

To: Jim Mehl, ERU Supervisor
From: Zack Clayton, Rad Coord
Subject: May Monthly Report
Date: June 13, 2011

Beans:

Training:	0
Drills	1
Meetings:	4
Technical Assistance:	2
Public Assistance:	6

Web Page Hits: There were 16 page views for May

Coming Attractions:

6/1	Working Group/After Action
6/8	IZRRAG Planning
6/16	IZRRAG Procedures
6/27	NAS-T TTX planning
7/6	Working Group
7/11	URSB
7/28	NEPAC

Facility Updates:

Davis Besse Nuclear Power Station

Davis Besse operated at full power in May.

Perry Nuclear Power Plant

Perry started May in the refueling outage that began April 17 and stayed in the outage for the month.

Beaver Valley Power Station

A large parachute with a small container attached unexpectedly landed in the Beaver

Valley Power Station (BVPS) switchyard on 5/19/2011 at 11:30 A.M. This was determined to be from a large weather balloon. It hung up on an electrical line owned by Duquesne Light Company. There was no adverse impact to the operation of BVPS. Duquesne Light Company subsequently de-energized the electrical line, and notified Pennsylvania-Jersey-Maryland grid operator and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. BVPS personnel contacted the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and confirmed that it was one of their balloons. The balloon contained a small package indicating what to do if found.

The contact with NOAA was not related to any adverse BVPS condition (but merely a confirmation of who the owner appeared to be by the information attached to the balloon). There was no classifiable event associated with this, however, the station NRC resident inspector was informed of the event.

Beaver Valley Unit I

Beaver Valley Unit I operated at full power for May.

Beaver Valley Unit II

On May 4, 2011, Beaver Valley Unit II reported actuations of the Auxiliary Feed Water System (March 7, 2011) and the Standby Service Water Pump (March 15, 2011) in two separate maintenance related incidents while Beaver Valley unit number 2 was in their scheduled refueling shutdown.

These actuations did not result in any release of radioactive material, damage to reactor plant systems or injury to personnel. At no time was there any risk to the general public. See Event Numbers 46816 and 46817.

Fermi II

Fermi II operated at full power for the month of May. One operator failed a Fitness for Duty random test for drugs. See Event Number: 46825.

On May 22, 2011, at 1444 hours, the Fermi 2 plant reported a Technical Specification limit on the Inability to ensure safe shutdown due to degraded voltage on the off site circuits. The plant was in no danger as the onsite Emergency Diesel generators were available. See Event Report number 46874.

Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant

There were no reports for Portsmouth or USEC in May.

Activity:

- 5/4 Working Group focused on plant activities and Agency updates. After this the Davis Besse exercise was discussed and a final check of the items from the Dry Run were completed.
- 5/10 Davis-Besse Evaluated Exercise This went very smoothly and the new assessment area functioned properly.
- 5/16-19 Shaken Horizon Exercise for Natural Disaster/ Tech hazards went well. The exercise allowed a real test of 24 hour operations over a couple of days. Additional attention to the driving events in the sim cell would benefit any future repeat of this, as the field desk wanted specifics that were not available in the injects.

Office Issues:

NRC Reports and Statistics:

Operating power levels

Date	BV1	BV2	DB	Fermi2	Perry	
1	100	100	100	70	0	Fermi adjusting rod pattern
2	100	100	100	100	0	
9	100	100	100	100	0	
16	100	100	100	100	0	
23	100	100	100	100	0	
30	100	100	100	100	0	
31	100	100	100	100	0	

Information Notices

The ADAMS Accession documents are publicly available and will be accessible via the public web site Electronic Reading Room in the Agency Document Access and Management System (ADAMS), <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html> or to access generic communications files on the NRC Homepage: <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/gen-comm/reg-issues/2010/>. To access these documents use the ADAMS Accession number listed with the title. This is in the format of : ML #####

Fermi Power Plant Unit 2 Integrated Inspection Report 05000341/2011002 –
 ML 111220240

Information Notice 2011-11, Reporting Requirement For Heat And Smoke Detector Failures In 10 CFR Part 36 Irradiators, dated April 27, 2011,
ML 103540028

Davis-Besse:: Request for Additional Information for the Review of the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station - Batch 3 (TAC No. ME4640)
ADAMS Accession No. ML 111170204

Conference Call with the Nuclear Energy Institute and License Representatives Re: Transition of Non-Pilot Licensees to National Fire Protection Association Standard 805
ADAMS Accession No.: ML111250084

Summary of April 14, 2011, Meeting with the Nuclear Energy Institute, the Electric Power Research Institute, and Licensees on Transitioning to National Fire Protection Association Standard 805
ADAMS Accession No.: ML111101518

SUBJECT: CYBER SECURITY PLAN IMPLEMENTATION SCHEDULE
ADAMS Accession No.: ML110980538

DAVIS-BESSE HEAT SINK REQUEST FOR INFORMATION LETTER
ADAMS ACCESSION# ML11130A144.

