To: Jim Mehl, ERU Supervisor

From: Zack Clayton, Rad Coordinator

Subject: April Monthly Report

Date: May 14 , 2013

Beans

Training:	0
Drills:	2
Meetings:	3
Technical Assistance:	2
Public Assistance:	1

Web Page Views: There were 33 page views in April.

Coming Attractions

5/7	Working Group
5/27	BV 2nd dry run if needed
6/3	Working Group
6/4-6	RAT Training
6/17	BV HAB Exercise

Facility updates

Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station

Davis-Besse was in a refueling and steam generator outage for April.

Perry Nuclear Power Plant

Perry operated for April at full power.

At 1401 on April 2 Perry declared an Unusual Event due to a flammable or toxic gas leak. The leak is Trichloroethylene (TCE) gas used in the Off-Gas building. The Off-Gas building ground and basement levels were evacuated due to the leak. There is no safe-shutdown equipment located in the Off-Gas building. The licensee isolated the leak and terminated the Unusual Event at 0059 on April 5. See Event No. 49987.

On April 9 five individuals with cameras entered the Davis-Besse property without permission. These individuals were detained and offsite law enforcement was called to the plant. The individuals appear to be French nationals and are reported to be fully

cooperating with law enforcement. It does not appear that they had any hostile intent toward the plant. No event report was filed with NRC for this.

Beaver Valley Power Station

On April 30, Beaver Valley made a notification to the NRC regarding unfused electrical circuits. In reviewing operation reports from other facilities BVPS staff identified a potential problem with the Direct Current (DC) control circuits. Specifically the control circuits for DC motors which drive non-safety related equipment do not have fuses and which is a fire hazard. The plant has established fire watches until the issue is resolved. The plant continues in normal operate and no other actions are required. See Event No. 50075.

Beaver Valley Unit I

Unit I operated at full power for the month.

Beaver Valley Unit II

Unit II operated at 100% power for two weeks and then coasted down to a refueling outage April 19.

DTE

Fermi II

Fermi II started April exiting a refueling outage. Power fluctuated during the month.

Fermi III

Fermi III continues as a documentation evaluation.

Portsmouth Enrichment Plant

There were no event reports for the sites at Portsmouth for April. But there were ADAMS documents submitted.

Activity

4/1	BV HAB Dry Run – most action happened in PA, the release did not make it to Ohio at levels of concern.
4/2	Working Group –Agency updates, discussed 40 CFR 190 Advanced Notice of Potential Rule Review
4/16	URSB - Normal business. Ohio EPA and ODH presented a synopsis of the Andvanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaiking for 40 CFR 190. Ohio EMA presented Rad Responder as a direction for field data collection.
4/24	NEPAC
4/29	Fermi Exercise observation - see report after the NRC plant reports.

Office Issues

A copy of RASCAL 4.3 has been received. Installation is pending migration to Win7.

Statistics, NRC Reports, News, and ADAMS References

Operating Power Levels

April

Date	BV1	BV2	DB	Perry	Fermi2	
1	100	100	0	100	10	DB in refueling outage, SG replacement
7	100	100	0	100	83	
14	100	100	0	100	83	
15	100	82	0	100	83	BV2 coasting down for refueling
16	100	82	0	100	0	Fermi ?
18	100	60	0	100	0	
19	100	0	0	100	0	
21	100	0	0	100	0	
25	100	0	0	100	98	
28	100	0	0	100	93	Fermi Power fluctuating with startup
30	100	0	0	100	94	

Plant Reports

Power Reactor	Event Number: 49987

Facility: PERRY Region: 3 State: OH Unit: [1] [ ] [ ] RX Type: [1] GE-6 NRC Notified By: DON ROGERS HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON	Notification Date: 04/02/2014 Notification Time: 14:42 [ET] Event Date: 04/02/2014 Event Time: 14:01 [EDT] Last Update Date: 04/02/2014
Emergency Class: UNUSUAL EVENT 10 CFR Section: 50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED 50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION	Person (Organization): DAVE PASSEHL (R3DO) TIM McGINTY (NRR) WILLIAM GOTT (IRD) JENNIFER UHLE (ET) CYNTHIA PEDERSON (R3RA)

Unit	SCRAM Code	RX CRIT	Initial PWR	Initial RX Mode	Current PWR	Current RX Mode
1	N	Y	100	Power Operation	100	Power Operation

Event Text

UNUSUAL EVENT DECLARED DUE TO TOXIC GAS RELEASE

"Release of toxic or flammable gas affecting the Protected Area boundary deemed detrimental to the safe operation of the plant."

