Exelon Point Beach
- First Energy Beaver Valley**
- Georgia Power Plant Vogtle
- Nextera Point Beach
- Nextera Seabrook
- Prairie Island Nuclear
- Progress Energy Brunswick
- Progress Energy Crystal River
- PSEG Alloway Creek
- Southern Cal Edison
- STP Nuclear
- TVA Sequoyah.

*** UPDATE AT 1715 EDT ON 04/08/15 FROM DAVID C. BROWN TO S. SANDIN ***

The following information is excerpted from a fax/email submitted by ABB, Inc.:

"This letter amends the previous 10CFR Part 21 Notification of 31 July 2013 to encompass a wider time period during which the close latch spring (P/N: 162374A00) was sold for use in medium voltage HK circuit breakers. The initial time period of concern reported was January 2010 to July 2013. Revision 7 to the print was issued in January 2010 and it was determined during the initial investigation that this was the start of the deviation because the free angle was incorrectly shown. Our [ABB, Inc.] corrective actions in 2013 corrected this mistake.

"In February 2015, a licensee notified us [ABB, Inc.] of springs from 2007 that have the same improper free angle. The order of springs received just prior to it had the proper free angle. We [ABB, Inc.] have narrowed the start time of this issue to the lone batch of springs purchased in 2007 as they were received shortly before the order identified by the licensee was released."

Notified R1DO (Ferdas), R2DO (Heisserer), R3DO (Skokowski), R4DO (Azua) and NRR Part 21 via email.

!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!

Power Reactor	Event Number: 50831
Facility: FERMI Region: 3 State: MI Unit: [2] [] [] RX Type: [2] GE-4 NRC Notified By: BRETT JEBBIA HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH	Notification Date: 02/19/2015 Notification Time: 09:55 [ET] Event Date: 02/19/2015 Event Time: 03:04 [EST] Last Update Date: 04/08/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL	Person (Organization): DAVID HILLS (R3DO)

Unit	SCRAM Code	RX CRIT	Initial PWR	Initial RX Mode	Current PWR	Current RX Mode
2	N	Y	100	Power Operation	100	Power Operation

Event Text

SECONDARY CONTAINMENT BUILDING DECLARED INOPERABLE DUE TO VENTILATION SYSTEM TRIP

"At 0304 EST on February 19, 2015, Fermi 2 experienced a trip of the Reactor Building Ventilation (RB) (HVAC) during plant operations associated with very cold temperatures outside. At the time of the trip, outside air temperature was -1 degrees Fahrenheit and RB HVAC tripped due to a Freeze-Stat actuation [a freeze protection feature].

"The plant Technical Specifications require that Secondary Containment pressure be maintained greater than or equal to -0.125 inches of vacuum water gauge (TS SR 3.6.4.1.1). This specification was not maintained and the highest pressure observed was -0.11 inches of vacuum water gauge. Subsequently, at 0450, during restoration activities, RB pressure degraded again to higher than -0.125 inches of vacuum water gauge for 38 seconds. The

lowest observed pressure was -0.11 inches of vacuum water gauge. RB HVAC has been restored by resetting the Freeze-Stat and the Standby Gas Treatment System (SGTS) has been placed back in a standby condition.

"The technical specification requirement is to maintain secondary containment at -0.125 inches of vacuum water gauge for secondary containment operability. Declaring secondary containment inoperable is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * RETRACTION FROM WARREN PAUL TO DANIEL MILLS AT 1035 ON 4/8/2015 * * *

"After reviewing the events that occurred on February 19, 2015 against the accident analyses in Chapter 15 of the UFSAR and design functions of the Standby Gas Treatment System and Secondary Containment structure, it is concluded that a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function to control the release of radioactive material did not occur as a result of momentarily exceeding the Technical Specification for Secondary Containment vacuum after a loss of the normal Reactor Building Ventilation System.

"The Fermi 2 accident analysis for a LOCA does not assume that secondary containment is under vacuum throughout the duration of an accident and contains conservative leakage assumptions to bound the effects of a postulated ground level release. The accident analysis credits the operation of the Standby Gas Treatment System (SGTS); both divisions of SGTS were operable at the time of the event. Although secondary containment was declared inoperable due to exceeding the Technical Specification value for secondary containment vacuum, the structural integrity of the secondary containment was not degraded at the time. Upon receipt of an accident signal, SGTS would have automatically started and restored secondary containment vacuum to within the bounding analyses of Chapter 15 of the UFSAR. Secondary containment was capable of performing its design function of minimizing any ground level release of radioactive material by maintaining boundary integrity so that the SGTS may draw a vacuum in the Reactor Building and filter radioactive material at all times. The event reported in EN # 50831 did not result in a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function to control the release of radioactive material. This event report is being retracted."

The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Skokowski).

