

To: Jim Mehl, ERU Supervisor
From: Zack Clayton, Rad Coordinator
Subject: January Monthly Report
Date: February 1, 2013

Beans

Training: 1
Drills: 0
Meetings: 6
Technical Assistance: 1
Public Assistance: 1

Web Page Views: There were 13 page views in January.

Coming Attractions

2/7 SRIP Planning Group
2/7 Rad Emergency Webinar
2/12 Working Group
2/14 NEPAC
3/5 SRIP Planning Group
4/4 SRIP
4/15 URSB
6/5-7 RAT Training

Facility updates

Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station

Davis-Besse operated at full power for January.

Perry Nuclear Power Plant

Perry operated at full power until January 22 at about 3:30 when the plant scrammed unexpectedly.

On January 22, 2013 at approximately 03:32 the reactor at Perry Nuclear Power Plant automatically shut down. This was caused by a low water level alarm and an alarm indicating the feed water system was not functioning. The high pressure spray system in

the plant activated to compensate for the lower water level and all of the control rods inserted into the reactor. The plant is currently in a stable condition and the water level in the reactor is being maintained by the motor driven feed pump. A news report indicates the cause of the alarms was traced to a blown fuse in the control circuitry. This was being investigated by plant personnel and the situation was reported to the NRC as required. On January 26 operators restarted the reactor at about 12:30 pm. The plant resynchronized to the grid on Sunday the 27th. See Event No. 48688.

Perry lost their computer network from about 2:00 am to 7:00 am January 31. This meant the Emergency Response Data System was down, which the plant uses to transmit plant data directly to the NRC during an emergency. See Event No. 48708.

Beaver Valley Power Station

While excavating for the new dry cask storage facility Beaver Valley discovered oil contaminated soil. Beaver Valley has notified the Pennsylvania Environmental Protection Agency as well as the NRC to this find. The new dry cask storage facility is located on the site of the former Shippingport Nuclear Reactor facility. There is no report on the extent or estimated volume of the contaminated soil. As this is a former industrial site this is not an uncommon occurrence. See Event No. 48666.

Beaver Valley Unit I

Unit I operated at full power for January.

Beaver Valley Unit II

Unit II operated at full power for January.

Fermi II

Fermi II operated at 68 per cent power for most of January due to a recirculating reactor pump issue.

On 01/22/2013 at 00:30 Reactor building HVAC tripped due to low outside air temperature. A standby system was manually started and maintained Reactor Building differential pressure negative. At 01:13 secondary containment pressure went positive during restart of the Center Reactor Building HVAC Train. This is a loss of secondary containment function. In a 12 second time span secondary containment pressure went above 0 inches Water Column to +0.17 inches and then decreased to < 0 inches. Loss of secondary containment is a reportable event. See Event No. 48689.

Fermi III

Fermi III continues as a documentation evaluation.

Portsmouth Enrichment Plant

There were no reports for Portsmouth for January.

Activity

- 1/9 Working Group. Information sharing for agencies and development of new reporting/tracking procedures for initiative activity. Preparation for the URSB meeting.
- 1/9 State Radiological Incident Plan. Player identification and preliminary discussions of existing plans.
- 1/14 URSB meeting. Presentation to the Board of the new initiative presentation and tracking structure. Reports of quarterly agency and plant activity, NRC discussion of the tracking matrix and plant location in this document. See URSB webpage for detailed minutes.
- 1/15 MIDAS training for County EOC responders. This is the Dose Assessment program the plants will use going forward.
- 1/16 FEMA presentation of the CHICAGO Improvised Nuclear Device plan. Looking at how a plan of this type differs from other All Hazards plans and what things become important in implementation. This introduced some tools Not currently used in Ohio planning but which are useful adaptations of business project tools.
- 1/16 Great Lakes HazMat TTX using the Chicago Incident Plan discussed in the morning. We took the scenario and used it to examine what Ohio could do in a similar situation. As part of this it became apparent that a Radiological Incident plan for an IND is inherently different from other incident plans such as an RRD/ lost source incident. The scale of planning outreach exceeds that for a natural disaster such as Katrina or Shaken Horizon.
- 1/17 Continuation of FEMA discussion examining Ohio capabilities and resource needs for an IND.
- 1/30 DOE Portsmouth briefing on

Office Issues

Initiative:	IZRRAG Activities		20130109.01E
Proponent/ Actioning Officer:	Ohio EPA: Zack Clayton		
Essential Task supported:	Emergency Planning: Sampling		
Action Item(s):	Status:	Completion Date:	Discussion:
Sampling Plan Redux	Ongoing	Working draft of new Sampling scheme: Final approval:	ORO Sampling Plan deemed inadequate by FEMA since teams did not sample the centerline for characterization.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Tentative "Get Well Date": 01JUN2014 • Still awaiting final AAR from FEMA 			

This table presentation is a way to snapshot what each initiative activity is. This one shows that the initiative is supporting the Ingestion Zone Recovery and Reentry Advisory Group. The number is the tracking number by date created in YYYYMMDD. Sequence and a letter designating which agency is responsible for this if more than one is involved. It then shows the responsible person, what URSB task is supported and then a brief description of the activity(s) and other comments.

