

To: Jim Mehl, ERU Supervisor
From: Zack Clayton, Rad Coordinator
Subject: August Monthly Report
Date: September , 2013

Beans

| | |
|-----------------------|---|
| Training: | 0 |
| Drills: | 1 |
| Meetings: | 1 |
| Technical Assistance: | 1 |
| Public Assistance: | 0 |

Web Page Views: There were 68 page views in August.

Coming Attractions

| | |
|-------|---|
| 9/4 | Working Group |
| 9/6 | Vibrant Response hot wash OEPA |
| 9/19 | Vibrant Response hot wash DOSE Assessment |
| 10/1 | Working Group |
| 10/2 | Vibrant Response hot wash ALL |
| 10/3 | RAT training |
| 10/15 | URSB meeting |

Facility updates

Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station

Davis Besse operated at full power for August.

Perry Nuclear Power Plant

Perry operated at full power for most of August, the plant decreased power the weekend of the 24th for unscheduled maintenance.

An Event of Potential Public Interest occurred at the Perry Nuclear Plant on August 14, at 13:45. A courier was attempting to deliver radioactive waste to NUGREEN Corp., that is located next to the Perry nuclear power plant. The courier made a wrong turn and ended up on the Perry nuclear power plant's property. Perry nuclear power plant security questioned the courier and allowed the courier to leave plant property to

continue to the correct address next door. As the courier was leaving the Perry nuclear power plant property, the courier vehicle backed into a Perry nuclear power plant security vehicle. Local law enforcement was called and responded to the scene. No injuries were reported. No radioactive materials were damaged or compromised, and there was no onsite or offsite contamination due to this event.

Beaver Valley Power Station

Beaver Valley Unit I

Unit I operated at full power in August.

Beaver Valley Unit II

Unit II operated at full power in August.

DTE

Fermi II

Fermi II operated at 68 per cent power for August due to an ongoing recirculating reactor pump issue.

Fermi III

Fermi III continues as a documentation evaluation.

Portsmouth Enrichment Plant

There were no reports for the sites at Portsmouth for April. But there were ADAMS documents submitted.

Activity

- | | |
|--------|--|
| 8/7 | Working Group – Agency reports and plant updates, discussion of KI replacement and possible TurboFRMAC training in Ohio. |
| 8/9-16 | Vibrant Response at Camp Atterbury, IN – a thorough test of the new IND plan and activation of the EOC in an alternate location. WebEOC was implemented by Dose Assessment for the first time and interface with the ESF desks and FRMAC was tested and modified. The anticipated interface with FRMAC will be changing as they move to adopt the ICS/NIMS system in their response. Data flow and tracking information needs to be further developed. |

Office Issues

Specific items for an IND SOP are being developed based on the exercise experience.

Statistics, NRC Reports, News, and ADAMS References

Operating Power Levels

August

| Date | BV1 | BV2 | DB | Perry | Fermi2 | |
|------|-----|-----|-----|-------|--------|---|
| 1 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 68 | |
| 5 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 68 | |
| 12 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 68 | |
| 19 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 68 | |
| 24 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 55 | 68 | Perry reduced power for unscheduled maintenance |
| 25 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 80 | 68 | |
| 26 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 99 | 68 | |
| 31 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 68 | |

Plant Reports

| | |
|--|---|
| Part 21 | Event Number: 48863 |
| Rep Org: INTEGRATED RESOURCES, INC. Licensee: INVENSYS (FOXBORO METER CO.) Region: 4 City: NEBRASKA CITY State: NE County: License #: Agreement: Y Docket: NRC Notified By: JOHN F. BROSEMER HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH | Notification Date: 03/28/2013 Notification Time: 15:53 [ET] Event Date: 03/27/2013 Event Time: 15:30 [CDT] Last Update Date: 08/21/2013 |
| Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE | Person (Organization): GREG PICK (R4DO) PAUL KROHN (R1DO) PART 21 GROUP (EMAI) DEBORAH SEYMOUR (R2DO) JULIO LARA (R3DO) |

