To: Jim Mehl, ERU Supervisor

From: Zack Clayton, Rad Coordinator

Subject: February Monthly Report

Date: March 3, 2013

Beans

Training:	0
Drills:	0
Meetings:	3
Technical Assistance:	2
Public Assistance:	1

Web Page Views: There were 47 page views in February.

Coming Attractions

3/5	Working Group
3/19	Beaver Valley systems Training
4/1	BV HAB Dry Run
4/16	URSB
4/24	NEPAC

Facility updates

Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station

Davis-Besse started February in a refueling outage which will include replacing the steam generators.

On February 14, workers cutting the access hole in the containment shield building discovered a void along the top of the previous penetration cut out. This is attributed to incomplete filling of the prior cut out or concrete settling in the opening prior to setting. Calculation show that the shield building would have provided the required protection during the interval the void was present. See Event No. 49828.

Davis-Besse has retracted the event notification 49828 to NRC because the shield building would have performed its intended function with the void present. There was no degradation in public protection from the design basis. The investigation of the void formation is still ongoing.

On February 16, a contract worker fell off a ladder and sustained injuries. The worker was transported off site with a radiation technician who conducted a survey. The worker was uncontaminated but there was contamination on his protective clothing. This was recovered and returned to the plant. There was no contamination found in the ambulance or at the hospital. See Event No. 49833.

Perry Nuclear Power Plant

Perry operated for most of February at full power.

On February 7 the Perry plant was leak testing containment isolation valves when they discovered a valve that exceeded the allowable leak rate. At 6:00 AM the Perry plant did a tech spec shutdown and decreased power to 43% in order to resolve the issue with the valve in question. The valve was isolated and retested. This valve was not leaking to the containment or environment, it is designed to stop a leak out of containment if the exterior piping is damaged. At 09:43 AM the valve leak through rate was shown within limits and the Perry plant exited the tech spec shutdown. There is and was no release from the valve during plant operation. The plant then returned to full power. See Event Report 49804.

Beaver Valley Power Station

Beaver Valley Unit I

Unit I exited the refueling outage February 2 and operated at full power for the rest of the month.

Beaver Valley Unit II

Unit II operated for February at 100% power.

DTE

Fermi II

Fermi II operated at full power until Feb 11 when the plant entered a refueling outage.

On Feb 6 an operator put the Emergency Equipment Cooling Water system in manual override during an Emergency Diesel Generator test. The system was in override mode for 36 seconds during which the HPIC Spray System cooler was inoperable by

Technical Specifications. The operators involved have been removed from license activities pending investigation. See Event 49801.

The computer system in the control room was taken offline for maintenance which is an 8 hour non-emergency notification. The Dose assessment program is not available in automatic mode and must have data entered manually for the duration of this maintenance. See Event 49851.

Fermi III

Fermi III continues as a documentation evaluation.

Portsmouth Enrichment Plant

There were no event reports for the sites at Portsmouth for January. But there were ADAMS documents submitted.

Activity

2/4	FRMAC teleconference. Miscellaneous updates. The USEPA 400 guidance for radioactivity in drinking water is a reference for further discussion, not a hard limit for emergencies. It can be used as a limit, or the discussion is for reasons to allow exceedance for drinking/sanitary supply or other reasons.
2/5	Working Group ODH led a discussion of RAD Responder and State use. The changes in EPA-400 were mentioned and the possible impact this might have on the IZRRAG drinking water advisory discussion.
2/19	Portsmouth operations and emergency systems Briefing at OEMA.

Attended 2 EOC weather emergency briefings.

Office Issues

Centerline Plume sampling considerations have been drafted for the REP Plan.
Specific items for an IND SOP are being developed.
A copy of RASCAL 4.3 has been received. Installation is pending migration to Win7.

Statistics, NRC Reports, News, and ADAMS References

Operating Power Levels

February

Date	BV1	BV2	DB	Perry	Fermi2	
1	15	100	0	100	85	Davis-Besse in refueling outage.
3	100	100	0	100	85	BV1 out of refueling outage.
10	100	100	0	100	65	
11	100	100	0	100	0	Fermi2 in refueling outage
17	100	100	0	100	0	
24	100	100	0	100	0	
28	100	100	0	100	0	

Plant Reports

Power Reactor	Event Number: 49801
Facility: FERMI Region: 3 State: MI Unit: [2] [ ] [ ] RX Type: [2] GE-4 NRC Notified By: PAUL GRESH HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER	Notification Date: 02/06/2014 Notification Time: 19:17 [ET] Event Date: 02/06/2014 Event Time: 12:54 [EST] Last Update Date: 02/06/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION	Person (Organization): ROBERT ORLIKOWSKI (R3DO)

Unit	SCRAM Code	RX CRIT	Initial PWR	Initial RX Mode	Current PWR	Current RX Mode
2	N	Y	85	Power Operation	85	Power Operation

