

To: Jim Mehl, ERU Supervisor
From: Zack Clayton, Rad Coordinator
Subject: November Monthly Report
Date: December 3, 2012

Beans

Training: 1
Drills: 0
Meetings: 3
Technical Assistance: 2
Public Assistance: 0

Web Page Views: There were 25 page views in November.

Coming Attractions

12/6 Working Group
12/6 SRIP Planning Group
1/14 URSB

Facility updates

Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station

Davis-Besse operated at full power for November.

Davis-Besse reduced power to 50% Friday November 9 to allow maintenance on a small tube leak in the plant's condenser unit. The plant returned to 100% power late on Monday 11/12/12.

Perry Nuclear Power Plant

Perry operated for the entire month but was at reduced power for portions of it for maintenance and testing.

A number of sirens lost power during Hurricane Sandy. These operated on battery backup until AC power was restored. The last effected sirens had line power restored as of Monday November 5.

On November 28 at 1019, Perry declared an Unusual Event due to a toxic gas in the Protected Area. This was identified as carbon monoxide from a leaking acetylene tank

from a welding operation. Due to high CO levels the RAD waste control room was evacuated. As of 1235 the tank was removed from the area and the building was being ventilated. By 1407 the RAD waste control room was re-occupied with temporary ventilation pending full restoration of normal ventilation. See Event no. 48542.

There was a radioactive resin spill in June of 2012. At a plant review of this spill in conjunction with an NRC inspector Perry determined that it should have been reported as an Unusual Event. Perry made an official notification on November 28. See Event No 48544.

Beaver Valley Power Station

Beaver Valley Unit I

Unit I operated at full power for September.

Beaver Valley Unit II

Unit II started November by exiting a refueling outage that started September 24. The plant was at full power on November 9th.

Fermi II

Fermi II operated at 68 per cent power for the first part of November due to a recirculating reactor pump issue.

On November 7 Fermi2 identified a hydrogen leak to the water cooling system for the generator stator. The plant instituted a manual SCRAM of the reactor and one rod did not fully insert. This rod was manually inserted the additional 6 inches to achieve full insertion. The leak and the rod insertion failure are being investigated by the plant. See Event No. 48487.

Fermi III

Fermi III continues as a documentation evaluation.

Portsmouth Enrichment Plant

There were no reports for Portsmouth for November.

Activity

- 11/9 Dept of Energy Road show at Ohio EMA. This presentation was to expose the state agencies to the services offered by DOE for radiological incidents.
- 11/15 WebEOC training. This offers better tracking and communications than Ops Center, but the boards and forms for radiological incidents still need to be produced. It will be of limited use for the Rad program until this happens.
- 11/26 All DERR Staff briefing in the CFE.
- 11/28 NRC FEMA phone conference briefing on the revisions to NUREG 0654.

Office Issues

No office issues of note.

News, NRC Reports, and Statistics

Operating Power Levels

November

Date	BV1	BV2	DB	Perry	Fermi2	
1	100	0	100	100	68	
2	100	15	100	100	68	BV Unit 2 exiting from refueling outage
5	100	87	100	100	68	
9	100	100	99	100	0	Fermi2 hydrogen leak and manual SCRAM
12	100	100	50	100	0	DB Tube leak repair in condenser
19	100	100	100	100	0	
26	100	100	100	100	0	
30	100	100	100	100	0	

Information Notices

Unless otherwise noted, these are ADAMS Accession documents, are publicly available, and will be accessible via the public web site Electronic Reading Room in the Agency Document Access and Management System (ADAMS),

<http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html>

or to access generic communications files on the NRC Homepage:

<http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/gen-comm/reg-issues/2012/>.

To access these documents use the ADAMS Accession number listed with the title.

This is in the format of : ML #####

Summary of October 18, 2012, Meeting with FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company to Discuss Request for Additional Information Regarding Their Proposed Revised Due Date for the Upcoming Beaver Valley Power Station National Fire Protection Association Standard 805 Submittal (TAC Nos. ME9015 and ME9016)
ADAMS Accession No.: ML12293A040

Fermi Power Plant Unit 2 Integrated Inspection Report 05000341/20112004 –
ML 12306A184

Information Notice 2009-23, Supplement 1: Nuclear Fuel Thermal Conductivity Degradation, dated, October 26, 2012
ML121730336

Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit 2: NRC Initial Operator Licensing Examination Report 05000412/2012302
ML12307A237