Information Notice 2011-10, Thermal Issues Identified During Loading Of Spent Fuel Storage Casks, dated May 2, 2011,
Adams Accession No. ML 111090200

Bulletin 2011-01, Mitigating Strategies to Handle Extreme Events, dated May 11, 2011,
ML 111250360

Summary of May 2, 2011, Meeting with FENCO [sic] on proposed license amendment request to delete Technical Specification 5.5.8G –
ADAMS Accession no. ML111260284

FORTHCOMING MEETING WITH PETITIONER REQUESTING ACTION UNDER 10 CFR 2.206 REGARDING IMMEDIATE SUSPENSION OF THE OPERATING LICENSES OF GENERAL ELECTRIC (GE) BOILING WATER REACTORS (BWRs) MARK I UNITS BOILING WATER REACTORS

ML 11126A096

Beaver Valley Power Station: NRC Integrated Inspection Report 05000334/2011002 and 05000412/2011002
ADAMS Accession No. ML111330263

DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION – NRC TEMPORARY INSTRUCTION 2515/183 INSPECTION REPORT 05000346/2011011

ADAMS Accession Number ML111320341

FERMI POWER PLANT, UNIT 2, NRC TEMPORARY INSTRUCTION 2515/183
INSPECTION rEPORT 05000341/2011011

ADAMS Accession Number ML111320352

PERRY NUCLEAR POWER PLANT – NRC TEMPORARY INSTRUCTION 2515/183
INSPECTION REPORT 050000440/2011011

ADAMS Accession Number ML111320382

FERMI: NON-PUBLIC MEETING TO DISCUSS THE 2010 END-OF-CYCLE PLANT
SECURITY PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT OF FERMI POWER PLANT, UNIT 2

ADAMS Accession No. ML11133A378

Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit No. 1 - Acceptance of requested licensing action Re:
License amendment request to adopt technical specification task force traveler TSTF-
514, Revision 3 "Revise BWR operability requirements and action for RCS Leakage" –
ADAMS Accession no. ML111260591

Beaver Valley Power Station – NRC Temporary Instruction 2515/183 Inspection Report
05000334/2011008 and 05000412/2011008

ADAMS ACCESSION NO. ML111310328

Fermi FFD Letter 5/16/2011

ADAMS Accession No. ML111360307

PERRY: NRC SECURITY BASELINE INSPECTION REPORT 05000440/2011404 -
COVER LETTER ONLY

ADAMS Accession No. ML11138A222

Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 1 - Acceptance of requested licensing
action re: Relief Request, proposed alternative to system leakage test requirements –

ADAMS Accession no. ML111310561

Davis-Besse: Request for Additional Information for the Review of the Davis-Besse
Nuclear Power Station - Batch 4 (Tac No. ME4640)

ADAMS Accession No. ML11132A203

Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit No. 1 - Issuance of amendment re: License
amendment to revise Technical Specification (TS) 3.1.4, "Control Rod Scram Times," to
incorporate Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF) Change Traveler TSTF-460,
Revision 0 –

ADAMS Accession no. ML111050267

Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit No. 1 - Issuance of Amendment Re: License
amendment to modify technical specification 3.1.4, "Control Rod Scram," to incorporate

technical specification task force (TSTF) change traveler TSTF-222 –
ADAMS Accession no. ML11105A038

Fermi 2 – Scheduler Exemption from Certain Requirements of 10 CFR Part 73, Section 73.55

ADAMS Accession Number: ML111290359

Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2 and Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 1 - Acceptance of requested licensing action re: License amendment to revise technical specification 3.4.15 "[Reactor Coolant System] RCS –

ADAMS Accession no. ML111330318

Fermi Summary of the May 23, 2011, Open House Public Meeting to Discuss NRC Activities, Nuclear Power Issues, and the 2010 End-of-Cycle Performance Assessment
ML 111460552.

