

To: Jim Mehl, ERU Supervisor
From: Zack Clayton, Rad Coordinator
Subject: March Monthly Report
Date: thru 3/8

Beans

Training: 0
Drills: 0
Meetings: 4
Technical Assistance: 4
Public Assistance: 1

Web Page Views: There were 14 page views in March.

Coming Attractions

4/2 Davis-Besse Dry Run
4/3 Working Group
4/4 SRIP
4/15 URSB
4/20 Offsite Agency Training for Davis-Besse
4/30 SRIP
5/1 ? Working Group
5/14 Davis-Besse Full Scale Exercise
5/14 Ottawa Co RRR support
5/15 FEMA TTX on Joint Action Incident Response
5/22 SRIP
6/5-7 RAT Training

Facility updates

Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station

Davis-Besse operated at full power for March. There were no Event reports.

Perry Nuclear Power Plant

Perry operated until March 18 when it entered a refueling outage.

On February 19, 2013, a contract worker fell in a contaminated area and was injured. Due to his condition, the worker was not surveyed by Health Physics prior to being transported still in their anti-contamination clothing. A Health Physics tech went with the worker to the hospital to assist. The worker was declared dead at the hospital. The Lake County Coroner determined that the individual died of natural causes. See Event no. 48769.

Beaver Valley Power Station

Beaver Valley Unit I

Unit I operated at full power for March.

Beaver Valley Unit II

Unit II operated at full power for March.

DTE

Fermi II

Fermi II operated at 66 per cent power for March due to a recirculating reactor pump issue.

Fermi III

Fermi III continues as a documentation evaluation.

Portsmouth Enrichment Plant

There were no reports for the sites at Portsmouth for March. But there were ADAMS documents submitted.

Activity

3/5	SRIP - review of pre draft plan.
3/6	Working Group
3/11	SRIP - continued review of pre draft plan.
3/13	URSB Grant Negotiation

Office Issues

No office issues of note.

Statistics, NRC Reports, News, and ADAMS References

Operating Power Levels

February

Date	BV1	BV2	DB	Perry	Fermi2	
1	100	100	100	94	66	Fermi 2 South Reactor Feed Pump still OOS
4	100	100	100	93	66	Perry in coast down to Refueling Outage
11	100	100	100	91	66	
18	100	100	100	0	66	Perry in Refueling Outage
25	100	100	100	0	66	
31	100	100	100	0	66	

Plant Reports

Part 21	Event Number: 48797
Rep Org: FLOWSERVE Licensee: ANCHOR DARLING Region: 1 City: RALEIGH State: NC County: License #: Agreement: Y Docket: NRC Notified By: JAMES TUCKER HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN	Notification Date: 03/01/2013 Notification Time: 11:12 [ET] Event Date: 12/29/2012 Event Time: [EST] Last Update Date: 03/01/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE	Person (Organization): ART BURRITT (R1DO) RANDY MUSSER (R2DO) JAMNES CAMERON (R3DO) DON ALLEN (R4DO) NRC HQ PART 21 GROUP (EMAI)

Event Text

PART 21 - WEDGE PIN FAILURE IN ANCHOR DARLING MOTOR OPERATED DOUBLE DISC GATE VALVES WITH THREADED STEM TO UPPER WEDGE CONNECTIONS

The following is a summary of information received from Flowserve via facsimile:

"This is to notify the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission that, in accordance with the provisions of 10CFR Part 21, we have identified a potential issue and are submitting our evaluation of the event.

"Flowserve has been working with the Tennessee Valley Authority's (TVA) Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant to investigate the failure of a Size 10, Class 900 Anchor/Darling motor-operated double-disc gate valve. The failure was due to the shearing of the wedge pin which serves a joint locking function at the threaded interface between the valve stem and upper wedge. The pin is designed to ensure that the joint does not loosen due to vibration and other secondary loads. On some valve designs, the pin also is used to attach the disc retainers to the upper wedge. The pin shearing allowed rotation of the stem during the closing stroke when the valve was seating and ultimately resulted in loss of the stem to upper wedge joint integrity.

"Flowserve has completed an evaluation of the failure and concluded the root cause of the wedge pin failure was excessive load on the pin. The stem operating torque exceeded the torque to tighten the stem into the upper wedge before installation of the wedge pin. The additional stem torque produced a load on the wedge pin creating a stress which exceeded the pin shear strength causing the failure. The recommended assembly stem torque did not envelope the operating torque for the TVA application providing the potential for an over load situation and ultimate failure. The operating torque for the TVA valve was unusually high due to the fast closing time of the actuator and very conservative closing thrust margin.

"This situation can potentially occur on any Anchor/Darling type double-disc gate valve with a threaded stem to upper wedge connection, typically size 2.5" and larger, operated by an actuator that applies torque on the stem to produce the required valve operating thrust. An operating stem torque greater than the assembly stem torque can provide the opportunity for excessive pin load and potentially failure.

"We have reviewed our records, and the only similar wedge pin failure that we can identify, in addition to the Browns Ferry problems, is a sheared wedge pin at LaSalle Nuclear Station in 1993. Our investigation of the LaSalle failure concluded that the wedge pin failed due to excessive torque in the opening direction due to bonnet over pressurization.

"Flowserve recommends that all critical Anchor/Darling Double-Disc Gate valves with threaded stem to upper wedge connections and actuators that produce a torque on the stem be evaluated for potential wedge pin failure. Valves with electric motor actuators which produce high output torques are the most susceptible to failure. Valves which were assembled with stem torques that exceed the operating torque are not candidates for failure.

"Below is a list, based on our records, of customers, utilities and nuclear plants which were supplied with Anchor/Darling Double-Disc Gate valves with motor actuators on contracts with ASME Section III and/or 10 CFR 21 imposed.

"Flowserve plans to provide each of the customers identified [below] with a copy of this notification letter."

The following facilities in the United States may be affected:

ANO 1, Browns Ferry, Brunswick, Callaway, Catawba, Clinton, Columbia, Cook, Cooper, Crystal River, Dresden, Diablo Canyon, Duane Arnold, Fitzpatrick, Fort Calhoun, Grand Gulf, Hatch, Indian Point, Kewaunee, LaSalle, Limerick, Maine Yankee, Millstone, Monticello, Nine Mile, North Anna, Oconee, Oyster Creek, Peach Bottom, **Perry**, Pilgrim, Prairie Island, Quad Cities, River Bend, Robinson, San Onofre, St. Lucie, Surry, Three Mile Island 2, Waterford, VC Summer, Vermont Yankee, Wolf Creek.

See Related Part 21 EN #48650.