Information Notice 2012-18, Failure to Properly Augment Emergency Response Organizations, dated, October 26, 2012
ML12178A010

Beaver Valley Power Station - NRC Integrated Inspection Report 05000334/2012004 and 05000412/2012004
ADAMS Accession No.: ML12312A374

Fermi Power Plant, Unit 2; NRC Security Baseline Inspection Report 05000341/2012405 – Cover Letter Only
ADAMS Accession Number ML12312A378

Assessment Follow-Up Letter for Perry Nuclear Power Plant
ML 12313A193

DAVIS-BESSE COMPLETION OF COMMITMENTS OF CONFIRMATORY ACTION LETTER NO. 3-11-001
ML 12313A412

DAVIS-BESSE: Project Manager change for the License Renewal of Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit1 (TAC NO.ME4840)
ADAMS Accession No. ML12292A636

DAVIS-BESSE: Summary of Telephone Conference Call Held on August 1, 2012, Between the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company, Concerning Requests for Additional Information Pertaining to the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power.
ADAMS Accession No. ML12299A396

DAVIS-BESSE: FINAL SIGNIFICANCE DETERMINATION OF A SECURITY-RELATED GREATER THAN GREEN FINDING AND NOTICE OF VIOLATION; NRC INSPECTION REPORT NO. 05000346/2012405(DRS) – COVER LETTER ONLY
ADAMS Accession No. ML12314A281

Subject: Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 2 – Summary of Conference Call with FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company to Discuss 2012 Steam Generator Tube Inspections (TAC No. ME9427)
ADAMS Accession No.: ML12310A066

DAVIS-BESSE CYBER SECURITY TI 22011 004 REQUEST FOR INFORMATION LETTER
ADAMS ACCESSION# ML12318A159

Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Assessment Follow-up Letter
ADAMS Accession Number ML12319A064

Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1 - Safety Evaluation in Support of 10 CFR 50.55 Requests for Alternative Examination Requirements for American Society of Mechanical Engineers Class 1 Piping Welds
Accession Number: ML12313A153

Davis-Besse: Request for Additional Information for the Review of the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station License Renewal Application Related to High Strength Bolting (TAC No. ME4640)
ADAMS Accession No. ML12318A246

Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 1 - Request for Additional Information Related to Physical Security Plan, Revision 16
ADAMS Accession Number: ML12310A029

Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 1 - Request for Additional Information
ADAMS Accession Number: ML12310A012

Fermi Power Plant, Unit 2, NRC Material Control and Accounting Program Inspection Report 05000341/2012404 –
ADAMS Accession No.: ML1233A206

Subject: Summary of November 15, 2012, Meeting with FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company to Discuss Upcoming License Amendment Request Relating to the Implementation of the Alternate Pressurized Thermal Shock Rule (TAC NO. ME9582)
ADAMS Accession No.: ML12321A301

Status of 60-Day Response to Orders Modifying Licenses Regarding Recommendations 4.2, 5.1, and 7.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Related to the Fukushima Dai-Ichi Nuclear Power Plant Accident

Adams Accession No. ML12326A829

Fermi 3 Draft Slides - 11/29/2012 Detroit Edison NRC Meeting Presentation 11/16/12.

Adams Accession No. ML12321A341

Memorandum and Order (Granting Motion for Summary Disposition of Contention 6; Denying Motions for Summary Disposition of Contentions 8 and 15; Denying Motion to Admit Contention 25; and resolving remaining issues regarding Contentions 20 and 21).

Adams Accession No. ML12314A071

2012/10/23 Fermi COL - Fermi 3 - Open Items Public Meeting Summary - Memo To File

Adams Accession No. ML12305A024

The ODH Annual Environmental Monitoring report for the nuclear plant areas is available here: <http://www.odh.ohio.gov/odhPrograms/rp/radprot/radppub1.aspx>

News

One-third of U.S. reactors should have filtered vents -- NRC staff

Hannah Northey, E&E reporter

Published: Friday, November 2, 2012

About a third of the country's 104 operating nuclear reactors should be required to install filtering systems that cost up to \$45 million each to limit how much radioactive material is sent up into the atmosphere after a severe accident, staff at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission said yesterday.

The equipment would allow operators to release steam and pressure from a damaged nuclear power plant while using filters to better protect the public and workers from radiation, John Monninger, deputy director of the NRC's Division of Risk Analysis, told the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards.

