

To: Jodi Billman-Kotsko, ERU Supervisor  
From: Zack Clayton, Rad Coordinator  
Subject: March Monthly Report  
Date: April 2 , 2015

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## Beans

Training: 2  
Drills: 1  
Meetings: 3  
Technical Assistance: 2  
Public Assistance: 1

Web Page Views: There were 23 page views in March.

## Coming Attractions

4/1 IREP  
4/1 Grant discussion/Strategy session  
4/2 RAT Steering Committee  
4/6 URSB meeting  
4/7 NRC Government to Government meeting  
4/23 NEPAC  
5/5 Davis-Besse HAB evaluation  
5/12 Office 365 training  
5/15 Public Records Training  
6/2-4 RAT Training

## Facility updates

### **Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station**

Davis-Besse operated at full power for the month.

Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station provided an update on the elevated levels of tritium that were first detected on February 3, 2015. The most recent testing collected samples from 19 wells on the plant property. Thirteen of those wells showed results above the agreed reporting level of 2000 pCi/L of tritium. The wells which have shown elevated tritium levels in past sampling, while still exceeding the reporting limit, are all showing lower sampling results. The drinking water standard for Tritium is lower than 20,000 pCi/L. The DBNPS Problem Solving Team has made extensive use of video pipe

inspection and thermography but has not located the source of the leakage. DBNPS has hired an independent firm with experience in tritium ground water issues to review their actions and suggest steps that can be taken to locate and mitigate the leakage. Monthly ground water sampling will continue to monitor the situation.

## **Perry Nuclear Power Plant**

Perry operated at reduced power during the coast down until the refueling outage started March 9. Perry has been in power coast down since January.

On Feb 27, 2015, a truck arrived on site with two boxes containing four rebuilt control rod drive mechanisms to be used during the Perry refueling outage. One of the boxes had a contact dose reading of 1290 MR/HR. This is above the 1000 MR/HR limit as noted in 10 CFR 71.47. No other limits were exceeded on the exterior of the vehicle. The box was taken into the Perry Fuel Handling Building and is posted per the Perry Radiation Control Program. The vehicle is parked outside the Fuel Handling Building and is being controlled. See Event Number 50852.

On March 23, at approximately 1526 EDT, the control room received a report of an individual working in a contaminated area of the plant experiencing chest pains. An ambulance was called to transport the individual to an offsite medical facility. The initial Radiation Protection survey did not detect any contamination, however the protective clothing the individual wore could not be removed. The individual is considered 'potentially contaminated' due to not being able to perform a complete frisk. Radiation Protection personnel escorted the individual offsite. At approximately 1652 [EDT], Perry Radiation Protection confirmed the individual was not contaminated. No contamination was found in the ambulance or at the hospital. Perry Radiation Protection is in possession of and returning all protective clothing worn by the individual to the plant. See Event Number 50918.

## **Beaver Valley Power Station**

### **Beaver Valley Unit I**

Unit I operated at full power for the month.

### **Beaver Valley Unit II**

Unit II operated at full power for the month.

At 1708 EDT on March 14, 2015, Beaver Valley Power Station (BVPS) Unit 2 determined that the Digital Radiation Monitoring System (DRMS) was not operating. This resulted in a loss of radiation monitor capability to alarm and indicate in the control room. BVPS Unit 2 DRMS was declared non-functional. Repair efforts were initiated and compensatory measures were initiated. At 2056 EDT on March 14, 2015, following initial investigation and repairs, BVPS Unit 2 emergency assessment capability was restored in conjunction with DRMS restoration.

Since the BVPS Unit 2 DRMS was non-functional, this event resulted in a loss of emergency assessment capability and is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). See Event number 50895.

## **DTE**

### **Fermi II**

Fermi II had a brief reduction in power on March 9 and then a shut down due to Event 50903 on March 20.

On March 9, 2015, at approximately 1521 [EDT], while performing a functional test of the LPCI swing bus automatic throwover scheme, the throwover function failed, rendering LPCI loop select inoperable. Tech Spec 3.0.3 was entered and power reduction commenced at 1615 [EDT]. Power was lowered to approximately 80%. Maintenance led a troubleshooting process that found and corrected the equipment problem. At approximately 2311 [EDT], the limiting condition for operating was cleared and LPCI loop selected was declared operable. Tech Spec 3.0.3 was exited at that time. The plant returned to 100% power. See Event Number 50874.

On March 19, 2015, Fermi 2 received an automatic scram due to actuation of the Reactor Protection System (RPS) function of Oscillation Power Range Monitor (OPRM) Upscale. The plant had recently transitioned to Single Loop Operation due to loss of normal and emergency cooling water supply. The lowest reactor water level was 134 inches above top of active fuel. Reactor water level is being maintained in the normal band by the Feedwater and Control Rod Drive Systems. No Safety Relief Valves (SRV) actuated. Reactor pressure is being maintained via the Main Turbine Bypass Valves and Main Condenser. Reactor Pressure Vessel Level 3 isolation occurred. No additional safety system actuations occurred. All off-site power sources were available throughout the event. The plant is currently in Mode 3 and in a stable condition. Investigation into the cause of the event is ongoing. This event is being reported under the four hour Non-Emergency reporting criteria of 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). See Event Number 50903.