Part 21	Event Number: 48798
Rep Org: CURTISS WRIGHT FLOW CONTROL CO. Licensee: CRYDOM, INC Region: 1 City: DANBURY State: CT County: License #: Agreement: N Docket: NRC Notified By: MICHAEL WEINSTEIN HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL	Notification Date: 03/01/2013 Notification Time: 11:40 [ET] Event Date: 03/01/2013 Event Time: [EST] Last Update Date: 03/01/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE	Person (Organization): ART BURRITT (R1DO) RANDY MUSSER (R2DO) JAMNES CAMERON (R3DO) PART 21 GROUP (EMAI)

Event Text

PART 21 - DUAL ALARM MODULES THAT MAY CONTAIN FAULTY DIODES IN SINGLE STATE RELAYS

The following is excerpted from a facsimile received from Curtis Wright:

"Crydom Inc., the sole supplier to Scientech of D4D07 Solid State Relays (SSRs) since before

2009, has informed Scientech that SSRs provided with date codes between 0908 (August 2009) and 1004 (April 2010) may have included faulty diodes which resulted in reduced reliability (early failure) of their SSRs.

"The mode of failure is that the module output may not be able to maintain voltage sufficient to activate its external load. It appears that this failure occurs randomly after some duration of operation, typically weeks or months. No common cause has been found.

"Scientech screens components for infantile failure by burning-in modules for a minimum of 48 hours prior to final test. There were no SSR failures during burn-in of potentially affected modules; therefore burn-in was not an effective screen for this issue.

"Prior to January 2013, Scientech did not track SSRs by date code. In establishing conservative boundaries for product shipped with suspect SSRs, Scientech can be certain that no suspect SSRs were shipped in Scientech products prior to August 2009 (the earliest suspect date code). It was determined in September 2012 that Scientech did not have any SSRs with a date code of 2010 or earlier in inventory or work-in-progress. Scientech can therefore determine that products shipped after September 2012 do not contain suspect SSRs."

Affected components:

DAM801, a Dual Alarm Module, manufactured by Scientech, Model DAM801 (/1 optional),
Part number EIP-E287PA-1

SAM801, a Single Alarm Module, manufactured by Scientech, Model SAM801 (11 optional),
Part number EIP-E289PA-1

DAM502, a Dual Alarm Module, manufactured by Scientech, Model DAM502, Part number
EIP-E297DD-1, -2, -3

SAM502, a Single Alarm Module, manufactured by Scientech, Model SAM502, Part number
EIP-E297DD-4

DAM503, a Dual Alarm Module, manufactured by Scientech, Model DAM503, Part number
EIP-E304DD-1, -2, -3

SAM503, a Single Alarm Module, manufactured by Scientech, Model SAM503, Part number

EIP-E304DD-4, -20

DAM504, a Dual Alarm Module, manufactured by Scientech, Model DAM504, Part number NUS-A131PA

Affected Facilities:

Beaver Valley

Farley
Ginna
Indian Point 2/3
Kewaunee
North Anna
Prairie Island
Surry
Turkey Point

Part 21	Event Number: 48834
Rep Org: ASCO VALVE INCORPORATED Licensee: ASCO VALVE INCORPORATED Region: 1 City: AIKEN State: SC County: License #: Agreement: Y Docket: NRC Notified By: BOB AMONE HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN	Notification Date: 03/20/2013 Notification Time: 10:41 [ET] Event Date: 03/20/2013 Event Time: 08:38 [EDT] Last Update Date: 03/20/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE	Person (Organization): DANIEL RICH (R2DO) PART 21 GROUP (E-MA)

Event Text

PART 21 - ASCO DIRECT ACTING 3-WAY SOLENOID VALVE FAILURE

The following is a summary of a Part 21 report received from ASCO Valves Inc., via facsimile:

ASCO received a failed solenoid actuated valve from its distributor (Areva). The valve has been qualified for 1-E nuclear use and is referred to as a NP8320 direct acting 3-way valve. The valve that failed would not shift when de-energized. Information accompanying the valve identified that it was operating for approximately three months since August 2012. The valve was manufactured in May 2010.

"The valve was disassembled and the spring was observed to be not on the core completely. The valve was re-assembled with the spring properly on the core and subjected to cycling. During cycle testing the second turn of the spring was shown to completely overlap the first turn coming over the edge of the core, pulling the first turn off of the core. The spring came completely off the core in 97 cycles. ASCO identified that the spring was not properly manufactured as the beginning of the second turn was not wound to the same diameter of the first turn.

"ASCO and the spring supplier identified the manufacturing lot that was the source of the spring for serial number A483456-001. ASCO identified 10 nuclear valves manufactured with this manufacturing lot. The remaining 3990 springs from this lot were used in commercial valves. ASCO uses this same spring in approximately 40,000+ commercial valves per year and no commercial returns have been found with the same condition of this spring coming off the core.

"Neither ASCO's incoming inspection nor the spring manufacturer detected the nonconformance for this manufacturing lot.

"ASCO evaluated other valves that used this same spring manufactured from other lots received in 2010. These valves represent a time period shortly before and shortly after the manufacture of the above valve. ASCO's investigation concluded that these springs are conforming.

"This condition may cause the spring to work itself off the core and present a situation where the valve would not shift to its de-energized position. ASCO believes the condition would present itself relatively early into its cycle life.

"ASCO has contacted the customer, AREVA, who received the 10 valves in question. ASCO has implemented corrective actions to include inspection of the spring assembled to the core at nuclear dedication inspection to verify that the spring is properly seated and the second turn does not overlap the first at the springs working length.

"ASCO does not have adequate knowledge of the actual installation and operating conditions of these valves to determine whether their malfunction could create a 'substantial safety hazard' as defined in 10 CFR 21.3. We are providing this information to inform you of our investigation results, corrective action and customer notification.

"If you have any questions, you can contact Bob Amone at 803-641-9395."

Power Reactor	Event Number: 48769
Facility: PERRY Region: 3 State: OH Unit: [1][][]	Notification Date: 02/19/2013 Notification Time: 16:39 [ET] Event Date: 02/19/2013

RX Type: [1] GE-6 NRC Notified By: THOMAS MORSE HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN	Event Time: 13:03 [EST] Last Update Date: 03/21/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION 50.72(b)(3)(xii) - OFFSITE MEDICAL OTHER UNSPEC REQMNT	Person (Organization): KENNETH RIEMER (R3DO)

Unit	SCRAM Code	RX CRIT	Initial PWR	Initial RX Mode	Current PWR	Current RX Mode
1	N	Y	96	Power Operation	96	Power Operation

Event Text

TRANSPORT OF POTENTIALLY CONTAMINATED WORKER AND SUBSEQUENT FATALITY

"On February 19, 2013, at approximately 1303 EST, the control room was notified that a supplemental worker (i.e., a contract individual) had fallen and was injured. The worker was in a contaminated area.

"Due to the individual's condition, the individual was not surveyed by a Health Physics technician prior to being transported in their anti-contamination clothing. The individual was transported by ambulance accompanied by Health Physics personnel to the local hospital for medical treatment (i.e., TriPoint Medical Center). Subsequently, the worker was declared deceased at the hospital.