"We believe it would provide improved confidence to operators to make that decision," he told the independent panel, which advises the NRC on reactor safety, radiation and license applications.

Filtered vents are systems of water-filled tanks, sand or other materials that scrub the gas of radioactive material before it leaves the plant.

The systems cost \$15 million to \$45 million, according to industry sources.

The NRC staff is looking into the issue as part of the agency's review of the disaster that erupted last year at Japan's Fukushima Daiichi power plant. Three reactors at the site on Japan's northeastern coast melted down after being slammed by a magnitude-9 earthquake and tsunami that disabled emergency diesel generators needed to keep the units cool, triggering explosions and radioactive leaks.

The draft recommendation focuses solely on General Electric boiling water reactors with Mark I and Mark II designs, which have smaller containment volumes and are more vulnerable to

excessive buildup of pressure during severe accidents, Monninger said. Containment systems are steel-lined concrete shells that prevent radioactive materials generated by reactor accidents from reaching the environment.

NRC staff will give the five-member commission a formal recommendation by the end of the month. The ACRS will make a separate recommendation based on staff and stakeholder input. Anti-nuclear groups applauded the staff's comments, calling the decision a "no-brainer."

Jim Riccio, nuclear policy analyst for Greenpeace, said nuclear operators around the world either have the vents or are installing them and that his group would reach out to Congress if the ACRS didn't agree to require filtered vents once the "silly season" of the elections was over. "The further you get up this building, the harder it is to trust what's being done," Riccio told the panel. "You should learn your lessons from Fukushima rather than being forced to do the right thing."

But the industry opposes mandatory filtered vents and says the boiling water reactors in question already include internal equipment that can be used to scrub radioactive gas before it is released.

"To suggest that there's no filtering being done is incorrect," said Tony Pietrangelo, the Nuclear Energy Institute's senior vice president and chief nuclear officer.

Pietrangelo dismissed the staff's assertion that requiring filtered vents would give operators more confidence during a severe accident. Unlike Japanese operators that didn't vent the Fukushima plant quickly enough -- leading to hydrogen buildup and explosions -- U.S. operators follow detailed procedures during severe accidents that would direct them when to vent early, he said. Having filters on the Fukushima reactors wouldn't have prevented radioactive release, he added.

Operators are "going to vent when the procedures tell them to vent," he said. "If that's what you're basing your decision on to move forward with a decision or recommendation to the commission, it's very, very tenuous."

Pietrangelo pointed to a [report](#) the Electric Power Research Institute released in September that found filters would be useless if operators didn't first find ways to cool a crippled reactor and the containment structure failed.

Instead, NEI is [asking](#) the NRC to consider strategies that involve adding new hardware and adopting new procedures to prevent any release or the need for filters. Plant operators should also be allowed to decide whether filters are the best option, NEI says.

"This is not a simple 'add a filter, no filter' decision," Pietrangelo said. "It's much more complex than that. Ultimately, what you're trying to do is prevent land contamination."

Monninger said that although he's open to more research, he doesn't see a commitment across the nuclear industry to move forward on the issue and questioned NEI's approach.

"We have less confidence in those filtering strategies," he said.

Source: <http://www.eenews.net/Greenwire/2012/11/02/29>

Davis-Besse hearings open

Opponents of nuclear-plant license go before federal board

Tuesday, November 06, 2012

BY VANESSA McCRAY

BLADE STAFF WRITER

A federal board heard arguments Monday in which opponents of the Davis-Besse nuclear power plant contend that cracks discovered in the plant's concrete shield building last year should be considered when weighing the renewal of the plant's license.

Four groups oppose the 20-year extension that the FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Co. seeks for its Ottawa County plant. The current license expires in 2017.

On Monday, a three-member board made up of administrative judges from the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board appointed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission asked questions about the cracking issue and another motion related to the renewal process. A second day of arguments is to begin at 9 a.m. today in Lucas County Common Pleas Court. Board Chairman William Froehlich said the board will issue a written decision on the motions within 45 days. Groups who oppose the license renewal want the issue of the hairline cracks admitted as a contention in the proceedings. However, FirstEnergy officials argue they missed the deadline to file in a timely fashion. The utility said it discovered the cracks in October, 2011. It contends the cracks were caused by the blizzard of 1978. Spokesman Jennifer Young said FirstEnergy has weather-proofed the building and continues to monitor the cracks.