Power Reactor	Event Number: 50831
Facility: FERMI Region: 3 State: MI Unit: [2] [] [] RX Type: [2] GE-4 NRC Notified By: BRETT JEBBIA HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH	Notification Date: 02/19/2015 Notification Time: 09:55 [ET] Event Date: 02/19/2015 Event Time: 03:04 [EST] Last Update Date: 04/15/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL	Person (Organization): DAVID HILLS (R3DO)

Unit	SCRAM Code	RX CRIT	Initial PWR	Initial RX Mode	Current PWR	Current RX Mode
2	N	Y	100	Power Operation	100	Power Operation

Event Text

SECONDARY CONTAINMENT BUILDING DECLARED INOPERABLE DUE TO VENTILATION SYSTEM TRIP

"At 0304 EST on February 19, 2015, Fermi 2 experienced a trip of the Reactor Building Ventilation (RB) (HVAC) during plant operations associated with very cold temperatures outside. At the time of the trip, outside air temperature was -1 degrees Fahrenheit and RB HVAC tripped due to a Freeze-Stat actuation [a freeze protection feature].

"The plant Technical Specifications require that Secondary Containment pressure be maintained greater than or equal to -0.125 inches of vacuum water gauge (TS SR 3.6.4.1.1). This specification was not maintained and the highest pressure observed was -0.11 inches of vacuum water gauge. Subsequently, at 0450, during restoration activities, RB pressure degraded again to higher than -0.125 inches of vacuum water gauge for 38 seconds. The lowest observed pressure was -0.11 inches of vacuum water gauge. RB HVAC has been restored by resetting the Freeze-Stat and the Standby Gas Treatment System (SGTS) has been placed back in a standby condition.

"The technical specification requirement is to maintain secondary containment at -0.125 inches of vacuum water gauge for secondary containment operability. Declaring secondary containment inoperable is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * RETRACTION FROM WARREN PAUL TO DANIEL MILLS AT 1035 ON 4/8/2015 * * *

"After reviewing the events that occurred on February 19, 2015 against the accident analyses in Chapter 15 of the UFSAR and design functions of the Standby Gas Treatment System and Secondary Containment structure, it is concluded that a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function to control the release of radioactive material did not occur as a result of momentarily exceeding the Technical Specification for Secondary Containment vacuum after a loss of the normal Reactor Building Ventilation System.

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ground level release of radioactive material by maintaining boundary integrity so that the SGTS may draw a vacuum in the Reactor Building and filter radioactive material at all times. The event reported in EN # 50831 did not result in a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function to control the release of radioactive material. This event report is being retracted."

The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Skokowski).

* * * UPDATE FROM WARREN PAUL TO CHARLES TEAL ON 4/15/15 AT 1348 EDT * * *

"Upon further review of NUREG-1022 section 3.2.7, the original Non-Emergency Event Notification, 50831, remains valid."

The NRC Resident Inspect has been informed. Notified R3DO (McCraw).

Power Reactor	Event Number: 50985
Facility: BEAVER VALLEY Region: 1 State: PA Unit: [1] [] [] RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP NRC Notified By: BLAS BARTKO HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN	Notification Date: 04/15/2015 Notification Time: 07:32 [ET] Event Date: 04/15/2015 Event Time: 04:11 [EDT] Last Update Date: 04/15/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION	Person (Organization): DON JACKSON (R1DO)

Unit	SCRAM Code	RX CRIT	Initial PWR	Initial RX Mode	Current PWR	Current RX Mode
1	M/R	Y	85	Power Operation	0	Hot Standby

Event Text

MANUAL REACTOR TRIP DUE TO THE LOSS OF A CONDENSATE PUMP

"At 0411 EDT on April 15, 2015, Beaver Valley Power Station (BVPS) Unit 1 manually tripped the reactor from approximately 85% power due to the trip of a condensate pump. The unit was performing an emergent power reduction due to a degraded condensate pump prior to the manual reactor trip. An end of cycle Tave coastdown was in progress at the time of the event. All control rods fully inserted into the core. All three auxiliary feed water pumps started as expected and were subsequently secured in accordance [with] station procedures. The main feedwater system remains available and in service. The unit is currently stable in Mode 3.

"Unit 2 was unaffected and remains at full power."

Decay heat removal is via main feedwater system with steam discharge to the main condenser via the steam bypass valves. Unit 1 is in a normal shutdown electrical lineup. No primary or secondary reliefs or safeties lifted during the transient.

The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.

News

The Lakewood Observer

Radon Gas – Be Aware Not Scared

by Michelle Mehaffey Taylor

Radon is still a mystery to many homeowners and new buyers. Some may be aware that it is something to be concerned about, but not exactly sure how it can affect their family's health. It's important to know the facts and safety measures. Understanding what radon is Radon is a tasteless, odorless, invisible gas — which comes from the natural breakdown of uranium in soil, rock, and water. If this happens out in the open, the radon quickly dissipates and poses no risk. The problem arises when radon gets trapped inside a structure. Radon levels can build up to a point where they are dangerous for humans. In fact, radon gas is considered the second leading cause of lung cancer in the United States. According to Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), radon contamination causes nearly 20,000 deaths a year.