"This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xii) and 50.72(b)(2)(xi). Additionally, OSHA was notified pursuant to the requirements of 29 CFR 1904.39. The Lake County Coroner was also notified.

"Subsequent surveys found no contamination on the worker, hospital, medical personnel, or ambulance.

"No press release is planned. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

* * * UPDATE ON 3/21/13 AT 2032 EDT FROM LLOYD ZERR TO PETE SNYDER * *
*

"The Lake County Coroner has determined that the individual died of natural causes."

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

Notified R3DO (Passehl).

News

DTE has until next week to rebut nuclear objections

Published: 3/6/2013

BY DAVID PATCH

BLADE STAFF WRITER

NEWPORT, Mich. — DTE Energy Co. and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission have until next week to formally respond to objections an environmental coalition has filed against the licensing of a proposed Fermi 3 nuclear power plant adjacent to Fermi 2. The coalition's five "contentions" include challenges to the adequacy of environmental review concerning radioactive waste storage at the plant, necessity for the plant's construction in light of declining electricity demand in the area, and three issues related to review of a 30-mile transmission line corridor associated with the plant.

The petitioners—including Beyond Nuclear, Citizens Environment Alliance of Southwestern Ontario, Don't Waste Michigan, Citizens for Alternatives to Chemical Contamination, and the Sierra Club Michigan chapter—filed their objections with the NRC's Atomic Safety and Licensing Board on Feb. 19, starting a 25-day clock for DTE, the regulatory commission, and any other interested parties to respond. Once it has received those responses, the petitioning coalition has seven days to add comments. After that, NRC spokesman Viktoria Mitlyng said, the licensing board "will review the contentions submitted by the petitioners, may schedule a pre-hearing conference in case clarification is needed, and assess each contention to determine if it meets the criteria for a hearing."

NRC regulations provide for a 45-day period for the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board to decide if it will admit the contentions once a prehearing conference has been held, but also allow the board to extend that deadline.

The environmental coalition contends, among other things, that the project's Final Environmental Impact Statement accepted without question that low-level radioactive waste will be stored on the plant site for no more than 10 years, even though DTE has no assured site for permanent disposal.

The groups also protested the lack of environmental, endangered-species, or historical/architectural review for the transmission corridor, stating that 11 miles of the power lines' route would pass through and disrupt possible habitat for the eastern fox snake. And they question whether the plant is needed at all to meet current electricity demand in Michigan.

All five issues represent "blatant National Environmental Policy Act violations," according to a coalition statement.

"It is time to pull the plug on this nuclear boondoggle," Michael J. Keegan of Don't Waste Michigan said in the statement.

"DTE must stop spending ratepayer and taxpayer resources by sending good money after bad. This fiasco has not broken ground and already they are behind schedule by at least 2 ¾-years."

Guy Cerullo, DTE's spokesman for nuclear issues, said the utility company has not committed to building Fermi 3, "but we are leaving that option open long-term" and thus proceeding with licensing the proposed plant.

"We are preparing a response on why we disagree [with the petitioners] and why we believe the contentions are inadmissible," Mr. Cerullo said. "We continue to provide thorough and factual information to the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board."

Fermi 2, DTE's 1100-megawatt nuclear plant on the Frenchtown Township site, about 25 miles northeast of Toledo on the Lake Erie shore, is licensed through 2025, and DTE has announced its intention to seek a 20-year renewal for that plant's license, Mr. Cerullo said.

Several of the environmental groups opposing Fermi 3 also are fighting FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Corp.'s 20-year license-renewal application for the Davis-Besse nuclear power plant near Oak Harbor, Ohio.

Davis-Besse's license expires in 2017.

Contact David Patch at:

dpatch@theblade.com or 419-724-6094.

Read more at

<http://www.toledoblade.com/local/2013/03/06/DTE-has-until-next-week-to-rebut-nuclear-objections.html#GtwJK3gXCqTvDgAU.99>

Nuclear plant inspections need to improve: report

Reuters – 18 hrs ago

(Reuters) - More than one-third of U.S. nuclear power plants suffered safety-related incidents over the past three years, and nuclear regulators and plant operators need to improve inspections to prevent such events, the Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS) said in a report on Thursday.

The UCS, which has long been critical of the nuclear industry and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), said 40 of the 104 U.S. reactors had experienced one or more safety-related incidents over the past three years.

None of the incidents harmed workers or the public, the UCS said.

The nuclear industry, however, disputed the UCS findings.

"Our facilities are operating safely. We continue to aggressively implement additional safety enhancements based on learning from the Fukushima accident to ensure that our plants will operate safely and reliably," Steven Kerekes, a spokesman for industry trade group Nuclear Energy Institute told Reuters.

The UCS recommended that the NRC determine whether the agency's baseline inspections could have found the safety problems sooner. It also urged the NRC to require plant owners to find and fix problems in their testing and inspection procedures.

"The NRC has continued to successfully carry out its mission of protecting the public's health and the environment. We have started inspections of various kinds whenever necessary," NRC spokesman Scott Burnell told Reuters.

UCS said the NRC conducted some level of special inspection at 14 plants in 2012 to investigate safety-related events.

Over the past three years, UCS said, there were 18 incidents in 2010, 17 in 2011 and 16 in 2012, with several reactors having more than one incident, including Wolf Creek in Kansas, Palisades in Michigan and Fort Calhoun in Nebraska.

The Nuclear Energy Institute, however, noted there were only two incidents over the past decade that the NRC determined were significant from the standpoint of public health or safety - at FirstEnergy Corp's **Davis Bessie** in Ohio in 2002 and the Tennessee Valley Authority's Browns Ferry in Alabama in 2011.

"The number of inspections that the NRC carries out varies from year to year and depends on a number of factors, including external events such as Superstorm Sandy," the NRC's Burnell said, noting the agency does not see anything unusual in the number of inspections carried out in 2012.

Wolf Creek is majority owned by units of Great Plains Energy Inc and Westar Inc; Entergy Corp owns Palisades; and the Omaha Public Power District owns Fort Calhoun. Over the past couple of years, the NRC has required several reactors to remain shut until the plant owners could show they were meeting NRC requirements.

Three reactors are currently shut pending NRC approval: Southern California Edison's San Onofre 2 and 3 in California, and Fort Calhoun.

Southern California Edison (SCE), a unit of Edison International, operates the station for its owners, including SCE and a unit of Sempra Energy.

(Reporting by Scott DiSavino in New York; Editing by Dale Hudson, Andrew Hay and Steve Orlofsky)

Source: <http://news.yahoo.com/nrc-conducted-14-special-nuclear-inspections-2012-report-170531441--finance.html>

NRC, watchdog group offer differing views of reactor safety

Hannah Northey, E&E reporter

Published: Thursday, March 7, 2013

The Union of Concerned Scientists and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in separate reports today offered very different views of how safe the country's operating nuclear reactors are.