### **Fermi III**

Fermi III continues as a documentation evaluation.

## **Portsmouth Enrichment Plant**

ADAMS documentation only.

### **Activity**

- |         |   |
|---------|---|
| 3/3     | Davis-Besse Offsite Agency Systems Training – several Ohio EPA personnel participated in this training. |
| 3/6     | FENOC Grant Negotiations for SFY2016-2017   |
| 3/10-11 | DERR Training including awareness level training for non-radiological staff.                            |

- 3/12 IREP – Plant and Agency updates and a brief discussion of the HAB dry run.
- 3/16 RAT Steering Committee - A discussion of internal organization and grant updates. Future training was also discussed.
- 3/24 Davis-Besse HAB dry run. A Law Enforcement focused exercise. There was no radiological release in the scenario.

## Office Issues

The seating chart has been rearranged to allow better work flow in the ER program, Zack’s area has been reassigned and a larger space allocated to the RAT program. Telephone and computer connections have not been configured yet.

## Statistics, NRC Reports, News, and ADAMS References

### Operating Power Levels

March

Date	BV1	BV2	DB	Perry	Fermi2	
1	100	100	100	87	100	Perry in coastdown to refueling outage
2	100	100	100	87	100	
7	100	100	100	86	100	
9	100	100	100	0	100	Perry in refueling outage
16	100	100	100	0	100	
20	100	100	100	0	0	Fermi automatic scram due to RPS Oscillation Power Range
23	100	100	100	0	0	
26	100	100	100	0	0	
30	100	100	100	0	0	
31	100	100	100	0	0	

### Event Reports

Power Reactor	Event Number: 50627
Facility: BEAVER VALLEY Region: 1 State: PA Unit: [1] [ ] [ ] RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP NRC Notified By: PATRICK HARTIG HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN	Notification Date: 11/19/2014 Notification Time: 09:57 [ET] Event Date: 11/19/2014 Event Time: 09:43 [EST] Last Update Date: 02/27/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY	Person (Organization):

10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE	TODD JACKSON (R1DO)
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Unit	SCRAM Code	RX CRIT	Initial PWR	Initial RX Mode	Current PWR	Current RX Mode
1	N	Y	100	Power Operation	100	Power Operation

**Event Text**

EAL REQUIRED GASEOUS WASTE EFFLUENT RADIATION MONITORS REMOVED FROM SERVICE FOR PLANNED MAINTENANCE

"The Beaver Valley Power Station (BVPS) Unit 1 Special Particulate, Iodine and Noble Gas (SPING 4) monitors were removed from service for a planned equipment upgrade/replacement. During the replacement process certain Emergency Action Level (EAL) required monitors will not be functional, therefore, alternate methods of monitoring have been placed in effect. The replacement activities are expected to take approximately 60 days. A follow-up notification will be made after the required monitors are returned to service and declared functional.

"This is an 8 hour notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). No BVPS Unit 2 systems will be adversely affected by the Unit 1 replacement activity.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

\* \* \* UPDATE FROM PATRICK HARTIG TO CHARLES TEAL AT 1728 EST ON 2/27/15 \* \* \*

"The planned equipment upgrade was completed and the Beaver Valley Power Station (BVPS) Unit 1 Particulate, Iodine and Noble Gas (PING) monitors were returned to service and declared functional at 1714 EST on 2/27/2015.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

Notified R1DO (Gray).

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Power Reactor	Event Number: 50852
Facility: PERRY Region: 3 State: OH Unit: [1][ ][ ] RX Type: [1] GE-6 NRC Notified By: MICHAEL BROGAN HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL	Notification Date: 02/27/2015 Notification Time: 16:10 [ET] Event Date: 02/27/2015 Event Time: 15:18 [EST] Last Update Date: 02/27/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 20.1906(d)(2) - EXTERNAL RAD LEVELS > LIMITS	Person (Organization): ANN MARIE STONE (R3DO) NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)

Unit	SCRAM Code	RX CRIT	Initial PWR	Initial RX Mode	Current PWR	Current RX Mode
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1	N	Y	87	Power Operation	87	Power Operation
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**Event Text**

**SHIPMENT OF CONTROL ROD MECHANISMS EXCEEDED EXTERNAL RADIATION LIMITS**

"At 1518 EST on Feb 27, 2015, the Perry Shift Manager received notice from the Radiation Protection group that an Exclusive Use closed transport vehicle arrived on site exceeding the 10 CFR 71.47 radiation levels on contact with a box on the vehicle. The truck that arrived had two boxes containing four rebuilt control rod drive mechanisms to be used during the Perry refueling outage. One of the boxes had a contact dose reading of 1290 MR/HR. This is above the 1000 MR/HR limit as noted in 10 CFR 71.47. No other limits were exceeded on the exterior of the vehicle. Specifically, the cab of the truck was reading 0.1 MR/HR which is less than the 2 MR/HR limit. Also at 2 meters around the truck, the highest level reading was 1.2 MR/HR which is below the 10 MR/HR [limit]. Also on direct contact with the outside of the vehicle, the highest reading was 30 MR/HR, which is below the 200 MR/HR limit.