Event Text

EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT COOLING WATER IN MANUAL OVERRIDE DUE TO HUMAN PERFOMANCE ERROR

"At 1254 [EST] on February 6, 2014, while shutting down Division 2 Emergency Equipment Cooling Water (EECW), a human performance error occurred resulting in the Division 2 EECW isolation override switch being placed in manual override. Division 2 EECW remained running and continued to operate normally. The Division 2 EECW system cools various safety related components including the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system room cooler. With the Division 2 EECW isolation override switch in manual override, Division 2 EECW may have been prevented from performing its safety function during a loss of power event. An unplanned HPCI inoperability occurred due to the Division 2 EECW inoperability which may have prevented HPCI from performing its safety function. A 14 day Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) was entered for HPCI via T.S. LCO 3.5.1 and subsequently exited 36 seconds later upon returning the Division 2 EECW isolation override switch to normal. This report is being made pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as a condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to mitigate the

consequences of an accident, based on a loss of a single train safety system. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

The licensee reported that the individuals involved have been removed from licensee duties pending further investigation.

*****

Power Reactor	Event Number: 49804
Facility: PERRY Region: 3 State: OH Unit: [1] [ ] [ ] RX Type: [1] GE-6 NRC Notified By: ROBERT KIDDER HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER	Notification Date: 02/07/2014 Notification Time: 08:19 [ET] Event Date: 02/07/2014 Event Time: 06:00 [EST] Last Update Date: 02/07/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS	Person (Organization): ROBERT ORLIKOWSKI (R3DO)

Unit	SCRAM Code	RX CRIT	Initial PWR	Initial RX Mode	Current PWR	Current RX Mode
1	N	Y	100	Power Operation	45	Power Operation

Event Text

PLANT SHUTDOWN REQUIRED BY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS DUE TO CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE OVER LEAK RATE LIMIT

"This event is being reported in accordance with 10CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i), 'Initiation of a Shutdown Required by Technical Specifications.'

"At 2043 hours [EST] on February 06, 2014, the Perry Nuclear Power Plant entered Technical Specification 3.6.1.3 Primary Containment Isolation Valves (PCIVs), action C.1, due to leakage identified during local leak rate testing of the containment penetration for the Containment and Drywell Purge system. Leakage was identified on the outboard containment isolation valve resulting in the plant exceeding the limit for secondary containment bypass leakage. The Containment and Drywell Purge system penetration is normally isolated and remains isolated in accordance with Technical Specifications. Action C.1 requires restoration of the leakage rate within four hours. At 0043 hours on February 7, 2014, the plant entered Technical Specification 3.6.1.3, 'Primary Containment Isolation Valves (PCIVs)', action E as the leakage rate was not restored. Action E requires the plant be in Mode 3 in 12 hours and Mode 4 in 36 hours.

"At 0600 hours on February 07, 2014, the Perry Nuclear Power Plant initiated a shutdown in accordance with Technical Specification 3.6.1.3, action E. Repairs to restore the penetration leakage to within allowable limits are in progress."

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

* * * UPDATE PROVIDED BY DAVE ODONNELL TO JEFF ROTTON AT 1220 EST ON 02/07/2014 * * *

"At 0943 hours [EST] the reactor shutdown to comply with Technical Specification 3.6.1.3 action E was terminated [with the reactor at 42% power]. A blind flange was installed downstream of the outboard containment isolation valve. Local leak rate testing of the containment penetration for the Containment and Drywell Purge system verified that leakage was within the limits for secondary containment bypass leakage.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

The licensee has commenced increasing reactor power.

Notified R3DO (Orlikowski)

*****

Power Reactor	Event Number: 49828
Facility: DAVIS BESSE Region: 3 State: OH Unit: [1] [ ] [ ] RX Type: [1] B&W-R-LP NRC Notified By: NICK BUEHLER HQ OPS Officer: DANIEL MILLS	Notification Date: 02/14/2014 Notification Time: 11:14 [ET] Event Date: 02/14/2014 Event Time: 03:25 [EST] Last Update Date: 02/14/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION	Person (Organization): ROBERT DALEY (R3DO)

Unit	SCRAM Code	RX CRIT	Initial PWR	Initial RX Mode	Current PWR	Current RX Mode
1	N	N	0	Defueled	0	Defueled

Event Text

SHIELD BUILDING CONSTRUCTION OPENING

"On 02/14/2014, an unfilled area was discovered in the concrete along the top of the shield building construction opening on the annulus side. The condition was discovered during the current steam generator replacement outage, and is likely due to not completely repouring the shield building wall opening in 2011. Analysis shows this condition is bounded by previous calculations that demonstrate the containment function is maintained such that the protection of the health and safety of the public was not in question. Further analysis is planned to reconfirm previous calculations.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

* * * RETRACTION FROM ROBERT OESTERLE TO VINCE KLCO ON 2/24/14 AT 1650 EST * * *

"The FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company is retracting the 8-hour non-emergency notification made on 02/14/2014 (EN# 49828).