The NRC released an [analysis](#) today of plant inspections for 2012 that showed the bulk of U.S. reactors -- 99 out of the country's 103 operating plants -- are top-performing, while acknowledging that a handful of sites have been plagued with problems. The NRC ranks plants on a scale from 1 to 5, with category 5 being the worst rating.

Unit 1 at the Tennessee Valley Authority's Browns Ferry nuclear plant in Alabama was the lone facility to receive as low as a category 4 performance rating.

The unit has drawn a considerable amount of attention in recent years after a valve in a system that cools the reactor during accidents failed to open in 2010, triggering high-profile visits from NRC officials and Sen. Lamar Alexander (R-Tenn.) ([E&ENews PM](#), Oct. 7, 2011).

The Columbia Generating Station in Richland, Wash., the Perry plant in Ohio, and the Wolf Creek facility in Kansas had a "degraded level of performance" and were placed in the NRC's third category.

Broken twin reactors at the San Onofre plant in California that have also generated concerns were placed in the agency's second category -- along with more than 15 other reactors -- indicating the plant needs to "resolve one or two items of low safety significance," potentially through additional inspectors or corrective actions.

NRC noted the situation at the Crystal River nuclear plant, which Duke Energy Corp. closed down last year after a high-drama merger with Progress Energy Inc.

"We ensure nuclear power plants are safe, inspecting them and rating their performance regularly, as part of our mission to protect people and the environment," Ho Nieh, a director in the NRC's Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, said in a statement.

But a nuclear watchdog group, while acknowledging the NRC has made improvements, said the commission has had multiple "near misses" at plants that could have escalated into larger problems.

The Union of Concerned Scientists' [report](#) found that the NRC had 14 "near misses" at reactors in 2012, and that 40 such incidents had occurred at plants during the past three years.

UCS defined a "near miss" as an event that increases the chance of core meltdown by at least a factor of 10.

David Lochbaum, a nuclear plant safety expert with UCS, called on the NRC to implement existing regulations, fine owners and shut down reactors that violate safety rules. Lochbaum said the commission instead allowed reactors to operate without proper fire protections in place, and even permitted a plant in Michigan last year to operate for nearly a month despite cooling water leaks.

"Unfortunately, the NRC has repeatedly failed to enforce essential safety regulations," he wrote. "These examples of tolerating the intolerable should be case studies for regulatory ineptitude. Failing to enforce existing safety regulations is literally a gamble that places lives at stake."

David McIntyre, a spokesman for the NRC, said that it takes issue with the tone of Lochbaum's report and that "near misses" is a term that UCS, not the commission, currently uses. The NRC's special inspections are evidence that the agency is uncovering problems before they become serious issues, he said.

"We view this as evidence that the regulatory process is working because it identified and corrects issues," he added.

Source: <http://www.eenews.net/eenewspm/2013/03/07/4>

PUBLIC MEETING TO DISCUSS THE 2012 END-OF-CYCLE PLANT PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT OF PERRY NUCLEAR POWER PLANT

This letter confirms plans as discussed between members of our staffs to meet and discuss the results of the 2012 end-of-cycle assessment. The annual assessment letter issued on March 4, 2013 (ADAMS ML13060A114), described the need for the continuation of the 2012 supplemental inspection in June 2013. This inspection will be conducted in accordance with Inspection Procedure 95002, "Inspection for One Degraded Cornerstone or Any Three Inputs in a Strategic Performance Area." We request you present the status of your preparations for this

inspection at this meeting. These preparations could include the establishment of internal milestones, check-and-assess points for you to gauge your progress and implement any needed changes, and any other indicators that you are using to measure your performance and improvement progress. The meeting is scheduled for Wednesday, April 10, 2013, at 6:00 p.m. (EDT), at Quail Hollow Resort, 11080 Concord-Hambden Road, Painesville, Ohio 44077. This meeting is open to the public. The public is invited to observe this meeting and will have opportunities to communicate with the NRC after the business portion, but before the meeting is adjourned.

2 years after Fukushima, questions continue about high-density fuel storage

Nathanael Massey, E&E reporter

Published: Thursday, March 14, 2013

The majority of the United States' spent fuel pools holding nuclear waste are close to capacity, and the industry needs to think seriously about alternatives, according to panelists at the 25th Regulatory Information Convention of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

"Pool limits have been approached. Most are reaching high-density storage," said Steve Jones, senior reactor systems engineer with NRC. "Plants are generally maintaining full capacity by transferring from pool to dry cask."

A transfer of waste to dry storage in concrete casks is possible only after waste has been cooled in a pool for eight to 10 years. About 25 percent of U.S. waste is currently stored in dry casks, though the industry is increasing that amount as it attempts to thin the density of its pools.

That effort received renewed attention following the disaster at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear complex in Japan in 2011. After the meltdown of the plant's reactors one, two and three, a chief concern for Japanese officials was the more than 10,000 spent fuel rods stored in little-protected pools near the damaged reactors.

In a worst-case scenario, they hypothesized, the water in the pools might evaporate, allowing an ignition event that could spread radioactive material across the country.

Though this scenario did not materialize, it took several days for a water truck to make its way into the damaged plant and ensure that water in the pools was at adequate levels.

A relatively small amount of radioactive material was lost as a result from Fukushima, but Gordon Thompson, executive director of the Institute for Resource and Security Studies, cautioned that a larger dose could be lost from the available Japanese stockpile.

Without water, "fuel discharged for 100 days will heat up to ignition within four hours," he said. "Then, if there's leakage, presence of radiation fields could preclude personnel access" to remedy the situation.

"You might also see the reverse arrangement -- leakage or overflow of water from a pool could disable support systems from reactor," he added.

Since Fukushima, regulators have been considering the hurdles and advantages of moving more waste from the pools to the storage containers in order to decrease vulnerability.

A blue-ribbon commission mandated by President Obama found that dry cask storage can be used for many years without jeopardizing safety. But regulators agree that ultimately, a long-term solution, namely a permanent storage facility, will be needed.

In the meantime, plant operators should continue to thin the amount of radioactive material stored in spent-fuel pools, said Mary Lampert, executive director of the citizens group Pilgrim Watch.

"Bottom line is, high-density fuel storage is just a bad engineering practice," Lampert said.

Source: <http://www.eenews.net/climatewire/2013/03/14/4>

Comment: The three plants that include Ohio in their evacuation planning zone either have or are developing dry cask storage.

Obama admin placing big bet on small reactors

Hannah Northey, E&E reporter

Published: Wednesday, March 13, 2013

Story Tools sponsored by **Advanced Energy Economy**

The Obama administration is promoting a bold, long-range plan for building dozens of small, factory-built reactors capable of replacing coal-fired power plants that are expected to be retired in the coming decades, a Department of Energy official said yesterday.

DOE's effort is aimed at establishing an industry that would manufacture as many as 50 small modular reactors (SMRs) a year by 2040 or sooner, said Rebecca Smith-Kevern, the director of light water reactor technology at the department's Office of Nuclear Energy, which oversees the licensing of tiny nuclear plants.