Event Text

PART 21 REPORT - FOXBORO POWER SUPPLY POTENTIAL FAILURES DUE TO DEFECTIVE TIE WRAPS AND HOLDERS

Mr. John F. Brosemer, President of Integrated Resources, Inc., reported discovery of repeated defects in Foxboro Meter Company's N-2ARPS-A6, Style D power supplies. When manufactured, the power supplies utilized Thomas and Betts TC105A aluminum wire tie holders in random numbers and placements. As the power supplies age, the tie wrap holder adhesive degrades and the tie wraps embrittle resulting in the separation of the tie wraps and loss of holder adhesion to the power supply enclosure. This causes the wraps and holders to fall to the bottom of the enclosure which could result in shorts when the aluminum comes in contact with electronic components. In one particular power supply, all tie wrap holders in use failed and separated from the enclosure.

The power supplies are used in Foxboro SPEC-200 cabinetry that are used throughout the industry. At the time of this notification, Integrated Resources has one power supply from Three Mile Island and two power supplies from Ft. Calhoun undergoing refurbishment. Integrated Resources will be following up this telephonic notification with a written report once their internal investigation is done.

Recommended corrective actions are for affected facilities to open and inspect all power supplies and remove the aluminum tie wrap holders and replace the tie wraps and holders with Teflon types.

* * * UPDATE FROM BROSEMER TO SNYDER AT 1530 EDT ON 4/1/13 * * *

"Suspecting this to be a common mode failure IRI [Integrated Resources, Inc.] opened and inspected two Foxboro N-2ARPS-A6 power supplies which were sent to IRI for refurbishment by Fort Calhoun Nuclear Station. Examination revealed that both of the power supplies have the same failures of the tie wrap aluminum mounting plates adhesive with the majority of the plates being held on the wire bundles by age embrittled nylon wire ties.

"Confirmation of the common mode failure by inspection of the Fort Calhoun Nuclear Stations was on or about 1530 CDT on March 27, 2013.

"IRI is not the OEM or Original supplier for this power supply and cannot provide the number nor locations of these components. However, by searching the RAPID database IRI has found the power supplies at the following:

"Arizona Public Service - Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station; Constellation Energy - Nine Mile Point Nuclear Power Plant; **Detroit Edison - Fermi 2 Nuclear Power Plant**; Dominion Nuclear - Millstone Nuclear Power Plant; Dominion Nuclear - Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant; Eletronuclear - Angra Nuclear Power Plant; Entergy Nuclear - Arkansas Nuclear One; Entergy Nuclear - Indian Point Energy Center; Entergy Nuclear - Pilgrim Nuclear Power Plant; Entergy Nuclear - J. A. Fitzpatrick Nuclear Power Plant; Exelon Corporation - Three Mile Island Nuclear Plant; Exelon Corporation - Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station; NextEra Energy - Point Beach Nuclear Power Plant; Progress Energy Florida - Crystal River Nuclear Power Plant; Southern California Edison - San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station.

"IRI suspects several other utilities and units are affected by this report.

Corrective action taken: "IRI's preliminary suggestion is inspection and removal of failed tie wrap mounting plates which are being held on to wire bundles by aging nylon tie wraps. IRI also suggests replacement of age embrittled nylon tie wraps with Tefzel tie wraps."

Contact Information:

John F. Brosemer; President
 Integrated Resources, Inc.
 113 South 9th Street
 Nebraska City, NE 68410

Notified R1DO (Dwyer), R2DO (Seymour), R3DO (Daley), R4DO (Kellar) and Part 21 Reactors (Email).

* * * UPDATE FROM JOHN BROSEMER (VIA EMAIL) ON 8/21/13 AT 1628 EDT * * *

"IRI's final recommendations are to remove all Thomas and Betts Co. model TC105A wire tie holders and to replace any embrittled wire ties with TEFZEL wire ties in all of the affected Foxboro Co. power supplies.

"IRI also discovered during the course of the investigation that Thomas and Betts Co. supplied these wire tie holders through normal distribution to all of the manufacturers. IRI recommends that the industry, during normal inspections, inspect for the these types of wire tie holders in all other installed equipment and to remove the failed wire tie holders."