"Engineering evaluation of the unfilled concrete area along the top of the shield building

construction opening determined the condition did not prevent the shield building from performing all design functions as described in the Updated Safety Analysis Report. Therefore, this issue did not represent a condition that significantly degraded plant safety, and the notification made per 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) is being retracted.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been briefed on the evaluation results and informed of this retraction."

Notified the R3DO (Kunowski).

*****

Power Reactor	Event Number: 49833
Facility: DAVIS BESSE Region: 3 State: OH Unit: [1] [ ] [ ] RX Type: [1] B&W-R-LP NRC Notified By: ERIC HORVATH HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER	Notification Date: 02/16/2014 Notification Time: 21:37 [ET] Event Date: 02/16/2014 Event Time: 17:25 [EST] Last Update Date: 02/16/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(3)(xii) - OFFSITE MEDICAL	Person (Organization): ROBERT DALEY (R3DO)

Unit	SCRAM Code	RX CRIT	Initial PWR	Initial RX Mode	Current PWR	Current RX Mode
1	N	N	0	Defueled	0	Defueled

Event Text

CONTRACT WORKER TRANSPORTED TO HOSPITAL AFTER FALL

"At time 1725 [EST] on 02/16/2014 a contract worker fell ten to fifteen (10-15) feet off of a ladder while descending the ladder above the 565 foot level in the Containment Building. The individual received lacerations to the forehead and potential other injuries.

"For his work activities the individual was dressed in anti-contamination clothing.

"The individual was transported via off-site ambulance in his anti-contamination clothing to H.B. Magruder hospital in Port Clinton, Ohio. A First Energy (FENOC) Radiation Protection (RP) Technician accompanied the injured person in the ambulance during the transfer to the hospital. A FENOC RP Supervisor along with the RP Technician assisted at the hospital while the injured individual received medical treatment. The protective anti-contamination clothing was removed from the individual. A full body frisk was performed and showed no contamination on the individual.

"Smear readings on the anti-contamination booties and gloves showed [approximately] 1500 dpm / 100 square cm. The clothing was bagged and subsequent readings and surveys on the outside of the bag showed no readings above background. The bagged anti-contamination clothing will be transported back to Davis-Besse NPS by FENOC RP Supervision. The H.B. Magruder Hospital Treatment Room and the off-site ambulance also were frisked and showed no residual contamination."

The licensee notified the State of Ohio and Lucas and Ottawa Counties. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

*****

Power Reactor	Event Number: 49851
Facility: FERMI Region: 3 State: MI Unit: [2] [ ] [ ] RX Type: [2] GE-4 NRC Notified By: PAUL GRESH HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH	Notification Date: 02/23/2014 Notification Time: 12:23 [ET] Event Date: 02/23/2014 Event Time: 12:00 [EST] Last Update Date: 02/23/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE	Person (Organization): HIRONORI PETERSON (R3DO)

Unit	SCRAM Code	RX CRIT	Initial PWR	Initial RX Mode	Current PWR	Current RX Mode
2	N	N	0	Refueling	0	Refueling

Event Text

INTEGRATED PLANT COMPUTER SYSTEM REMOVED FROM SERVICE FOR PLANNED MAINTENANCE

"[On] February 23, 2014, at approximately 1200 [EST], the Fermi 2 Integrated Plant Computer System (IPCS) was removed from service outside of the Control Room to support planned system maintenance. The Safety Parameters Display System (SPDS) and Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) reside on the IPCS platform and [was rendered] out of service when the IPCS [was] removed from Emergency Response Facilities (ERFs). These systems will be unavailable to all Emergency Response Facilities (ERFs) for approximately 50 hours. During this time, dose assessment (Raddose) capability will only be available in the manual data input mode. The SPDS indications and Raddose remain available to the plant staff in the Control Room, and will be used for emergency response, if needed. Information will be communicated to the NRC using other available communication systems as needed. A follow-up notification will be submitted when the IPCS is completely restored, including SPDS and ERDS, to the Operational Support Center, the Technical Support Center, and alternate facilities. This 8-hour non-emergency notification is being made per the requirements of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), as an event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

*****

Part 21	Event Number: 49856
Rep Org: NUCLEAR LOGISTICS, INC. Licensee: NUCLEAR LOGISTICS, INC. Region: 4 City: FORT WORTH State: TX County:	Notification Date: 02/26/2014 Notification Time: 17:19 [ET] Event Date: 01/28/2014 Event Time: [CST] Last Update Date: 02/26/2014