"We have a vision of having a whole fleet of [small modular reactors] produced in factories," Smith-Kevern told a regulatory conference in Bethesda, Md. "We envision the U.S. government to be the first users."

DOE this week announced a second wave of million-dollar cost-share grants to help the industry design and license the modular reactors, which the administration defines as factory-built plants of less than 300 megawatts that are shipped by truck, barge or rail to construction sites for assembly.

The department awarded the first grants under its \$452 million cost-share program to veteran reactor designer Babcock & Wilcox, which is building two small units at the Clinch River site in Oak Ridge, Tenn. ([Greenwire](#), Nov. 11, 2012).

Smith-Kevern said the agency hopes to complete the awards by the year's end.

The administration is pinning its hopes on the establishment of a factory network to make the small plants. After supporting the licensing and design process for the plants through grants and possibly loan guarantees, the "first movers" would be built, Smith-Kevern said. A network of U.S. manufacturing plants would then be established, and vendors would begin filling orders, which she said could lower plant costs and attract investors.

By 2030, the industry would produce about 20 small modular reactors a year with the support of production tax credits and feed-in tariffs -- allowing for a mature industry to develop. By 2040, the United States could produce up to 50 of the small plants annually with the potential for an import and export market, she said.

"We recognize this is ... an ambitious vision," she said. "There would be a role for new public policy to support [small modular reactors]."

Smith-Kevern said the administration is also hoping to enlist the military and is looking at building modular nuclear plants on the islands of Hawaii and Guam to lessen their oil dependence.

The plan has sparked debate about the costs of building small nuclear plants and how regulators would ensure that such facilities are safe.

Smith-Kevern said modular construction of the reactors could reduce costs for the industry hindered by price tags of \$12 billion or so for traditional nuclear power plants.

Smith-Kevern cited a [2011 paper](#) by Robert Rosner of the Energy Policy Institute at the University of Chicago and Stephen Goldberg of the Argonne National Laboratory that found modular plants could cost \$3 billion to \$5 billion.

But Ed Lyman, a senior scientist with the Union of Concerned Scientists, said capital cost per kilowatt -- not the cost of building a reactor itself -- is what matters.

"Small plants, of course, cost less than large plants, but they also generate less electricity," Lyman said. "And with the economies of scale factor, small plants will cost more per kilowatt than large plants unless there is some major cost savings somewhere to offset this factor."

Lyman cited a 2007 [report](#) by Westinghouse when he told the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee, "At best, the capital cost of four 335-megawatt reactors was slightly greater than that of one 1,340-megawatt reactor."

The Nuclear Energy Institute, on the other hand, has taken issue with Lyman's use of the report and has said the Westinghouse numbers constitute a preliminary evaluation that found the capital costs of small and large plants are "practically equivalent."

Lake Barrett, a former DOE official and nuclear consultant, said groups for and against small modular reactors are using dueling reports to argue their cases, but cost estimates aren't firm and could change as the plants are developed.

Factors that must be considered, he said, are fixed costs like security, licensing and siting; whether the plants can be mass-produced; and uncertainty about whether Congress will price heat-trapping carbon emissions.

"How successful SMRs are going to be, we really don't know yet," he said. "If the world is going to phase out older coal plants because of carbon concerns, you have to replace them."

Source: <http://www.eenews.net/Greenwire/2013/03/13/1>

NRC News No.13-016

NRC TO ENHANCE POST-FUKUSHIMA VENT REQUIREMENTS, BROADEN ANALYSIS OF FILTERING STRATEGIES

The NRC's Commissioners have directed the agency's technical staff to follow a two-track approach for further improvements to systems for safely venting pressure during potential accidents at 31 U.S. reactors.

The Commission's Staff Requirements Memorandum calls for enhancing a March 2012 Order requiring "hardened" venting systems at 31 boiling-water reactors with "Mark I" and "Mark II" containments. The memo also starts rulemaking activities to produce requirements for those reactors to cool core debris and retain radioactive material in conjunction with venting during severe accidents.

"In reaching this decision, the Commission engaged in thoughtful deliberation with each other as we each considered these important issues in our post-Fukushima accident review process," said NRC Chairman Allison Macfarlane. "I compliment my colleagues and the staff for their sustained efforts on this issue and for taking a hard look at a complex matter." The Commission has given the staff 60 days to finalize the enhanced Order, which will require the vents to handle the elevated pressures, temperatures and radiation levels from a damaged reactor. The enhanced Order will also ensure plant personnel can operate the vents safely under these accident conditions.

The Commission has also given the staff a year to produce a technical evaluation to support rulemaking on filtering. During that time the staff will gather more public input as it completes its analysis. The Commission directed the staff to consider both the use of a filter to be placed on the vent, as well as a more performance-based approach using existing systems to achieve a similar reduction in radioactive release during an accident. The staff then must develop a draft rule and final rule, all by March 2017.

The Commissioners' individual votes on this decision are available on the NRC website .

NRC, Yucca Mountain proponents square off over funding
Hannah Northey, E&E reporter

Published: Thursday, March 28, 2013

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission in a court filing yesterday argued it cannot review the proposed Yucca Mountain nuclear waste repository because a spending bill President Obama signed last week provides no money to do so, prompting a backlash from proponents who say dodging the review would be illegal.

NRC told the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit that the six-month continuing resolution provides no funding for the commission to complete its review of the Energy Department's application to build a nuclear waste repository under Yucca Mountain in Nevada.

"The preservation of the status quo means that DOE continues to lack the funds necessary to support the application to construct the Yucca Mountain repository and NRC continues to lack the funds necessary to complete the proceedings necessary to review the application," Charles Mullins, a senior attorney in NRC's Office of the General Counsel, and other agency officials wrote in a court filing. "By its funding decisions, Congress has demonstrated its intent that the federal government should not complete the Yucca Mountain project at this time."

NRC has repeatedly pointed to a lack of funds in halting its review of the application. DOE moved to abandon its license application in 2010, claiming the project was unworkable (E&ENews PM, March 3, 2010).

But a group of states, utility regulators, counties and individuals that support Yucca Mountain shot back in a separate filing that the spending bill does not change the agency's legal requirement under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 to review DOE's application. They also asked the court to force NRC to begin reviewing the license application immediately.

"Congress took no action that affects this case," they wrote. "The parties remain in the same position they were in at oral argument."

How the court will respond to the arguments remains unclear. The panel of three judges last year indicated they may force NRC to spend all its existing money -- \$10.4 million -- allocated to the proposed construction of the Yucca Mountain before it can cite lack of funds in suspending its consideration of the project (Greenwire, May 2, 2012).

On Capitol Hill, the fate of Yucca Mountain remains a sticking point in debates over how Congress should overhaul the country's stalled nuclear waste program.