In board documents, license-renewal opponents contend the cracking "is an aging-related feature of the plant, the condition of which precludes safe operation of the atomic reactor beyond 2017 for any period of time, let alone the proposed 20-year license period."

Among FirstEnergy's arguments against admitting the contention as part of the process is the timing of the filing, which is to take place within 60 days of when the relevant material becomes available. Intervenors initially filed the proposal over cracking on Jan. 10, five days after a public meeting convened by the NRC to discuss the cracking, said Terry Lodge, a lawyer representing the intervenors. Mr. Lodge said it took time for the public and intervening groups to learn the scope, and potential effects, of the cracking problem identified last fall. "We believe the initial filing was certainly timely . . ." he said. "We also believe that this is an incredibly serious issue." The intervening groups are Beyond Nuclear, Citizens Environment Alliance of Southwestern Ontario, Don't Waste Michigan, and Green Party of Ohio.

Attorney Timothy Matthews, who represents FirstEnergy, called on the board to reject what he said are untimely filings. He said intervenors lack support for the cracking contention and have provided only "layman's speculation" on the issue.

NRC attorney Catherine Kanatas also argued the contention is inadmissible.

The board on Monday also heard arguments on FirstEnergy's motion to dispose of a different, previously admitted contention that deals with analysis of what would happen in the case of a severe plant accident, said Viktoria Mitlyng, NRC spokesman.

Contact Vanessa McCray at: vmccray@theblade.com or 419-724-6065.

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The Toledo Times

SUBJECT: FERMI UNPLANNED SHUTDOWN GREATER THAN 72 HOURS DUE TO HYDROGEN IN-LEAKAGE TO THE STATOR WATER COOLING SYSTEM

On November 7, 2012, at 9:21 a.m. EDT, while operating at 68% power, operators of the Unit 2 reactor at the Fermi Nuclear Power Plant manually scrammed (shut down) the reactor in accordance with procedures due to an increase of hydrogen gas in-leakage to the stator water cooling system from the main turbine generator. The stator water cooling system's function is to cool portions of the main generator. All control rods, except one, fully inserted and all plant systems responded normally to the scram. One control rod had to be manually inserted one notch (approximately six inches) by the operators.

On November 7, 2012, at 10:23 p.m. EDT, the licensee entered cold shutdown (Mode 4). The licensee is continuing to investigate the cause of the hydrogen in-leakage into the stator water cooling system and the control rod issue.

The NRC resident inspectors were onsite at the time and responded to the notification of the scram. The NRC resident inspectors continue to follow the hydrogen in-leakage and control rod issues closely.

The NRC Preliminary Notification (PNO) is a communication that is issued in advance of a final NRC inspection report. The PNO is issued after a facility has been shutdown for 36 hours, or as needed. Please see the attached for additional information and please visit www.nrc.gov to sign up for automatic updates of NRC information about the Fermi plant. (See Event No. 48487.)

Plant Reports

Power Reactor	Event Number: 48468
Facility: FERMI Region: 3 State: MI Unit: [2] [] [] RX Type: [2] GE-4 NRC Notified By: BRETT JEBBIA HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN	Notification Date: 11/01/2012 Notification Time: 08:20 [ET] Event Date: 11/01/2012 Event Time: 08:00 [EDT] Last Update Date: 11/01/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE	Person (Organization): LAURA KOZAK (R3DO)

Unit	SCRAM Code	RX CRIT	Initial PWR	Initial RX Mode	Current PWR	Current RX Mode
2	N	Y	68	Power Operation	68	Power Operation

Event Text

INTEGRATED PLANT COMPUTER SYSTEM OUT-OF-SERVICE OUTSIDE THE CONTROL ROOM FOR PLANNED MAINTENANCE

"Beginning November 01, 2012, at approximately 1000 [EDT], the Fermi 2 Integrated Plant Computer System (IPCS) will be removed from service outside of the Control Room to support installation of a Cyber Security Modification. The Safety Parameters Display System (SPDS) and Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) reside on the IPCS platform and will be out of service when the IPCS is removed from Emergency Response Facilities (ERFs). These systems will be unavailable to all Emergency Response Facilities (ERFs) for approximately 196 hours.