Notified R1DO (Schmidt), R2DO (Haag), R3DO (Kozak), R4DO (Werner) and Part 21 Reactors (via email).

| | |
|---|---|
| Part 21 | Event Number: 49302 |
| Rep Org: BALDOR ELECTRIC CO. Licensee: BALDOR ELECTRIC CO. Region: 1 City: FLOWERY BRANCH State: GA County: License #: Agreement: Y Docket: NRC Notified By: JAMES THIGPEN HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ | Notification Date: 08/23/2013 Notification Time: 12:35 [ET] Event Date: 08/23/2013 Event Time: [EDT] Last Update Date: 08/23/2013 |
| Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 21.21(a)(2) - INTERIM EVAL OF DEVIATION | Person (Organization): WAYNE SCHMIDT (R1DO) ROBERT HAAG (R2DO) LAURA KOZAK (R3DO) GREG WERNER (R4DO) PART 21 GROUP (NRR) |

Event Text

PART-21 NOTIFICATION - MOTORS MAY HAVE A POINT FOR FOREIGN MATERIAL ENTRY

The following information was received via fax:

"This is a reportable 10CFR21 notification because some 1E motors in frame sizes 360, 400, and 440 may have been shipped by Baldor Electric, which contain an entry point for blast media to enter the motor during post shipment paint treatment preparations. During a recent inspection of a returned motor, some foreign materials were discovered inside the motor which appeared to consist of two types of blast media. One type of blast media found is used during the manufacturing process to clean the rotor end ring area before applying an end ring coating. This media is non-conductive and is typically cleaned away as part of the treatment process. The presence of blast media is a key inspection point at rotor final inspection. In mid 2008 this type of blast media was eliminated from Baldor processes and substituted with C02 blast media.

"The other blast media found inside the motor is not used during the motor manufacturing process at Baldor. It was a metallic bead media and used during a paint preparation process after leaving Baldor. The entry point of this material was found to be through a small window in the frame casting that normally is closed with weld after the stator is assembled into the frame. In this instance, one of the stator weld notches was aligned with one (of the two) small windows in the frame casting. This allowed the blast media to enter and travel along the OD [outside diameter] of the stator core weld notch and into the motor.

"Engineering and Quality reviewed all nuclear orders to verify the frame sizes that may have used the weld slot construction. The frames were determined to be 360, 400, and 440 during the time frame when the welds may not have been verified. The date range was established as 2002 thru 2013.

"The motors identified as possibly having this non-conformance should be inspected for the following:

- a. The frame weld windows on identified 360,400 or 440 frame motors show no weld.
and
- b. The stator core weld notch is visible in at least one (of the two) frame weld windows."

If both issues exist, then remediation is recommended.

Customers who have received these motors:

Areva, Inc.

David Brown Union Pumps Co.

Duke Energy Corp.

Enertech

First Energy

First Energy Service Co.

Flowserve Pump Division - Spain

Georgia Power

Howden North America Inc.

Limitorque

Spencer Turbine Co.

Taiwan Power Company

Westinghouse Electric Company

Point of Contact: James Thigpen, 678-947-7272

News

By Brian Montopoli /

CBS News/ August 15, 2013, 2:46 PM

Study: All 107 U.S. nuclear reactors vulnerable to terrorists

Every commercial nuclear reactor in the United States is insufficiently protected against "credible" terrorist threats, according to a new report (PDF) from the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Project at the University of Texas at Austin.

The report found that facilities were vulnerable to the theft of bomb-grade nuclear materials and sabotage attacks designed to cause a meltdown.

While all 107 commercial nuclear power reactors were thought to be vulnerable, the report spotlighted 11 that were most at risk. That included eight reactors that were deemed unprotected from attacks from the sea: Diablo Canyon in California, St. Lucie in Florida, Brunswick in North Carolina, Surry in Virginia, Indian Point in New York, Millstone in Connecticut, Pilgrim in Massachusetts, and the South Texas Project.

Three civilian reactors fueled with bomb-grade uranium were also deemed particularly vulnerable. They are housed at the University of Missouri in Columbia, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in Cambridge, and the National Institute of Standards and Technology - which is within 25 miles of the White House. Unlike military facilities that hold bomb-grade uranium, the report found, these facilities are not sufficiently defended against a credible terrorist threat.