"The Site Radiation Protection Shipping Coordinator contacted the shipping organization of this finding at Perry. This was the Director of Operations of Energy Solutions in Memphis, Tennessee. The box was taken into the Perry Fuel Handling Building and is posted per the Perry Radiation Control Program. The vehicle is parked outside the Fuel Handling Building and is being controlled."

The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed.

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Part 21	Event Number: 50691
Rep Org: ABB GROUP Licensee: ABB GROUP Region: 1 City: CORAL SPRINGS State: FL County: License #: Agreement: Y Docket: NRC Notified By: DENNIS BATOVSKY HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER	Notification Date: 12/17/2014 Notification Time: 17:38 [ET] Event Date: 12/17/2014 Event Time: [EST] Last Update Date: 03/05/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE	Person (Organization): DONNA JANDA (R1DO) KATHLEEN O'DONOHUE (R2DO) AARON MCCRAW (R3DO) NEIL OKEEFE (R4DO) PART 21 GROUP (EMAI)

**Event Text**

**PART 21 REPORT - POTENTIAL DEFECT REGARDING KF RELAYS**

"Recent seismic testing results of the above Class 1E KF under-frequency relays uncovered inaccurate qualification by similarity to the tested relay 1328D72A03 (qualified in 2011). The subject relays do not meet the previously published ZPA rating, but meet a rating of 1.7g in

accordance with IEEE C37.98-1987 requirements.

"Records show a total of 37 suspect relays were provided to seven customers. ABB does not have the capability to perform the evaluation to determine if a defect exists, thus we are notifying the purchasers or affected licensees of this determination so that they may evaluate the deviation, pursuant to 10 CFR. 21.21(b).

"If you have any questions regarding this notice, please contact the ABB Technical Support 954-752-6700.

"Dennis Batovsky  
Managing Director"

\* \* \* UPDATE FROM DENNIS BATOVSKY TO HOWIE CROUCH VIA FAX ON 3/5/15 AT 1522 EST \* \* \*

"This letter is an update to the Part 21 Notification submitted on December 17, 2014, 'Potential defect regarding KF relay zero period acceleration (ZPA) rating'.

"ABB reminds all licensees, that per ABB KF Under-frequency relays, Instruction Leaflet 41-503.21A effective April 1997, 'the normally closed contact at terminal number 2 should not be used for critical circuits due to a low fragility rating'.

"ABB [has] conducted the following actions:

- ABB has performed an initial extent of condition evaluation to determine if this situation exists in other electromechanical IE qualified relays. There are no additional findings at this time.
- ABB issued a corrective action to improve existing engineering qualification procedures that govern qualification by similarity.

"If you have any questions regarding this notice, please contact the ABB Technical Support 954-752-6700."

Notified R1DO (Burritt), R2DO (Sykes), R3DO (Cameron), R4DO (Kellar) and Part 21 Group (via email).

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Power Reactor	Event Number: 50874
Facility: FERMI Region: 3 State: MI Unit: [2] [ ] [ ] RX Type: [2] GE-4 NRC Notified By: S. REITH HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA	Notification Date: 03/09/2015 Notification Time: 17:38 [ET] Event Date: 03/09/2015 Event Time: 15:21 [EDT] Last Update Date: 03/10/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION	Person (Organization): STEVE ORTH (R3DO)

Unit	SCRAM	RX CRIT	Initial	Initial RX Mode	Current	Current RX Mode
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	Code		PWR		PWR	
2	N	Y	100	Power Operation	83	Power Operation

**Event Text**

TECH SPEC REQUIRED SHUTDOWN DUE TO SWING BUS AUTOMATIC THROWOVER FAILURE

"While performing a Technical Specification surveillance functional test of the [Low Pressure Coolant Injection] LPCI swing bus automatic throwover scheme, the throwover function failed, rendering LPCI Loop Select inoperable. Time of [the] event was 1521 [EDT]. Inoperable LPCI Loop Select results in entry into Tech Spec 3.0.3. Power reduction activities were briefed and power reduction commenced at 1615. Maintenance is currently implementing a contingency work order to correct the auto throwover failure.

"This report is made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i), initiation of plant shutdown required by the plant's Technical Specifications; and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of systems needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident."

Offsite and Emergency power remain available.

The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.

\* \* \* UPDATE FROM KELLEY BELLENKY TO DANIEL MILLS AT 0123 EDT ON 3/10/2015 \* \* \*

"On March 9, 2015, at approximately 1521 [EDT], while performing a functional test of the LPCI swing bus automatic throwover scheme, the throwover function failed, rendering LPCI loop select inoperable. Tech Spec 3.0.3 was entered and power reduction commenced at 1615 [EDT]. Power was lowered to approximately 80%. Maintenance led a troubleshooting process that found and corrected the equipment problem. At approximately 2311 [EDT], the limiting condition for operating was cleared and LPCI loop selected was declared operable. Tech Spec 3.0.3 was exited at that time."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The plant has returned to 100% power.

Notified R3DO (Orth).