License #: Agreement: Y Docket: NRC Notified By: TRACY BOLT HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN	
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE	Person (Organization): BOB HAGAR (R4DO) DANIEL RICH (R2DO) ANNE DeFRANCISCO (R1DO) PART 21 GROUP (EMAI)

Event Text

PART 21 REPORT INVOLVING A POTENTIAL MANUFACTURING DEFECT IN REPLACEMENT MASTERPACT CRADLES

The following information was received via facsimile:

"Part 21 Report No: P21-01312014

"Subject: Report of potential defect per 10CFR Part 21 primary disconnect assembly

"Pursuant to 10CFR 21.21(d)(3)(ii), AZZ/NLI is providing written notification of the identification of a defect. This letter is to notify you of a potential manufacturing defect concerning primary disconnect assemblies used on Masterpact replacement cradles. These assemblies are used in the replacement of the circuit breakers in low voltage switchgear.

"The following information is required per 10CFR 21.21(d)(4),

"(i) Name and address of the individual or individuals informing the Commission.

Aron Seiken, Vice President
Nuclear Logistics, Inc.
7410 Pebble Drive
Ft. Worth, TX 76118

"(ii) Identification of the facility, activity, or the basic component supplied for such facility or such activity within the United States which fails to comply or contains a defect.

Facility:

Nuclear Logistics, Inc.
7410 Pebble Drive
Ft. Worth, TX 76118

"The specific part which fails to comply or contains a defect:

"Primary disconnect (p/n AHX30701) for Square D replacement low voltage switchgear breaker cradles (model LGSB4).

"(iii) Identification of the firm constructing or supplying the basic component which fails to

comply or contains a defect.

"The primary disconnect was manufactured by Square D Services (Schneider Electric) and supplied as a dedicated component by Nuclear Logistics, Inc.

"(iv) Nature of defect or failure to comply and the safety hazard which is created or could be created by such defect or failure to comply.

"The cradle is an adaptor between the replacement circuit breaker and the existing switchgear cubicle. Part of the interfaces is the primary disconnects (fingers). The cradle primary disconnects connect to the bus stabs in the switchgear. The cradle primary disconnects are designed to account for vertical misalignment of the stabs in the switchgear. The primary disconnect fingers have vertical flexibility (float) that maintains the finger pressure on the bus stabs when the bus stabs are not completely aligned in the vertical axis.

"The fabrication drawing for the primary disconnect fingers had an incorrect tolerance. If the fingers are made with a dimension at the low end of the specified tolerance, there will be interference with a mating part. This reduces or eliminates the vertical float for the fingers. If the cradle is installed in a switchgear cubicle with vertically misaligned bus stabs, the disconnect fingers may have inadequate contact pressure. This condition may result in a higher than normal contact resistance from the cubicle stab to the cradle primary disconnect. The higher contact resistance at any one finger contact could cause an unacceptable temperature rise at that connection point. At very high temperatures, the springs that maintain the finger contact pressure could relax, which would further increase the connection resistance and cause additional overheating.

"This would not be an issue if there was no vertical misalignment of the switchgear cubicle stabs. See the additional clarifications in section (vi) below.

"(v) The date on which the information of such defect or failure to comply was obtained.

"The information that there is a defect was obtained on January 28, 2014.

"(vi) In the case of a basic component which contains a defect or fails to comply, the number and location of these components in use at, supplied for being supplied for, or may be supplied for, manufactured or being manufactured for one or more facilities or activities subject to the regulations in this part.

"The issue is applicable to 1600amp cradles only. The same and similar disconnects are used in the different cradle designs identified below. A list of the cradle types, primary disconnect part numbers and affected facilities (plants) in Table 1 as follows:

"TABLE 1

Plant Name / Cradle-Breaker Type / Primary disconnect part number / Quantity / Original breaker type-Notes

OPPD-Ft. Calhoun/LGSB4 with Masterpact NW breaker/AHX30701/18/Original breakers: GE AK-50. OPPD replaced all AHX30701 with narrower disconnect p/n R300112

TVA-Browns Ferry/LGSB4 and LGSB21 with Masterpact NW breaker/AHX30701/28/Original breakers: GE AK-50.

Entergy-River Bend/LGSB9 Masterpact NW breaker/R300112/5/ Original breakers: AKR-50. Narrower disconnect.

FENOC-Beaver Valley/LGSB4 Masterpact NW breaker/AHX30701/20/Original breakers: GE AK-50

FPL-St. Lucie/LISB2 Masterpact NW breaker/AJF30101/15/Original breakers: ABB K-1600

FPL-Turkey Point/LISB2 Masterpact NW breaker/AJF30101/12/Original breakers: ABB K-1600

SCE-SONGS/LISB2 Masterpact NW breaker/AJF30101/8/Original breakers: ABB K-1600

Nextera Energy-Seabrook/LISB2 Masterpact NW breaker/AJF30101/4/Original breakers: ABB K-1600

"Additional details:

"- This issue does not affect all of the cradles identified above. Since the issue is a result of incorrect manufacturing tolerances, it will not be present on all cradles.