News, NRC Reports, and Statistics

Operating Power Levels

January

Date	BV1	BV2	DB	Perry	Fermi2	
1	100	100	100	100	7	Fermi 2 increasing power –see Event 48487
7	100	100	100	100	68	Fermi 2 South Reactor Feed Pump still OOS
14	100	100	100	100	68	
21	100	100	100	100	68	
22	100	100	100	0	68	Perry low reactor water level actuated trip.
28	100	100	100	35	68	
31	100	99	100	68	68	

Information Notices

Unless otherwise noted, these are ADAMS Accession documents, are publicly available, and will be accessible via the public web site Electronic Reading Room in the Agency Document Access and Management System (ADAMS),

<http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html>

or to access generic communications files on the NRC Homepage:

<http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/gen-comm/reg-issues/2012/>

To access these documents use the ADAMS Accession number listed with the title.

This is in the format of : ML #####

Beaver Valley Power Station Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation – Physical Protection and Access Authorization Security Information

Letter: ADAMS Accession No.: ML12362A465

Enclosure 2: ADAMS Accession No.: ML12362A468

RIS 2012-12:Licensing Submittal Information and Design Development Activities for Small Modular Reactor Designs, dated December 28, 2012

ADAMS Accession No.: ML12319A181

FERMI UNIT 1: MASTER INSPECTION PLAN – CALENDAR YEAR 2013

ADAMS Accession No.: ML 13004A281

DAVIS-BESSE: Request for Additional Information for the Review of the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station License Renewal Application Related to the Shield Building Monitoring Program (TAC NO.ME640)

ADAMS Accession No. ML12355A184

BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION: DECEMBER 5, 2012 NRC GENERIC FUNDAMENTALS EXAMINATION RESULTS

ADAMS ACCESSION NO: ML13007A432

Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station; NRC Emergency Preparedness Annual Inspection Report Nos. 05000346/2012501 and 05000346/2012502

ADAMS Accession Number ML13007A207

Fermi Power Plant; NRC Emergency Preparedness Annual Inspection Report

Nos. 05000341/2012501 and 05000341/2012502

ADAMS Accession Number ML13007A217

Perry Nuclear Power Plant; NRC Emergency Preparedness Annual Inspection Report Nos. 05000440/2012501 and 05000440/2012502

ADAMS Accession Number ML13007A242

Ltr 01/14/13 Davis-Besse Emergency Preparedness Exercise on May 14, 2013 (Plume-Phase Only)

ADAMS Accession Number ML13015A162

Ltr 01/11/13 Davis-Besse Response to Disputed Cross-Cutting Aspect in Inspection Report No. 05000346/2012403(DRS) (Cover Letter Only)

ADAMS Accession Number ML13014A387

Ltr 01/11/13 Davis-Besse Response to Disputed Cross-Cutting Aspect in Inspection Report No. 05000346/2012403(DRS) (Cover Letter Only)

ADAMS Accession Number ML13014A387

Assessment Followup Letter For The Perry Nuclear Power Plant And Deviation From The Reactor Oversight Process Action Matrix

ADAMS Accession No. ML13018A163

Beaver Valley Power Station – Missed and Unreported ST Licensee NCVs- NRC Investigation Report No. 1-2012-025

ADAMS Accession No. ML13023A173

Follow-Up Letter on Technical Issues For Resolution Regarding Licensee Communication Submittals Associated with Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 9.3

ADAMS Accession Number: ML13010A162

Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Integrated Inspection Report 05000346/2012005 and 07200014/2012001 –

ADAMS Accession No.: ML13025A126

Fermi Power Plant, Unit 2 - NRC Integrated Inspection Report 05000341/2012005

ADAMS Accession No. ML13028A454

Subject: Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit NOS. 1 and 2 - Evaluation of Report Describing the Nature of, and Estimated Effect on, Peak Cladding Temperature Resulting from a Sign. Emergency Core Cooling System Evaluation Model Error (TAC NOS. ME8409 and ME8410)