\* \* \* UPDATE FROM DAVID COSIO TO CHARLES TEAL AT 1253 EDT ON 3/10/15 \* \* \*

The LCO and LPCI operability declared was at 2211 EDT NOT 2311 EDT.

Notified R3DO (Orth).

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Power Reactor	Event Number: 50895
Facility: BEAVER VALLEY Region: 1 State: PA Unit: [ ] [2] [ ] RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP	Notification Date: 03/14/2015 Notification Time: 23:32 [ET] Event Date: 03/14/2015 Event Time: 17:08 [EDT]

NRC Notified By: MARK PHILLIPS HQ OPS Officer: DANIEL MILLS	Last Update Date: 03/14/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE	Person (Organization): WILLIAM COOK (R1DO)

Unit	SCRAM Code	RX CRIT	Initial PWR	Initial RX Mode	Current PWR	Current RX Mode
2	N	Y	100	Power Operation	100	Power Operation

**Event Text**

**DIGITAL RADIATION MONITORING SYSTEM FAILED**

"At 1708 EDT on March 14, 2015, Beaver Valley Power Station (BVPS) Unit 2 determined that the Digital Radiation Monitoring System (DRMS) was not operating. This resulted in a loss of radiation monitor capability to alarm and indicate in the control room. BVPS Unit 2 DRMS was declared non-functional. Repair efforts were initiated and compensatory measures were initiated.

"The radiation monitoring computer system is a stand-alone system. No cyber interference is suspected.

"At 2056 EDT on March 14, 2015, following initial investigation and repairs, BVPS Unit 2 emergency assessment capability was restored in conjunction with DRMS restoration.

"Since the BVPS Unit 2 DRMS was non-functional, this event resulted in a loss of emergency assessment capability and is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii).

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

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Power Reactor	Event Number: 50903
Facility: FERMI Region: 3 State: MI Unit: [2] [ ] [ ] RX Type: [2] GE-4 NRC Notified By: WARREN PAUL HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO	Notification Date: 03/19/2015 Notification Time: 10:51 [ET] Event Date: 03/19/2015 Event Time: 07:02 [EDT] Last Update Date: 03/19/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL	Person (Organization): GREGORY ROACH (R3DO)

Unit	SCRAM Code	RX CRIT	Initial PWR	Initial RX Mode	Current PWR	Current RX Mode
2	A/R	Y	70	Power Operation	0	Hot Shutdown

**Event Text**

**AUTOMATIC REACTOR SCRAM DUE TO AN OSCILLATION POWER RANGE MONITOR**

## UPSCALE ACTUATION

"At 0702 EDT on March 19, 2015, Fermi 2 received an automatic scram due to actuation of the Reactor Protection System (RPS) function of Oscillation Power Range Monitor (OPRM) Upscale. The plant had recently transitioned to Single Loop Operation after securing the 'A' Reactor Recirculation Pump due to loss of normal and emergency cooling water supply. The lowest reactor water level was 134 inches above top of active fuel. Reactor water level is being maintained in the normal band by the Feedwater and Control Rod Drive Systems. No Safety Relief Valves (SRV) actuated. Reactor pressure is being maintained via the Main Turbine Bypass Valves and Main Condenser. Reactor Pressure Vessel Level 3 isolation occurred. No additional safety system actuations occurred. All off-site power sources were available throughout the event. The plant is currently in Mode 3 and in a stable condition. Investigation into the cause of the event is ongoing.

"This event is being reported under the four hour Non-Emergency reporting criteria of 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

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Part 21	Event Number: 48798
Rep Org: CURTISS WRIGHT FLOW CONTROL CO. Licensee: CRYDOM, INC Region: 1 City: DANBURY State: CT County: License #: Agreement: N Docket: NRC Notified By: MICHAEL WEINSTEIN HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL	Notification Date: 03/01/2013 Notification Time: 11:40 [ET] Event Date: 03/01/2013 Event Time: [EST] Last Update Date: 03/20/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE	Person (Organization): ART BURRITT (R1DO) RANDY MUSSER (R2DO) JAMNES CAMERON (R3DO) PART 21 GROUP (EMAI)

### Event Text

#### PART 21 - DUAL ALARM MODULES THAT MAY CONTAIN FAULTY DIODES IN SINGLE STATE RELAYS

The following is excerpted from a facsimile received from Curtis Wright:

"Crydom Inc., the sole supplier to Scientech of D4D07 Solid State Relays (SSRs) since before 2009, has informed Scientech that SSRs provided with date codes between 0908 (August 2009) and 1004 (April 2010) may have included faulty diodes which resulted in reduced reliability (early failure) of their SSRs.

"The mode of failure is that the module output may not be able to maintain voltage sufficient to activate its external load. It appears that this failure occurs randomly after some duration of operation, typically weeks or months. No common cause has been found.

"Scientech screens components for infantile failure by burning-in modules for a minimum of 48 hours prior to final test. There were no SSR failures during burn-in of potentially affected modules; therefore burn-in was not an effective screen for this issue.