Summary of May 11, 2011, Meeting with the Nuclear Energy Institute, Industry Representatives, and Licensees on Transitioning to National Fire Protection Association Standard 805

ADAMS Accession No.: ML111430783

Information Notice 2011-09, Fixed Gauge Shutter Failures Due To Operating In Harsh Working Environments, dated May 18, 2011,

ML111370206

NRC approves spent-fuel storage increase at Beaver Valley

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission on Friday gave its approval for the Beaver Valley Unit 2 nuclear reactor in Shippingport, Pa., to significantly expand its spent fuel storage capacity.

The approval, which comes after a three-year review of the plant's request, allows the FirstEnergy Corp. plant to increase its underwater storage capacity from 1,088 spent fuel bundles to 1,690. The company will be allowed to "rerack" its spent-fuel storage pool and install higher-capacity racks.

"[Nuclear power] plants all over the country are doing this," said Todd Schneider, a FirstEnergy spokesman. "It's a stop-gap measure that's necessary because there's no centralized national storage facility."

Unit 2's storage pool now contains 945 bundles, each of which contain 264 spent fuel rods.

NRC, in its approval, said that there is "reasonable assurance" that "the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public."

NRC spokesman Neil Sheehan said that the agency's three-year review was fairly typical.

"Spent fuel is getting a great deal of attention because of what happened in Japan," Sheehan said. "But there's not a great deal of controversy about this one"

Mr. Schneider said spent fuel storage at the Japanese reactors was located above the reactors, which caused some problems.

"Ours are located at ground level in concrete and steel-lined pools in a completely different area of the plant," he said.

A nuclear fuel rod is as big around as a pencil and 14 feet long. Each fuel assembly or "bundle" contains 264 rods and each of the two Beaver Valley reactor cores contain 157 assemblies.

FirstEnergy replaces or "changes out" about one-third of the assemblies in each core every 18 months during refueling and the spent fuel bundles are placed in the pool where they are submerged under 23 feet of water.

The Beaver Valley Power Station Units 1 and 2, located along the Ohio River, 22 miles northwest of Pittsburgh, produce more than 1,800 megawatts of electric power. The two reactors at Beaver Valley power station went online in 1976 and 1987.

(Don Hopey, *Pittsburgh Post-Gazette*, April 30). – **AP**

NUCLEAR CRISIS: NRC chief defends evacuation plans, safety review (05/02/2011)

Hannah Northey, E&E reporter

The top U.S. nuclear regulator said today he doesn't support testing evacuation plans around the country's 104 reactors and refuted charges that his agency is conducting limited and secretive safety reviews.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission Chairman Gregory Jaczko said at a press conference hosted by the consumer advocacy group Public Citizen that he does not support conducting mass evacuation drills.

Ralph Nader, the watchdog group's founder, pushed Jaczko today on whether or not he would support such an initiative, but Jaczko said massive test evacuations would be very difficult and that utilities and state and local governments already conduct evacuation exercises every two years. Those exercises, he said, are a "reasonable" way of ensuring the effectiveness of evacuation plans.

"It's very difficult to try and do a mass evacuation as a trial basis," Jaczko said. "I think I would not really be supportive of doing something like that."

Jaczko also refuted accusations made by Rep. Ed Markey (D-Mass.), who said NRC is curbing the time and scope of a nationwide safety review of reactors and refusing to publicly release some results of that review.

NRC launched the review in response to the March 11 earthquake and tsunami that damaged the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant in Japan. The agency is conducting a short-term, 90-day "snapshot" of federal requirements, programs and processes. The short-term review will be followed by a longer review when more information is known about the Japan crisis.

In a letter to NRC, Markey said he learned federal inspectors were told to limit their reviews to analyze only events the commission had already contemplated in its regulatory requirements.

The House Natural Resources Committee's ranking Democrat said he had received reports -- without specifying where they came from -- that NRC was limiting the scope and depth of its review and could fail to provide sufficient information to assess or

remedy outstanding safety issues with U.S. plants (*Greenwire*, April 15). But Jaczko said inspectors are ensuring that reactors meet NRC rules. Findings that show otherwise, he said, are being recorded and will be made public.