Emergency Action Level entered: MU-1. The leak is Trichloroethylene (TCE) gas used in the Off-Gas building. The Off-Gas building ground and basement levels were evacuated due to the leak. There is no safe-shutdown equipment located in the Off-Gas building. The licensee is working to isolate the leak.

The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.

The licensee notified the State of Ohio and the local counties.

Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Ops Center, NICC Watch Officer, DOE Ops Center, USDA Ops Center, HHS Ops Center, and Nuclear SSA via email.

* * * UPDATE AT 1630 EDT ON 4/2/14 FROM DON ROGERS TO S. SANDIN * * *

The licensee notified the following outside agencies: U.S. EPA National Response Center, Ohio EPA, Perry Township Fire Department, Lake County Emergency Planning Committee, and the U.S. Coast Guard.

Notified R3DO (Passehl).

* * * UPDATE FROM MICHAEL ADLER TO DANIEL MILLS AT 0115 EDT ON 04/05/2014 * *

"Unusual Event has been terminated on 4/5/2014 at 0059 EDT. The trichloroethylene leak has been stopped. Access has been restored to all normally accessible areas."

Unit 1 remains in Mode 1 at 100% power.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the Local and State emergency agencies.

Notified the IRD MOC (Gott), R3DO (Passehl), and NRR EO (McGinty).

Notified DHS SWO, DOE Ops Center, FEMA Ops Center, HHS Ops Center, NICC Watch Officer, USDA OPS Center, EPA EOC, FDA EOC, and Nuclear SSA via email.

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!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!	
Power Reactor	Event Number: 49801
Facility: FERMI Region: 3 State: MI Unit: [2] [ ] [ ] RX Type: [2] GE-4 NRC Notified By: PAUL GRESH HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER	Notification Date: 02/06/2014 Notification Time: 19:17 [ET] Event Date: 02/06/2014 Event Time: 12:54 [EST] Last Update Date: 04/04/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION	Person (Organization): ROBERT ORLIKOWSKI (R3DO)

Unit	SCRAM Code	RX CRIT	Initial PWR	Initial RX Mode	Current PWR	Current RX Mode
2	N	Y	85	Power Operation	85	Power Operation

Event Text

EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT COOLING WATER IN MANUAL OVERRIDE DUE TO HUMAN PERFORMANCE ERROR

"At 1254 [EST] on February 6, 2014, while shutting down Division 2 Emergency Equipment Cooling Water (EECW), a human performance error occurred resulting in the Division 2 EECW isolation override switch being placed in manual override. Division 2 EECW remained running and continued to operate normally. The Division 2 EECW system cools various safety related components including the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system room cooler. With the Division 2 EECW isolation override switch in manual override, Division 2 EECW may have been prevented from performing its safety function during a loss of power event. An unplanned HPCI inoperability occurred due to the Division 2 EECW inoperability which may have prevented HPCI from performing its safety function. A 14 day Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) was entered for HPCI via T.S. LCO 3.5.1 and subsequently exited 36 seconds later upon returning the Division 2 EECW isolation override switch to normal. This report is being made pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as a condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident, based on a loss of a single train safety system. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

The licensee reported that the individuals involved have been removed from licensee duties pending further investigation.

* * * RETRACTION FROM PAUL GRESH TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 0931 EDT ON 4/4/14 * * *

"The Fermi 2 Engineering staff has completed a comprehensive evaluation of the momentary mispositioning of the Division 2 EECW system overide switch initially reported on February 6, 2014.

"The evaluation determined that HPCI room temperature would remain below the HPCI room steam leak detection isolation logic setpoint in the unlikely event that the momentary mispositioning resulted in the temporary interruption of the cooling water flow to the HPCI system room cooler. Over the brief period of time for which EECW would have been unavailable to support the effective operation of the room cooler, its function was not necessary for HPCI to perform its required safety functions. Therefore, event notification 49801 is retracted."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Passehl).

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Part 21	Event Number: 50017
Rep Org: BALDOR ELECTRIC CO. Licensee: BALDOR ELECTRIC CO. Region: 1 City: FLOWERY BRANCH State: GA County: License #: Agreement: Y Docket: NRC Notified By: JAMES THIGPEN HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN	Notification Date: 04/09/2014 Notification Time: 15:19 [ET] Event Date: 03/19/2014 Event Time: [EDT] Last Update Date: 04/09/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE	Person (Organization): MALCOLM WIDMANN (R2DO) PATTY PELKE (R3DO) NRR PART 21 GROUP (EMAI)

Event Text

PART 21 - POTENTIAL DEFECT IN MOTORS SHIPPED TO **DTE ELECTRIC COMPANY**

The following is excerpted from a report received by fax:

"NUCLEAR NONCONFORMANCE REPORT

"1. CUSTOMER: DTE Electric Company, P.O. BOX 44440, DETROIT Ml 48244

"2. PURCHASE ORDER: 4700670925 - QTY 2

"3. PART/COMPONENT NAME: AC MOTORS

"4. PART/COMPONENT#: B1038686-010 T1/DTE P/N 100309425 and B1038686-010

T2/DTE P/N 100309425

"5. QUANTITY ON HAND - 1 SHIPPED- 2

"6. LOCATION OF ALL UNITS: Motor in service at DTE, **Enrico Fermi Power Plant 2** (Qty 1) and at Baldor Gainesville Motor Plant (Qty 1)

"7. DATE NONCONFORMANCE ASCERTAINED: March 13, 2014

"8. DESCRIPTION OF DEFECT/NONCONFORMANCE: This is a reportable 10CFR21 notification because we believe it is possible that the B1038686-010 T1, 1E motor shipped by Baldor Electric, contains a design where the shaft journal is not long enough to allow the proper fit between the motor shaft and the o-ring of the inpro seal rotating element.

"The motor (Bl038686-010 T2) returned for evaluation under RA310488951 was in response to the inpro seal separating. Upon inspection Baldor has determined the shaft journal is not long enough to allow the proper fit between the motor shaft and the o-ring of the in pro seal rotating clement.

"9. CORRECTIVE ACTION TAKEN: Baldor has notified DTE Electric Company's Quality Assurance of our findings. Through them we have initiated replacement of the motor identified as located at DTE, Enrico Fermi Power Plant 2.

"A review was completed by design engineering to determine this design issue has only occurred for the Specification ID B1038686, of which Baldor has only shipped the 2 motors identified above. The design of the shaft/inpro seal fit has been completed to correct the issue.

"10. ANY ADVICE RELATED TO DEFECT/NONCONFORMANCE: Separation of the rotating element from the in pro seal obviously reduces the full effectiveness of the in pro seal. However, if this were to occur, the motor is still functional. Baldor has confirmed the motor with a failed inpro seal as received is still equivalent to IP55. Grease from the DE bearing will still be retained as intended, and water ingress into the motor would only occur if sprayed directly. Baldor recommends continued use of B1038686-010T1 until the next outage unless direct spray is expected. B1038686-010T2, which is currently in Baldor's possession, will be repaired by changing the rotating assembly. Baldor has notified DTE that we will be manufacturing a complete motor per the revised bill of material to replace B1038686-010T1 which is currently in service.

"11. INDIVIDUAL COMPLETING THIS REPORT: James Thigpen, QA Manager, Baldor Electric, Gainesville, GA 30506, April 09, 2014"

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Part 21	Event Number: 49923
Rep Org: DRESSER-RAND COMPANY Licensee: DRESSER-RAND COMPANY Region: 1 City: WELLSVILLE State: NY County: License #:	Notification Date: 03/17/2014 Notification Time: 13:53 [ET] Event Date: 02/17/2014 Event Time: [EDT] Last Update Date: 04/17/2014

Agreement: Y Docket: NRC Notified By: ED GRANDUSKY HQ OPS Officer: DANIEL MILLS	
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE	Person (Organization): BLAKE WELLING (R1DO) KATHLEEN O'DONOHUE (R2DO) JULIO LARA (R3DO) PART 21 GROUP (EMAI)

Event Text

PART 21 - BEARING DEFECT

The following was received via email:

"On Dresser-Rand Drawing 75439A part number 07 is identified as a Heim LSS-8 bearing that has an Aluminum Bronze insert to accommodate a non-lubricated application. Dresser-Rand shipped 10 bearings part number 75439A07 to Dominion Nuclear in 2006 that were Seal Master Com 8 bearings that do not have an Aluminum Bronze insert.

"This bearing is used on turbines that have a PG type mechanical governor with the cam plate linkage. Extended operation without lubrication will result in the Seal Master Com 8 bearing seizing. The customer should visually inspect this bearing for the bronze insert. If no insert is visible then the bearing should be replaced at the first opportunity."

Licensees potentially affected (turbine serial numbers): Calvert Cliffs (T36674A, T36674B, T36674C, T36674D), DC Cook (T36700A, T36700B), Salem (T36988A, T36988B), Crystal River (T37009A), **Davis Besse** (T37686A, T37686B), Millstone (F37273A, T38587A), Summer (T38765A).

International sites potentially affected: Bugey (T38498A, T38498B, T38880A, T38880B).

* * * UPDATE AT 1102 EDT ON 04/17/14 FROM ED GRANDUSKY TO S. SANDIN VIA FAX * * *

Dresser-Rand submitted their final report of the defect. This report is Dresser-Rand number 47.