"Prior to January 2013, Scientech did not track SSRs by date code. In establishing conservative boundaries for product shipped with suspect SSRs, Scientech can be certain that no suspect SSRs were shipped in Scientech products prior to August 2009 (the earliest suspect date code). It was determined in September 2012 that Scientech did not have any SSRs with a date code of 2010 or earlier in inventory or work-in-progress. Scientech can therefore determine that products shipped after September 2012 do not contain suspect SSRs."

Affected components:

DAM801, a Dual Alarm Module, manufactured by Scientech, Model DAM801 (/1 optional), Part number EIP-E287PA-1

SAM801, a Single Alarm Module, manufactured by Scientech, Model SAM801 (11 optional), Part number EIP-E289PA-1

DAM502, a Dual Alarm Module, manufactured by Scientech, Model DAM502, Part number EIP-E297DD-1, -2, -3

SAM502, a Single Alarm Module, manufactured by Scientech, Model SAM502, Part number EIP-E297DD-4

DAM503, a Dual Alarm Module, manufactured by Scientech, Model DAM503, Part number EIP-E304DD-1, -2, -3

SAM503, a Single Alarm Module, manufactured by Scientech, Model SAM503, Part number EIP-E304DD-4, -20

DAM504, a Dual Alarm Module, manufactured by Scientech, Model DAM504, Part number NUS-A131PA

Affected Facilities:

**Beaver Valley**

Farley

GINNA

Indian Point 2/3

Kewaunee

North Anna

Prairie Island

Surry

Turkey Point

\*\*\* UPDATE AT 1625 EDT ON 3/20/2015 FROM VINCE CHERMAK TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ \*\*\*

The following information was received via fax. Only information that has changed is being attached below.

"Thirteen plants were notified during the original notification. On March 10, 2015, one affected plant reported that when one SSR failed, its output consisted of high frequency noise at a reduced duty cycle. This noise caused overheating and failure of resistors in an RC filter connected to the alarm module output. Plants experiencing SSR failures should check downstream elements for possible consequential damage. Scientec has not received any other reports of this condition. The condition was reevaluated and the Part 21 evaluation was revised. The evaluation concluded that this newly identified condition does not impact the original defect as reported."

Notified the R1DO (Dental), R2DO (Desai), R3DO (Roach), and Part-21 Group (via e-mail).

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Power Reactor	Event Number: 50918
Facility: PERRY Region: 3 State: OH Unit: [1] [ ] [ ] RX Type: [1] GE-6 NRC Notified By: ED CONDO HQ OPS Officer: DANIEL MILLS	Notification Date: 03/23/2015 Notification Time: 16:28 [ET] Event Date: 03/23/2015 Event Time: 15:26 [EDT] Last Update Date: 03/23/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(3)(xii) - OFFSITE MEDICAL	Person (Organization): JAMNES CAMERON (R3DO)

Unit	SCRAM Code	RX CRIT	Initial PWR	Initial RX Mode	Current PWR	Current RX Mode
1	N	N	0	Refueling	0	Refueling

**Event Text**

POTENTIALLY CONTAMINATED INDIVIDUAL TRANSPORTED OFFSITE DUE TO MEDICAL CONDITION

"At approximately 1526 EDT, the control room received a report of an individual experiencing chest pains. An ambulance was called to transport the individual to an offsite medical facility. The initial Radiation Protection survey did not detect any contamination, however the protective clothing the individual wore could not be removed. The individual is considered 'potentially contaminated' due to not being able to perform a complete frisk. Radiation Protection personnel escorted the individual offsite. The individual will be frisked at the medical facility."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and will notify the state and local government.

\* \* \* UPDATE AT 1722 EDT ON 3/23/2015 FROM ED CONDO TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ \* \* \*

"At approximately 1652 [EDT], Perry Radiation Protection confirmed the individual was not contaminated. Additionally no contamination was found in the ambulance or at the hospital.

Perry Radiation Protection is in possession of and returning all protective clothing worn by the individual to the plant."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified the R3DO (Cameron).

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## News

# Ohio.com – Akron Beacon Journal Editorial

A 'grand bargain' for environmental groups and power companies  
There's a way for environmental groups and utilities to get what they want

By the Beacon Journal editorial board Published: February 28, 2015-05:00 PM

No power company in Ohio embraced electricity deregulation with more gusto than FirstEnergy. The Akron-based utility first resisted the concept. Then, with enactment of the new regime, the company took the lead. So, it amounted to no small change last summer when FirstEnergy unveiled plans to seek the cover of regulation, proposing that customers subsidize the operation of power plants struggling to compete in the marketplace.

FirstEnergy wasn't alone. American Electric Power and Duke Energy have advanced similar proposals to the state Public Utilities Commission. On Wednesday, the commission rejected a plan from AEP, arguing that the company failed to show how consumers would benefit. The three utilities acknowledge that consumers would see higher prices at the start. They stress that once energy prices begin to rise, the plants becoming more competitive against natural gas and financially stronger, consumers would reap credits and eventually come out ahead.

The commission found the AEP scenario much too speculative. For its part, FirstEnergy has proposed a 15-year plan, or a period during which much could change, and change again, in electricity markets. The commission did leave open the possibility of approving such arrangements — if the utilities are more precise about the way consumers would benefit.