As a release announcing the report notes, the Sept. 11 hijackers considered flying a passenger jet into a New York City-area nuclear reactor.

"More than 10 years have come and gone since the events of September 2001, and America's civilian nuclear facilities remain unprotected against a terrorist attack of that scale," said report co-author Alan J. Kuperman. "Instead, our civilian reactors prepare only against a much smaller-scale attack."

The facility near the White House, Kuperman added, is not required to even protect against the smaller-scale attack, known as "design basis threat."

"We know where the weak spots are when it comes to nuclear facilities, so it would be the height of irresponsibility to fail to take action now," he said.

The report found that some U.S. government nuclear facilities are protected against most or all threats, but others remain unprotected because they are seen as having little appeal to terrorists or because officials believe an attack would not be catastrophic.

The report's authors take issue with that calculation, saying it is impossible to know which sites terrorists favor or which could be used to cause the most harm. They recommend that all facilities be upgraded to defend against a maximum credible terrorist attack.

© 2013 CBS Interactive Inc. All Rights Reserved.

Columbus Dispatch

Op-Ed Columns

Nuclear panel's disregard for the law is outrageous and dangerous

Thursday August 22, 2013 5:50 AM

By George F. Will

Nowadays the federal government leavens its usual quotient of incompetence with large dollops of illegality.

This is eliciting robust judicial rebukes, as when, last week, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia instructed the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to stop "flouting the law.

" Judge Brett M. Kavanaugh said: "It is no overstatement to say that our constitutional system of separation of powers would be significantly altered if we were to allow executive and independent agencies to disregard federal law in the manner asserted in this case."

For six decades, the nation has been studying the challenge of safely storing nuclear waste from weapons production, Navy vessels and civilian power plants. So far, more than \$15 billion has been spent developing a waste-repository system deep within Yucca Mountain, 90 miles northwest of Las Vegas.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 says the NRC "shall consider" the Yucca Mountain application to become a repository, and "shall" approve or disapprove the application within three years of its submission. *Shall* means *must*. The application, submitted in June 2008, has not been acted upon, and the court says: "By its own admission, the commission has no current intention of complying with the law." Judge A. Raymond Randolph's concurring opinion said:

"Former (NRC) Chairman Gregory Jaczko orchestrated a systematic campaign of noncompliance. Jaczko unilaterally ordered commission staff to terminate the review process in October 2010 . . . and ignored the will of his fellow commissioners."

Jaczko resigned last year, leaving the NRC in demoralized disarray. The New York Times reported "charges of mismanagement and verbal abuse of subordinates" and that all four of his fellow commissioners, two from each party, complained about Jaczko to the White House.

To be fair to him, he was put there to disrupt. He was put there by Nevada's Sen. Harry Reid, on whose staff he had served.

Reid seems uninterested in the metallurgy of waste-containment vessels or the geology of the mountain's 40 miles of storage tunnels where the waste would be stored 1,000 feet underground on 1,000 feet of rock.

Rather, Reid, like almost all Nevadans, regards the repository as a threat to Las Vegas, a gamblers' destination that lives off tourists who are demonstrably irrational about probabilities.

The court, which was concerned only with the law, not the mountain, said, "the president must follow statutory mandates so long as there is appropriated money available and the president has no constitutional objection to the statute." He has none, and Reid has not yet quite succeeded in starving the NRC of funding for the Yucca licensing process.

The NRC said Congress has not yet appropriated the full amount required to complete the process. The court said Congress often appropriates "on a step-by-step basis." The

NRC speculated that Congress may not finish appropriating the sums necessary. The court said that allowing agencies to ignore statutory mandates based on "speculation" about future congressional decisions "would gravely upset the balance of powers between the (government's) branches."

The NRC said small appropriations indicate Congress' desire to stop the licensing process. The court responded that "Congress speaks through the laws it enacts" and "courts generally should not infer that Congress has implicitly repealed or suspended statutory mandates based simply on the amount of money Congress has appropriated." The court noted that, "as a policy matter," the NRC may want to block the Yucca project but "Congress sets the policy, not the commission." And the court said there is no permissible executive discretion to disregard "statutory obligations that apply to the executive branch."