Notified R1DO (Burritt), R2DO (Blamey), R3DO (Hills) and NRR Part 21 Group via email.

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Power Reactor	Event Number: 50075
Facility: BEAVER VALLEY Region: 1 State: PA Unit: [1] [2] [ ] RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP NRC Notified By: ROBERT KRISTOPHEL HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON	Notification Date: 04/30/2014 Notification Time: 16:59 [ET] Event Date: 04/30/2014 Event Time: 11:40 [EDT] Last Update Date: 04/30/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section:	Person (Organization): WILLIAM COOK (R1DO)

50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION	

Unit	SCRAM Code	RX CRIT	Initial PWR	Initial RX Mode	Current PWR	Current RX Mode
1	N	Y	100	Power Operation	100	Power Operation
2	N	N	0	Defueled	0	Defueled

Event Text

POSTULATED HOT SHORT FIRE EVENT COULD ADVERSELY IMPACT SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT

"Based on a review of industry operating experience, it was identified that each unit has two un-fused DC control circuits for non safety-related DC motors which are routed from the turbine building through other separate fire areas including the Control Room. The DC breakers used to protect the motor power conductors are insufficient to protect the control conductors for these circuits. It is postulated that a fire induced short in one fire area could adversely impact safe shutdown equipment by overheating the cable and causing a secondary fire in other fire areas where the cable is routed. At Unit 1, cables for the affected circuits are routed in the Turbine Building, Cable Spreading Area and Control Room. At Unit 2, cables for the affected circuits are routed in the Turbine Building, Normal Switchgear, Service Building Cable Tray Area, Cable Vault, Instrument Relay Room, Control Building West Communication Room, Control Building Cable Spreading Area and Control Room.

"The postulated secondary fires or cable failures are outside the assumptions of each unit's fire protection analysis. A preliminary investigation of the issue indicates that existing fire protection safe shutdown procedures could be used to safely shut down the plant if needed. This condition is reportable as an 8-hour report in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). Interim compensatory measures will be implemented for affected areas of the plant.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

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Fermi 2 exercise observations and notes

NOTE: Get link to state plan and EPA procedures for tablet. Google docs do not work without connection. County plans are linked to the Ohio EMA internet page.
Michigan FTC does not have electronic display but is fully integrated with WebEOC, which they call MISIM. Some players are on laptops and some on tablets for modeling and field team tracking.
They are using new iPads for their tablets and they did not hold a charge for more than the first 3 hours. That could be a problem as there were several phone chargers in the room but none were compatible with iThingies. The android tablets, personal phones, and the older flip phones they had for field team communication held their charges for the exercise. These flip phones are kept with the field kits and stored similarly to rad meters – the batteries are removed during storage.
0902 unusual event. Michigan has a curious mix of high and low tech in terms of tablets and laptops running WebEOC and paper displayes for maps and status. The event log at the FTC was kept on a whiteboard.
Activated MSP at 0918.
Alert issued at 0932. A 747 crashed at the plant. large fire. SAE issued soon after the crash.

Michigan teams have GPS units with teams and backup units in radio boxes.
FTC operational at 1002.
Their procedure calls out a side window probe ? ? ? They hang a probe out the front passenger window by the cable. Does this provide a 4 pi reading or are they shielded? Also, what effect does vehicle plate out and dust contamination have on the readings?
The turn back value is 15 R/hr (based on a 25 R/hr life saving exposure rate[sic]). their dose exposure limit is 1R/day. 3R/event. The teams use respirators. A high dose alarm is set at 20 Rem, again as it approaches the life saving limit. Low dose alarm is 800 mRem.
Team routes are predetermined at set distances from the plant and coded red, blue, and yellow. This repeats colors with routes 1, 2, etc. going away from plant. They run them by sectors.
NOTE FOR RAT: put mini /ultra Radiac manual in RAT SOP.
The ICC Wanted the teams sent to the command post for escort in the security control zone. the IC was not sure what to do with them. This needed explanation and controller inject.
The roof of reactor building collapsed. GE At 1106.
Field team readings put on WebEOC by Michigan to share with the ICC for police and other emergency workers. They use a grid of time, team, what. e.g. end of route, background, highest reading on route, distance bearing, etc. Computer communication via internet from Lansing to Monroe was sporadic. The printer connections did not work. It could have been XP issues. Nothing has printed since reinstall started, and it is not complete on all machines present.
The scenario was Chernobyl type with thermal lifting of the plume with a distant settling of the center at a distance. Later information indicated that it was actually a Fukushima Daichii type event where the roof collapse triggered a release from the spent fuel pool with thermal lifting driven by the jet fuel fire.
There was no communication with the plant as to what the release scenario was and the teams almost missed the air plume sample. The Michigan SOP calls for readings to be called in when they are 10x background, but no background was recorded prior to start. Lansing kept asking for constant updates at the end of every transect in spite of the SOP. After an hour of the GE the FMTC asked the teams to take a sample anyway even though they were not at 10x background. The plant declared EndEx about 15 minutes later.
The lack of communication with the plant meant the wrong model was run from the FTC, and the teams were in the wrong location to actually catch a good plume sample.