"- The overheating issue could be a problem with replacement circuit breakers for GE AK-50 circuit breakers. Due to the construction of the switchgear cubicles, there can be vertical misalignment of the stabs in the switchgear. If the primary disconnect float is not adequate, the overheating issue identified above could occur.

"- The overheating issue is expected to be much less prevalent or non-existent on the replacements for GE AKR and ABB K-line circuit breakers. The construction of the switchgear cubicles results in good vertical alignment of the stabs in the switchgear, so the amount of cradle finger vertical float is not as critical.

"(vii) The corrective action which has been, is being, or will be taken; the name of the individual or organization responsible for the action; and the length of time that has been or will be taken to complete the action.

"NLI has generated Technical Bulletin TB-14-001 to direct the plants for inspections to determine if the manufacturing defect is present in the specific applications. The Technical Bulletin will be issued to the potentially impacted plants by March 4, 2014.

"NLI is in process of revising test plans to include verification of the proper operation of the primary disconnects during factory acceptance testing. The verification will be performed on 100% of supplied cradles.

"Square D Services is revising manufacturing drawings to eliminate any tolerance stack up issue that could limit the vertical movement of the finger contacts of the primary disconnect assemblies.

"(viii) Any advice related to the defect or failure to comply about the facility, activity, or basic component that has been, is being, or will be given to purchasers or licensees.

"NLI Will submit NLI Technical Bulletin TB-14-001 to all facilities where the potentially impacted Masterpact breakers have been installed. The technical bulletin provides a summary of the issue and provides instructions for inspection and testing of the cradles. Please contact me with any questions or comments."

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News

NUCLEAR POLICY:
EPA considering overhaul of 1970s radiation release limits
Hannah Northey, E&E reporter
Published: Tuesday, February 4, 2014

U.S. EPA is considering updating rules from the 1970s that limit how much radiation can be released from normally operating U.S. reactors and facilities that process uranium.
The agency published a notice in the *Federal Register*today seeking comment on ways to update the standards, which limit radiation releases from normally operating reactors and facilities involved in the milling, conversion, fabrication, use and reprocessing of uranium fuel for generating commercial electrical power.
Comments are due by June 4.
EPA **said** updates may be necessary in light of a number of trends that have emerged since the 1970s. The rules were crafted based on technology and the understanding of radiation biology at the time, EPA said.
The agency pointed to improved dose and risk methods stemming from new calculation tools, as well as a growing interest in nuclear power stemming from concerns about climate change. "The nuclear industry anticipates demand for construction of new nuclear power plants in the next 10 to 30 years," the agency said.
EPA also wants to ensure that the standards reflect new nuclear technologies that could become available in the next three decades and any changes in on-site storage of spent nuclear fuel. The agency is also re-examining the need for more groundwater protections.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission, which regulates reactor safety, is responsible for implementing and enforcing the limits.
Ed Lyman, a senior scientist with the Union of Concerned Scientists, said he does not want to see EPA relax the current standards on radionuclide releases from reprocessing plants, noting that industry groups have argued that they impose too many costs.
"Although there are no reprocessing plants in the pipeline, we worry that the industry is paving the way for cheaper, dirtier reprocessing plants in this country," Lyman said in an email.
The Nuclear Energy Institute said the current standards are fully protective of the public.
"By any measure, existing radiation protection standards are completely safe," John Keeley, a spokesman for the group, said in an email. "This is an issue with fairly wide

applicability throughout the nuclear energy sector. It is too early to know what changes if any might result from it, but it is an opportunity to achieve greater consistency among federal agencies."
Source: http://www.eenews.net/eenewspm/2014/02/04/stories/1059994008
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Low gas, power prices have nuclear giant mulling closures