This episode is a snapshot of contemporary Washington: small, devious people putting their lawlessness in the service of their parochialism, and recklessly sacrificing public safety and constitutional propriety. One can only marvel at the measured patience with which the court has tried to teach the obvious to the willfully obtuse.

George F. Will writes for the Washington Post Writers Group.

NRC to probe Pa. plant that failed security test

Published: Tuesday, August 27, 2013

Federal regulators next week will meet with the owner of a nuclear power plant in western Pennsylvania to discuss an apparent security failure at the company's plant near Pittsburgh.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission said yesterday that it will hold a closed-door meeting with FirstEnergy Corp. on Sept. 5 to go over the Beaver Valley plant's failure to pass a routine "force-on-force" drill in April.

In the exercise, which was run by the federal government, former military personnel armed with laser weapons tried to breach Beaver Valley's security defenses and sabotage one of the plant's two reactors.

Details of the mock raid were not released. But in a letter to FirstEnergy, NRC warned that the plant could face a citation for failing the test.

NRC is conducting a round of security tests at nuclear plants across the country and plans to issue reports about the exercises next month (John Funk, [Cleveland Plain Dealer](#), Aug. 26). -- **DB**

Source: <http://www.eenews.net/greenwire/2013/08/27/stories/1059986461>

Information Notices

Unless otherwise noted, these are ADAMS Accession documents, are publicly available, and will be accessible via the public web site Electronic Reading Room in the

Agency Document Access and Management System (ADAMS),

<http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html>

or to access generic communications files on the NRC Homepage:

<http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/gen-comm/reg-issues/2013/>.

To access these documents use the ADAMS Accession number listed with the title.

This is in the format of : ML #####A###

Part 21 and Miscellaneous

Online Reference Portal for Nuclear Regulatory Commission Review of Fukushima Near Term Task Force Related Documents

ADAMS Accession No.: ML13206A427

Acknowledgement Letter for 60 Day Response to Issuance of Seismic Guidance Related to the NTTF Recommendation 2.1, Seismic Reevaluations

ADAMS Accession No.: ML13161A286

Notice of Forthcoming Meeting with Petitioners Requesting Action Against General Electric Mark I and Mark II Boiling-Water Reactors (TAC No. MF1176)

ADAMS Accession No.: ML13210A008

Rescission of Certain Security Orders Concerning Spent Nuclear Fuel in Transit

ADAMS Accession No.: ML13225A557

Rescission of Certain Security Orders Concerning Spent Nuclear Fuel in Transit

ADAMS Accession No.: ML13231A288

Clarification Regarding the Timing of Submittal of a Decommissioning Funding Plan Per Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations Section 72.30(b) for Future Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations

ADAMS Accession No.: ML13234A559

Establishment of Mitigation Strategies Directorate for Nuclear Regulatory Commission Review of Order EA-12-049

ADAMS Accession No.: ML13233A364

RIS 2013-09, NRC Endorsement of NEI 09-10, Revision 1a-A, "Guidelines for Effective Prevention and Management of System Gas Accumulation", dated August 23, 2013

ADAMS Accession No.: ML13178A152

Nuclear Regulatory Commission Audits of Licensee Responses to Mitigation Strategies Order EA-12-049

ADAMS Accession No.: ML13234A503

Davis-Besse

Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 1 - Safety Evaluation for Relief Request RP-6 and RV-1

ADAMS Accession No.: ML13210A467

Enclosures A & B: Decommissioning Cost Analysis for the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station and Financial Escalation Analysis for the Decommissioning of Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station.

ML13247A055

Safety Evaluation Report Related to the License Renewal of Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station.

ML13248A267

NUREG/CR-2907 Vol. 15, "Radioactive Effluents from Nuclear Power Plants Annual Report 2009".