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News

Chemical leaks in building at FirstEnergy nuclear plant
Associated Press
Published: April 3, 2014
-
09:26 AM
PERRY, OHIO: The operator of a Northeast Ohio nuclear power plant says a refrigerant leaked from equipment in a building on the site, prompting air monitoring for the chemical.
A FirstEnergy Corp. spokeswoman tells the Plain Dealer an undetermined amount of the chemical escaped Wednesday as workers were starting routine maintenance at a

facility near the reactor building at the Perry nuclear plant along Lake Erie. The leak occurred at a building that contains charcoal beds to absorb radioactive gases.
No one was hurt, but the building was deemed off-limits. Air monitors were called to check for trichloroethylene, a chemical from the refrigerant that can be a neurotoxin in high concentrations.
Such problems are required to be reported to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Perry is about 35 miles northeast of Cleveland.
Find this article at:
http://www.ohio.com/news/break-news/chemical-leaks-in-building-at-firstenergy-nuclear-plant-1.478099

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Feds taking over Piketon uranium plant
By Jessica Wehrman
The Columbus Dispatch
Thursday April 3, 2014 6:42 AM
WASHINGTON
—
The U.S. Department of Energy will take over the management of a proposed uranium-enrichment plant in southern Ohio in order to continue the project, Energy Secretary Ernest Moniz said yesterday.
Testifying before a House Appropriations subcommittee, Moniz said the department —through its Oak Ridge (Tenn.) National Laboratory —will take over management of the American Centrifuge Project in Piketon.
“We have to preserve the technology, we have to preserve the (intellectual property) and we have to think about how we are going to go ahead to meet our national-security obligations,” Moniz said.
The Piketon plant currently is operated by USEC, a former federal entity that was privatized in 1998. But the company declared bankruptcy last month, to restructure its debt. It has been troubled by a drop in demand for enriched uranium in the wake of the 2011 meltdown of three reactors in Fukushima, Japan, caused by a tsunami.
Moniz suggested USEC would continue to play a role in the new arrangement, likely as a subcontractor. The Piketon project itself will not move but simply change management.
On April 15, a federally funded research and development project at the plantruns out of money. Last month, the company sent employees at the plant notices warning of possible layoffs.
Supporters say the needfor U.S.-produced enriched uranium outweighs concerns about weak demand for it or even concerns about USEC’s long-term viability. Critics, meanwhile, say it’s been a boondoggle that has cost taxpayers millions of dollars but has yet to demonstrate a payoff.
The department is looking at how to reprogram $57 million in Energy Department money to keep the plant running.
“We have to keep it going this year,” Moniz said, adding that the American Centrifuge Project met all of the goals set by the Department of Energy. “Frankly, it would be very, very desirable to make sure we keep our 120 machines spinning.”

After the testimony, USEC issued a statement saying it was pleased that Moniz had "confirmed the importance of maintaining a domestic uranium technology to support national-security objectives."
Paul Jacobson, a spokesman for USEC, said the parameters of the arrangement are still being set. "The scope is being determined," he said.
jwehrman@dispatch.com
*****
Serving Northern Ohio
Refrigerant leak at Perry Nuclear Power Plant does not affect plant operation
By Staff report
Thursday, April 3, 2014

About 50 gallons of a refrigerant leaked at the Perry Nuclear Power Plant in North Perry Village on April 2. At about 2 p.m., two mechanics were working on a valve of an air system that provides cool air to other parts of the plant. While working, liquid refrigerant began leaking from the valve and then turned into gas, said Jennifer Young, a spokeswoman for FirstEnergy.
The mechanics immediately contacted the control room. The air in the small room was tested and high levels of trichloroethylene, a chemical used in refrigerants, was detected, Young said.
According to the Environmental Protection Agency, exposure to the chemical can cause fatigue, headache and confusion, and affect the liver, kidneys and skin.
Both mechanics were checked by medical staff and were unharmed. They returned to work after the incident, Young said.
The leak was contained to one room and the valve was repaired. Crews are now simply waiting for the remaining chemical to evaporate and the room to ventilate, Young said.
She added that this cooling system contains no radioactive material and the leak did not affect the operation of the plant.
While the leak was not a threat to public safety, Young said it still triggered an "unusual event" emergency notification because many precautions are taken in nuclear energy to ensure safe operation.
"And that's exactly what our plan did," she said.
URL: http://www.news-herald.com/general-news/20140403/refrigerant-leak-at-perry-nuclear-power-plant-does-not-affect-plant-operation