Senate Energy and Natural Resources Chairman Ron Wyden (D-Ore.) has said he is crafting a bill with three other bipartisan senators to jump-start the process for finding, vetting and licensing temporary and permanent sites for storing and disposing of nuclear waste.

House Republicans have said any waste bill will fail if it doesn't specify the Yucca Mountain site in Nevada as the nation's legal repository, but senators have indicated the language will not specify the site (E&E Daily, Feb. 7).

Sen. Lisa Murkowski of Alaska, the panel's ranking Republican, told reporters last week that she has had some "good conversations" with House members. When asked about the role Yucca Mountain played in those discussions, Murkowski said Congress cannot "sit and wait until there's [a resolution]."

Heritage Foundation nuclear energy researcher Jack Spencer today wrote in an issue brief that the legislation doesn't appear to tackle the country's long-term challenge of transitioning waste disposal to the private sector.

Nuclear companies that produce the waste should be responsible for disposing of the material in a competitive market where costs reflect services -- as occurs in France, Finland, Japan and Sweden, Spencer wrote. Companies should not, however, be compelled to turn to the federal government for disposal, he said.

NRC should also complete its review of the Yucca Mountain application so the public can learn about the project, he added. "Regardless of the NRC's final conclusion, the nation deserves to know the outcome," he wrote.

Reporter Jason Plautz contributed.

Source: <http://www.eenews.net/Greenwire/2013/03/28/4>

Information Notices

Unless otherwise noted, these are ADAMS Accession documents, are publicly available, and will be accessible via the public web site Electronic Reading Room in the Agency Document Access and Management System (ADAMS),

<http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html>

or to access generic communications files on the NRC Homepage:

<http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/gen-comm/reg-issues/2012/>.

To access these documents use the ADAMS Accession number listed with the title.

This is in the format of : ML #####

Part 21 and Miscellaneous

Supplemental Information Related to Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Flooding Hazard Reevaluations for Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights From the Fukushima Dai-Ichi Accident

ADAMS Accession No.: ML13044A561

NRC Regulatory Issue Summary 2013-02 Impact of Sequestration on NRC Activities and NRC Stakeholders

ADAMS Accession No.: ML13056A001

RIS 2013-02: Impact of Sequestration on NRC Activities and NRC Stakeholders, dated March 1, 2013

ADAMS Accession No. ML13056A001

Status of 60-Day Response to Issuance of Flooding Integrated Assessment Guidance Related to the Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1, Flooding Reevaluations

ADAMS Accession No.: ML13039A435

NR-3605-0008, Emergency Plan for the ACP Revision 23 September 2012.

ADAMS Accession No. ML13060A324

Information Notice 2013-03, Recent Issue With The Definition Of Core Quadrant, dated March 5, 2013

ADAMS Accession No. ML12272A003

Information Notice 2013-04, Shield Building Concrete Subsurface Laminar Cracking Caused By Moisture Intrusion and Freezing, dated March 7, 2013

ADAMS Accession No. ML12352A052

Sequoyah Fuels Corporation's Notice of Appeal of LBP-94-5 and LBP-94-8.

ADAMS Accession No.: ML13063A031

RIS 2005-01, Revision 1, Changes To Notice Of Enforcement Discretion Process And Staff Guidance, dated March 13, 2013

ADAMS Accession No.: ML12163A492

RIS 2013-01: Use Of Aftermarket Sealed Sources Registered Under 10 CFR 32.210, dated March 12, 2013

ADAMS Accession Number: ML12313A147

Removal of the Safeguards Information Designation From Attachment 2 of Order EA-02-261

ADAMS Accession No.: ML13074A789

Information Notice 2013-02, Issues Potentially Affecting Nuclear Facility Fire Safety, dated March 19, 2013

ADAMS Accession Number: ML122840031

Information Notice 2013-05, Battery Expected Life and Its Potential Impact on Surveillance Requirements, dated March 19, 2013

ADAMS Accession Number: ML122130601

Response to Nuclear Energy Institute Request for Review of Draft Electric Power Research Institute Report, "Seismic Evaluation Guidance : Augmented Approach for the Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic".

Adams Accession No. ML13078A029

Correction to Title of Response Letter to Nuclear Energy Institute Concerning Central and Eastern United States Ground Motion Model Update Project

Adams Accession No. ML13021A079

Information Notice 2013-06, Corrosion In Fire Protection Piping Due To Air And Water Interaction, dated March 25, 2013

ADAMS Accession Number: ML13031A618

Davis-Besse

Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 1 - Supplemental Information Needed For Acceptance or Requested Licensing Action RE: Request for Exemption From Post-Repair Testing Requirements of Containment Vessels Opening (TAC NO. MF0537)

ADAMS Accession Number: ML13058253

Annual Assessment Letter for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station (Report 05000346/2012001) –

ADAMS Accession No. ML13063A119

Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, 10 CFR 50.55a Notification of Impracticality and Requests for Alternatives Supporting the Third and Fourth to-Year Inservice Inspection Intervals.

ADAMS Accession No. ML13059A315

Davis-Besse, Unit 1 - 10 CFR 50.55a Requests RP-1, RP-1A, RP-3, RP-5, RP-6 and RV-1 Regarding Inservice Pump and Valve Testing.

ADAMS Accession No. ML13059A321

Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 1 - Acceptance of requested Licensing Action RE: Proposed Alternative Regarding Post-repair Pressure Testing Requirements (TAC No. MF0537)

ADAMS Accession Number: ML13073A092

Summary of Telephone Conference Call Held on January 23, 2013, Between the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company, Concerning Request for Additional Information Pertaining to the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1, License Renewal Application (TAC NO. ME4640)

ADAMS Accession No. ML13051A660

Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 1 - Closure Evaluation for Report Pursuant To Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 50, Section 50.469(a)(3) Concerning Significant Emergency Core Cooling System Evaluation Model Errors/Changes Related to Emergency Core Cooling System Bypass and Upper Plenum Column Weldments (TAC No. ME8411)

Accession Number: ML13086A165

Perry

ANNUAL ASSESSMENT LETTER FOR PERRY NUCLEAR POWER PLANT (REPORT 05000440/2012001)

ADAMS Accession No. ML13060A114

Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit No. 1 - Issuance of Amendment RE: Modify Technical Specification 3.8.1, "AC Sources - Operating", To Remove Mode Restrictions on Certain Division 3 Surveillance Requirements (TAC No. ME9006)

ADAMS Accession Number: ML13052A706

Public Meeting To Discuss The 2012 End-of-Cycle Plant Performance Assessment of Perry Nuclear Power Plant

ADAMS Accession No. ML13070A125

Summary of February 20, 2013, Meeting Regarding An Inspection Procedure 95002 Inspection

ADAMS Accession No. ML13080A250

PERRY MOD 50.59 REQUEST FOR INFORMATION LETTER

ADAMS ACCESSION# ML13081A383

TELECONFERENCE SUMMARY FEB 25 AND MAR 4, 2013

ADAMS ACCESSION# ML13086A680

PERRY TELECONFERENCE SUMMARY MARCH 11, 2013

ADAMS ACCESSION# ML13086A726

U.S. Department of Homeland Security/After Action Report/Improvement Plan for the October 2-3-2012 Exercise for the Perry Nuclear Power Plant.