ML13218A300

Perry

Perry Nuclear Power Plant NRC Security Baseline Inspection Report 05000440/2013405 (Cover Letter Only)

ADAMS Accession No.: ML13219A077

PERRY NUCLEAR Power PLANT - nrc Integrated Inspection Report 05000440/2013003

ADAMS Accession No.: ML13219A056

Perry Nuclear Power Plant - NRC 95002 Supplemental Inspection Report 05000440/2013009 And Assessment Follow-Up Letter

ADAMS Accession No.: ML13224A382

Information Request To Support Upcoming Problem Identification And Resolution (PI&R) Inspection At The Perry Nuclear Power Plant

ADAMS Accession No.: ML13235A347

2013 Perry Nuclear Power Plant Mid-Cycle Letter Combined.

ML13246A237

Perry Nuclear Power Plant Fourteenth Inservice Inspection Summary Report.

ML13225A225

IR 05000440-13-009, 6/10/2013 - 6/28/2013, Perry Nuclear Power Plant; Supplemental Inspection - Inspection Procedure (IP) 95002, One Degraded Cornerstone or any Three White Inputs in a Strategic Performance Area.

ML13224A382

IR 05000440-13-003, 04/01/2013 - 06/30/2013; Perry Nuclear Power Plant. Routine Integrated Inspection Report.

ML13219A056

NUREG/CR-2907 Vol. 15, "Radioactive Effluents from Nuclear Power Plants Annual Report 2009".

ML13218A300

Beaver Valley

BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION: NRC SECURITY INSPECTION REPORT
05000334/2013403 AND 05000412/2013403
ADAMS Accession No.: ML13214A108

BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION: NRC SECURITY INSPECTION REPORT
05000334/2013403 AND 05000412/2013403
ADAMS Accession No.: ML13214A108

Beaver Valley Power Station, Units 1 and 2 - Extension of Branch Chief Reassignment
ADAMS Accession No.: ML13221A235

BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION: TEMPORARY INSTRUCTION 2515/186, "INSPECTION
OF PROCEDURES AND PROCESS FOR RESPONDING TO POTENTIAL AIRCRAFT
THREATS;" INSPECTION REPORT NO. 05000334/2013405 and 05000412/2013405
ADAMS Accession No.: ML13241A089

Beaver Valley - Discharge Monitoring Report (NPDES) Permit No. PA0025615.
ML13241A343

NRC Licensing Actions Received from July 2007 thru July 31, 2013.
ML13220A106

Beaver Valley Power Station June 2013 Discharge Monitoring Report (NPDES) Permit No.
PA0025615.
ML13212A284

Beaver Valley, Unit 1, License Amendment Request to Implement 10 CFR 50.61a. "Alternate
Fracture Toughness Requirements for Protection Against Pressurized Thermal Shock Events."
ML13212A027

NUREG/CR-2907 Vol. 15, "Radioactive Effluents from Nuclear Power Plants Annual Report
2009".

ML13218A300

IR 5000334-2013003 and 5000412-2013003, 04-01-2013 - 06-30-2013, Beaver Valley Power
Station - NRC Integrated Inspection Report.

ML13211A101

Portsmouth Facilities

FOIA/PA-2011-0118, FOIA/PA-2011-0119 & FOIA/PA-2011-0120 - Resp 121 - Partial - Group
CE. Part 1 of 5.

ML13227A207

Enclosure 2: Materials License for ACO - SNM-7003 - Public - Amendment 8.
ML13142A505

Fermi1

Fermi 1, License Amendment Request to Change Name of Licensee from The Detroit Edison Company to DTE Electric Company.
ML13002A037

Fermi 2

FERMI NOTICE OF NRC INSPECTION LETTER
ADAMS Accession No.: ML13227A044

INFORMATION REQUEST TO SUPPORT UPCOMING PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND
RESOLUTION (PI&R) INSPECTION AT THE FERMI 2 NUCLEAR POWER PLANT
ADAMS Accession No.: ML13235A314

FERMI HEAT SINK REQUEST FOR INFORMATION LETTER
ADAMS Accession No.: ML13241A505.

IR 05000341-13-003, 04/01/2013 - 06/30/2013, Fermi Power Plant, Unit 2, NRC Integrated
Inspection.
ML13210A073

Fermi 3

DTE Electric Company Response to NRC Request for Additional Information Letter No. 87.
ML13232A266

DTE Electric Company Response to NRC Request for Additional Information Letter No. 88.
ML13231A068

Fermi 3, DTE Electric Company Response to NRC Request for Additional Information Letter No.
87.
ML13226A030