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The Coumbus Dispatch
Coolant leak at nuke plant prompts air monitoring
Friday, April 04, 2014

PERRY
The operator of a northeastern Ohio nuclear power plant says a refrigerant leaked from equipment in a building on the site, prompting air monitoring for the chemical.
A FirstEnergy Corp. spokeswoman told The Plain Dealer newspaper of Cleveland an undetermined amount of the chemical escaped on Wednesday as workers were starting

routine maintenance at a facility near the reactor building at the Perry nuclear plant along Lake Erie.
No one was hurt, but the building was deemed off-limits.
—From staff and wire reports
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Fluor-B&W Portsmouth working to preserve momentum

April 26, 2014
By Wayne Allen

tallen@civitasmedia.com
The leadership of Fluor-B&W Portsmouth meet with the Scioto County Commissioners quarterly to update them on ongoing activities with the Decontamination and Decommissioning (D&D) of the former gaseous diffusion plant in Piketon.
A continued topic of discussion in this setting is the federal budget and what impact it will have on current and future D&D work.
“I told you (commissioners) the last time we were here for 2014 or congressional delegation stepped up and got us a bump up in the omnibus bill that was passed by congress. That basically restored our funding to levels that were consistent with 2013,” saidDennis Carr Fluor-B&W Site Project Director. “As a result we have set aside any need for workforce restructuring actions. At least until later in the fiscal year until we evaluate nest years funding.”
He said with consistent funding levels they were able to proceed as planed with projects for the fiscal year.
Carr said the increased funding was needed to compensate for the declining price of uranium.
“The uranium price has shrunk substantially. About 80 percent of our funding comes from the sale of uranium, with the other 20 coming from appropriations,” Carr said. “We went from the Christmas of 2012 we were selling uranium $121 a kilogram now we are selling at somewhere around $93 a kilogram. So, we’ve lost $33 million of barter capability,” Carr said.
He said the focus has now turned to fiscal year 2015.
In his Fiscal Year 2015 budget request, President Barack Obama has included $221.8 million for the continued cleanup at the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant (GDP) at Piketon. That request includes an increase of over $22 million from FY 2014, enacted to offset reduced revenues reflecting current uranium price and the expected quantities of uranium anticipated to be transferred in FY 2015 to the Department of Energy prime contractor.
“The president’s (proposed) budget has some challenges for us. Right now it appears there is a reduction in that, to the tune of about $23 million,” Carr said. “That could be offset by an increase in barter if it were to go up.
Right now the market analysis is that, that price will not recover.”
He said now they have to consider funding implications for fiscal year 2015 and provide the Department of Energy with an impact analysis.
Carr said that same information would be provided to the congressional delegation to see if they would take similar actions in 2015 as they did in 2014 to restore funding levels.

“The bottom line is, it’s very positive for FY (Fiscal Year) 2014, FY15 we’ve got our eye on it and we need to work together to try to preserve the projects momentum,” Carr said.
Wayne Allen can be reached at 740-353-3101, ext. 228 or on Twitter @WayneallenPDT
Link: http://www.portsmouth-dailytimes.com/news/home_top-news/3617828/Fluor-BW-Portsmouth-working-to-preserve-momentum