Jeffrey Tomich, E&E reporter
Published: Friday, February 7, 2014

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Facing competition from cheap natural gas and wind and tepid electricity demand, the nation's largest nuclear operator may decide by the end of the year to shut down unprofitable plants unless they see improved financial performance.
Christopher Crane, Exelon Corp.'s chief executive, believes power markets will eventually recover. But when that will happen no one knows for sure, and money-losing units may not survive unless policies are implemented to reward nuclear generation.
"Despite our best-ever year in generation, some of our nuclear units are unprofitable at this point in the current environment due to the low prices and bad energy policy that we're living with," he said during a conference call with analysts and investors to discuss Exelon's fourth-quarter financial results.
"If we do not see a path to sustainable profits, we will be obligated to shut units down to avoid the long-term losses," he said. "That decision path or process should bring us to some conclusion by year-end."
The ultimate decision to shut down nuclear reactors could not only have broad implications for Exelon and the power markets it's part of but also pose thorny policy issues in the face of efforts to combat global warming.
A Department of Energy official at an industry conference this week expressed concern that early retirements of otherwise well-functioning U.S. reactors could threaten the Obama administration's goals to reduce greenhouse gas emissions (*Greenwire*, Feb. 5).
Executives from Exelon and Entergy Corp., the second-largest nuclear owner, have complained that electricity markets are rewarding natural gas and subsidized wind -- a point that Crane drove home yesterday (*Greenwire*, Feb. 6).
Dominion Resources Inc. closed its 556-megawatt Kewaunee nuclear plant in Carlton, Wis., last year, and Entergy plans to close its 604 MW Vermont Yankee plant by the end of this year. Both companies cited weak energy markets and cheap natural gas as factors in their decisions. And Exelon has already announced the planned closure of its 645 MW Oyster Creek plant in New Jersey by the end of 2019.
Chicago-based Exelon owns the nation's largest nuclear fleet with 17 reactors at 10 plants, six of them in Illinois.
The company said the plants generated a record 134 million megawatt-hours of electricity last year and achieved a 94.1 percent capacity factor -- 5 percentage points above the industry average. But as well as the fleet performed, the combination of flat electricity demand, low regional natural gas prices and competition from Midwest wind farms hurt results from the company's merchant power business.

"Exelon can't escape the fall in power prices across their regions," Morningstar analyst Travis Miller said. "Where they are, some of [their] plants are going to have a tough time earning sufficient returns."

Overall, Exelon's fourth-quarter earnings rose because of improved performance at its regulated utilities. But the merchant power segment, Exelon Generation, saw a 22 percent dip in earnings.

Most-threatened plants

Crane declined to say how much money some of the nuclear plants are losing, and he didn't specifically name which units face possible closure. But at an industry conference last fall, he singled out the Clinton plant just south of Bloomington, Ill., and Quad Cities plant just north of Davenport, Iowa, among those that face challenges.

The Clinton plant, in particular, is located within the footprint of the Midcontinent Independent System Operator, the Midwest regional grid. Unlike the PJM Interconnection, MISO lacks a long-term capacity market, making it more difficult for merchant generators to wait out a power market recovery.

Crane said the company continues to seek out supply contracts as a lifeline, at least for the 1,065 MW Clinton plant. And he disputed reports that the company may be looking to the Illinois Power Agency for such contracts -- a move that would require state legislation and likely prompt a political firestorm.

"We're not negotiating with the state of Illinois on [power purchase agreements]," Crane said. "We would like to get longer-term contracts, especially on the MISO asset. There's not many of those deals out there. But MISO and now MISO South would be our target for those opportunities."

Besides weak power markets and inexpensive natural gas, Crane again railed on renewable energy subsidies -- a stance that got Exelon booted from the American Wind Energy Association. While the federal production tax credit expired at the end of 2013, many states have renewable portfolio standards that require increasing amounts of green power.

Crane said nuclear generators should be rewarded for the reliability of their fleet because plants can run for two years between refueling and don't rely on "the wind, the sun or the flow of any fuel through a pipe."

"Energy and capacity markets should reflect reliability of those," he said. "We think that good policy for the competitive market is to let good assets compete."

Source: http://www.eenews.net/energywire/2014/02/07/stories/1059994204

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NRC Davis-Besse inspectors to hold public webinar to answer consumer questions

By John Funk, The Plain Dealer

on February 12, 2014 at 7:00 AM, updated February 12, 2014 at 7:04 AM

CHICAGO

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The Nuclear Regulatory Commission will hold a public webinar on Thursday, Feb. 20, to take questions from the public about FirstEnergy Corp.'s $600 million steam generator replacement project at the Davis-Besse nuclear power plant.

FirstEnergy's contractors have cut through the reinforced concrete walls of the reactor's shield building and its inner solid carbon steel containment vessel in order to replace the steam generators.
Critics have raised concerns about the strength of the building once it is restored, and about the replacement generators, which they argue are not identical to the original equipment.
Standing more than 70 feet tall, the massive 12-foot diameter cylinders are sophisticated heat exchangers that contain two separate and closed tubing systems, one in which superheated radioactive reactor water flows under high pressure, the other containing clean water that flashes into steam to drive the power plant's turbines, which spin the generator.
The NRC is prepared to discuss its staff inspections of the project, explain regulations that FirstEnergy must meet and answer questions, said Cynthia D. Pederson, head of the agency's Midwest region.
The webinar is scheduled from 6:00-7:00 p.m. eastern time. To participate, you must register here.
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Tepco took months to release record strontium readings at Fukushima