ADAMS Accession NO.: ML12332A351

Information Notice 2012-22, Counterfeit, Fraudulent, Suspect Item (CFSI) Training Offerings, dated January 25, 2013

ADAMS Accession No.: ML12137A248

DAVIS-BEESE: Schedule Revision for the Safety and Environmental Review of the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, License Renewal Application (TAC Nos. ME4640)

ADAMS Accession No. ML13011A301

Updated Fermi 3 COLA Service List (Docket Number 52-033)

Adams Accession No.: ML13028A403

NOTICE OF AVAILABILITY OF THE FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT FOR ENRICO FERMI NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, UNIT 3, COMBINED LICENSE APPLICATION REVIEW

Adams Accession No.: ML13010A264

NUREG 2105 Vol4 - Environmental Impact Statement for the Combined License (COL) for Enrico Fermi Unit 3 Final Report - Appendices F to M

Adams Accession No.: ML12347A202

SUMMARY OF PUBLIC MEETING HELD WITH DETROIT EDISON COMPANY TO DISCUSS OPEN ITEMS AND OUTSTANDING REQUESTS FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION RESPONSES RELATING TO THE COMBINED LICENSE APPLICATION FOR FERMI UNIT 3

Adams Accession No.: ML12362A390

News

Davis-Besse's extension

Friday, January 04, 2013

FirstEnergy Corp. is moving closer to getting federal approval of an extension through 2037 of its operating license for the Davis-Besse nuclear plant in Ottawa County. But formal action likely won't occur before fall, 2014 — which gives regulators ample time to ensure that the plant is running smoothly.

That hasn't always been the case since Davis-Besse, one of the region's largest employers, opened in 1977. Still, an NRC board last week declined an opportunity to delay the license-extension process.

Four activist groups, citing exterior cracks found in Davis-Besse's containment shield building in 2011, questioned FirstEnergy's assessment of its ability to handle a severe plant accident. The licensing board ruled, largely on narrow technical grounds, that the issues the challengers raised were speculative or irrelevant.

The next step in the licensing process is FirstEnergy's response to items in the safety report the NRC issued for Davis-Besse last summer. The plant's current license is scheduled to expire in 2017.

At the same time, the NRC has said it will not issue new or renewed licenses for nuclear plants until Congress decides what to do about tons of highly radioactive spent reactor fuel that is piling up at plant sites. An Obama Administration task force is scheduled to present its recommendations by fall, 2014. The administration has rejected Yucca Mountain in Nevada as the federal government's potential repository, after years of research and development there.

Davis-Besse has been one of the nuclear industry's more erratic performers. A license extension could provide economic stability and energy security, if the plant operates as it should. That will require regulators to stay on their toes, and Congress to resolve the national waste-disposal dilemma.

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Star Beacon

Feds plan more scrutiny at Perry nuclear plant

January 6, 2013

Associated Press

PERRY — A nuclear power plant alongside Lake Erie can expect continued heightened scrutiny by federal regulators this year. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission told the Perry nuclear power plant operator FirstEnergy Corp. in a Dec. 28 letter that it will do a return safety inspection this year at some point. The commission says the NRC staff has concluded the plant hasn't adequately addressed safety concerns. Two years ago the commission increased inspections at the plant after four contractors were exposed to radiation. Akron-based FirstEnergy said the highest radiation exposure to any worker was the equivalent of two or three chest X-rays. Spokes-woman Jennifer Young said the plant has operated without similar issues since a 2012 NRC inspection.

US NRC

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC's) staff conducted a supplemental inspection pursuant to Inspection Procedure (IP) 95002, "Inspection for One Degraded Cornerstone or Any Three White Inputs in a Strategic Performance Area," at the Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1 from August 27 through November 16, 2012. The attached inspection report documents the inspection results.

This supplemental inspection was performed to assess FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company's (FENOC's) evaluation associated with a finding with low to moderate safety significance which occurred in the second quarter of 2011 and a White Performance Indicator (PI) which affected the Occupational Radiation Safety Cornerstone in the radiation safety strategic performance area.

The objectives of this supplemental inspection were to: (1) provide assurance that the root and contributing causes of individual and collective (multiple White inputs) risk-significant performance issues were understood; (2) provide assurance that the individual and collective (multiple White inputs) risk-significant performance issues were identified; (3) independently determine whether safety culture components caused or significantly contributed to the individual and collective (multiple White inputs) risk-significant performance issues; and (4) provide assurance that corrective actions were or will be sufficient to address and preclude repetition of the root and contributing causes.