"By 1600 [EDT] on November 9, 2012 it is planned to restore IPCS, including SPDS and ERDS, to the Operational Support Center, the Technical Support Center, and alternate facilities. During this time dose assessment (Raddose) capability will only be available in the manual data input mode. The SPDS indications and Raddose remain

available to the plant staff in the Control Room, and will be used for emergency response, if needed. Information will be communicated to the NRC using other available communication systems as needed. A follow-up notification will be submitted when the IPCS is completely restored.

"This 8-hour non-emergency notification is being made per the requirements of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), as an event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability. ERDS previously reported out of service under event number EN 48451 ."

The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE ON 11/9/12 AT 2056 EST FROM BRETT JEBBIA TO DONG PARK * * *

"This is a follow up to EN #48468 & EN #48451.

"On October 29, 2012, Fermi experienced a failure of a data server within the process computer system which feeds data to Emergency Response Data System (ERDS), and EN #48451 was made to the NRC.

"On November 1, 2012, planned maintenance for Cyber Security Modification began which removed ERDS, SPDS, and IPCS from service, and EN #48468 was made to the NRC.

"On November 9, 2012, planned maintenance on ERDS, SPDS, and IPCS is complete, restoring full emergency assessment capabilities to all onsite emergency response facilities (EN #48468). The maintenance also repaired the data server within the process computer system which feeds data to ERDS (EN #48451)."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Lipa).

Power Reactor	Event Number: 48471
Facility: FERMI Region: 3 State: MI Unit: [2] [] [] RX Type: [2] GE-4 NRC Notified By: BRETT JEBBIA HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE	Notification Date: 11/01/2012 Notification Time: 15:35 [ET] Event Date: 11/01/2012 Event Time: 12:15 [EDT] Last Update Date: 11/01/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION	Person (Organization): LAURA KOZAK (R3DO)

Unit	SCRAM Code	RX CRIT	Initial PWR	Initial RX Mode	Current PWR	Current RX Mode
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2	N	Y	68	Power Operation	68	Power Operation
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Event Text

OFFSITE NOTIFICATION - OIL SPILL INTO NAVIGABLE WATERS

"At approximately, 1215 EDT, November 1, 2012, Fermi 2 experienced an oil spill to navigable waters, requiring notification of National Response Center, Michigan Department of Environmental Quality (MDEQ) Pollution Emergency Alert System (PEAS), and Primary Public Safety Answering Point (911). The spill has not left site. A fuel oil and water mixture overflowed from a tank onto the ground during the performance of station fire header flushing. It is estimated that the volume of the overflow was less than ten gallons. A portion of the overflow entered the site storm drains. The source of the spill has been terminated.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

Power Reactor	Event Number: 48487
Facility: FERMI Region: 3 State: MI Unit: [2] [] [] RX Type: [2] GE-4 NRC Notified By: JEFF GROFF HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK	Notification Date: 11/07/2012 Notification Time: 12:39 [ET] Event Date: 11/07/2012 Event Time: 09:21 [EST] Last Update Date: 11/07/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL	Person (Organization): CHRISTINE LIPA (R3DO)

Unit	SCRAM Code	RX CRIT	Initial PWR	Initial RX Mode	Current PWR	Current RX Mode
2	M/R	Y	68	Power Operation	0	Hot Shutdown

Event Text

MANUAL REACTOR SHUTDOWN DUE TO HYDROGEN IN-LEAKAGE TO STATOR WATER COOLING SYSTEM

"At 09:21 EST 11/7/12, the reactor mode switch was taken to shutdown and the main turbine generator was manually tripped in response to hydrogen gas in-leakage into the stator water cooling system from the main turbine generator. The scram was uncomplicated, and all control rods, except one, fully inserted into the core. One control rod stopped at position 02 and was manually inserted. The lowest reactor vessel water level reached was 125 inches, and as expected, HPCI & RCIC did not actuate. No safety relief valves (SRV) actuated. Reactor water level is being controlled

in the normal band using the control rod drive and reactor feedwater systems. All isolations and actuations for reactor water level 3 occurred as expected.

"The cause of the increased hydrogen gas in-leakage into stator water cooling is under investigation. At the time of the manual scram, all Emergency Diesel Generators were operable. All Emergency Core Cooling Systems were available and no significant safety related equipment was out of service. This report is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), as an event that results in actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) when the reactor is critical."

The MSIVs are open with decay heat being removed via steam to the main condenser using the bypass valves. The plant is in a normal shutdown electrical lineup.