"Our inspectors inspect against our requirements and our regulations -- that's all that they can ultimately inspect," he said. "I think sometimes that can be perhaps misconstrued to say that we're limiting what they gather."

<http://www.eenews.net/eenewspm/2011/05/02/3>

FDA and EPA Public Information on Milk

Link to NRC Actions on Japan Emergency <http://www.nrc.gov/japan/japan-info.html>

Link to NRC Fact Sheets and Brochures

<http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/>

The EPA website <http://www.epa.gov/japan2011/japan-faqs.html#test-milk> included the following as seen on Monday May 2, 2011:

Milk

Does EPA test milk for radiation contamination?

- As part of our efforts to ensure that there is no public health concern in the U.S. related to radiation exposure, EPA routinely samples cow milk at more than 30 stations every three months.

We are accelerating the regularly scheduled sampling for milk throughout the country to provide additional data more quickly in light of the Japan nuclear incident.

Why has EPA increased their milk sampling?

- EPA's existing milk sampling routine would have RadNet operators collect milk samples during the first week in April. Instead, our sampling stations across the nation will collect the samples immediately.

This action is precautionary, to make sure that we are gathering as much data as possible in order to inform our scientists and the public.

What federal standards exist that address radiation in drinking water and milk?

- Under the Safe Drinking Water Act, EPA has set maximum contaminant levels (MCLs) to establish limits of certain substances in drinking water, including microorganisms, disinfectants, disinfection byproducts, inorganic chemicals, organic chemicals, and radionuclides. These MCLs apply only to drinking water.

EPA's drinking water MCL for the radionuclide iodine-131 is 3 picocuries per liter. It is important to note that this drinking water MCL was calculated based on long-term chronic exposures over the course of a lifetime 70 years.

EPA samples milk for radioactive iodine helps ensure that the milk supply is safe for the public by identifying potentially contaminated milk. The Food and Drug Administration has set derived intervention levels (DILs) to assure that no one will reach a specific dose that would warrant protective actions as a result of a release of radionuclides. These levels also help the agency determine whether domestic food in interstate commerce or food offered for import into the United States presents a safety concern. FDA's DIL for iodine-131 in milk is 4,770 picocuries per liter. FDA's DIL for total cesium in milk is 33,000 picocuries per liter.

Is EPA collecting additional milk or drinking water samples?

- EPA will conduct a second round of drinking water and milk sampling this in April, which comes after EPA already accelerated its normal quarterly sampling efforts for drinking water and milk. This second round of sampling allows EPA to maintain an accurate understanding of radiation in the environment associated with the Japanese nuclear incident and share the most up to date data with the public. EPA will continue to collect precipitation samples as precipitation events happen and will continue to conduct detailed analyses of RadNet air monitor filters. All of this is in addition to the 24/7 near-real-time air monitoring our network provides.

The low levels of radioactive material in air, precipitation, drinking water and milk that EPA has seen since the Japan nuclear incident were expected. To date, all of EPA's sampling and monitoring results have been below levels of public health concern.

The FDA website <http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/PublicHealthFocus/ucm247403.htm> included the following as seen on Monday May 2, 2011:

The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has reported low levels of radionuclides in milk in the U.S. Is this a cause for concern?

At this time, there is no radiation safety risk related to milk produced in the U.S. EPA monitors milk for radiation under its RADNET program, and has reported extremely low levels of I-131 and Cesium in some milk samples. These results are expected and are far below FDA's Derived Intervention Levels. Even for a person who drinks a lot of milk, it would be virtually impossible to consume enough milk to approach the level of concern.

As federal and state agencies test milk samples, low levels of I-131 may be found in different samples, and the levels may vary slightly. However these low levels are not expected to cause adverse health effects, even for the developing fetus, babies, or children.

At this time, there is no public health threat in the U.S. related to radiation exposure. FDA, together with other agencies, is carefully monitoring any possibility for distribution of radiation to the United States. At this time, theoretical models do not indicate that significant amounts of radiation will reach the U.S. Please see www.epa.gov¹¹ for more information about monitoring efforts.

Activists win chance to contest nuke license

Printed Tuesday, May 10, 2011

By TOM HENRY

BLADE STAFF WRITER

OAK HARBOR, Ohio — Four activist groups challenging the relicensing of FirstEnergy Corp.'s Davis-Besse nuclear plant have persuaded a federal three-judge panel to let them have a seat at the table.