Perhaps FirstEnergy will carry the day, its proposal due for a decision by April. More than anything, the commission ruling last week presents an opportunity for Gov. John Kasich and other leaders weighing the energy future, if they are willing think expansively and boldly.

FirstEnergy won little sympathy when it successfully pushed for a two-year freeze in the state's energy efficiency and renewable energy portfolio and then appeared at the commission looking for a stronger regulatory hand. Now the circumstances are such that a "grand bargain" could be crafted. The power companies get relief they seek, and the state returns to the efficiency and renewable standards.

The centerpieces of the FirstEnergy proposal are the Sammis coal-fired plant and the Davis-Besse nuclear plant, the company asking for subsidies to keep them operating. Both provide necessary, steady base-load electricity. More, Davis-Besse generates clean electricity. That's no small asset when the state faces compliance with new federal limits on carbon emissions.

Environmental groups rightly talk about the value of energy efficiency and renewable energy. The same goes for nuclear power—if the problem of climate change is faced fully. Will the country suddenly stop burning coal? Hardly. Thus, there is room for a Sammis plant equipped with the best pollution-control technology. The energy industry is in transition. Best to think of a bridge that aids Ohioans in multiple ways.

Find this article at:

<http://www.ohio.com/editorial/editorials/a-grand-bargain-for-environmental-groups-and-power-companies-1.570739>

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Cleveland.com

Editorial

The case against the Davis-Besse nuclear power plant

By Connie Kline on March 29, 2015 at 5:47 AM

Aggressively lobbied by FirstEnergy Corp. and passed by the General Assembly in May 2014, Senate Bill 310, along with wind-turbine restrictions, decimated Ohio's 2008 renewable-energy and energy-efficiency standards in order to force reliance on coal and nuclear power.

Not coincidentally, in August 2014, FirstEnergy filed a rate case which, according to the Ohio Consumers' Counsel and the Northeast Ohio Public Energy Council, could cost ratepayers up to \$3 billion over 15 years to "bail out" FirstEnergy's old, failing, noncompetitive Sammis coal plant and Davis-Besse nuclear reactor. The utility is threatening to close both plants if the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio denies its application.

According to a recent Pew Charitable Trusts' report, in 2012, Ohio was number 13 in the country for new wind capacity and private investment in wind; this has virtually ceased due to SB 310.

August and September 2014 polls showed that Ohioans overwhelmingly favor efficiency and renewable energy over coal and nuclear.

According to NOPEC, construction of the Perry and Davis-Besse reactors caused "electric rates in northern Ohio to soar, becoming the highest in the state and among the highest in the nation and cost ratepayers "approximately \$9 billion."

Forty-year-old Davis-Besse has been plagued by near-catastrophes since its inception.

- Because it was built in a flood plain, a 1972 Lake Erie storm caused massive flooding of the entire construction site including the pre-operational reactor.
- In October 1977, a relief valve stuck.
- Uranium fuel must be submerged in water (coolant) at all times to prevent a meltdown. In June 1985, Davis-Besse had a loss-of-feedwater accident. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission closed the plant for a year.
- A June 1998 tornado caused loss of external electric power.

- In March 2002, neglected, leaking boric acid in the coolant water had eaten through more than seven inches of the steel reactor lid, leaving only a 3/16" liner to prevent radiation release. The plant closed for two years, costing ratepayers \$600 million. Davis-Besse was fined \$33.5 million, the largest in NRC history.
- The corroded lid was replaced before restart in 2004, but in 2010, cracks were found in this new lid, forcing its replacement in 2011.
- To replace aging, deteriorating, damaged parts, an unprecedented four large cuts have been made through the Davis-Besse concrete shield building which prevents release of radiation. Starting in 2011, cracks and voids were discovered in the building's concrete.
- Davis-Besse's steam generators were replaced in 2011 and 2014. A new tubing alloy was used.

Unprotected exposure to used reactor fuel can kill a person in minutes, yet no disposal solution exists for this waste which must be isolated from humans and the environment virtually forever. Funding for the permanent, deep-geological radioactive waste repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada was canceled in 2011, making every reactor a de facto radioactive waste dump at the least environmentally suitable sites for potable water, in flood, erosion, and earthquake zones.

The industry claims that nuclear power does not contribute to climate change. In fact, the nuclear fuel cycle from mining and fabricating uranium to decommissioning reactors requires a significant amount of fossil fuel. In January 2015, FirstEnergy commissioned a self-serving "study" by an industry group with a vested interest in the conclusion that Davis-Besse is economically beneficial. The study failed to consider energy efficiency or replacing Davis-Besse with renewable energy that typically provides more jobs per megawatt/hour than nuclear power. If Davis-Besse were truly a valuable asset, FirstEnergy wouldn't be seeking up to \$225 million a year in ratepayer subsidies to keep it operating.

According to the U.S. Department of Energy, nuclear power provides only 5 percent of Ohio's generation. According to the World Nuclear Association, Davis-Besse's lifetime capacity factor through 2012 was only 67.6 percent, one of the lowest in the country. It's time to stop throwing good money after bad and transition to safe, clean renewable energy. Davis-Besse should meet the fate of other U.S. reactors than have been permanently closed for safety and economic reasons.