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Part 21	Event Number: 48492
Rep Org: FISHER CONTROLS INTERNATIONAL, LLC Licensee: FISHER CONTROLS INTERNATIONAL, LLC Region: 3 City: MARSHALLTOWN State: IA County: License #: Agreement: Y Docket: NRC Notified By: CHAD ENGLE HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO	Notification Date: 11/08/2012 Notification Time: 10:11 [ET] Event Date: 11/07/2012 Event Time: [CST] Last Update Date: 11/08/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE	Person (Organization): GLENN DENTEL (R1DO) MARVIN SYKES (R2DO) CHRISTINE LIPA (R3DO) THOMAS FARNHOLTZ (R4DO) PART 21 GROUP (EMAI)

Event Text

PART 21 REPORT- COMMERCIAL GRADE DEDICATION NOT PROPERLY APPLIED TO BUTTERFLY VALVES

The following information was received by facsimile:

"While reviewing an order for a Type 9200 Butterfly Valve, it was discovered that some parts [shipped from Marshalltown, Iowa from 2009-present] had not been identified for Commercial Grade Dedication, These parts were considered Essential-

to-Function and were needed for the valve assembly to perform its safety-related function(s).

"[The vendor] then extended its review to all safety-related orders going back to 2009. This review confirmed that the failure to dedicate was not confined to Type 9200 butterfly valves. The beginning of 2009 was selected because [an audit follow-up was] performed in January, 2009. A key point of emphasis during the audit was commercial grade dedication, with a recommended outcome being the addition of guidance on commercial grade dedication with all new quotations. Therefore, the 2009 audit brought clarity and consistency in approach, that was not always applied correctly between January, 2009 thru October, 2012.

"It is [vendor's] opinion that while the affected equipment identified as safety-related was not properly dedicated, the failure to dedicate does not appear to pose an inherent safety risk based on currently available Information. The reason being that much of the equipment affected by [the vendor's] error were items such as mounting kits, wherein [the vendor] failed to dedicate the hardware used to mount the instrument (i.e., the bracket and screws), but did properly dedicate the instrument. Additionally, in forming this opinion, [the vendor] has taken into account that there are no known field issues with the affected equipment and all such possibly non-dedicated equipment passed the required standard testing."

U.S. nuclear plants affected include the following:

D.C. Cook; Millstone; Surry; McGuire; San Onofre; Indian Point; Palisades; Clinton; Peach Bottom; **Beaver Valley**; Cooper; Palo Verde; Brunswick; Hope Creek/Salem and Watts Bar. It is noted that numerous foreign facilities are also affected.

If there are any technical question, contact the Fisher Quality Manager (George Baitinger) : Fax: (641) 754-2854 or Phone: (641) 754-2026.

Power Reactor	Event Number: 48451
Facility: FERMI Region: 3 State: MI Unit: [2] [] [] RX Type: [2] GE-4 NRC Notified By: BRETT JEBBIA HQ OPS Officer: DAN LIVERMORE	Notification Date: 10/29/2012 Notification Time: 18:15 [ET] Event Date: 10/29/2012 Event Time: 17:00 [EDT] Last Update Date: 11/09/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE	Person (Organization): LAURA KOZAK (R3DO)

Unit	SCRAM Code	RX CRIT	Initial PWR	Initial RX Mode	Current PWR	Current RX Mode
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2	N	Y	68	Power Operation	68	Power Operation
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Event Text

ERDS LOST DUE TO PROCESS COMPUTER SYSTEM DATA SERVER FAILURE

"At 1700 EDT on October 29, 2012, Fermi 2 discovered a failure occurred with a data server within the Process Computer system at 0115 EDT on October 28, 2012. The failure of the data server affects data input to the server providing information to the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS). ERDS is currently not receiving updated information from Fermi data systems. This loss in capability is being reported as a loss of assessment capability in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii).

"Indications of related plant variables are available in the Main Control Room. The Visual Annunciator System (VAS) and other portions of the Process Computer system remain functional. Meteorological and process effluent radiological monitor indications are available and dose assessment capability is available. Fermi 2 personnel will use normal phone communications to update NRC Operations Center in the case of an event declaration. Information normally provided by ERDS can be transmitted via the notification system as described in the Radiological Emergency Response Preparedness Plan. Fermi 2 will notify the NRC when ERDS is returned to service."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE ON 11/9/12 AT 2056 EST FROM BRETT JEBBIA TO DONG PARK * * *

"This is a follow up to EN #48468 & EN #48451.