ADAMS Accession Number: ML13079A549

Sequoyah Fuels Corporation's Notice of Appeal of LBP-94-5 and LBP-94-8.

ADAMS Accession Number: ML13063A031

Beaver Valley

Beaver Valley Power Station - Annual Assessment Letter for Beaver Valley Units 1 and 2 (Report 05000334/2012001 and 05000412/2012001)

ADAMS Accession No.: ML13063A077

IR 05000334-13-007 and 05000412-13-007, 1/28/13 – 2/15/13, Beaver Valley Power Station, Units 1 and 2; Permanent Plant Modifications Engineering Team Inspection.

ADAMS ACCESSION NO: ML13067A289

Beaver Valley: Summary of February 20, 2013, Meeting with FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company to Discuss Request for Additional Information Response Regarding Beaver Valley Power Station End-of-Life Moderator Temperature Coefficient Testing (TAC Nos. ME9144 and ME9145)

ADAMS Accession No.: ML13057A678

Beaver Valley Power Station, Units 1 and 2 - Notice of Public Meeting on April 11, 2013

ADAMS Accession No.: ML13073A337

Beaver Valley Power Station - Discharge Monitoring Report (NPDES) Permit No. PA0025615.

ADAMS Accession No.: ML13067A329

NRC Actions Received from July 2007 thru February 2013.

ADAMS Accession No.: ML13067A150

BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION: NRC EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS ANNUAL INSPECTION REPORT NOS. 05000334/2012501, 05000412/2012501, 05000334/2012502, AND 05000412/2012502; NRC SECURITY ANNUAL INSPECTION REPORT NOS. 05000334/2012401 AND 05000412/2012401

ADAMS Accession No.: . ML13077A409

Dewey-Burdock Safety Evaluation Report.

ADAMS Accession Number: ML13052A182

FOIA/PA-2011-0118, FOIA/PA-2011-0119, FOIA/PA-2011-0120 - Resp 95 - Partial - Group AS. Part 3 of 3.

ADAMS Accession Number: ML13084A115

Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2; and Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit No. 1 - Request for Additional Information RE: Parental Guaranty (TAC Nos. MF0401, MF0402, and MF0403)

Accession Number: ML13086A244

Portsmouth Facilities

USEC-02, "Emergency Plan for the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant Lead Cascade Revision 202 August 2012."

ADAMS Accession No. ML13060A325

NRC Actions Received from July 2007 thru February 2013.

ADAMS Accession Number: ML13067A150

American Centrifuge Plant and Lead Cascade Facility - Annual Summary Report of Facility Changes.

ADAMS Accession No. ML13029A224

Fermi

Annual Assessment Letter for Fermi Power Plant Unit 2 (Report 05000341/2012001) –
ADAMS Accession No. ML13063A131

2013/02/08 Fermi COL - 2/8/13 Fermi 3 Submittals

ADAMS Accession No. ML13052A796

Comment (1) of Kenneth A. Westlake, on Behalf of US EPA, on the Final Environmental
Impact Statement for the Combined License for Enrico Fermi Unit 3, Monroe County,
Michigan - CEQ No. 20130006.

ADAMS Accession No. ML13063A434

FERMI CONFIRMATION OF INITIAL LICENSE EXAM LETTER

ADAMS ACCESSION# ML13070A364

March 19, 2013, Audit Plan To Review Sassi2010 Verification And Validation
Documentation.

ADAMS Accession No.: ML13071A181

Request For Additional Information Letter No. 83 Related To Chapter 13 For The
Fermi 3 Combined License Application.

ADAMS Accession No.: ML13071A243

Fermi 2 - Overall Integrated Plan in Response to March 12, 2012 Commission Order
Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Reliable Spent Fuel Pool
Instrumentation (Order Number EA-12-051).

ADAMS Accession No.: ML13063A285

DTE Energy - Detroit Edison Fermi 3 COLA (Final Safety Analysis Report), Rev. 5 - List
of Tables

ADAMS Accession No.: ML13063A342

DTE Energy - Detroit Edison Fermi 3 COLA (Final Safety Analysis Report), Rev. 5 -
Chapter 02 - Site Characteristics - Subsection 02.05.02 - Vibratory Ground Motion

ADAMS Accession No.: ML13063A354

DTE Energy - Detroit Edison Fermi 3 COLA (Final Safety Analysis Report), Rev. 5 -
Chapter 02 - Site Characteristics - Subsection 02.05.04 - Stability of Subsurface
Materials and Foundations

ADAMS Accession No.: ML13063A357

DTE Energy - Detroit Edison Fermi 3 COLA (Final Safety Analysis Report), Rev. 5 -
Chapter 14 - Initial Test Program

ADAMS Accession No.: ML13063A384

DTE Energy - Detroit Edison Fermi 3 COLA (Final Safety Analysis Report), Rev. 5 -
Chapter 02 - Site Characteristics - Section 02.00 – Introduction

ADAMS Accession No.: ML13063A347

DTE Energy - Detroit Edison Fermi 3 COLA (Final Safety Analysis Report), Rev. 5 -
Chapter 07 - Instrumentation and Control Systems

ADAMS Accession No.: ML13063A378

DTE Energy - Detroit Edison Fermi 3 COLA (Final Safety Analysis Report), Rev. 5 -
Chapter 02 - Site Characteristics - Section 02.02 - Nearby Industrial, Transportation,
and Military Facilities

ADAMS Accession No.: ML13063A349

DTE Energy - Detroit Edison Fermi 3 COLA (Final Safety Analysis Report), Rev. 5 -
Chapter 1 - Introduction and General Description of Plant

ADAMS Accession No.: ML13063A346

DTE Energy - Detroit Edison Fermi 3 COLA (Final Safety Analysis Report), Rev. 5 -
Chapter 12 - Radiation Protection

ADAMS Accession No.: ML13063A382

DTE Energy - Detroit Edison Fermi 3 COLA (Final Safety Analysis Report), Rev. 5 -
Chapter 03 - Design of Structures, Components, Equipment, and Systems - 3.7.2
Seismic System Analysis

ADAMS Accession No.: ML13063A373

DTE Electric Company Application for a Combined License for Fermi 3 Update.