Radon Testing in Lakewood

The EPA considers any homes with results 4.0 picocuries per liter or higher, at risk. Lakewood fairs better than other west shore communities with radon scores. "Lakewood has relatively lower readings with only 25% of homes averaging over 4.0 – these are primarily homes in northwest Lakewood where the soil is soft and has more sand. The remaining 75% test in the safe range, which tend to be homes in the southern, and eastern borders of the city. That area has a hard, clay soil," says John Larto, a licensed Inspector with Bowman Home Inspection. Homeowners and buyers alike should consider Radon testing. When you are purchasing, a licensed Radon Inspector can test at the time of your general home inspection. This typically takes 48-96 hours with results to you within 24 hours. Current owners can pick up a radon test kit at Lakewood Hardware. The simple do-it-yourself tests are affordable, reliable, and require minimum set up. It is recommended that owners repeat Radon tests every few years, and when the soil has been disturbed from remodeling or new construction.

What to do about Radon

If your results are 4.0 or higher, check with the Ohio EPA for a list of qualified mitigation contractors. While some of the solutions are simple, it is not a DIY job. If you don't do it right, you might actually increase the level of radon, or compromise the air quality in your house. A radon mitigation contractor will be able to tell you what kind of radon

control system will be most effective for your home. Most of the systems range in cost from \$900 to \$1,500. The mitigation system itself is a pipe placed into your foundation which extends to the roof of the home. A fan draws the radon up from the ground, and out to the top of the pipe, where it becomes diluted with the outside air. Your contractor will be able to explain maintenance of the system, and tips for keeping your home safe, such as continually checking for, and sealing up, cracks in your foundation.

Cleveland.com

Perry refuels its nuclear reactor, critics concerned about storage (photos)

Picture 1/10

Maintenance crews at the Perry nuclear power plant are replacing the reactor's "feedwater "preheaters," large hot water tanks that heat new water, as needed, before it is added to the operating reactor, where temperatures are between 500 and 540 degrees. Here, a support platform is prepared to help workers remove the old heaters. (Photo courtesy the FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Co.)

By [John Funk, The Plain Dealer](#) [Follow on Twitter](#)

on March 26, 2015 at 9:00 AM, updated March 26, 2015 at 11:26 AM

NORTH PERRY, Ohio -- FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Co. is switching to a new type of fuel rod at its Perry nuclear reactor, one that is more simply designed, more robust and more efficient.

But the switch-over has some anti-nuclear groups worried. One reason is that the rods contain slightly more enriched uranium, up to 5 percent rather than the traditional 3 percent.

The newly designed rods are manufactured by Global Nuclear Fuel, or GNF, a joint venture of GE, Toshiba and Hitachi. Perry had been using rods manufactured by GE. GNF claims the new design not only increases energy output but that its use ultimately will allow a reactor operator to use fuel rods with lower levels of enriched uranium and to use fewer of them.

The GNF fuel rods can stay in the reactor for up to three years, the company claims. The longer run time increases the reactor's efficiency and total power output, saving the company money at a time when natural gas-fired power plants are making it tough for nuclear reactors to compete on power prices.

Other reactor operators are already using these fuel rods or other hotter, newer-designed rods. These rods are collectively known as "high burn-up" fuel rods in the industry because they are able to run longer and consume more of the uranium they contain.

That extra time in the reactor core is exactly what the nuclear critics say will lead to major storage problems later.

They charge that the longer runs and potentially higher heat levels during storage will embrittle the metal cladding holding the pellets of enriched uranium inside each fuel rod, and once brittle that cladding will more likely crack, especially if the used fuel rods are transported.

"This is a data-free exercise," said Kevin Kamps of Beyond Nuclear, a Maryland-based watchdog group. "I am skeptical," he added, noting that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has very little hard data to support its acceptance of the new fuel.

Donna Gilmore, a California-based nuclear critic, said enriched fuel rods are all about increasing utility profits and will create storage problems, which is crucial because currently all "spent" or used fuel rods are stored at each reactor site.

They are stored first in deep pools of continually cooled water for at least five years. After that they are packed dry into heavy sealed steel and concrete casks and stored at the reactor site, indefinitely. During the decades of storage, the cladding will become brittle because of the radiation and heat, argues Gilmore and other critics.

"Apparently this has been under the radar for years," said Gilmore of the new fuel rods.

"They told everybody these enriched fuel rods had to stay in the [spent] fuel pool a little longer. They did not know the storage problems of high burn-up fuel."

The NRC does not agree.