In a 65-page ruling, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Atomic Safety and Licensing Board said the groups — Beyond Nuclear, Citizens Environmental Alliance of Southwestern Ontario, Don't Waste Michigan, and the Green Party of Ohio — should be "admitted as parties in this proceeding" because two of their four contentions have at least enough merit to explore further.

The groups jointly petitioned the NRC to get what is known as "intervener status" for the licensing proceedings. FirstEnergy wants to extend the life of Davis-Besse by 20 years when the current license expires, allowing the plant to continue operating until April, 2037, instead of April, 2017.

The ruling comes in response to a March 1 hearing in Ottawa County Common Pleas Court in Port Clinton in which nearly every seat was taken.

Davis-Besse's relicensing process is at least a couple of years away from being concluded, according to the NRC.

To formally be recognized as an intervener, the groups had to convince judges they had found at least one issue that had not been fully addressed by the utility's massive relicensing application. Judges agreed with their contention that the region's potential for gaining more electricity through wind power and solar power warranted more study, especially in light of recent promise that shows a technology known as compressed air energy storage could be developed in the coming years to harness more energy from their sources for longer periods.

The panel also agreed FirstEnergy could do more work in developing Davis-Besse's Severe Accident Mitigation Analysis, a document required by all utilities to show how they would respond to any major nuclear accident that might occur at their plants.

The federal licensing board sided with the NRC and FirstEnergy on two other issues raised by the activist groups, ones that pertained to contingency plans for terrorist attacks and the potential meltdown of highly radioactive nuclear fuel rods stored on site.

Judges said they were beyond the scope of the proceedings.

Terry Lodge, a Toledo lawyer representing all four groups involved in the Davis-Besse proceedings, said activists with them have joined 45 other groups in calling on the NRC to suspend all license proceedings until more is known about what happened in the Fukushima nuclear disaster in Japan. "Many of the dangers we brought up in March that were disallowed by the panel have actually happened in Japan," he said.

Todd Schneider, FirstEnergy Corp. spokesman, said the utility filed an appeal of the decision Friday. "We will continue to follow the process [of the appeal]," he said.

The decision did not appear to be a decisive win for either side, although the activist groups accomplished what they wanted by being granted intervener status.

The licensing board said the groups met their legal obligation of providing enough evidence "to warrant further inquiry" as to whether wind power and solar power ever can

be viable alternatives if the compressed air storage technology becomes more developed. Judges said FirstEnergy and the NRC erred by assuming a single meteorological tower would be enough to gauge the interaction of lake breezes and radioactive fallout if a major release occurred.

The groups "have provided support indicating that a lake breeze might cause spatially varying air circulation in the area surrounding Davis-Besse," the panel said.

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The Toledo Times ®

More-than-expected damage found at Japan reactor

AP Associated Press

By MARI YAMAGUCHI, Associated Press – 2 hrs 16 mins ago

TOKYO – One of the reactors at Japan's crippled nuclear power plant has been damaged more severely than originally thought, officials said Thursday — a serious setback for efforts to stabilize the radiation-leaking complex.

Repairs to monitoring equipment revealed the new data, which also showed that the water level in the core of Unit 1 at the Fukushima Dai-ichi plant is much lower than previously thought, leaving the portion of the fuel rods still intact fully exposed. Other fuel has slumped to the bottom of the pressure vessel and is thought to be covered in water.

The findings also indicate a greater-than-expected leak in that vessel. Radioactive water pouring from troubled reactors has pooled around the complex, hindering work to bring the plant under control.

However, temperatures in the unit are still far below dangerous levels because the plant's operator, Tokyo Electric Power Co., continues to inject new water to keep the rods cool. That radioactive water is apparently then leaking into and through the larger, beaker-shaped drywell, or containment vessel.

"The situation (in the core) hasn't changed since (early in the crisis), and the fuel rods are being cooled by water continuously being injected into the core," nuclear official Takashi Sakurai said.

Nuclear Industrial and Safety Agency officials said the new data indicates that it is likely that partially melted fuel had fallen to the bottom of the pressurized vessel that holds the reactor core together and possibly leached down into the drywell soon after the March 11 quake and tsunami that struck Japan's northeastern coast.

While officials said it was unlikely that the chunks of fuel were still dangerously hot or that they could melt through the concrete base of containment vessel, they acknowledged that the level of damage could complicate plans detailed in April to bring the plant to a cold shutdown within nine months. Further examination was needed to ascertain the full extent of damage, they said.