Connie Kline, of Willoughby Hills, is former chairperson of the Ohio Sierra Club Nuclear Committee.

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## Information Notices

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## **Part 21 and Miscellaneous**

RIS 2015-03, Identifying and Reporting Security Incidents under 10 CFR Part 37, dated February 24, 2015

ADAMS Accession No. ML14255A037

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IN 2015-03, Improper Operation of Spent Fuel Transfer Cask Neutron Shield Equipment Leading to Elevated Radiation Levels Adjacent to Spent Fuel Transfer Cask, dated February 9, 2015

ADAMS Accession No. ML14213A477

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## **Davis-Besse**

Schedule Revision and Project Manager Change for the Review of the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station License Renewal Application

ADAMS Accession No. ML15054A534

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DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION EVALUATIONS OF CHANGES, TESTS, AND EXPERIMENTS AND PERMANENT PLANT MODIFICATIONS BASLINE INSPECTION REPORT 05000346/2014007

ADAMS Accession Number ML15048A196

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DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION EVALUATIONS OF CHANGES, TESTS, AND EXPERIMENTS AND PERMANENT PLANT MODIFICATIONS BASELINE INSPECTION REPORT 05000346/2014007

ADAMS Accession Number ML15050A150

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ANNUAL ASSESSMENT LETTER FOR DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION (REPORT 050000346/2014001)

ADAMS Accession Number: ML15062A569

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Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 1 - Acceptance Review Concerning Change to Pressure-Temperature Curves (TAC NO. MF5433)(L-14-407)

ADAMS Accession Number: ML15036A402

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Subject: Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Plant, Unit No. 1 - Request for Additional Information Concerning Report of Errors in Evaluation Model (TAC NO. MF5578) (L-14-403)

ADAMS Accession No. ML15062A651

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Davis-Besse, Unit 1 - Core Operating Limits Report, Cycle 19, Revision 1.

ADAMS Accession No. ML15072A019

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FENOC Motion for Clarification Regarding Termination of Proceeding.

ADAMS Accession No. ML15065A222

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Schedule Revision for the Review of the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Units 1, License Renewal Application  
ADAMS Accession No. ML15083A099

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## **Perry**

Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1 – Request for Additional information Regarding Phase 2 Staffing Assessment Provided Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations Part 50, Section 50.54(f) Request Regarding Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 9.3 Emergency Preparedness (TAC No. MF5314)

ADAMS Accession No.: ML15034A613

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Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit No. 1 - Acceptance Review Concerning Cyber Security Implementation Plan Milestone 8 Completion Date (TAC NO. MF557)(L-14-421)

ADAMS Accession Number: ML15040A718

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Annual Assessment Letter for Perry Nuclear Power Plant (Report 05000440/2014001)

ADAMS Accession No. ML15062A604

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Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Submittal of Emergency Plan Changes, Revision 37.

ADAMS Accession No. ML12307A428

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Perry Nuclear Power Plan - Emergency Plan Changes, Revision 19.

ADAMS Accession No. ML040980500

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## **Beaver Valley**

Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 1 - Letter for Withdrawal of an Amendment Request (TAC NO. MF2505)

ADAMS Accession No.: ML15042A132

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Annual Assessment Letter for Beaver Valley Power Station Unit Nos. 1 and 2 (Report 05000334/2014001 and 05000412/2014001)

ADAMS Accession No. ML15062A379

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Beaver Valley Power Station, Units 1 and 2 - Request for Additional Information Re: License Amendment Request to Adopt National Fire Protection Association Standard 805 (TAC Nos. MF3301 and MF3302).

ADAMS Accession No.: ML15049A507

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Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2 - Issuance of Amendments RE: Request for Adoption of TSTF-425, Revision 3, "Relocate Surveillance Frequencies to Licenciese Control - Risk Informed Technical Specification Task Force Initiative 5b"

ADAMS Accession No.:ML14322A461

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Beaver Valley Power Station Units 1 & 2 - Notice of Annual Assessment Meeting and Open House, April 9, 2015

ADAMS Accession No.: ML15082A385

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Beaver Valley, Units 1 and 2 - Emergency Preparedness Plan.

ADAMS Accession No. ML040710474

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Beaver Valley Power Station - Discharge Monitoring Report (NPDES) Permit No. PA0025615.

ADAMS Accession No. ML15062A005

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NUREG-2163, "Technical Basis for Regulatory Guidance on the Alternate Pressurized Thermal Shock Rule," Draft Report for Comment.

ADAMS Accession No. ML15058A677

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## **Portsmouth Facilities**

Letter to Centrus Corp. re: Extension of Authorization to Operate HQ's Thin Client Network.

ADAMS Accession No. ML15078A209

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American Centrifuge Lead Cascade Facility - (U) Additional Information for Summary of Changes for Calendar Year 2014.

ADAMS Accession No. ML15086A027

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American Centrifuge Plant and American Centrifuge Lead Cascade Facility - Supplemental Information Related to the Cyber Security Plans for the American Centrifuge Operating, LLC (Technical Assignment Control Numbers L34289 and L34297).