"They cool down so rapidly that after five years the difference between the high burn-up fuel and traditional fuel is not that much in terms of heat and radioactivity," said Meraj Rahimi, an engineer and chief of the criticality, shielding and risk assessment branch in the NRC's Division of Spent Fuel Management in Rockville, Maryland.

Rahimi said engineers at the Oakridge National Laboratory are now conducting tests on the cladding of used fuel rods to determine whether the metal is less ductile, that is, more brittle, than expected.

He said an earlier series of tests at the Argonne National Laboratory involving the high heating of the same kind of metal used in fuel rod cladding led researchers to conclude that the metal could become brittle.

And there are other tests under way in an effort to determine how hot the older fuel stays once it has spent five years in a cooling pool and then placed in heavy casks and stored on outdoor concrete pads.

"The industry and the U.S. Department of Energy are doing a full-scale test, taking a cask and filling it with high burn-up fuel," he said.

But so far, the interior temperatures of the casks in those experiments are not as high as the oven temperatures at the Argonne National Laboratory, said Rahimi, where a researcher testing cladding metal concluded it had become brittle after being heated in an oven at temperatures higher than 752 degrees for long periods of time.

David Lochbaum, nuclear safety engineer at the Union of Concerned Scientists, a nuclear watchdog group that is not opposed to nuclear power, dismissed the fears of the anti-nuclear critics.

He too traced the opposition to the fuel to the report made by the Argonne National Laboratory in 2012.

"Imagine that, a researcher at a national lab concluding that further research was needed to more fully understand something. I cannot imagine a researcher depending on future funding ever concluding that all that needed to be known was already known

and that money could henceforth be spent researching something else," Lochbaum said in an email.

"In this case, the self-serving conclusion by the researcher has spawned an army of activists around the country who contend that high burn-up fuel in dry storage is the greatest risk to humanity yet created. That's so far from the truth that the truth could not be seen using the Hubble telescope (with a good lens)."

Just the same, the company last fall decided it would ask the NRC to for permission to amend its operating license once it switched to the new fuel.

Though both the company and the agency say the amendment of a technical specification in a reactor's operating license is strictly routine, the request has alarmed critics. Worse, the NRC has not yet approved it, even as FirstEnergy prepares to refuel. Anti-nuclear groups think that delay in approving the license amendment and a recent closed-door discussion by an NRC advisory group involving another company switching to the same fuel may mean the fuel is experimental.

Crews at Perry already have removed all of the fuel rods from the reactor's core and stored them in an on-site cooling pool. Routine inspections of the reactor vessel itself and related equipment are under way.

The company is also replacing a major transformer and a very large water heater that preheats replacement water pumped into the reactor, as needed, while it is operating. All of this maintenance will take time, and FirstEnergy believes it will have the license amendment in hand before it's time to restart the reactor.

While the company no longer reveals, for competitive reasons, when it plans to restart any of its power plants, the unapproved license amendment raises another question: Can the refueling begin before the NRC approves the amendment to the operating license?

The NRC itself seems to be undecided.

The amendment, said NRC spokeswoman Maureen Conley at agency headquarters in Maryland, is not specifically related to the new fuel rods but instead is required by the "design" of the core, once the refueling is complete.

So, it appears the refueling can occur but that the company would not be able to run the reactor at full power until the agency grants the amendment, she said.

Ernest Harkness, site vice president at Perry and the man responsible for its overall management, said the company has amended its operating license after other refueling shutdowns.

Because the enriched uranium in fuel rods is consumed at different rates, often because of each fuel rod's location in the core, nuclear engineers calculate the burn rate throughout the core and often decide to amend some of the technical specifications contained in a company's operating license, Harkness explained.

"They will look at current performance, and then design the fuel so that in the next fuel cycle, you get a consistent burn up of the fuel so you can stay at 100 percent [fission] longer," he said.

"They [fuel rods] are tailor made" for each refueling," he added. "They have to match the fuel requirements, and occasionally you might have to adjust a limit."

The company is replacing 280 of the reactor's 748 fuel rod assemblies. That's about 37 percent, which is traditionally a typical percentage in a reactor that has run steadily for 24 months, as Perry does.

The company does not expect to pull so many fuel rods during the next refueling in 2017.

"Well, instead of loading 275 or so, we will [probably] do 265," Harkness said. "We will look at how the fuel performs. Each fuel rod is designed with different levels of enriched uranium."

http://www.cleveland.com/business/index.ssf/2015/03/nuclear_refueling_at_perry_cri.html#incart_river

House Oversight panel to probe DOE official's move to Centrus

Hannah Northey, E&E reporter

Published: Wednesday, April 1, 2015

A House Oversight panel is investigating whether Daniel Poneman, a former top Energy Department official, violated any ethics guidelines or conflict-of-interest laws when taking the reins of a controversial uranium enrichment company that benefited from the government's support.