"On October 29, 2012, Fermi experienced a failure of a data server within the process computer system which feeds data to Emergency Response Data System (ERDS), and EN #48451 was made to the NRC.

"On November 1, 2012, planned maintenance for Cyber Security Modification began which removed ERDS, SPDS, and IPCS from service, and EN #48468 was made to the NRC.

"On November 9, 2012, planned maintenance on ERDS, SPDS, and IPCS is complete, restoring full emergency assessment capabilities to all onsite emergency response facilities (EN #48468). The maintenance also repaired the data server within the process computer system which feeds data to ERDS (EN #48451)."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Lipa).

Power Reactor	Event Number: 48542
Facility: PERRY Region: 3 State: OH	Notification Date: 11/28/2012 Notification Time: 10:50 [ET]

Unit: [1] [] [] RX Type: [1] GE-6 NRC Notified By: RICH PROUTY HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH	Event Date: 11/28/2012 Event Time: 10:19 [EST] Last Update Date: 11/28/2012
Emergency Class: UNUSUAL EVENT 10 CFR Section: 50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED	Person (Organization): ANN MARIE STONE (R3DO) CHUCK CASTO (R3RA) DAN DORMAN (NRR) JOHN LUBINSKI (NRR) JANE MARSHALL (IRD)

Unit	SCRAM Code	RX CRIT	Initial PWR	Initial RX Mode	Current PWR	Current RX Mode
1	N	Y	100	Power Operation	100	Power Operation

Event Text

NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT DUE TO TOXIC GAS IN RADWASTE CONTROL ROOM

"Entered an Unusual Event [under Emergency Action Level] MU1, toxic gas, carbon monoxide (CO), detected in the Radwaste Control Room. Levels rose to 34 ppm and the Radwaste Control Room was evacuated prior to reaching the First Energy exposure limit of 35 ppm. The source of the CO has not been determined. There is no radiation release from this event."

There were no personnel injuries and offsite assistance was not requested. There was no effect on plant operations. The licensee has notified state and local authorities and the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified DHS SWO, FEMA, DHS NICC and NuclearSSA via email.

* * * UPDATE AT 1504 EST ON 11/28/12 FROM MARIKIO BLOUNT TO HUFFMAN *
* *

" [At 1452 EST, the licensee] terminated the Unusual Event for MU1, due to toxic gas - carbon monoxide, detected in the Radwaste Control Room. The source of the carbon monoxide readings was determined to be from a leaking acetylene bottle. The acetylene bottle has been removed from the building. Carbon monoxide readings have returned to normal."

The licensee noted that the acetylene is detected as carbon monoxide by the toxic gas monitoring devices.

The licensee has notified State and local authorities and the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified R3DO (Stone), NRR (EO) Lubinski) , IRD (Marshall), DHS SWO, FEMA, DHS NICC and NuclearSSA via email.

Power Reactor	Event Number: 48544
Facility: PERRY Region: 3 State: OH Unit: [1] [] [] RX Type: [1] GE-6 NRC Notified By: RICK O'CONNOR HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO	Notification Date: 11/28/2012 Notification Time: 19:47 [ET] Event Date: 06/03/2012 Event Time: [EST] Last Update Date: 11/28/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: OTHER UNSPEC REQMNT	Person (Organization): ANN MARIE STONE (R3DO) JOHN LUBINSKI (NRR) JANE MARSHALL (IRD)

Unit	SCRAM Code	RX CRIT	Initial PWR	Initial RX Mode	Current PWR	Current RX Mode
1	N	Y	100	Power Operation	100	Power Operation

Event Text

DISCOVERY OF AFTER-THE-FACT EMERGENCY CONDITION (UNUSUAL EVENT)

"At 1930 [EST] on November 28, 2012, it was determined that a Notification of Unusual Event (NOUE) was not declared for an event that occurred on June 3, 2012, when an equipment failure resulted in a deposit of ion exchange resin onto the floor of the Radioactive Waste building. Subsequent radiological surveys indicated that conditions met the requirements for a NOUE in accordance with the Perry Nuclear Power Plant Emergency Plan.

"This report is being provided within one hour of the recognition of the undeclared event. As discussed in NUREG 1022, Revision 2, an actual declaration of an Unusual Event is not necessary. The Initiating Conditions for the emergency classification no longer existed at the time of recognition.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