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PRELIMINARY NOTIFICATION – REGION III
April 28, 2014
PRELIMINARY NOTIFICATION OF EVENT OR UNUSUAL OCCURRENCE – PNO-III-14-003A
This preliminary notification constitutes an update to a previously issue notification which was of interest.
Facility Licensee Emergency Classification
Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station __Notification of Unusual Event
FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company __Alert
Oak Harbor, OH __Site Area Emergency
Docket: 50-346 __General Emergency
License: NPF-3 X Not Applicable
SUBJECT: UPDATE TO DAVIS-BESSE SHIELD BUILDING RESTORATION
On February 14, 2014, the licensee informed the NRC that it had discovered an unfilled area (void) in the concrete along the top of the 2011 construction opening on the inside wall of the Davis-Besse shield building. The void occurred as a result of the process used to pour concrete during restoration of the 2011 construction opening associated with the reactor pressure vessel head replacement. The void condition was discovered while the plant was shut down for the 2014 steam generator replacement outage. Subsequently, the licensee performed an operability evaluation of the shield building and determined that the shield building could have performed its intended safety functions despite the existence of the void. During the licensee’s creation of a new construction opening to support the 2014 steam generator replacement outage, the process used to create the new construction opening damaged some of the shield building reinforcement bars (rebar). The rebar damage was not present while the plant was operating and when the shield building was required to be operable. The licensee repaired the void and damaged rebar prior to restoring the shield building construction opening for the 2014 outage.
The NRC reviewed the licensee’s operability evaluation, which analyzed the impacts of the concrete void during the previous operating cycles and verified that the shield building could have fulfilled its intended safety functions, even with the existence of the concrete void. In particular, the NRC concluded that the shield building remained capable of maintaining structural integrity and protecting the containment vessel against impacts from external objects despite the presence of the concrete void.
The NRC also conducted a wide range of activities, during the 2014 outage, to ensure that the shield building was restored to its design bases in accordance with procedural requirements and the applicable codes and standards. The NRC inspectors directly observed, monitored, and evaluated the licensee’s repair of damaged shield building rebar and the void, and the pouring and testing of concrete during the restoration of the 2014 shield building construction opening. The NRC inspectors verified that the shield building void and the damaged rebar were adequately repaired, and that the licensee implemented adequate corrective actions to preclude the formation of another void during the restoration of the 2014 construction opening.

Details of the NRC's review and conclusions will be documented in an NRC inspection report that will be available to the public after completion of the ongoing NRC steam generator replacement inspection. Subsequently, the public will be provided the opportunity to discuss the NRC's activities associated with this issue during the NRC's annual performance assessment end-of-cycle public outreach for Davis-Besse. The specific date and location of the public outreach will be publically announced in the near future.
This preliminary notification is issued for information only. State officials have been informed. The information presented herein has been discussed with the licensee and is current as of April 28, 2014, 10:10 a.m. (EDT).
ADAMS Accession Number: ML14118A185
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Information Notices

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http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html
or to access generic communications files on the NRC Homepage:
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/gen-comm/reg-issues/2013/.
To access these documents use the ADAMS Accession number listed with the title. This is in the format of : ML #####A###

Part 21 and Miscellaneous

GL 95-08, Revision 1 "10 CFR 50.54(p) Process For Changes
To Security Plans Without Prior NRC Approval" dated April 16, 2014
ML14055A356
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RIS 2014-02, Withdrawal Of NRC Generic Letter 95-08, "10 CFR 50.54(p) Process For Changes To Security Plans Without Prior NRC Approval", dated April 16, 2014
ML13151A084
*****
Information Notice 2014-06, Damage Of Industrial Radiographic Equipment Due To Falling Equipment And Improper Mounting, dated April 28, 2014
ML14059A195
*****
Synthesis of Volcanism Studies for the Yucca Mountain Site Characterization Project.
ML032460732
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Davis-Besse

Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 1 - Safety Evaluation Concerning Comprehensive Pump Testing Relief Request (TAC No. MF0756) (L-13-067)
ADAMS Accession Number: ML14030A574
*****

Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 1 - Issuance of Amendment Related to Steam Generator Inventory Change (TAC No. MF0536)(L-13-040)
ADAMS Accession Number: ML14023A766
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DAVIS-BESSE HEAT SINK REQUEST FOR INFORMATION LETTER
ML14097A196
*****

DAVIS-BEESE: Request for Additional Information for the Review of the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station License Renewal Application
ADAMS Accession No. ML14097A454
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DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION
NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000346/2014002
ADAMS Number: ML14113A073
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Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1 - Review of Draft Plant-Specific Supplement 52 to the Generic Environmental Impact Statement for License Renewal of Nuclear Plants Regarding.
ML14112A315
*****

Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station - Core Operating Limits Report, Cycle 19.
ML14108A311
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Exhibit 8 - Expert Witness Report of Arnold Gundersen, 50-246-LA.
ML14112A006
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Motion for Admission of Contention No. 6 on Shield Building Concrete Void, Cracking and Broken Rebar Problems.
ML14112A007
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FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Co., Enclosure C to L-14-120 - 2734296-R-009, Rev. 1, "NTTF 2.1 Seismic Hazard for Screening Report, Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Ottawa County, Ohio."
ML14090A148
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Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Draft Environmental Impact Statement Public Meeting: Afternoon Session - Corrected. Pages 1-56.
ML14097A254
*****

Transcript of 03/25/2014 for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Draft Environmental Impact Statement Public Meeting: Evening Session - Corrected. Pages 1-84.
ML14097A253
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Perry