The NRC staff concluded that FENOC's Perry staff did not provide assurance that the corrective actions for performance issues associated with the Occupational Exposure Control Effectiveness PI were sufficient to address the root and contributing causes and prevent recurrence. The NRC further concluded that FENOC's Perry staff did not adequately address corrective actions for the White NOV. Specifically, the NRC determined that events occurred following initial implementation of corrective actions for the White PI and White NOV, which had similar root causes as the White PI and White NOV. Additionally, the NRC inspection staff identified an additional Non-Cited Violation

(NCV) of Technical Specification regarding establishing adequate controls for locked high radiation areas during the performance of the IP 95002 inspection that exhibited a similar causal factor of both the White NOV and the White PI. Taken collectively, the issues associated with the White finding represented a significant weakness, as discussed in IP 95002, and FENOC's Perry staff actions to date have not provided the assurance level required to meet the inspection objectives. In accordance with NRC Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0305, "Operating Reactor Assessment Program," a parallel PI inspection finding is assigned the same safety significance as the initiating PI. Similarly, the White finding associated with NOV 05000440/2011014-01 will be held open. The NRC will notify FENOC's Perry staff in separate correspondence of the NRC's determination of Perry Nuclear Power Plant's location in the NRC's ROP Action Matrix as a result of the parallel PI White inspection finding and the held open White finding associated with the NOV.

When the NRC is informed of readiness, a future inspection will be conducted to verify corrective actions that FENOC's Perry staff have put in place to address and preclude a repetition of the root and contributing causes of the multiple Occupational Exposure Control Effectiveness occurrence PI's. Also, the NRC will assess whether the White NOV can be closed. During the performance of this supplemental inspection, the inspection team did not complete its independent review of the extent of condition and extent of cause for the issues due, in part, to the significant weaknesses noted in your corrective action for the White PI and White NOV. Therefore, the NRC will complete its independent review of the extent of condition and the extent of cause during this future inspection.

NUCLEAR WASTE:

White House calls for next repository by 2048

Hannah Northey, E&E reporter

Published: Friday, January 11, 2013

The Obama administration today called for the creation of a permanent geologic repository by 2048 to store increasing amounts of nuclear waste, more than five decades after Congress intended the original Yucca Mountain site in Nevada to be built. The administration's [strategy](#) calls for the creation of a pilot interim storage facility by 2021, a larger interim facility by 2025 and a final repository more than two decades later.

But Lake Barrett, who led DOE's Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management from 1993 to 2002, said the administration's plan should have been released months ago and lacks proactive guidance for states hoping to host a repository.

"It's timid and tepid and filled with bureaucratic phraseology to kick the can down the road," Barrett said.

The nuclear industry and state regulators were less critical. The Nuclear Energy Institute, the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners and the Nuclear Waste Strategy Coalition in a joint statement applauded the administration for responding to recommendations that President Obama's Blue Ribbon Commission released last year.

Obama tasked the group with finding alternatives for storing more than 65,000 metric tons of nuclear waste after saying the controversial site under Yucca Mountain was unworkable. The expert panel called for a consent-based process for siting one or more temporary storage sites and geologic repositories.

"The DOE's report recognizes the need to establish a sustainable, integrated program to safely and efficiently manage used nuclear fuel from nuclear energy facilities and high-level radioactive waste from our nation's defense program," the groups said. The report endorses the Blue Ribbon Commission's recommendation to use fees that utilities pay into the Nuclear Waste Fund to revamp the country's waste program. DOE's report also calls for the creation of one or more consolidated storage facilities at volunteer sites with priority given to the used fuel from decommissioned reactors. The report also used a [study](#) from Rand Corp., which found that the government could establish an independent federal agency like NASA or a federal corporation like the Tennessee Valley Authority to oversee the siting of repositories and interim storage sites.

But Barrett noted that the administration's response was expected last summer. Notably, former National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft, who co-chaired Obama's Blue Ribbon Commission, blasted the DOE last year for failing to respond to the commission's set of recommendations ([Greenwire](#), Sept. 12, 2012).

It's also unclear how or when Congress will act.

Sen. Ron Wyden (D-Ore.), the new chairman of the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee, has said he supports moving nuclear waste away from risky reactors. Keith Chu, a spokesman for the senator, said Wyden plans to focus on the issue this Congress and will likely hold hearings on the issue.

Alaska Sen. Lisa Murkowski, the top Republican on the committee, has said she hopes Wyden will work with her and other bipartisan senators to push through legislation to jump-start the legislative process ([Greenwire](#), Dec. 17, 2012).