TEPCO had adopted an unorthodox method of trying to cool Unit 1's reactor by trying to fill the drywell with water leaking from the core, but the possibility that chunks of melted fuel had fallen and damaged part the containment vessel raised questions about how successful this method would be. It also called into question the utility's timeline for

stabilizing the reactor.

"We have to revise the flooding method, as we need to re-examine the way we carry it out," Matsumoto said.

Recent temperatures inside Unit 1's core were at the most 237 degrees Fahrenheit (114 Celsius), well below the normal operating temperature of about 570 Fahrenheit (300 Celsius). Zirconium fuel rod casing begin to break down at 2,200 Fahrenheit (1,200 Celsius) and melt at 3,900 Fahrenheit (2,200 Celsius).

The new findings became available as workers fixed a water meter Tuesday after entering the building for the first time since a March 12 hydrogen explosion at the unit. The gauge showed that the water was at least three feet (one meter) below the 13-foot-long (four-meter-long) fuel rods, which are suspended in the pressure vessel. Some of the rods has melted away, however, and the chunks of damaged fuel are presumed to be sitting at the bottom of the vessel, covered in water.

The low level of water indicates that the core of Unit 1 had a bigger breach than expected, said TEPCO spokesman Junichi Matsumoto.

Cooling water has been leaking from the reactor cores of Units 2 and 3 as well, allowing an estimated 70,000 tons of contaminated water to pool inside the complex, which TEPCO has been struggling to bring under control for two months.

To prevent contaminated water from leaking into the ocean, workers in April began pumping it into a waste processing building while a system to decontaminate the water is set up.

The plant, 140 miles (220 kilometers) north of Tokyo, has a total of six reactors. Units 5 and 6 have already reached cold shutdown. Unit 4 contained no fuel rods at the time of the earthquake, but workers have needed to spray water into its spent fuel pool where still-hot rods are stored and structural damage and leakage are suspected.

The government on Thursday also delayed the announcement of a plan to ensure that TEPCO fulfills its obligation to compensate tens of thousands of people affected by the crisis. Prime Minister Naoto Kan said further discussion was needed.

Under the plan, a new fund would be created with mandatory contributions from electric utilities, including TEPCO, in case TEPCO's total compensation exceeds its financial capacity. The government could also add public money if needed.

TEPCO would be required to repay any money it uses from the fund. The utility has agreed to drastic restructuring, cost-cutting and other conditions in exchange for government support in the compensation scheme.

http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20110512/ap_on_re_as/as_japan_earthquake

5/16/2011

NRC EXITS MONITORING MODE FOR JAPANESE NUCLEAR EMERGENCY; CONTINUES TO SUPPORT U.S. GOVERNMENT EFFORTS

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission announced today it will exit "monitoring mode" and transition its response to the Japanese nuclear emergency from its 24-hour Operations Center to its Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR).

The NRC activated its headquarters-based Operations Center on March 11, 2011, in response to the events at Fukushima Daiichi in Japan. Since that time, staff from throughout the agency supported the U.S. government's response, including staff dispatched to the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo.

“The conditions at the Japanese reactors are slowly stabilizing. As conditions have continued to improve and the Japanese continue to implement their recovery plan, the NRC has determined that it is time to adjust our response,” said Executive Director for Operations Bill Borchardt.

A team in NRR will assume the responsibility of supporting the NRC staff members in Japan, the U.S. Embassy, and will coordinate response efforts with federal and industry partners.

Power Reactor	Event Number: 46803
Facility: PERRY Region: 3 State: OH Unit: [1] [] [] RX Type: [1] GE-6 NRC Notified By: THOMAS MORSE HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL	Notification Date: 04/29/2011 Notification Time: 13:29 [ET] Event Date: 04/29/2011 Event Time: 11:00 [EDT] Last Update Date: 04/29/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION	Person (Organization): ANN MARIE STONE (R3DO) JOHN THORP (NRR) JEFFERY GRANT (IRD)

Unit	SCRAM Code	RX CRIT	Initial PWR	Initial RX Mode	Current PWR	Current RX Mode
1	N	N	0	Refueling	0	Refueling

Event Text

OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO FATALITY OF A CONTRACT EMPLOYEE

"On April 29, 2011, at approximately 1100 hours, a contract employee was found unresponsive in a vehicle, off the road, inside the Perry Nuclear Power Plant owner controlled area. At 1120 hours, it was confirmed by the Perry Fire Department that the individual was deceased. Notification has been made to the Lake County Sheriffs department and the Lake County Coroner. The death does not appear to be work related or the result of an accident. A preliminary diagnosis by the coroner is the individual suffered a heart attack. The Lake County Coroner is conducting a routine investigation into the death.