Rep. Jason Chaffetz (R-Utah), chairman of the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee, and pro-uranium-mining Rep. Cynthia Lummis (R-Wyo.), who leads the committee's Interior subpanel, in a [letter](#) to Energy Secretary Ernest Moniz expressed concern with Poneman's appointment to the position of CEO and president of Centrus Energy Corp., formerly the U.S. Enrichment Corp.

Chaffetz and Lummis noted that Poneman served as the DOE's deputy secretary from May 2009 to October 2014, during which time he was "substantially involved" in the agency's business arrangements with Centrus' predecessor. That work, they said, "raises questions about whether he complied with ethics guidelines and federal conflict of interest laws that cover government employees who are seeking private employment."

Documents show that Poneman advocated for a loan guarantee for USEC in 2011 and suggested providing federal funds to the company despite financial challenges while serving on the National Security Council Deputies Committee, Chaffetz and Lummis wrote.

The House Republicans expressed concern that Poneman violated post-employment laws for federal personnel, including restrictions that require senior government officials to report when they are seeking private employment and to recuse themselves from matters with a direct effect on the financial interests of that potential private employer. Chaffetz and Lummis asked for all communication between Poneman and Centrus or USEC from May 2009 to October 2014 by April 10, as well as any documents related to his request for recusals. They made the same request for information in a separate [letter](#) to Centrus' senior vice president and general counsel, Peter Saba.

Jeremy Derryberry, a spokesman for the company, said Centrus will respond to the request. He also defended Poneman.

"At no time during his employment with the Department of Energy did anyone affiliated with Centrus contact Mr. Poneman to discuss future employment opportunities," he

wrote in an email. "The first communications with Mr. Poneman about this opportunity occurred after he left the Department. At all times, Mr. Poneman and the company have fully complied with all applicable post-employment restrictions and government ethics requirements and will continue to do so in the future."

Still, Poneman's move continues to raise eyebrows on Capitol Hill on both sides of the aisle.

Republican Sen. John Barrasso, who hails from the uranium-rich state of Wyoming, said he has a "serious concern" with Poneman's move and his work with USEC while serving at DOE. Barrasso in a letter to Moniz said the move "epitomizes the inappropriate and legally questionable relationship that DOE has had with this private company"

([Greenwire](#), March 12).

And at a Senate appropriations hearing last week, Sen. Dianne Feinstein (D-Calif.) also questioned the move, noting that Poneman was "heavily involved" in decisions that helped keep USEC afloat when it wasn't meeting timetables and goals. Feinstein noted that there were restrictions regarding Poneman's contact with USEC for the balance of the Obama administration, but said "this seems to ignore his potential influence with career bureaucrats."

"I'm really less concerned about the optics for Mr. Poneman than I am the department, and given Mr. Poneman's direct role at DOE in advancing USEC, how can anyone fully trust the DOE to contract a decision that benefits Centrus?" she asked.

Moniz said DOE made sure Poneman had a "refresher course" on restricted activities and distributed those guidelines to agency workers.

"We will try, absolutely, to adhere to that wall as called for in those restrictions," Moniz said.

Source: <http://www.eenews.net/greenwire/2015/04/01/stories/1060016138>

Drone rules pose risks and rewards for nuclear power plants

Blake Sobczak, E&E reporter

Published: Thursday, April 30, 2015

The U.S. electric sector has broadly welcomed a federal proposal that would clear the way for wide commercial use of drones.

It's easy to see why. Small unmanned aircraft systems -- commonly called drones -- offer a convenient way for utilities to inspect transmission lines and investigate storm damage.

But recent security breaches have given some in the power industry pause. In one mysterious episode last fall, drones flew over restricted airspace at 13 different nuclear plants in France. Officials still don't know who was behind the controls.

That and other similar cases this year have raised red flags at the U.S. Nuclear Energy Institute.

David Kline, the industry group's director of security, urged caution last week in comments to the Federal Aviation Administration, the agency drafting the new regulations.

"Although NEI is not aware of any unauthorized flights of [small unmanned aircraft systems] at or near U.S. commercial nuclear power plants, the present FAA regulatory regime and the Proposed Rule are not sufficient to address such flights," Kline [said](#). He suggested adding a provision to bar drone operators from flying within a roughly 3-mile radius of any nuclear power plant licensed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. "The unauthorized operation of [small unmanned aircraft systems] should be prohibited in airspace above and surrounding these facilities," he said, although he added that the devices "may have beneficial uses for [NEI's] members."

One application could counter the drone threat with more drones -- Exelon Corp., the nation's largest nuclear power plant operator, suggested using small unmanned aircraft to patrol "secured areas" in [comments](#) filed with the FAA.

Exelon subsidiary Commonwealth Edison has already received conditional approval from the FAA to survey storm damage with drones in the Midwest ([EnergyWire](#), April 14). ComEd was the first utility to receive such authorization in February, but several others have followed suit since.