Source: <http://www.eenews.net/eenewspm/2013/01/11/1>

THE NRC WILL KEEP PERRY NUCLEAR POWER PLANT IN CURRENT PERFORMANCE COLUMN

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission will continue to monitor the Perry Nuclear Power Plant in Column 3 of the agency's action matrix, despite a security finding and issues discovered with Perry's occupational radiation safety program. The NRC chose not to move Perry into Column 4 at this time because recent inspections found that the unresolved issues exist in the single area of occupational radiation safety and are not widespread. The NRC will conduct a follow-up inspection, after which a final determination on Perry's position in the action matrix will be determined.

Perry is operated by FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Co. and is located in Perry, Ohio, about 35 miles northeast of Cleveland.

"The NRC decided to deviate from its process and continue to monitor the plant in Column 3 because Perry's overall performance is adequate and has improved. Perry does not exhibit the widespread problems we normally see in Column 4 plants. Its challenges are confined to occupational radiation protection and we expect the plant to resolve them quickly," said NRC Region III Administrator Charles Casto.

Perry entered Column 3 in 2011 as a result of a “white” finding and a “white” performance indicator in the occupational radiation protection area which evaluates the plant’s ability to make sure radiation exposure to workers is effectively managed. The plant is operating safely and there were no overexposures to workers as a result of these issues.

The NRC’s inspection in response to these issues concluded that FirstEnergy did not resolve all the challenges with occupational radiation protection and the issues remain open. In addition, in January 2012, Perry had a “greater-than-green” finding in the security area which, according to a subsequent NRC inspection, is not indicative of current plant performance. By NRC process, the occupational radiation protection deficiencies and the security finding would normally result in the downgrade in the NRC’s response to Column 4.

The NRC will reassess the decision to keep the plant in Column 3 by conducting a follow-up inspection between May and July 2013. The inspection will determine if Perry has successfully resolved the performance challenges in occupational radiation protection and ensure these performance problems do not extend to other areas of plant performance.

If the follow-up inspections show the problems have not been resolved, the NRC will take further actions and may move the plant to Column 4.

The NRC’s action matrix reflects overall plant performance. There are five columns in the matrix with Column 1 requiring a baseline level of inspections. A move up in columns results in an increased level of NRC oversight and inspections.

The deviation memo and NRC inspection reports are available of through the NRC RIII Office of Public Affairs and the NRC’s web site: <http://adams.nrc.gov/wba> .

Cincinnati CityBeat Study Finds Cancer Link Among Fernald Hourly Workers

Researchers tracked more than 6,000 workers through 2004; salaried workers fared better

January 21st, 2013

By German Lopez

More than 18 years later, Hamilton County’s Fernald Feed Materials Production Center is in the news again. This time, a study found a correlation between higher rates of cancer mortality and hourly workers, with some evidence of radiation causing intestinal cancer.

The study from the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) found salaried workers fared much better than hourly workers, and all-cause mortality was below expectations for them despite increased malignancies in blood, bone marrow, spleen, lymph nodes and thymus cells.

Hourly workers weren’t so lucky, according to the study.

They had above-average cancer mortality rates in comparison to the rest of the U.S. population, but tests only provided evidence for a connection between hourly workers and intestinal cancer.

Previous studies also found a link between non-malignant respiratory disease and exposure to radiation, but the NIOSH study found no such connection. The discrepancy could be due to "improved exposure assessment, different outcome groupings and extended follow-up" in the NIOSH study, according to the study's abstract.

The NIOSH study followed 6,409 workers who were employed at Fernald for at least 30 days between 1951 and 1985, following them through 2004.

Fernald was initially surrounded by controversy in 1984 when it was revealed that it was releasing millions of pounds of uranium dust into the atmosphere, causing radioactive contamination in surrounding areas. The controversy was elevated when Dave Bocks, an employee at the factory, mysteriously disappeared and was later found dead at a uranium processing furnace. Some suspected Bocks was murdered for allegedly being a whistleblower, but no evidence of foul play was ever officially recorded.

NUCLEAR WASTE:

Industry, states fault DOE for defending fee collections

Hannah Northey, E&E reporter

Published: Monday, January 21, 2013

Energy Secretary Steven Chu is drawing criticism from the nuclear industry and state regulators after a court filing that defends federal collections of \$750 million annually for the Department of Energy's stalled reactor waste program.

Chu told the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in a filing Friday that the fees are generating "neither insufficient nor excess revenues" and that DOE has no intention of halting the charges.