REUTERS

By Mari Saito February 13, 2014 2:00 AM
By Mari Saito

TOKYO (Reuters) - The operator of Japan's wrecked Fukushima nuclear plant knew about record high measurements of a dangerous isotope in groundwater at the plant for five months before telling the country's nuclear watchdog, a regulatory official told Reuters.
Tokyo Electric Power Co (Tepco) said late on Wednesday it detected 5 million becquerels per liter of radioactive strontium-90 in a sample from a groundwater well about 25 meters from the ocean last September. That reading was more than five times the broader all-beta radiation reading taken at the same well two months earlier.
A Tepco spokesman said there was uncertainty about the reliability and accuracy of the September strontium reading, so the utility decided to re-examine the data.
Shinji Kinjo, head of a Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA) taskforce on contaminated water issues at Fukushima, told Reuters he had not heard about the record high strontium reading until this month. "We did not hear about this figure when they detected it last September," he said. "We have been repeatedly pushing Tepco to release strontium data since November. It should not take them this long to release this information."
Strontium-90, which has a half-life of around 29 years, is estimated to be twice as harmful to the human body as cesium-137, another isotope that was released in large quantities during the meltdowns at the Fukushima Daiichi plant in March 2011. The legal limit for releasing strontium into the ocean is 30 becquerels per liter.
Tepco has been heavily criticized for its inept response to the 2011 disaster at Fukushima, including delays in releasing radiation data. The NRA's chairman said on

Wednesday that Tepco still lacks a fundamental understanding of measuring and handling radiation.
"This is not an appropriate way to deal with the desire of the public (for transparency) and in particular, the regulator, which is now very closely regulating issues related to public health, the environment and so on," said Martin Schulz, a senior research fellow at the Fujitsu Research Institute.
Tepco, which was taken over by the government in 2012, came under criticism last year after highly radioactive water leaked from a holding tank at Fukushima.
Japan's government vowed to provide half a billion dollars to help contain contaminated water at Fukushima last September, just days before Tokyo won its bid to host the 2020 Olympic Games. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe told the International Olympic Committee then that contaminated water at Fukushima was "under control".
Abe is scheduled to visit towns around the Fukushima plant later this week.
(Additional reporting by Kentaro Hamada; Editing by Aaron Sheldrick and Ian Geoghegan)
Source: http://news.yahoo.com/tepco-took-months-release-record-strontium-readings-fukushima-070044085--finance.html
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Zanesville TimesRecorder.com

Gap in concrete wall found at Ohio nuclear plant

Feb. 16, 2014
Written by
AP
OAK HARBOR
—
Workers at a nuclear plant along Lake Erie found a gap within the concrete of a protective wall while the plant was shut down to replace two steam generators, its operator said.
Officials at the Davis-Besse nuclear plant near Toledo described the gap as an air pocket and said they don't believe it affected the structural integrity of the shield wall.
A spokeswoman for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission said that it's too early to determine whether the gap found Thursday posed a problem.
"That is the question we expect the company to provide us an answer with, and we will assess it before making a determination," NRC spokeswoman Viktoria Mitlyng told The (Toledo) Blade.
The agency plans to send more inspectors to the plant operated by Akron-based FirstEnergyCorp.
FirstEnergy spokeswoman Jennifer Young said the gap runs along the length of a 25-foot cut made in 2011 when a new reactor head was brought into the plant.
The gap is six to 12 inches wide. "It's probably an air pocket that got in there when the concrete was poured," Young said.
She said there's no sign of it on the outside of the mostly concrete-and-steel structure, which is intended to protect the plant from events like storms or terrorist attacks and protect the public in the event of a catastrophe.
FirstEnergy will eventually seal the structure again once its new steam generators are installed.

“They will have to address this void before they start up,” Mitlyng said. We will be evaluating how they handle the concrete pouring and the conditions to make sure these conditions do not recur. We need to understand what happened and why and what possible implications there might have been.”
The shield structure at Davis-Besse came under scrutiny three years ago after several hairline cracks were found in the concrete. FirstEnergy determined they were caused by moisture seeping into the concrete during a blizzard and that the structural integrity wasn’t affected.
The utility said in September that more cracks were found, but said the structure was safe. Anti-nuclear groups questioned whether the structure was compromised after the first cracks were found.
Regulators and FirstEnergy both think the cracks are unrelated to gap in the concrete found this past week.

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Information Notices

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Part 21 and Miscellaneous

Environmental Radiation Protection Standards for Nuclear Power Operations, pp 6509-6527
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2014-02-04/html/2014-02307.htm
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2014-02-04/pdf/2014-02307.pdf
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RIS 2014-01, Regulatory Requirements For Withholding Of Proprietary Information From Public Disclosure
ADAMS Accession No. ML13351A195
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Letter from Eric J. Leeds Re: Supplemental Information Related to Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Seismic Hazard Reevaluations for Recommendation 2.1
ADAMS Accession No.: ML14030A046
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Information Notice 2014-01, “Fuel Safety Limit Calculation Inputs Were Inconsistent With NRC-Approved Correlation Limit Values, dated February 21, 2014
ADAMS Accession No. ML13325A966
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Information Notice 2014-02, “Failure To Properly Pressure Test Reactor Vessel Flange Leak-Off Lines”, dated February 25, 2014
ADAMS Accession No. ML13193A002
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ADAMS Accession No. ML13350A189
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Davis-Besse

Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 1 - Safety Evaluation for Relief Request RP-3
ADAMS Accession Number: ML14002A444
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Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit NO. 1 - Safety Evaluation for Relief Request RR-A1 and RR-B1
ADAMS Accession Number: ML14030A592
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REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FOR THE REVIEW OF THE DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION LICENSE RENEWAL APPLICATION (TAC NO. ME4640)
ADAMS Accession Number: ML14029A201
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NUREG/KM-0005 "2002 Davis-Besse Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Degradation Knowledge Management Digest".
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ADAMS Accession No.: ML14007A670
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Notice of Availability of the Draft Plant Specific Supplement 52 to the Generic Environmental Impact Statement for License Renewalof Nuclear Plants Regarding Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1
ADAMS Accession No. ML14050A078
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Request for Concurrence on the Effects of the Proposed Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1, License Renewal on Threatened Endangered Species
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Mega-Tech Services, LLC, Technical Evaluation Report Regarding the Overall Integrated Plan for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, TAC No.: MF0961.
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Perry

Perry EP HAB Exercise Letter
ADAMS Accession No. ML14037A329
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Re-Issued Inspection Report: Perry Nuclear Power Plant NRC Integrated Inspection Report 05000440/2013005
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Perry Emergency Preparedness Annual Inspection Report Letter
ADAMS Accession No. ML14044A021
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Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit No. 1 - Supplemental Information Needed for Acceptance of Requested Licensing Action Concerning Alternative Accident Source Term Design Bases (TAC No. MF3197)(L-13-306)
ADAMS Accession Number: ML14029A649
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Beaver Valley

Beaver Valley Power Station - NRC Integrated Inspection Report 05000334/2013005 and 05000412/2013005
ADAMS Accession No.: ML14041A003
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Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit 2 - Request for Additional Information Re: Pressure and Temperature Limits Report Revision 6 (TAC No. MF3224)
ADAMS Accession No.: ML14022A220
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Beaver Valley Power Station, Units 1 and 2 - Staff Assessment of the Seismic Walkdown Report Supporting Implementation of Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Related to the Fukushima DaiIchi Nuclear Power Plant Accident (TAC Nos. MF0092 and MF0093)
ADAMS Accession No.: ML14009A089
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BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION: NRC EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS ANNUAL INSPECTION REPORT NOS. 05000334/2013501, 05000412/2013501, 05000334/2013502, AND 05000412/2013502; NRC SECURITY ANNUAL INSPECTION REPORT NOS. 05000334/2013401 AND 05000412/2013401
ADAMS Accession Number:. ML14043A037
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Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 1 - Relief Request No. BV1-IW-2-3 Regarding Visual Examination of the Containment Liner (TAC No. MF2882)
ADAMS Accession No.: ML13281A876
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Listing of Actions Received from January 2007 through January 2014.
ADAMS Accession No. ML14036A191
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Beaver Valley, Unit 1, Twenty-Second Refueling Outage Inservice Inspection Report.
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ML14030A135
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Beaver Valley Power Station, Discharge Monitoring Report (NPDES) Permit No. PA0025615.
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Portsmouth Facilities

American Centrifuge Plant and American Centrifuge Lead Cascade Facility - Annual Summary Report of Facility Changes.
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Report to Congress on the Health, Safety, and Environmental Conditions at the Gaseous Diffusion Plants Located Near Paducah, Kentucky, and Portsmouth, Ohio (Oct. 1, 2008 to Sept. 30, 2013).
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American Centrifuge Plant, Review of Cyber Security Program.
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American Centrifuge Plant, Submittal of Changes to Security Program.
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American Centrifuge Plant, Transmittal of Monthly Security Incident Log per 10 CFR 95.57(b) and SPPP for American Centrifuge Operating, LLC.
ML14050A114
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Fermi 1

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Fermi 2

Fermi 2 – Issuance of Amendment re: Relocation of Pressure and Temperature Curves to a Pressure Temperature Limits Report
ADAMS Accession Number: ML13346B067
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Request for Withholding Information from Public Disclosure for Fermi Nuclear Plant, Unit 2
ADAMS Accession Number: ML13221A399
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Fermi 2 – Issuance of Amendment re: Measurement Uncertainty Recapture Power Uprate
ADAMS Accession Number: ML13364A131
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Fermi 3

Intervenors' Reply in Opposition to DTE Energy "Motion to Strike."
ADAMS Accession No. ML14041A488
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Regulatory Audit Summary For The Review Of Soil Structure Interaction Calculations Related To FSAR 3.7 and 3.8.
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