ADAMS Accession No. ML15084A132

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March 5, 2015 Summary of the Category 3 Public Meeting for proposed Part 74 rulemaking 01.

ADAMS Accession No. ML15072A391

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Environmental Assessment for the Proposed URENCO USA Uranium Enrichment Facility Capacity Expansion.

ADAMS Accession No. ML15072A016

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Response to Centrus Corp., on Withholding Proprietary Information in the February 6, 2015 Letter.

ADAMS Accession No. ML15061A392

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Letter to S. Toelle re: Request for Additional Information Regarding 10 CFR 70.72 ACP and Lead Cascade Facility Changes for Calendar Year 2014.

ADAMS Accession No. ML15061A413

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Acceptance E-mail on Review of Updated FOCl for USEC, Inc. (Centrus).

ADAMS Accession No. ML15058A525

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## **Fermi 1**

Submittal of Revision 8 to the Fermi 1 Safety Analysis Report.  
ADAMS Accession No. ML14325A523  
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## **Fermi 2**

Schedule Revision and Project Manager Change for the Review of the Fermi 2 License  
Renewal Application (TAC NO. MF4222)  
ADAMS Accession No. ML15051A348  
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Annual Assessment Letter For Fermi Power Plant, Unit 2 (Report 05000341/2014001)  
ADAMS Accession No. ML15062A599  
\*\*\*\*\*

Summary of Telephone Conference Call Held on February 9, 2015, Between the U.S. Nuclear  
Regulatory Commission and DTE Electric Company, Concerning Requests for Additional  
Information Pertaining to the Fermi 2 License Renewal Application  
ADAMS Accession No. ML15051A509  
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Request for Additional Information for the Review of the Fermi 2 License Renewal Application -  
Set 24  
ADAMS Accession No. ML15051A317  
\*\*\*\*\*

Summary of Telephone Conference Call Held on November 14, 2014, Between the U.S.  
Nuclear Regulatory Commission and DTE Electric Company, Concerning Draft Requests for  
Additional Information in Sets 4, 5, and 6 Pertaining to the Fermi 2 License Renewal Application  
(TAC No. MF4222)  
ADAMS Accession No. ML15051A507  
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Request for Withholding Information From Public Disclosure (TAC No. MF4222)  
ADAMS Accession No. ML15070A161  
\*\*\*\*\*

Request for Additional Information for the Review of the Fermi 2, License Renewal Application -  
Set 25 (TAC No. MF4222)  
ADAMS Accession No. ML15072A081  
\*\*\*\*\*

Request for Withholding Information from Public Disclosure (TAC No. MF4222)  
ADAMS Accession No. ML15072A213  
\*\*\*\*\*

Summary of Telephone Conference Call Held on January 22, 2015, Between the U.S. Nuclear  
Regulatory Commission and DTE Electric Company, Concerning RAIs Pertaining to the Fermi 2  
LRA (TAC No. MF4222)  
ADAMS Accession No. ML15054A134  
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Resubmittal of Phase 1 Integrated Plan in Response to June 6, 2013 Commission Order  
Modifying Licenses With Regard to Reliable Hardened Containment Vents Capable of  
Operation under Severe Accident Conditions (Order Number EA-13-109).  
ADAMS Accession No. ML15079A044  
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OFFICIAL EXHIBIT - DTE000014-MA-CM01 - NRC-14-0073, "Response to License Renewal Environmental Request for Additional Information," Enclosure 2, Final Threatened and Endangered Species Survey and Assessment Report.  
ADAMS Accession No. ML15070A298

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OFFICIAL EXHIBIT - DTE000011-MA-CM01 - Applicant's Response to Post-Hearing Commission Questions.  
ADAMS Accession No. ML15070A296

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Order (Adopting Proposed Transcript Corrections and Admitting Post Hearing Exhibits).  
ADAMS Accession No. ML15068A411

\*\*\*\*\*

DTE Appeal of Licensing Board Decision on Petitions to Intervene.  
ADAMS Accession No. ML15062A634

\*\*\*\*\*

Supplemental Information Needed For Acceptance of Request For Use of Mururoa Supplied Air Suits Models MTH2 and V4F1 and The Mururoa Blu Suit Systems (Tac No. MF5742)  
ADAMS Accession No. ML15084A069

\*\*\*\*\*

Issuance Of Amendment Re: License Amendment Request To Revise Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements For Direct Current Batteries (Tac No. MF4002)  
ADAMS Accession No. ML15057A297

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Request for Additional Information from Public Disclosure  
ADAMS Accession No. ML15054A171

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Summary of February 25, 2015, Pre-Application Teleconference With DTE Electric Company For a Proposed Relief Request Regarding The Core Spray System Pumps (Tac No. MF5700)  
ADAMS Accession No. ML15069A615

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Request for Additional Information for the Review of the Fermi 2 License Renewal Application - Set 26 (TAC NO. MF4222)  
ADAMS Accession No. ML15062A336

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### **Fermi 3**

Fermi, Unit 3 Combined License Application, Supplemental Biological Assessment.  
ADAMS Accession No. ML15043A747

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