DOE is playing defense following the court's finding last summer that the department's rationale for charging plant operators for waste disposal was "legally defective" and needed to be re-evaluated ([Greenwire](#), June 1, 2012).

Under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, nuclear companies pay DOE a fee to cover the cost of a federal waste program, and the agency is required by statute to review the adequacy of those fees each year.

Industry and state regulators have told the court the fees are unnecessary in light of the Obama administration's decision to abandon the Yucca Mountain repository in Nevada.

DOE claims that money collected so far -- \$28 billion -- will be needed under a variety of potential scenarios laid out in its fee assessment. The scenarios for which the money is necessary will vary as the economy or the cost of a repository shifts, DOE said.

The money will also be needed to enact a strategy the Obama administration released earlier this month, which calls for the development of a national repository by 2048, the agency said ([E&ENews PM](#), Jan. 11).

But the Nuclear Energy Institute said DOE's justification for the fees is based on insufficient research and should be thrown out.

"The extraordinary level of uncertainty expressed in the report's many economic scenarios -- ranging from \$5 billion more than needed to \$2 billion less than needed -- indicates that DOE has not meaningfully analyzed either the costs of disposing of used nuclear fuel or whether the amount of fees collected from electric utilities and their customers is justifiable," NEI spokesman Steve Kerekes said in a statement.

DOE's assessment is "confused" because the agency hasn't indicated that it will actually move forward with disposing of the waste, Kerekes said. DOE at one point in its response to the court said it is "not currently possible to assign meaningful probabilities to any of the scenarios," he added.

"Simply put, DOE's strategy is not a disposal program with costs to be assessed and upon which the nuclear waste fund fee can be assessed," Kerekes said. "Until such time as a used fuel disposal program is authorized and implemented, no basis exists to justify continued collection of waste fund fees."

The National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners also criticized DOE's assessment. "At first blush, we find it difficult to understand how the department can justify charging nuclear utilities and their consumers for a program they effectively concede does not exist," Rob Thormeyer, a spokesman for NARUC, said in an email.

Source: <http://www.eenews.net/Greenwire/2013/01/21/5>

NUCLEAR POWER:

Blown fuse leads to shutdown at Ohio reactor

Published: Wednesday, January 23, 2013

Engineers are investigating an electrical issue that led to the shutdown of a reactor at the Perry Nuclear Power Plant in Ohio yesterday morning.

The reactor shut itself down at 3:30 a.m. following detections of a decreasing water level, which poses a threat because reactor fuel rods can melt if they are not submerged in water.

Engineers discovered a fuse blew in a circuit that powers the water pumps.

"The fuel was never uncovered and emergency systems worked. There were no injuries and no radiation was released," said plant spokesman Jennifer Young.

Workers replaced the fuse and are conducting extensive testing of the circuitry before the reactor is restarted, Young said (John Funk, [Cleveland Plain Dealer](#), Jan. 22). -- KJ

NUCLEAR:

Steam from Pa. power plant creates snowstorm

Michelle Merlin, E&E reporter


Published: Thursday, January 24, 2013

The people of Shippingport, Pa., have a whole new concept of nuclear winter.

On Tuesday evening, unique weather conditions froze steam emitted from the Beaver Valley Nuclear Power Station near Pittsburgh, blanketing the region with up to an inch of snowfall.

The nuclear plant cools its facilities using water from the Ohio River. That process heats the water to 90 or 95 degrees, and it's released as steam through towers into the air. The steam is not radioactive or contaminated from being inside the plant.

Conditions were just right Tuesday evening as dry, cold Arctic air funneled into the region. The constant plume of water vapor crystallized and fell as snow.



This radar image, captured by the National Weather Service on Tuesday, shows a plume of vapor emitted from the Beaver Valley Nuclear Power Station near Pittsburgh. Up to an inch of snow was generated from the plume. Photo courtesy of the National Weather Service.

Snowfall is rare, said Jennifer Young, a spokeswoman for FirstEnergy Corp., the utility that operates the plant. "It requires the perfect combination of moisture in air, relative humidity and temperatures. It's not something we see all the time, but it's not unheard of."

Although a plume is always present, the National Weather Service was able to capture a striking image of it on its radar. The image shows the plume extending more than 20 miles over two counties.

Richard Kane, a meteorologist at the Pittsburgh branch of NWS, said that if there has been plume-related snow in the past, it has gone unnoticed. Tuesday evening was unusually clear, allowing NWS to capture a clear image of the plume.