ADAMS Accession No.: ML13063A296

DTE Energy - Detroit Edison Fermi 3 COLA (Final Safety Analysis Report), Rev. 5 -
Chapter 02 - Site Characteristics - Subsection 02.05.03 - Surface Faulting

ADAMS Accession No.: ML13063A356

DTE Energy - Detroit Edison Fermi 3 COLA (Final Safety Analysis Report), Rev. 5 -
Chapter 02 - Site Characteristics - Subsection 02.05.01 - Geology, Seismology, and
Geotechnical Engineering - Part 01

ADAMS Accession No.: ML13063A352

DTE Energy - Detroit Edison Fermi 3 COLA (Final Safety Analysis Report), Rev. 5 -
Chapter 03 - Design of Structures, Components, Equipment, and Systems through 3.7.1

ADAMS Accession No.: ML13063A372

DTE Energy - Detroit Edison Fermi 3 COLA (Final Safety Analysis Report), Rev. 5 -
Chapter 02 - Site Characteristics - Appendix 02.04CC - Raw Slug Test Data
ADAMS Accession No.: ML13063A365

DTE Energy - Detroit Edison Fermi 3 COLA (Final Safety Analysis Report), Rev. 5 -
Chapter 09 - Auxiliary Systems
ADAMS Accession No.: ML13063A379

DTE Energy - Detroit Edison Fermi 3 COLA (Final Safety Analysis Report), Rev. 5 -
Chapter 02 - Site Characteristics - Appendix 02.05BB - Updated Characterization of
Large-Magnitude New Madrid Seismic Zone Earthquake Model
ADAMS Accession No.: ML13063A368

DTE Energy - Detroit Edison Fermi 3 COLA (Final Safety Analysis Report), Rev. 5 -
Chapter 02 - Site Characteristics - Appendix 02.04DD - Raw Packer Test Data
ADAMS Accession No.: ML13063A366

DTE Energy - Detroit Edison Fermi 3 COLA (Final Safety Analysis Report), Rev. 5 -
Chapter 06 - Engineered Safety Features
ADAMS Accession No.: ML13063A376

DTE Energy - Detroit Edison Fermi 3 COLA (Final Safety Analysis Report), Rev. 5 -
Chapter 02 - Site Characteristics - Subsection 02.05.01 - Geology, Seismology, and
Geotechnical Engineering - Part 02
ADAMS Accession No.: ML13063A353

DTE Energy - Detroit Edison Fermi 3 COLA (ITAAC), Rev. 4 - COL Part 10 – ITAAC
ADAMS Accession No.: ML13063A393

DTE Energy - Detroit Edison Fermi 3 COLA (Final Safety Analysis Report), Rev. 5 - List
of Figures

ADAMS Accession No.: ML13063A343

Fermi 2 - DTE Electric Overall Integrated Plan in Response to March 12, 2012
Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Reliable
Containment Hardened Vents (Order Number EA-12-050).

ADAMS Accession No.: ML13063A446

DTE Energy - Detroit Edison Fermi 3 COLA (Final Safety Analysis Report), Rev. 5 -
Chapter 02 - Site Characteristics - Section 02.01 - Geography and Demography
ADAMS Accession No.: ML13063A348

DTE Energy - Detroit Edison Fermi 3 COLA (Final Safety Analysis Report), Rev. 5 -
Chapter 02 - Site Characteristics - Appendix 02.04AA - Wells Within 25 Miles of Fermi 3
ADAMS Accession No.: ML13063A363

DTE Energy - Detroit Edison Fermi 3 COLA (Final Safety Analysis Report), Rev. 5 -
Chapter 02 - Site Characteristics - Appendix 02.04BB - Monthly Water Level Maps
ADAMS Accession No.: ML13063A364

DTE Energy - Detroit Edison Fermi 3 COLA (Final Safety Analysis Report), Rev. 5 -
Chapter 13 - Conduct of Operations
ADAMS Accession No.: ML13063A383

DTE Energy - Detroit Edison Fermi 3 COLA (Final Safety Analysis Report), Rev. 5 -
Chapter 02 - Site Characteristics - Section 02.04 – Hydrology
ADAMS Accession No.: ML13063A351

DTE Energy - Detroit Edison Fermi 3 COLA (Final Safety Analysis Report), Rev. 5 -
Chapter 02 - Site Characteristics - Section 02.03 - Meteorology and Air Quality
ADAMS Accession No.: ML13063A350

DTE Energy - Detroit Edison Fermi 3 COLA (Final Safety Analysis Report), Rev. 5 -
Chapter 11 - Radioactive Waste Management
ADAMS Accession No.: ML13063A381

DTE Energy - Detroit Edison Fermi 3 COLA (Final Safety Analysis Report), Rev. 5 -
Chapter 17 - Quality Assurance - Appendix 17BB - Quality Assurance Program
Description

ADAMS Accession No.: ML13063A388

DTE Energy - Detroit Edison Fermi 3 COLA (Final Safety Analysis Report), Rev. 5 -
Chapter 17 - Quality Assurance through Appendix 17AA - Fermi 3 Policy Quality
Assurance During Construction and Operation

ADAMS Accession No.: ML13063A387

Subject: Fermi 2 – Supplemental Information Needed for Acceptance of License
Amendment Request for Measurement Uncertainty Recapture (TAC No. MF0650)

ADAMS Accession No.: ML13080A229

FERMI CDBI REQUEST FOR INFORMATION LETTER

ADAMS ACCESSION#ML13081A391

NRC Staff Answer in Opposition to Intervenors' Motion for Resubmission of Contentions
3 and 13, for Resubmission of Contention 23 or its Admission as a New Contention, and
for Admission of New Contentions 26 and 27.

ADAMS Accession No.: ML13077A427

Applicant's Answer to Proposed New Contentions Based on Final Environmental Impact
Statement.

ADAMS Accession No.: ML13077A477

Applicant's Answer to Proposed New Contentions Based on Final Environmental Impact Statement.

ADAMS Accession No.: ML13077A219

March 19, 2013, Audit Plan To Review Sassi2010 Verification And Validation Documentation.

ADAMS Accession No.: ML13071A181

Request For Additional Information Letter No. 83 Related To Chapter 13 For The Fermi 3 Combined License Application.

ADAMS Accession No.: ML13071A243

Fermi 2 - Overall Integrated Plan in Response to March 12, 2012 Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation (Order Number EA-12-051).

ADAMS Accession No.: ML13063A285

DTE Electric Submittal of Flooding Hazard Reevaluation Report in Response to March 12, 2012 Information Request Regarding Flood Protection Evaluations.

ADAMS Accession Number: ML13070A199

Attachment 1, Supplemental Response to RAI Letter No. 77 (eRAI Tracking No. 6446) RAI Question No. 01.05-1. (Part 1 of 3).

ADAMS Accession Number: ML13070A491

DTE Electric Overall Integrated Plan in Response to March 12, 2012 Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events (Order Number EA-12-049).

ADAMS Accession Number: ML13070A262

Combined Reply in Support of 'Motion for Resubmission of Contentions 3 and 13, for Resubmission of Contention 23 or its Admission as a New Contention, and for Admission of New Contentions 26 and 27'.

ADAMS Accession Number: ML13070A404

General Conformity Applicability Analysis Related to Issuance of a Combined License for the Fermi, Unit 3.

ADAMS Accession Number: ML13070A554