NRC Staff Answer to Southern Alliance for Clean Energy's Hearing Request Regarding De Facto Amendment of St. Lucie Unit 2 Operating License.
ML14118A290
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FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Co., Enclosure D to L-14-120 - 2734298-R-009, Rev. 1, "NTTF 2.1 Seismic Hazard and Screening Report for Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Lake County, Ohio."
ML14090A145
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NEDO-31960-A, "Licensing Topical Report, BWR Owners' Group Long-Term Stability Solutions Licensing Methodology."
ML14093A212
*****
Perry, License Amendment Request for Adoption of TSTF-425, Revision 3, "Relocate Surveillance Frequencies to Licensee Control - RITSTF Initiative 5b".
ML14084A165
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Annual Financial Test for a Parent Company Guarantee.
ML14087A454
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Beaver Valley

Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit 2 - Upcoming Steam Generator Tube Inservice Inspection (TAC No. MF3862)
ADAMS Accession No.: ML14093A839
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Beaver Valley Power Station, Units 1 and 2 - Acceptance of Requested Licensing Action RE: License Amendment Request to Adopt National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light-Water Generating Plants (Tac Nos. MF3301 and MF3302)
ML14108A408
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Beaver Valley Power Station, Units 1 and 2 - Request for Additional Information Regarding Reactor Vessel Surveillance Capsule Withdrawl Schedules (Tac Nos. MF1929 and MF1930)
ML14101A176
*****
Beaver Valley, Units 1 and 2, License Amendment Request to Extend Containment Leakage Test Frequency.
ML14111A291
*****
Beaver Valley Unit 1 - Draft Written Exam (Folder 2).
ML12111A204
*****
Beaver Valley Unit 1 - Final Written Examination with Answer Key (401-5 Format) (Folder 2).
ML12111A222
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WCAP-16527-NP, Suppl 1, Rev. 0, "Analysis of Capsule X from FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company Beaver Valley, Unit 2 Reactor Vessel Radiation Surveillance Program."

ML072410032
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Beaver Valley, Units 1 & 2 - Supplemental Information Regarding Application for License Amendment to Adopt NFPA 805, "Performance Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactor Electric Generating Plants (2001 Edition)".
ML14051A499
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FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Co., Enclosure A to L-14-120 - 2734294-R-017, Rev. 1, "NTTF 2.1 Seismic Hazard and Screening Report, Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit 1, Beaver County, Pennsylvania."
ML14090A146
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FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Co., Enclosure B to L-14-120 - 2734294-R-018, Rev. 1, "NTTF 2.1 Seismic Hazard and Screening Report, Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 2, Beaver County, Pennsylvania."
ML14090A144
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FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company Beaver Valley Power Station Units 1 and 2, NFPA 805 Transition Report. Page 284 Through Page T-42.
ML14002A091
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ML14002A090
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Dewey-Burdock Final Safety Evaluation (Revised).
ML14043A347
*****
Beaver Valley, Submittal of Discharge Monitoring Report for February 2014, Permit No. PA0025615.
ML14086A454
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Portsmouth Facilities

Peter J. Miner LTR Re: Review of Annual Summary Report of Facility Changes for Calendar Year 2013-American Centrifuge Plant and Lead Cascade Facility (Technical Assignment Control Number L34278).
ML14107A255
*****
American Centrifuge Plant and Lead Cascade Facility, Termination of Facility Code 11560.
ML14108A457
*****
American Centrifuge Plant - Submittal of Description of Change and Changed Pages to the Security Program.
ML14107A046
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Fermi 1

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Fermi 2

FERMI POWER PLANT, UNIT 2 – NOTICE OF REGULATORY CONFERENCE ON APRIL 14, 2014
ADAMS Accession Number ML14093A584
*****
Fermi Power Plant, Unit 2 - NRC Integrated Inspection Report 05000341/2014002
ADAMS Accession No. ML14114A741
*****
Fermi NRC Security Baseline Inspection Report 05000341/2014404 (Cover Letter Only)
ML14114A362
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Fermi 2 Issuance of Amendment Regarding Control Room Habitability Technical Specification Task Force TSTF-448 Amendment (TAC No. MF1467)
ADAMS Accession Number: ML14098A062
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Fermi, Unit 2, Issuance of Amendment re: Relocation of Pressure and Temperature Curves to a Pressure Temperature Limits Report (TAC MF0446).
ML13346B067
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DTE Electric Company's Seismic Hazard and Screening Report, Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident.
ML14090A326
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Fermi 2 - Submittal of the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) Permit Application for Reissuance.
ML14094A030
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Fermi 3

Fermi, Unit 3, SER Chapter 20 - OGC Cmts - Rev 3-031914.
ML14101A058
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ML14036A294
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