Kane compared the steam plume to the lake-effect snow of Lake Erie: When the first cold blast of winter moves over the relatively warm lake, snow crystals form.

"It really makes you appreciate the moisture source and how much precipitation can be picked up," said Kane.

Although the snow itself may not have formed naturally, Kane doesn't think it had an effect on the area, which already had 3 inches of snow cover.

"Changing a little of the weather pattern directly downstream from the plant has little effect on anything at all," said Kane. "That amount of snow was just a little bit of water."

NWS's Facebook page, however, was flooded with activity, with more than 200 likes on the image and nearly 800 shares.

Source: <http://www.eenews.net/Greenwire/2013/01/24/14>

Plant Reports

Power Reactor	Event Number: 48658
Facility: BEAVER VALLEY	Notification Date: 01/08/2013

Region: 1 State: PA Unit: [1] [2] [] RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP NRC Notified By: BRIAN STROBEL HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN	Notification Time: 15:26 [ET] Event Date: 01/08/2013 Event Time: 14:32 [EST] Last Update Date: 01/08/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION	Person (Organization): CHRISTOPHER NEWPORT (R1DO)

Unit	SCRAM Code	RX CRIT	Initial PWR	Initial RX Mode	Current PWR	Current RX Mode
1	N	Y	100	Power Operation	100	Power Operation
2	N	Y	100	Power Operation	100	Power Operation

Event Text

OFFSITE NOTIFICATION OF OIL FOUND IN SOIL ON PROPERTY ADJACENT TO BEAVER VALLEY

"During excavation activities at the site of the former Shippingport Atomic Power Station (SAPS) which is located on company property outside the protected area but adjacent to Beaver Valley Power Station (BVPS), BVPS found soil with evidence of a historical oil leak. The area was underneath a concrete pad for a removed fuel oil storage tank at SAPS. Actions to remove the soil with oil residue have been initiated and are in progress. Decommissioning of SAPS was completed in 1989.

"BVPS has notified the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection of the condition and the activities being taken on 01-08-13 at 1432 EST.

"This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) based on a notification to another government agency that has been made.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

This included as a 10CFR21 notice. It is not known at this time if any Ohio plants are affected.

Part 21	Event Number: 48666
Rep Org: EMERSON PROCESS MANAGEMENT Licensee: FISHER DIVISION Region: 3 City: MARSHALLTOWN State: IA County: License #: Agreement: Y	Notification Date: 01/11/2013 Notification Time: 12:27 [ET] Event Date: 01/11/2013 Event Time: [CST] Last Update Date: 01/11/2013

Docket: NRC Notified By: DENNIS SWANSON HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO	
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE	Person (Organization): CHRISTOPHER NEWPORT (R1DO) MARK FRANKE (R2DO) JOHN GIESSNER (R3DO) VINCENT GADDY (R4DO) PART 21 GROUP (EMAI)

Event Text

PART 21 REPORT INVOLVING TYPE 546NS TRANSDUCERS

The following report was received via fax:

"Fisher Information Notice: FIN 2013-01; 9 January 2013

"Subject: Type 546NS Transducers

"Equipment Affected By This Information Notice: Type 546NS Transducers shipped prior to 19 December 2012.

"Purpose:

The purpose of this Fisher Information Notice (FIN) is to alert users of the Type 546 and 546NS Transducers, shipped prior to 19 December 2012, that Fisher Controls International LLC (Fisher) was made aware of a situation which may affect the performance of the aforementioned equipment. We are informing you of this circumstance in accordance with Sections 21.21(b) and 50.55 (e) of 10CFR21.

"Applicability:

This notice applies only to Fisher Type 546 and 546NS Transducers shipped prior to 19 December 2012 that are not in operation, installed or in service.

"Discussion:

Recently, while a Fisher maintenance engineer was installing a Type 546NS Transducer in a non US customer's plant, the instrument did not perform as expected.

Upon investigation of the unit, it was determined that the vent hole to the relay was plugged which resulted in the build up of pressure inside the housing. This increased pressure will cause the output pressure to ramp up to supply pressure. In the event the relay is plugged, users will easily detect ramping up of the output pressure immediately after the sealed unit is put in service, which is why this FIN applies to

units that are not yet in service.

"Action Required:

All Type 546 and 546NS Transducer units shipped to customers prior to 19 December 2012 and not already-in-service should be checked for this restriction of the case vent. Units in-service with the cover installed and properly working will not have a plugged case vent.

"10CFR21 Implications:

Fisher requests that the recipient of this notice review it and take appropriate action in accordance with 10CFR21.