"A press release is not planned at this time. The individuals name has not yet been released pending notification of next-of-kin. A notification to OSHA per 29CFR1904.39 will be made for this event.

"The plant is currently in MODE 5 (Refuel) for a refueling outage. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) as an event or situation, related to the health and safety of the public or on-site personnel, for which notification to other

government agencies has been or will be made. Such an event may include an on-site fatality. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified."

Power Reactor	Event Number: 46816
Facility: BEAVER VALLEY Region: 1 State: PA Unit: [] [2] [] RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP NRC Notified By: DAVID HASER HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH	Notification Date: 05/04/2011 Notification Time: 10:25 [ET] Event Date: 03/07/2011 Event Time: 11:18 [EDT] Last Update Date: 05/04/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION	Person (Organization): HAROLD GRAY (R1DO)

Unit	SCRAM Code	RX CRIT	Initial PWR	Initial RX Mode	Current PWR	Current RX Mode
2	N	N	0	Cold Shutdown	0	Cold Shutdown

Event Text

INVALID ACTUATION OF THE AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM

"On March 7, 2011 at 1118 hours with Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 2 in Mode 5 during a scheduled refueling outage an invalid actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System occurred. Instrumentation & Control (I&C) technicians were using a procedure to place simulated signals in two out of three channels of the narrow range level indication on all three steam generators (SG). During this activity, I&C technicians repositioned the input test relays to the test position on both channel 1 and channel 2 in two out of three SGs before inserting the simulated signals. This action resulted in a zero level input to the SG level circuits in two out of three SGs. An Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) actuation signal for the Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System was generated based on having a two out of three low-low level signal in at least one SG (starts turbine driven AFW pump) and subsequently having a two out of three steam generators low-low level signal in at least two SGs (starts motor driven AFW pumps). The AFW initiation signal resulted in a successful automatic start of both the Train A and Train B motor driven AFW pumps. The AFW pump discharge flow control valves were closed per procedure prior to this event, so the motor driven AFW pumps operated on 100% recirculation flow following their automatic start. The turbine driven AFW pump did not start since steam pressure was not present in the main steam lines due to the plant being in Mode 5. A Reactor Protection Signal (RPS) signal was also generated due to having a two out of three low-low level signal in at least one SG. The RPS actuation signal did not result in opening of the reactor trip breakers since the breakers were previously opened as part of the plant shutdown procedures. The reactor control rods had been fully inserted into the reactor core prior to this event. Plant operators took appropriate

actions to secure AFW flow after determining that the actuation was invalid and the issue was entered into the corrective action program for evaluation.

"The initiation of an ESFAS and RPS actuation signal, due to a SG low-low level signal, was not in response to any valid system or plant condition. There was no event, transient or condition that required any type of mitigation in Mode 5. Plant equipment responded as expected based on the conditions prior to the event.

The invalid actuation of the AFW system is reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) since it involved an actuation of a PWR auxiliary feedwater system train per 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B)(6). Per 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)(2)(ii), the actuation of the RPS due to a SG low-low signal is not reportable since the actuation was invalid and occurred after the safety function had already been completed (i.e. the RPS actuation occurred after the control rods had already been inserted in the core).

"Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), this event is being reported via this telephone notification, in lieu of a written Licensee Event Report, since the automatic actuation of both trains of AFW was invalid."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.