Commercial drone pioneers may bump up against a patchwork of state regulations as lawmakers grapple with privacy questions that are outside the scope of the FAA's rulemaking, according to Brendan Schulman, who leads the unmanned aircraft systems group at law firm Kramer Levin.

He said firms should urge state legislatures to "separate out the types of applications that raise privacy issues from those that don't."

"What we will see otherwise are restrictions on the use of drones, including by industry, on the basis of overstated privacy concerns," he said, noting that for utilities, "you're not taking pictures of someone through their window -- you're measuring and inspecting infrastructure."

Nuclear power producers may have their own privacy worries as more drones take off across the country.

Monika Coflin, a technical assistant for the division of security policy at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, said in a [blog post](#) last week that drones "can be used to conduct surveillance to gather intelligence about facility security."

"Drones may be fun toys, but they pose a number of concerns," she said, warning that they could also be used to deliver explosive payloads, taking after their much larger cousins in the military.

Pilots of conventional aircraft are already advised not to linger around sites such as power plants, dams and refineries. Drone operators would be held to the same expectations.

Schulman, whose firm has worked with the UAS America Fund LLC, said that because they're so small, "it would be easy to overstate the threat to infrastructure from these drones in the absence of an appropriate analysis."

"I understand the concern about not wanting drones to take out power lines or things like that," he said. "But that seems like a minimal threat, because many of these systems are very lightweight and I don't think pose a hazard to the actual power plants," which are built to withstand severe weather and other disasters.

"It's important to ask what we're trying to protect against -- I think someone who's planning to do something malicious is not going to be deterred by a regulation," he added.

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Source: <http://www.eenews.net/energywire/2015/04/30/stories/1060017725>

Information Notices

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<http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html>

or to access generic communications files on the NRC Homepage:

<http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/gen-comm/reg-issues/2013/>.

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This is in the format of : ML #####A###

Part 21 and Miscellaneous

Subject: G20110171 - Letter to Petitioner Saporito on Proposed Director's Decision Regarding 2.206 Petition Dated: March 12, 2011.

ADAMS Accession No.: ML13018A239

Subject: G20110171 - Letter to Licensees on Proposed Director's Decision Regarding 2.206 Petition Dated: March 12, 2011.

ADAMS Accession No.: ML13018A244

Subject: G20110563 - LTR to Lochbaum -- Draft Director's Decision Re 2.206 Petition Re Boiling Water Reactors with Mark I and Mark II Containment Designs

ADAMS Accession No.: ML12215A283

RIS 2015-04, Withdrawal of Administrative Letter 93-01, dated April 14, 2015

ADAMS Accession No. ML14262A350

Correction Letter For Proposed Director's Decision Regarding Saporito Petition dated March 12, 2011.

ADAMS Accession No.: ML15105A188

G20110563 - Licensee Letter Regarding Draft Director's Decision to Licensee's with Mark I and II Containment Design.

ADAMS Accession No.: ML15069A112

IN 2013-13, Rev. 1, "Deficiencies With Effluent Radiation Monitoring System Instrumentation," dated April 15, 2015

ADAMS Accession No. ML14253A270

RIS 2015-05, "Preparation and Scheduling of Operator Licensing Examinations", dated April 20, 2015

ADAMS Accession No ML15062A568

IN 201504, "Fatigue in Branch Connection Welds", dated April 24, 2015
ADAMS Accession No.: ML15023A054

FirstEnergy

SUMMARY OF TELEPHONE CONFERENCE CALL HELD ON FEBRUARY 20, 2015,
BETWEEN THE U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION AND FIRSTENERGY
NUCLEAR OPERATING COMPANY
ADAMS Accession No. ML15056A456

Davis-Besse

NUREG-1437, Supplement 52 Vol. 1 Final Generic Environmental Impact Statement for License
Renewal of Nuclear Plants Supplement 52 Regarding Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Final
Report Chapters 1 to 12.

ADAMS Accession No.: ML15112A098

Davis Besse Final TIA Response-Laminar Cracks in the Shield Building.

ADAMS Accession No.: ML15082A125

Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Component Design Bases Inspection Report
05000346/2015008

ADAMS Accession Number ML15103A639

Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Unit 1 - Acceptance Review Concerning Change to Cyber
Security Milestone 8 Completion Date (TAC NO. MF5892) (L-15-084)

ADAMS Accession No.: ML15103A067

DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT

05000346/2015001 AND 07200014/2015001

ADAMS Accession Number: ML15113B387

Availability of the Final Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement Regarding Davis-Besse
Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1, License Renewal

ADAMS Accession No. ML14302A244

NUREG-1437 SUPP 52 V2 "Generic Environmental Impact Statement for License Renewal of
Nuclear Plants, Regarding Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station." Final Report.

ADAMS Accession No. ML15113A187

Perry

2015 Perry Nuclear Station, Initial License Exam, Letter from Licensee Submitting Proposed
Exam.

ADAMS Accession No.: ML15110A193

Perry, Unit 1 - Submittal of Core Operating Limits Report for Operating Cycle 16.