If there are any technical questions or concerns, please contact:

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Power Reactor	Event Number: 48688
Facility: PERRY Region: 3 State: OH Unit: [1] [] [] RX Type: [1] GE-6 NRC Notified By: THOMAS MORSE HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER	Notification Date: 01/22/2013 Notification Time: 06:57 [ET] Event Date: 01/22/2013 Event Time: 03:32 [EST] Last Update Date: 01/22/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(A) - ECCS INJECTION 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION	Person (Organization): TAMARA BLOOMER (R3DO) ERIC THOMAS (NRR) JASON KOZAL (IRD)

Unit	SCRAM Code	RX CRIT	Initial PWR	Initial RX Mode	Current PWR	Current RX Mode
1	A/R	Y	100	Power Operation	0	Hot Shutdown

Event Text

AUTOMATIC REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM ACTUATION

"On January 22, 2013, at approximately 0332 hours [EDT], an automatic Reactor Protection System (RPS) actuation occurred at the Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1. At the time of the event, the plant was in Mode 1 at 100% power. All control rods are inserted into the reactor core and the plant is currently stable in Mode 3 (Hot Shutdown) with reactor pressure and level being maintained in the normal shutdown range.

"The RPS actuation was initiated by a low reactor water level (Level 3 - 178") signal. In response to the RPS actuation and subsequent reactor Level 2 (130") signal, the High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) system and Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system both actuated and injected to maintain reactor coolant level. The reactor level is currently being maintained in its normal band by the feedwater system and decay heat is being removed by [turbine bypass valves to] the condenser (both HPCS and RCIC have been returned to standby). The plant is in a normal electrical line-up with all three Emergency Diesel Generators operable and available, if needed. The Containment Isolation Valves (responded to the Level 2 and 3) isolation signals as designed.

"The cause of the RPS actuation is under investigation.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

Power Reactor	Event Number: 48689
Facility: FERMI Region: 3 State: MI Unit: [2] [] [] RX Type: [2] GE-4 NRC Notified By: KELLEY BLENKY HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER	Notification Date: 01/22/2013 Notification Time: 08:38 [ET] Event Date: 01/22/2013 Event Time: 01:13 [EST] Last Update Date: 01/22/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL	Person (Organization): TAMARA BLOOMER (R3DO)

Unit	SCRAM Code	RX CRIT	Initial PWR	Initial RX Mode	Current PWR	Current RX Mode
2	N	Y	68	Power Operation	68	Power Operation

Event Text

SECONDARY CONTAINMENT PRESSURE POSITIVE FOR 12 SECONDS

"On 01/22/2013 at 00:30 Reactor building HVAC tripped due to low outside air temperature and Standby Gas Treatment system was manually started and maintained Reactor Building differential pressure negative. At 01:13 secondary

containment pressure went positive during restart of the Center Reactor Building HVAC Train. This is a loss of secondary containment function. In a 12 second time span secondary containment pressure went above 0 inches WC [Water Column] to +0.17 inches WC and then decreased to < 0 inches WC remaining stable during the Reactor Building HVAC restart. The Center Reactor Building HVAC Exhaust Fan Discharge Damper opened after the Supply Fan discharge damper; this condition would produce the indications noted.

"The System was returned to normal with two Reactor Building HVAC trains running and the Standby Gas Treatment System shutdown and in standby. Reactor building pressure is stable with differential pressure negative < - 0.30 inches WC.

"The loss of Secondary Containment function is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(v)(C) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Power Reactor	Event Number: 48708
Facility: PERRY Region: 3 State: OH Unit: [1] [] [] RX Type: [1] GE-6 NRC Notified By: RICHARD O'CONNOR HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN	Notification Date: 01/31/2013 Notification Time: 09:28 [ET] Event Date: 01/31/2013 Event Time: 02:10 [EST] Last Update Date: 01/31/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE	Person (Organization): ANN MARIE STONE (R3DO) ERDS GROUP (EMAI) CAT GROUP (EMAI)

Unit	SCRAM Code	RX CRIT	Initial PWR	Initial RX Mode	Current PWR	Current RX Mode
1	N	Y	62	Power Operation	72	Power Operation

Event Text

LOSS OF EMERGENCY RESPONSE DATA SYSTEM (ERDS)

"On January 31, 2013, at approximately 0210 hours [EST], the ability to transfer plant parameter data via the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) was lost. ERDS capability was restored at 0701 hours [EST]. The cause is under investigation.

"In the event of an emergency while ERDS was unavailable, contingency plans were in place to transmit plant parameter data, This event is being reported in accordance

with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii),

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