Power Reactor	Event Number: 46817
Facility: BEAVER VALLEY Region: 1 State: PA Unit: [] [2] [] RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP NRC Notified By: DAVID HASER HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH	Notification Date: 05/04/2011 Notification Time: 10:35 [ET] Event Date: 03/15/2011 Event Time: 17:16 [EDT] Last Update Date: 05/04/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION	Person (Organization): HAROLD GRAY (R1DO)

Unit	SCRAM Code	RX CRIT	Initial PWR	Initial RX Mode	Current PWR	Current RX Mode
2	N	N	0	Refueling	0	Refueling

Event Text

INVALID ACTUATION OF THE STANDBY SERVICE WATER PUMP

"On March 15, 2011 with Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 2 in Mode 6 during a scheduled refueling outage, the 'A' Standby Service Water (SWE) pump 2SWE-P21A automatically started at 1716 hours when electrical power was removed from the

Secondary Process Rack 'A' . The removal of power from the process rack caused pressure transmitter 2SWS-PT113A (Service Water Pump Discharge Pressure Transmitter) to read low resulting in an invalid automatic start of pump 2SWE-P21A. As a result of the automatic start of the SWE pump, the SWE pump discharge isolation valve (2SWE-MOV116A) also opened to provide a flow path from the SWE header to the main service water supply header. The SWE pump is designed to automatically start on a low service water header pressure (i.e. < 34 psig). At the time of the actuation, the service water header pressure was stable at 93 psig. This invalid actuation resulted in a successful start of the Train 'A' SWE system which functioned properly. Plant operators secured the SWE pump after determining that the pump start was invalid and entered the issue into the corrective action program for evaluation.

"The SWE system is required by the Beaver Valley Unit 2 Licensing Requirements Manual requirement number 3.7.5 to be Functional in plant operating Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4. The SWE system is not normally in operation and serves as a backup cooling water supply on a loss of the main intake structure. The non-safety related automatic start of the SWE pump on low service water pressure is provided to prevent an inadvertent plant trip on a loss of a running service water pump and is not required for the design basis event. The plant was in Mode 6 when the invalid actuation occurred. The automatic start of the SWE pump was not initiated in response to any plant event.

"This event is reportable 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) since it involved an actuation of an emergency service water system as per 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), this event is being reported via this telephone notification, in lieu of a written Licensee Event Report, since the automatic actuation of the Train 'A' SWE was invalid."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Power Reactor	Event Number: 46825
Facility: FERMI Region: 3 State: MI Unit: [2] [] [] RX Type: [2] GE-4 NRC Notified By: GREG MILLER HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA	Notification Date: 05/06/2011 Notification Time: 10:11 [ET] Event Date: 05/05/2011 Event Time: 15:30 [EDT] Last Update Date: 05/06/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 26.719 - FITNESS FOR DUTY	Person (Organization): MARK RING (R3DO)

Unit	SCRAM Code	RX CRIT	Initial PWR	Initial RX Mode	Current PWR	Current RX Mode
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2	N	Y	100	Power Operation	100	Power Operation
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Event Text

LICENSED OPERATOR TESTED POSITIVE DURING RANDOM FITNESS FOR DUTY TEST

A licensed operator had a confirmed positive for an illegal drug during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details.

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Power Reactor	Event Number: 46874
Facility: FERMI Region: 3 State: MI Unit: [2] [] [] RX Type: [2] GE-4 NRC Notified By: JIM KONRAD HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA	Notification Date: 05/23/2011 Notification Time: 17:03 [ET] Event Date: 05/22/2011 Event Time: 14:44 [EDT] Last Update Date: 05/23/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD	Person (Organization): JAMNES CAMERON (R3DO)

Unit	SCRAM Code	RX CRIT	Initial PWR	Initial RX Mode	Current PWR	Current RX Mode
2	N	Y	100	Power Operation	100	Power Operation

Event Text

SAFE SHUTDOWN OPERABILITY CONCERN ASSOCIATED WITH OFFSITE POWER CIRCUITS

"On May 22, 2011, at 1444 hours, the Fermi 2 Control Room was notified by the Central System Supervisor that the switchyard voltage for both the 345kV (Division II) and 120kV (Division I) offsite power circuits following a generator trip would not be sufficient to sustain operability of the safety-related loads. Technical Specification (TS) 3.8.1 'AC-Sources Operating,' Condition E was entered at 1444 hours. At 1535, both offsite power circuit voltages were at acceptable levels and the offsite circuits were declared operable. Technical Specification (TS) 3.8.1, Condition E was exited at 1535 hours. Abnormal Operating Procedure (AOP) 20.300 GRID was entered. The Emergency Diesel Generators (EDG) remained operable during the degraded voltage condition. The ability of the EDGs to fulfill their design function was not affected by this condition.

"The event is being reported per 50.72(b)(3)(V)(A), as any event or condition that at

the time of discovery could have prevented fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to shutdown the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition."

The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