ADAMS Accession No.: ML15104A088

Submittal of the Decommissioning Funding Status Reports for Beaver Valley, Units 1 and 2, Davis-Besse and Perry, Unit 1.

ADAMS Accession No.: ML15090A447

2013 Perry Nuclear Power Plant Initial License Examination Proposed Written Exam and References.

ADAMS Accession No.: ML13179A104

Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit No. 1 - Issuance of Amendment Concerning Full Implementation of Alternative Source Term (TAC NO. MF3197) (L-13-306).

ADAMS Accession No.: ML15075A139

Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit No. 1 - Issuance of Amendment Concerning Safety Limit Critical Power Ratio Values (TAC NO. MF5007)(L-14-325).

ADAMS Accession No.: ML15075A091

Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1; NRC Security Baseline Inspection Report 05000440/2015404 (Cover Letter Only)

ADAMS Accession Number ML15099A760

Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit No. 1 – Relaxation of the Schedule Requirements for Order EA-12-049 “Issuance of Order to Modify Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events”

ADAMS Accession No.: ML15089A182

Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit, No. 1 - Request for Additional Information Concerning Battery Surveillance Test Frequencies (TAC NO. MF5298)

Accession Number: ML15096A051

PERRY NUCLEAR POWER PLANT - NRC INITIAL LICENSE EXAMINATION REPORT 05000440/2015301

ADAMS Accession Number ML15117A634

Beaver Valley

Beaver Valley, Unit 1, Current Facility Operating License No. DPR-66, Technical Specifications, Revised 04/08/2015.

ADAMS Accession No.: ML052720291

Beaver Valley, Units 1 and 2 - License Amendment Request to Steam Generator Technical Specifications.

ADAMS Accession No.: ML15092A569

Beaver Valley, Units 1 and 2 - February 2015 Discharge Monitoring Report (NPDES) Permit No. PA0025615.

ADAMS Accession No.: ML15091A360

Submittal of the Decommissioning Funding Status Reports for Beaver Valley, Units 1 and 2, Davis-Besse and Perry, Unit 1.

ADAMS Accession No.: ML15090A447

Beaver Valley Unit 1 - Draft Written Exam (Folder 2)

ADAMS Accession No.: ML14246A234

Beaver Valley Unit 1 - Draft Operating Exam (Sections A, B, and C) (Folder 2)

ADAMS Accession No.: ML14246A235

Beaver Valley Unit 1 - Final Written Examination with Answer Key (401-5 Format) (Folder 2)

ADAMS Accession No.: ML14246A237

Beaver Valley Unit 1 - Final Operating Exam (Sections A, B, and C) (Folder 3)

ADAMS Accession No.: ML14246A240

MARCH 4, 2015, NRC GENERIC FUNDAMENTALS EXAMINATION RESULTS FOR BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION, UNIT 1 (COVER LETTER PUBLICLY AVAILABLE, ENCLOSURES WITHHELD FROM PUBLIC)

ADAMS ACCESSION NO. ML15091A223

Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2 - Issuance of Amendment Re: License Amendment Request to Extend Containment Leakage Rate Test Frequency (Tac Nos. MF3985 and MF3986)

ADAMS Accession No.: ML15078A058

Beaver Valley Power Station, Units 1 and 2 - Notification of Conduct of a Triennial Fire Protection Baseline Inspection

ADAMS No.: ML15111A524

Forthcoming Closed Meeting to Discuss Dam Failure Analysis for Beaver Valley Power Station Units 1 and 2

ADAMS Accession No.: ML15110A406

Portsmouth Facilities

Transmittal of Security Incident Log per 10 CFR 95.57(b) for American Centrifuge Operating, LLC - Security-Related Information.

ADAMS Accession No.: ML15112A077

American Centrifuge Lead Cascade Facility and American Centrifuge Plant - Transmittal of Updated OODEP Listings.

ADAMS Accession No.: ML15105A082

American Centrifuge Lead Cascade Facility and American Centrifuge Plant - Response to Request for Additional Information Related to the Summary of Changes for Calendar Year 2014.

ADAMS Accession No.: ML15093A337

Submittal of Changed Pages for the Security Program for the American Centrifuge Plant - Security-Related Information, Official Use Only, and Export Controlled Information.

ADAMS Accession No.: ML15098A117

Letter to S. Toelle on NRC's Final NRC Approval of Cyber Plans for ACO.

ADAMS Accession No.: ML15085A167

Enclosure 1: Attendees Sheet for March 4 and 5, 2015 Meeting Between NRC and Stakeholders Regarding Fuel Cycle Regulatory Activities.

ADAMS Accession No.: ML15075A095

Revisions 67 & 68 to Portsmouth Certification Application - NRC Certification Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant USEC-02 Remove/Insert Instructions through Appendix A - Deleted.

ADAMS Accession No.: ML03345160

Transmittal of Revisions 67 & 68 to Portsmouth Certification Application - Enclosure 1, Oath and Affirmation through Section 3.0 Administrative Controls.

ADAMS Accession No.: ML033440567

Revisions 67 & 68 to Portsmouth Certification Application - PORTS, Table of Contents Through Revision 68, Figure 4.3-33.

ADAMS Accession No.: ML033450144

Revisions 67 & 68 to Portsmouth Certification Application - 4.4 References through Figure 5.1 - 21.

ADAMS Accession No.: ML033450155

Revisions 67 & 68 to Portsmouth Certification Application - 5.2 Nuclear Criticality Safety through Appendix B.

ADAMS Accession No.: ML033450157

Appendix C - Dose Methodology and Impacts.

ADAMS Accession No.: ML15092A688

Fermi 1

No reports

Fermi 2

Fermi, Unit 2, Response to Request for Additional Information (RAI) Regarding the License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specifications by Relocating Surveillance Frequencies to Licensee Control in Accordance with TSTF-425, Revision 3.

ADAMS Accession No.: ML15107A407

Fermi, Unit 2 - Interim Staff Evaluation Relating to Overall Integrated Plan in Response to Phase 1 of Order EA-13-109,"Severe Accident Capable Hardened Vents."

ADAMS Accession No.: ML15077A574

Requests for Additional Information for the Review of the Fermi 2 License Renewal Application -
Set 28 (TAC No. MF4222)
Accession No. ML15078A337

Requests for Additional Information for the Review of the Fermi 2 License Renewal Application -
Set 29 (TAC NO. MF4222)
Accession No. ML15082A046

Requests for Additional Information for the Review of the Fermi2 License Renewal Application -
Set 27 (TAC NO. MF4222)
Accession No. ML15077A108

Request for Additional Information for the Review of the Fermi 2 License Renewal Application -
Set 31 (TAC No. MF4222)
ADAMS Accession No. ML15085A513

Fermi Power Plant, Unit 2, Evaluations of Changes, Tests, and Experiments and Permanent
Plant Modifications Baseline Inspection Report 05000341/2015008
ADAMS Accession Number ML15096A506

Requests for Additional Information for the Environmental Review of the Fermi 2 License
Renewal Applications—Severe Accident Mitigation Alternatives
ADAMS Accession No. Accession No. ML15092A945

SUMMARY OF TELEPHONE CONFERENCE CALL HELD ON NOVEMBER 19, 2014,
BETWEEN THE U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION AND DTE ELECTRIC
COMPANY, CONCERNING RAIs PERTAINING TO THE FERMI 2 LRA (TAC NO. MF4222)
ADAMS Accession No. ML15092A243

SUMMARY OF TELEPHONE CONFERENCE CALL HELD ON FEBRUARY 13, 2015,
BETWEEN THE U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION AND DTE ELECTRIC
COMPANY, CONCERNING RAIs PERTAINING TO THE FERMI 2 LRA (TAC NO. MF4222)
ADAMS Accession No. ML15076A468

REQUESTS FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FOR THE REVIEW OF THE FERMI 2
LICENSE RENEWAL APPLICATION – SET 32 (TAC NO. MF4222)
ADAMS Accession No. ML15099A016

REQUEST FOR WITHHOLDING INFORMATION FROM PUBLIC DISCLOSURE (TAC NO.
MF4222)
ADAMS Accession No. ML15099A663

SUMMARY OF TELEPHONE CONFERENCE CALLS HELD ON MARCH 6, 2015 BETWEEN
THE U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION AND DTE ELECTRIC COMPANY,
CONCERNING RAIs PERTAINING TO THE FERMI 2 LRA (TAC NO. MF4222)
ADAMS Accession No. ML15072A203

SUMMARY OF TELEPHONE CONFERENCE CALL HELD ON MARCH 16, 2015, BETWEEN
THE U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION AND DTE ELECTRIC COMPANY,
CONCERNING RAIs PERTAINING TO THE FERMI 2 LRA (TAC NO. MF4222)
ADAMS Accession No. ML15082A188

Fermi 2 - Mururoa Supplied Air Suits Models MTH2 and V4F1 and The Mururoa Blu Suit Systems (TAC No. MF5742)
ADAMS Accession No.: ML15107A105

Fermi 3

NRC000018 - Supplemental Biological Assessment.

ADAMS Accession No.: ML15096A487

Supplemental Biological Assessment - Submittal of the Supplemental Biological Assessment on the Northern Long-Eared Bat for the Proposed ENRICO Fermi Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 3.

ADAMS Accession No.: ML15093A316

NRC000020 - Supplemental Biological Assessment.

ADAMS Accession No.: ML15119A342

Commission Memorandum and Order (CLI-15-13).

ADAMS Accession No.: ML15120A040